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Abstract
A multi-sectorial regime of protection including international treaties, conservation and 
security measures, demand reduction campaigns and quasi-military interventions has been 
established to protect rhinos. Despite these efforts, the poaching of rhinos and trafficking 
of rhino horn continue unabated. This dissertation asks why the illegal market in rhinoceros 
horn is so resilient in spite of the myriad measures employed to disrupt it. A theoretical 
approach grounded in the sociology of markets is applied to explain the structure and 
functioning of the illegal market. The project follows flows of rhino horn from the source 
in southern Africa to illegal markets in Southeast Asia. The multi-sited ethnography included 
participant observations, interviews and focus groups with 416 informants during fourteen 
months of fieldwork. The sample comprised of, amongst others, convicted and active rhino 
poachers, smugglers and kingpins, private rhino breeders and hunting outfitters, African 
and Asian law enforcement officials, as well as affected local communities and Asian  
consumers. Court files, CITES trade data, archival materials, newspaper reports and social 
media posts were also analysed to supplement findings and to verify and triangulate data 
from interviews, focus groups and observations.
Central to the analysis is the concept of “contested illegality”, a legitimization mechanism 
employed by market participants along the different segments of the horn supply chain. 
These actors’ implicit or explicit contestation of the state-sponsored label of illegality serves 
as a legitimising and enabling mechanism, facilitating participation in gray or illegal markets 
for rhino horn. The research identified fluid interfaces between legal, illegal and gray markets, 
with recurring actors who have access to transnational trade structures, and who also 
possess market and product knowledge, as well as information about the regulatory regime 
and its loopholes. It is against the background of colonial, apartheid and neoliberal  
exploitation and marginalization of local communities that a second argument is introduced: 
the path dependency of conservation paradigms. Underpinning rhino conservation and 
regulation are archaic and elitist conservation regimes that discount the potential for  
harmonious relationships between local communities and wildlife. The increasing  
militarization of anti-poaching measures and green land grabs are exacerbating the rhino 
problem by alienating communities further from conservation areas and wild animals. The 
third argument looks at how actors deal with coordination problems in transnational illegal 
markets. Resolving the coordination problems of cooperation, value and competition are 
considered essential to the operation of formal markets. It is argued that the problem of 
security provides an additional and crucial obstacle to actors transacting in markets. The 
systematic analysis of flows between the researched sites of production, distribution and 
consumption of rhino horn shows that the social embeddedness of actors facilitates the 
flourishing of illegal markets in ways that escape an effective enforcement of CITES  
regulations.
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appreciated	when	it	came	to	steering	through	the	muddy	waters	of	different	rhino	narratives.	
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Chapter	1:	An	unstoppable	pathway	to	extinction?	
	
	
“Only	when	the	last	tree	is	cut,	only	when	the	last	river	is	polluted,	only	when	the	last	fish	is	
caught,	will	they	realize	that	you	can’t	eat	money.”	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 American	Indian	proverb	
	
1.1	Setting	the	scene:	Where	have	all	the	rhinos	gone?	
	
The	days	of	the	rhinoceros1,	the	second	largest	living	mammal	after	the	elephant,	appear	
numbered	(Ripple	et	al.	2015).	Black	rhino	populations	in	South	Africa’s	Kruger	National	Park	
(KNP)	are	believed	to	be	declining,	and	white	rhino	numbers	are	likely	to	follow	suit	if	rhino	
poaching	trends	continue	(Ferreira	et	al.	2015:	16).	South	Africa	has	lost	more	than	5	000	
rhinos	since	poaching	surged	in	2008.		Some	conservators	give	the	African	rhino	species	
another	6	to	8	years	in	the	wild	(Interviews,	2014).	Thereafter,	the	pachyderms	might	be	
relegated	to	zoos	and	high-security	enclosures;	and	in	years	to	come,	possibly	to	the	annals	of	
natural	history	books	and	narratives	of	those,	who	shared	the	planet	with	the	rhino	at	some	
point	in	the	past.	The	rhino’s	prehistoric	ancestors	and	other	species	of	charismatic	
megafauna	have	gone	extinct	over	the	millennia	due	to	climate	change,	habitat	loss	and	
human	intervention	(Lorenzen	et	al.	2011).	While	these	factors	continue	to	impact	the	rhino’s	
chances	of	survival,	the	surprising	bounty	on	its	keratin-like	nasal	appendage	–	the	rhino	horn	
–	and	the	associated	illegal	and	gray	markets	constitute	major	threats	to	the	modern	rhino’s	
existence.	Extraordinary	regulatory,	institutional	and	military	measures	have	been	
implemented	to	save	the	rhino	from	extinction	and	disrupt	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn.	So	
far,	these	measures	have	failed	to	stem	the	tide.	The	aim	of	this	dissertation	is	to	analyse	
rhino	horn	market	structures	and	situate	these	within	social,	economic	and	political	structures	
and	the	broader	social	system,	thereby	explaining	why	measures	to	disrupt	flows	of	rhino	
horn	have	achieved	limited	success.			
	
																																																						
1	The	term	“rhino”,	the	shortened	form	of	rhinoceros,	will	be	employed	throughout	the	dissertation.	
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Of	the	five	extant	rhino	species	(see	Map	1),	the	black	rhino	(Diceros	bicornis)	and	the	white	
or	square–lipped	rhino	(Ceratotherium	simum)	live	in	Sub–Saharan	Africa.	Two	subspecies	of	
white	rhino	are	recognized:	the	northern	white	species	(Ceratotherium	simum	cottoni)	and	
the	southern	white	species	(Ceratotherium	simum	simum).	The	northern	white	subspecies	
were	wiped	out	through	poaching	in	their	natural	range	in	Central	and	East	Africa	by	2007.	
The	last	four	potential	breeding	northern	white	rhinos	were	moved	from	a	zoo	in	the	Czech	
Republic	to	a	rhino	sanctuary	in	Kenya,	where	armed	guards	protect	the	survivors	around	the	
clock	(Jones	2015).2	The	other	subspecies	–	the	southern	white	rhinos	–	are	currently	listed	as	
“near	threatened”	on	the	International	Union	for	Conservation	of	Nature	(IUCN)	Red	List	
(IUCN	2012a).	With	approximately	5000	animals	remaining	in	the	wild,	the	IUCN	categorizes	
the	black	rhino	species	as	“critically	endangered”	(IUCN	2012b).3	The	greatest	number	of	black	
rhinos	–	approximately	1	850	animals	–	live	in	Namibia.	Community–based	conservation	
initiatives	are	believed	to	have	led	to	positive	growth	rates	after	a	period	of	severe	poaching	
during	the	border	wars	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	The	Namibian	rhino	populations	recovered	
until	2014	when	24	rhino	carcasses	were	discovered	in	the	north-western	desert	regions	(New	
Era	2015).	In	light	of	a	further	81	illegal	rhino	killings	in	2015,	rhinos	are	facing	an	uncertain	
future	in	Namibia.		
	
South	Africa	is	home	to	about	three-quarters	of	world’s	remaining	rhinos	(Milliken/Shaw	
2012:	8).	By	the	1960s,	an	estimated	650	white	rhinos	were	left	in	Africa.	The	Natal	Parks	
Board	rescued	the	white	rhino	from	almost	certain	extinction	through	innovative	conservation	
																																																						
2	Scientists	were	hoping	that	the	move	to	the	rhino’s	natural	habitat	would	encourage	breeding.	One	of	the	two	
rhino	bulls	died	of	natural	causes	in	October	2014,	pushing	the	subspecies	closer	to	extinction	(Knight	et	al.	2015:	
13).		
3	The	IUCN	Red	List	is	the	world's	most	comprehensive	inventory	of	the	global	conservation	status	of	plant	and	
animal	species.	It	uses	a	set	of	criteria	to	evaluate	the	extinction	risk	of	thousands	of	species	and	subspecies.	
These	criteria	are	relevant	to	all	species	and	all	regions	of	the	world.	With	its	strong	scientific	base,	the	IUCN	Red	
List	of	Threatened	Species	is	recognized	as	the	most	authoritative	guide	to	the	status	of	biological	diversity.	
Within	the	Red	List	the	concept	“threatened	species”	is	used	as	an	overarching	concept.	The	following	categories	
of	imperilment	are	relevant:	
• “critically	endangered”:	species	face	an	extremely	high	risk	of	going	extinct	in	the	wild	
• “endangered”:	species	face	a	very	high	risk	of	going	extinct	in	the	wild	
• “vulnerable”:	species	face	a	high	risk	of	going	extinct	in	the	wild	(IUCN	Standards	and	Petitions	
Subcommittee	2010)	
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measures	in	the	1970s	(Player	2013).	Of	the	remaining	21	000	rhinos4	–	19	300	are	southern	
white	rhinos	and	approximately	1	700	animals	belong	to	the	black	species	(Milliken	2014:	15)	
–	between	8	001	to	9	290	white	rhinos	survive	in	the	Kruger	National	Park	(KNP)	(Molewa	
2015),	South	Africa’s	signature	national	park.	Roughly	one-quarter	of	South	Africa’s	rhinos	is	
on	private	land	while	national	and	provincial	parks	authorities	host	approximately	15	700	
black	and	white	rhinos	(Ferreira	2013a).	A	critical	tipping	point	in	rhino	populations	was	
reached	in	2014	with	rhino	deaths	outstripping	births	in	that	year.	At	the	current	rate	of	
attrition	(three	rhinos	are	poached	each	day),	rhinos	might	be	extinct	in	the	wild	in	South	
Africa	by	2022	(African	rhino	expert,	personal	communication,	2015).	With	the	exception	of	
Nepal	where	the	rhino	population	increased	by	21	percent	between	2011	and	May	2015	
(WWF	2015),	the	Asian	rhino	species	are	not	faring	better	than	their	African	relatives.	The	
Indian	or	greater	one–horned	rhino	(Rhinoceros	unicornis)	–	from	which	the	Nepalese	
population	stems–	is	the	most	common	Asian	species	at	an	estimated	3	350	animals.	The	
Javan	or	lesser	one–horned	rhino	(Rhinoceros	sondaicus)	and	the	Sumatran	or	two–horned	
rhino	(Dicerorhinus	sumatrensis)	both	count	less	than	100	animals.	
	
Map	1:	Global	population	numbers	
	
Source:	Save	the	Rhino	(2014)	
	
																																																						
4	Milliken	collated	rhino	numbers	from	IUCN/SSC	AfRSG	data	that	was	last	updated	on	13	October	2013.	In	2015,	
conservators	(personal	communication,	2015)	estimated	that	the	total	number	of	rhinos	had	dropped	to	19	700	
animals	of	both	species.	
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At	the	core	of	the	rhino	crisis	is	the	tenacious	demand	for	rhino	horn	in	consumer	markets.	
Powdered	rhino	horn	has	been	used	in	Traditional	Chinese	medicine	(TCM)	for	more	than	four	
millennia.	Carved	into	hilts	for	traditional	daggers	known	as	‘jambiyas’,	rhino	horn	was	also	in	
high	demand	in	Yemen	during	the	1970s	and	1980s	(Varisco	1989a).	Small	pockets	of	demand	
remain	in	the	Middle	Eastern	country	(see	for	more	detail:	Vigne/Martin	2008);	however	
consumers	cannot	compete	with	the	high	prices	offered	in	the	southeast	and	eastern	Asian	
markets	(Vigne/Martin	2013:	324).5		Another	centuries-old	tradition	relates	to	the	trophy	
hunting	of	rhinos.	The	resultant	hunting	trophies	are	exported	to	the	hunter’s	home	country	
where	they	are	kept	in	private	collections,	galleries	and	museums.	While	these	old	uses	
endure	to	lesser	degrees,	rhino	horn	is	increasingly	employed	as	an	investment	tool	and	as	a	
criminal	currency.	It	also	serves	as	a	status	symbol,	religious	or	cultural	artefact	and	gift	
amongst	the	upper	strata	of	Asian	societies.	The	horn	of	the	three-toed	ungulate	is	amongst	
the	most	expensive	commodities	in	the	world	(see	Graph	1).		
	
	
Graph		1:	Price	comparison	in	US	$/kg	of	rhino	horn	to	other	commodities		
	
Source:	Data	collected	for	this	project	in	Southeast	Asia	and	Bloomberg	Business	(2015)	
	
																																																						
5	In	fact,	the	recent	economic	crisis	in	Yemen	has	led	to	some	jambiyas	getting	sold	off.	Vigne	and	Martin	(2013:	
op	cit)	observed	that	Yemenis	appeared	more	guarded	and	avoided	showing	off	their	daggers	in	public	for	fear	of	
theft.	While	old	daggers	remain	in	circulation	and	a	remnant	demand	for	‘fresh’	rhino	horn	persists,	alternative	
materials	have	been	developed	to	replace	rhino	horn,	which	resembles	rhino	horn	but	is	cheaper	and	not	deadly	
to	rhino	populations.	Gum	and	some	secret	ingredient	are	used	that	provide	jambiyas	with	the	authentic	look	of	
rhino	horn	(Vigne/Martin	2008).	
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As	the	number	of	live	rhinos	grows	less,	the	price	for	rhino	horn	appears	to	be	surging.	
According	to	reports	from	northern	Vietnam	(Amman	2015a)	consumers	were	paying	
between	$	100	to	$	120/g	for	rhino	horn	bangles	and	prayer	beads	in	2015.	However,	
fieldwork	undertaken	for	this	project	in	Vietnam	in	2013	found	a	range	of	prices	between	$25	
000	to	$65	000/kg.	The	price	was	contingent	on	the	type	of	horn	(African	versus	Asian/fake	or	
real),	use	(medicinal	versus	status)	and	size/composition	(whole	horn/disks/powder).	At	an	
average	weight	of	5,5	kg	per	pair	of	rhino	horns	(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens	1991),	the	
horns	of	a	single	free-ranging	white	rhino	are	worth	close	to	half	a	million	Dollars	on	
consumer	markets.	Meanwhile,	the	average	weight	of	a	pair	of	horns	of	black	rhino	in	South	
African	national	parks	and	reserves	is	2,65	kg	(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens	1991:	102).	The	
current	poaching	statistics	provide	an	approximate	size	of	illegally	hunted	rhino	horn	entering	
illegal	markets	each	year.	In	light	of	South	Africa	losing	1004,	1215	and	1175	rhinos	to	
poaching	in	2013,	2014	and	2015	respectively	(see	Table	1),	a	minimum	of	4	tons	of	illegally	
and	freshly	harvested	rhino	horn	entered	illegal	flows	each	year.	In	addition,	rhino	poaching	
has	flared	up	in	Namibia	and	Zimbabwe	and	continues	to	trouble	safari	parks	in	Kenya	and	
other	rhino	range	states,	further	augmenting	fresh	horn	supplies.	Gangs	of	thieves	have	been	
stealing	rhino	horn	from	private	collections,	state-owned	stockpiles,	museums	and	galleries	
across	the	globe.	An	unknown	amount	of	previously	harvested,	even	antique	rhino	horn,	horn	
artefacts	and	hunting	trophies	are	either	in	circulation	or	safely	stowed	away.	Due	to	the	high	
value	of	rhino	horn,	entrepreneurs	have	also	developed	fake	or	‘ersatz’	horn,	for	which	
consumers	are	willing	to	part	with	substantial	sums	of	money.		
	
Rhinos	and	their	body	parts	were	among	the	first	species	to	be	afforded	variable	degrees	of	
protection	when	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	International	Trade	in	Endangered	Species	
of	Wild	Fauna	and	Flora	(CITES)6	entered	into	force	in	1975.		In	spite	of	the	partial	trade	ban	
and	various	other	conservation,	protective	and	security	measures,	the	illegal	hunting	of	rhinos	
continues.	The	Kruger	National	Park	(KNP)	and	several	publically	and	privately	owned	game	
reserves	have	become	‘battlefields’,	where	state	security	forces,	game	ranger	and	private	
																																																						
6	CITES	protects	about	5000	species	of	animals	and	28	000	species	of	plants	against	overexploitation	through	
international	trade.	Protected	species	are	included	in	one	of	three	lists,	called	the	Appendices.	Each	Appendix	
details	the	extent	of	the	threat	to	a	species	and	trade	controls.	Species	are	considered	for	inclusion	in	or	deletion	
from	the	Appendices	at	meetings	of	the	Conference	of	Parties,	held	approximately	once	every	three	years.		
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anti-poaching	units	fight	for	the	rhino’s	survival	in	the	South	African	bush.	The	South	African	
National	Defence	Force	(SANDF),	a	multitude	of	private	security	companies,	public	and	private	
intelligence	operatives,	law	enforcement	agencies	and	hundreds	of	NGOs	have	stepped	up	
measures	to	‘save’	the	rhino.	In	spite	of	all	these	interventions,	financial	donations	and	the	
increasing	militarization	of	responses,	more	than	5	000	rhinos	have	been	poached	in	South	
Africa	since	2008	(see	Table	1).		
	
Table	1:	South	African	rhino	poaching	statistics	(2000	–	2015)	
Year	 Kruger	National	
Park	
Rest	of	South	Africa	 Total	
			2000	 0	 7	 							7	
2001	 4	 													2	 												6	
2002	 20	 5	 25	
2003	 14	 8	 22	
2004	 7	 3	 10	
2005	 10	 3	 13	
2006	 17	 7	 24	
2007	 10	 3	 13	
2008	 36	 47	 837	
2009	 50	 72	 122	
2010	 146	 187	 333	
2011	 252	 196	 448	
2012	 425	 253	 668	
2013	 606	 398	 1004	
2014	 827	 388	 1215	
2015	 826	 349	 11758	
	
Source:	Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	(2014b)	&	Molewa	(2016)	
	 	 	 	
	
It	is	not	only	rhinos	that	are	losing	their	lives	in	what	is	described	as	a	“War	on	Poachers”	in	
public	discourse:	anti-poaching	units	have	shot	dead	dozens	of	suspected	poachers	in	the	KNP	
since	2009.9	As	will	be	shown	in	later	sections	of	this	dissertation,	the	increasing	militarization	
																																																						
7	2008	is	highlighted	in	red	to	indicate	a	sudden	increase	in	the	frequency	of	rhino	poaching.		
	
8	The	Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	(DEA)	is	responsible	for	collating	poaching	statistics,	which	were	
released	on	a	monthly	basis	until	2015.	Since	the	beginning	of	2015,	the	statistics	are	released	at	irregular	
intervals.		
	
9	Meanwhile,	a	Kruger	Park	ranger	and	a	police	officer	were	shot	and	killed	in	April	2012	in	a	“blue	on	blue”	
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of	anti-poaching	responses	comes	at	a	high	cost	not	only	in	economic	terms	but	has	also	led	
to	the	further	marginalization	and	alienation	of	rural	communities	living	in	the	vicinity	of	
conservation	areas.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Taken	at	face	value	the	regulatory,	military	and	conservation	measures,	as	well	as	demand-
reduction	campaigns	employed	to	safeguard	the	rhino	suggest	that	the	wild	animal	should	be	
one	of	the	best–protected	and	cared	for	creatures	in	the	world.	What	explains	the	failure	of	
regulation,	and	the	limited	success	of	military	and	other	interventions?	What	is	the	role	of	
markets	for	rhino	horn	in	this?	To	what	extent	can	a	sociological	understanding	of	the	illegal	
global	trade	in	rhino	horn,	and	an	analysis	of	the	mechanisms	of	the	market	help	us	
understand	why	these	measures	have	failed	and	continue	to	do	so?		
	
It	is	against	this	background	that	the	leading	research	question	of	this	dissertation	focuses	on	
the	resilience	of	illegal	wildlife	markets.	The	dissertation	explores	why	the	myriad	measures	
employed	to	disrupt	the	market	have	failed	to	protect	the	rhino	effectively.	A	theoretical	
framework	grounded	in	economic	sociology	is	applied	to	explain	the	structure	and	functioning	
of	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn.	It	will	be	argued	that	a	sociological	study	of	valuation,	
competition,	cooperation	and	security	in	the	illegal	market	for	rhino	horn	can	assist	in	
understanding	the	reasons	why	it	is	so	difficult	to	disrupt	the	flows	of	rhino	horn.	Central	to	
the	analysis	is	the	concept	of	“contested	illegality”,	a	legitimization	mechanism	that	actors	
employ	to	justify	illegal	economic	action	in	contravention	of	the	law	on	the	books.	Actors	may	
also	use	it	to	defend	the	exploitation	of	legal	or	regulatory	loopholes.	The	dissertation	shows	
how	contested	illegality	tied	to	the	valuation	of	the	rhino	and	its	horn	plays	an	important	role	
in	the	constitution	and	resilience	of	the	global	market	in	rhino	horn.	The	notion	of	“contested	
illegality”	is	further	unpacked	and	conceptualized	in	the	theoretical	framework	(section	1.3).	
The	next	section	provides	a	review	of	scholarly	research	into	the	global	trade	in	rhino	horn,	
identifies	gaps	in	the	literature	and	expands	on	the	contribution	of	this	dissertation.	
	
																																																																																																																																																																											
incident.	Five	soldiers	were	killed	in	a	helicopter	crash	in	April	2013.	In	May	2013,	a	ranger	was	accidentally	shot	
in	the	stomach	and	seriously	wounded	by	a	soldier	(data	supplied	by	Julian	Rademeyer).	While	the	death	toll	is	
comparatively	low,	the	emotional	and	psychological	burden	faced	by	those	formerly	employed	to	conserve	all	
wildlife	in	the	Park	and	now	re-deployed	to	“fight	a	war”	to	save	the	last	rhinos	is	immense	(Interviews	with	KNP	
officials,	2013).		
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1.2	Problematizing	the	resilience	of	illegal	markets	
	
Of	interest	to	this	dissertation	is	the	question	why	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	has	not	
been	disrupted	in	spite	of	regulation,	law	enforcement	and	other	methods	of	intervention	
such	as	demand	reduction	campaigns	in	consumer	countries.	Different	streams	of	scholarly	
literature	have	attempted	to	answer	this	question	through	distinct	theoretical	or	paradigmatic	
lenses.	The	sheer	abundance	of	papers	and	books	dealing	with	the	plight	of	the	rhino	seem	to	
suggest	that	we	should	have	a	clear	understanding	of	how	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	is	
structured,	how	it	works	and	how	to	disrupt	it.	This	is	however	not	the	case	(Nadal	2015).10	
Many	scholarly	and	policy	contributions	suffer	from	paradigmatic	convergence	employing	
either	anthropocentric	or	ecocentric	perspectives	(Shoreman-Ouimet/Kopnina	2015),	as	well	
as	ethnocentric	or	cultural	relativist	interpretations	of	social	facts	(Sitas	2014).	Scholars	who	
employ	anthropocentric	perspectives	centre	their	analysis	around	human	beings	and	social	
concerns	whereas	ecocentric	scholars	regard	the	ecosphere	as	fundamental	to	the	planet’s	
existence	and	survival.	Central	to	the	argument	of	this	dissertation	is	an	elaboration	of	how	
these	biases	and	interpretations	weaken	normative	claims	about	rhino	protection	and	
conservation.	This	dissertation	has	benefitted	significantly	from	insights	gathered	from	so–
called	gray	literature	such	as	position	papers,	blogs	and	technical	reports.		In	the	following	
subsections,	I	will	discuss	a	selection	of	relevant	scholarly	contributions	and	gaps	within	the	
literature.	The	net	is	cast	wider	through	the	inclusion	of	insights	from	other	wildlife	and	illegal	
markets.	
	
	
1.2.1	Rhino	horn	trade	as	a	poaching	problem	
	
There	is	a	noticeable	bias	towards	describing	the	supply	side	of	wildlife	markets	within	the	
literature,	as	many	studies	focus	almost	exclusively	on	the	first	segment	or	stage	of	the	supply	
																																																						
10	Roughly,	the	literature	can	be	divided	into	reports	aimed	at	influencing	policy	with	the	implicit	or	explicit	
suggestion	that	regulatory	responses	could	lead	to	an	disruption	of	rhino	horn	markets	(‘t	Sas-Rolfes	2012;	‘t	
Sas–Rolfes	2011;	Di	Minin	et	al.	2014;	Economists	at	Large	2013;	Eustace	2012;	Martin	2012;	Nadal/Aguayo	
2014;	Taylor,	Andrew		et	al.	2014),	papers	that	assess	or	suggest	responses	to	rhino	poaching	(Duffy	2014;	
Duffy/Emslie/Knight	2013b;	Duffy/St	John	2013;	Humphreys/Smith	2014;	Lunstrum	2014;	Massé/Lunstrum	;	
Mouton/de	Villiers	2012;	Lopes	2014;	Koen	et	al.	2014;	Eloff	2012;	Eloff/Lemieux	2014)	and	analyses	of	market	
segments	or	supply	chains	of	rhino	horn	(Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Montesh	2013;	Rademeyer	2012;	Swanepoel	
1998;	Milliken	2014;	Orenstein	2013;	Milledge	2007;	Ipsos	Marketing	2013;	Ellis	2013;	Ayling	2013).	
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chain	with	little	consideration	of	what	happens	further	down	the	line.		Scholars	thus	portray	
“poachers”	as	the	principal	suppliers	of	wildlife	contraband,11	ignoring	the	role	of	the	state,	
the	wildlife	industry,	NGOs	and	criminal	networks	in	the	overall	market	structure.	An	analysis	
of	actor	constellations	at	the	source	of	rhino	horn	and	the	structural	conditions	under	which	
poaching	takes	place	are	nonetheless	essential	to	any	sociological	study.	Criminologists	have	
set	the	tone	in	the	literature	on	wildlife	trafficking	by	describing	the	crime,	profiling	wildlife	
offenders	and	providing	instrumental	explanations	why	wildlife	crime	is	perpetrated,	such	as	
motivations	to	poach,	and	structural	or	geographic	drivers.12		
South	African	criminologist	Gerhard	Swanepoel	(1998:	8–9),	for	example,	examined	45	police	
dockets,	profiling	offenders	involved	in	the	illegal	trade	in	rhino	horn	in	the	mid–1990s.13	Back	
then,	close	to	80	%	of	the	offenders	were	of	South	African	origin	while	2%	hailed	from	Asia.	
According	to	rhino	crime	investigators	and	prosecutors	(Interviews,	2013,	2014	and	2015),	
about	70%	of	rhino	offenders	were	of	Mozambican	descent,	and	the	overall	percentage	of	
Asian	offenders	had	also	increased	during	the	active	research	phase.	Greg	Warchol	(2004)	
undertook	a	similar	study	about	ten	years	later,	focusing	on	the	transnational	illegal	wildlife	
trade	in	South	Africa	and	Namibia.	Although	observing	“hundreds	of	confiscated	ivory	tusks	
and	rhino	horns”	in	the	ESPU’s	warehouses	in	2004,	Warchol	regarded	the	threat	to	rhinos	
and	elephants	as	marginal	at	the	selected	research	sites.	He	linked	the	abundance	of	
stockpiled	rhino	horn	and	ivory	to	South	Africa’s	geographical	position,	which	served	(and	still	
does)	as	a	transhipment	node	for	poached	wildlife	from	other	African	countries	(Warchol	
																																																						
11	I	will	problematize	the	distinction	between	poachers	and	hunters	later	in	the	dissertation.	Suffice	to	note	here	
that	the	distinction	denotes	race	and	class	differences	in	the	southern	African	context.		
	
12	Mainstream	criminologists	have	shown	limited	interest	in	the	study	of	environmental	security	and	illegal	
wildlife	markets.	There	have	been	efforts	to	expand	the	boundaries	of	the	discipline	to	include	what	has	been	
termed	‘green	criminology’,	‘conservation	criminology’	or	‘environmental	criminology’	(Wellsmith	2011:	126).	
Each	sub-discipline	applies	different	theoretical	frameworks.	The	green	criminological	approach	offers	rich	and	
diverse	studies	dealing	with	problematic	human	–	environment	relations;	however,	it	lacks	“a	core	set	of	
theoretical	concepts	that	explain	the	meaning	of	green	and	green	criminological	orientation”	(Lynch/Stretesky	
2011:	293).	Moreover,	the	definition	of	green	criminology	per	se	is	contested	and	has	been	associated	with	
political	perspectives	and	a	“narrow	range	of	associated	issues”	(Gibbs	et	al.	2010:	125).		Scholars	at	Michigan	
State	University	have	developed	conservation	criminology,	which	offers	a	multidisciplinary	and	interdisciplinary	
framework	for	the	study	of	environmental	crimes	and	risks	“that	lie	at	the	intersection	of	criminology,	natural	
resources	and	risk	sciences”	(Gibbs	et	al.	2010:	129).	Central	to	the	Michigan	definition	of	“environmental	
crimes”	are	political,	cultural,	economic	and	social	influences.	
	
13	Swanepoel	obtained	45	dockets	dating	from	1992	to	1995	from	the	now	defunct	Endangered	Species	
Protection	Unit	(ESPU)	formerly	located	within	the	South	African	Police	Service	(SAPS).	
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2004:	62).	Poachers	and	traffickers	were	“individual	operators”	rather	than	belonging	to	
organized	criminal	groupings	with	abalone	traffickers14	being	the	exception	(Warchol	2004:	
63).	Noteworthy	is	the	observation	that		“unsophisticated	poachers”	struggled	to	locate	
buyers	for	rhino	horn:	“If	they	succeed	in	locating	a	buyer,	they	may	be	offered	as	little	as	US	
$	50	for	the	rhino	horn”	(Warchol	2004:	63).	The	question	arising	here	is:	How	have	rhino	
poachers	addressed	the	problem	of	finding	a	suitable	trade	partner	since	then?	What	has	
changed?	
In	2011,	Warchol	collaborated	with	South	African	criminologist	Friedo	Herbig.	The	researchers	
applied	the	routine	activity	theory	to	explain	the	poaching	problem	in	South	Africa’s	
protected	conservation	areas.	According	to	this	theoretical	approach,	crime	is	more	likely	to	
occur	when	a	motivated	offender	is	present,	a	suitable	target	is	nearby	and	the	absence	of	
“capable	guardians”	(Herbig/Warchol	2011:	5).15	The	assumed	rational	choice	considerations	
of	criminal	actors,	together	with	the	crime’s	situational	features,	and	“the	target’s	degree	of	
attractiveness	in	the	context	of	levels	of	guardianship”	(ibid)	are	used	to	explain	why	poaching	
occurs	in	some	places	and	not	in	others.	While	the	notion	of	opportunity	structures	is	useful,	
the	study	says	little	about	the	social	setting,	the	role	of	market	demand	and	how	poachers,	
traffickers,	and	traders	locate	and	trade	with	each	other.	Eloff	and	Lemieux	(2014)	examine	
how	criminal	opportunity	structures	develop	and	are	exploited	by	rhino	poachers	in	the	
Kruger	National	Park.	Conceived	as	an	extension	of	the	routine	activity	theory,	the	researchers	
propose	situational	crime	prevention	(SCP).16	This	approach	incorporates	an	intervention	that	
attempts	to	defuse	opportunity	structures	along	the	trade	chain	from	the	African	bush	to	
Asia.	Eloff	(2012)	uses	Geographic	Information	Systems	(GIS)	and	remote	sensing	to	plot	rhino	
poaching	incidents	in	the	Kruger	National	Park	in	another	study.	He	differentiates	between	
“organized”	and	“foot”	poachers:	
“The	organized	poacher	with	his	helicopter,	night	vision	and	technologically	advanced	
																																																						
14	Warchol	found	that	Chinese	organized	crime	groups	controlled	the	trafficking	in	abalone.	
	
15	“Capable	guardians”	refers	to	the	quality	of	game	rangers	and	supervisors,	and	presence	or	lack	thereof	due	to	
labour	laws	or	inadequate	budgeting	(Herbig/Warchol	2011:	13).	
	
16	Situational	crime	prevention	seeks	to	reduce	opportunities	for	particular	forms	of	crime	(Lemieux/Clarke	
2009).	Ronald	Clarke’s	theory,	which	he	conceptualised	in	1980,	has	found	resonance	amongst	criminologists	
and	practitioners.		
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rifles	receives	an	estimated	R12	000	per	kg	compared	to	the	unorganized	“foot”	
poacher	who	receives	an	estimated	R81	000	per	horn.17	The	final	buyer	will	pay	
between	$20	000	to	$60	000	per	kg,	depending	on	whether	it	is	a	black	or	white	rhino	
horn.18	The	“money”	circle	involved	within	this	criminal	activity	leads	to	various	
secondary	crimes	–	the	bribing	of	public	custom	officials,	the	illegal	issuing	of	poaching	
permits,	and	so	on.”	(Eloff	2012:	4)	
The	rational	choice	and	the	routine	activity	theories	stand	out	from	classical	criminological	
approaches,	as	they	do	not	focus	on	criminal	offenders	and	suitable	criminal	justice	responses	
only.	These	theories	consider	situational	features	and	the	target,	thereby	bypassing	critiques	
of	mono-causal	fallacies	(Brantingham/Brantingham	1993:	259).	Scholars	claim	to	explain	the	
complexities	of	the	crime	and	the	interconnectedness	of	offenders,	situational	features,	and	
the	target.	The	approach,	nevertheless,	falls	short	of	explaining	the	social	embeddedness	of	
economic	action,	non-economic	reasons	for	poaching	(such	as	defiance	of	the	rules	or	rule–
makers)	and	the	framing	of	the	problem.		An	advantage	to	most	criminological	approaches	is	
the	action-	or	policy-driven	agenda	underpinning	theory	building.	The	routine	activity	and	
situational	prevention	approaches	are	both	tailored	towards	offering	policy	and	criminal	
justice	interventions.	In	other	words,	theoretical	constructs	provide	advice	on	how	best	to	
respond	to	the	crime	at	hand.	The	action-orientated	approach	of	criminology	can	also	
constitute	a	shortcoming:	law	enforcers	and	regulators	are	targeted	with	immediate	and	
often	short-term	policy	interventions,	such	as	the	provision	of	additional	boots	on	the	ground,	
new	technologies,	and	military	equipment.	With	regards	to	illegal	wildlife	markets,	there	
tends	to	be	limited	consideration	of	the	overall	market	structure,	the	structural	drivers	of	
offending	and	the	question	of	demand.	The	theoretical	and	normative	objectives	of	such	
approaches	appear	to	overlap	with	the	policy	and	budget	objectives	of	law	enforcement	
agencies	and	the	military-industrial	complex,	which	calls	into	question	the	autonomy	and	
objectivity	of	such	research	(Abercrombie,	Nicholas/Hill,	Stephen/Turner,	Bryan	S	[1984]	
2006:	88).		
																																																						
17	The	website	www.oanda.com	is	used	for	currency	conversion	throughout	this	dissertation.	Oanda	offers	
historical	currency	conversions,	which	allow	for	a	truthful	reflection	of	the	price	of	goods	in	the	past.	Where	
appropriate	and	known,	historical	rates	of	foreign	exchange	are	reflected.	As	regards	the	current	quotation:	R	12	
000	approximated		€	1	120	and	R	81	000	was	worth	€	7	600	in	2012.	
	
18	This	information	is	incorrect.	According	to	data	collected	for	this	project	and	independently	verified,	buyers	
and	sellers	do	not	differentiate	between	white	and	black	horn	but	between	Asian	and	African	horn.	The	former	is	
highly	coveted	in	TCM	markets	due	its	potency	and	rarity;	consumers	are	hence	willing	to	pay	a	premium.	African	
rhino	horn	was	traded	for	25	000	to	45	000	$/kg	while	Asian	horn	cost	45	000	to	65	000	$/kg	in	Vietnam	in	
September	2013.	
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The	role	of	wildlife	professionals	in	illegal	supply	markets	is	omitted	in	many	contributions	
with	a	few	notable	exceptions:	Milledge	(2007)	refers	to	the	unregistered	stockpiling	of	rhino	
horn	and	the	laundering	of	horn	into	illegal	flows.	Milliken	and	Shaw	(2012)	and	Rademeyer	
(2012)	describe	permit	fraud	and	organized	poaching.	Beyond	wildlife	industry	professionals,	
there	are	myriad	NGOs,	private	security	companies,	and	the	military–industrial	complex,	all	of	
which	have	become	inextricably	linked	to	anti–poaching	measures	and	broader	conservation	
issues.	Their	role	in	creating	public	awareness	(a	“moral	panic”	of	sorts),	and	the	framing	of	
poaching	as	a	security	issue	has	been	largely	overlooked	in	the	literature.	Lunstrum	(2014)	
observes	a	growing	and	mutually–beneficial	partnership	between	public	conservation	officials	
and	private	military	companies	in	the	Kruger	National	Park.	She	refers	to	“the	use	of	military	
and	para-military	(military-like)	actors,	techniques,	technologies,	and	partnerships	in	the	
pursuit	of	conservation”	as	“green	militarization”	(Lunstrum	2014:	2),	which	has	“led	to	a	
conservation–related	arms	race”	(Lunstrum	2014:	7).	Duffy	(2014:	819)	argues	that	parks	
agencies	and	conservation	NGOs	are	“waging	a	war	to	save	biodiversity.”	According	to	
Humphreys	and	Smith	(2014:	795)	the	“rhino	wars”	have	led	to	the	“rhinofication”	of	South	
African	security.	The	anti-poaching	strategy	has	been	fused	with	“broader	issues	of	national	
security,	such	as	the	concern	over	South	Africa’s	borders	and	transnational	crime”	(ibid)	and	
the	persistent	legacy	of	apartheid	in	the	form	of	“white	exceptionalism”,	which	precludes	
broad-based	participation	in	wildlife	management	and	conservation	(Humphreys/Smith	2014:	
818).	Büscher	and	Ramutsindela	(2016)	extend	the	notion	of	“green	militarization”	and	
“rhinofication”	to	the	broader	concept	of		“green	violence”,	arguing	that	the	discourse	of	war	
and	violence	underpins	conservation	initiatives	in	and	beyond	the	physical	boundaries	of	
conservation	areas.	This	dissertation	deals	with	the	impact	of	the	conservation	‘arms	race’	on	
economic	and	social	structures.	The	“collateral	damage”	of	these	military	interventions	on	
social	structures,	such	as	village	communities	living	in	and	around	conservation	areas,	remains	
under-researched.	Moreover,	we	do	not	know	whether	military	and	non–military	
interventions	lead	to	the	social	reproduction	of	historical	inequalities,	stigmatization,	and	
alienation	of	village	communities,	who,	under	different	circumstances	and	framing,	might	be	
agents	of	change	and	disruptors	of	illegal	horn	supplies.	
What	is	known	about	poaching	in	the	broader	literature	on	illegal	hunting?	Scholars	face	
several	dilemmas	when	writing	about	poachers	and	the	act	of	poaching.	Von	Essen	et	al.	
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(2014:	7)	comment	on	the	difficulty	of	categorizing	the	motley	assortment	of	actors	involved	
in	poaching	and	defining	criteria	to	use	in	the	process	of	categorization.	The	scholars	
distinguish	between	three	main	approaches	that	have	been	used	to	deconstruct	poaching	or	
illegal	hunting:	“drivers	of	deviance”19,	“profiling	perpetrators”20	and	“categorizing	the	crime”	
(von	Essen	et	al.	2014:	1).	In	their	opinion,	the	existing	approaches	ignore	the	socio-political	
dimensions	of	illegal	hunting	“that	render	a	number	of	hunting	crimes	difficult	to	explain	by	
use	of	economic	and	opportunist	models	of	behaviour”	(von	Essen	et	al.	2014:	14	–15).	
Instead	of	stigmatizing	poachers	as	criminals,21	they	propose	a	systematic	examination	of	the	
socio-political	context	that	may	lead	to	illegal	hunting	(von	Essen	et	al.	2014:	14).	While	
																																																						
19	Muth	and	Bowe	(1998)	provide	a	comprehensive	typology	of	poaching	motivations,	which	includes	commercial	
gain,	household	consumption,	recreational	satisfactions,	trophy	poaching,	thrill	killing,	protection	of	self	and	
property,	poaching	as	rebellion,	poaching	as	a	traditional	right,	disagreements	with	specific	regulations	and	
gamesmanship.	
	
20	Using	interviews	with	state	conservation	officials	in	Kentucky	as	a	basis	for	classification,	Eliason	(2008)	
provides	a	motive	–grounded	typology	of	“backdoor	poacher/hunter”,	“experienced/habitual	poacher”,	
“opportunist	poacher”,	“trophy	poacher”,	“poacher	that	mixes	up	his	schedule”	and	“the	quiet	one”.	Some	
scholars	have	subsumed	these	categories	in	their	analyses	(Blevins/Edwards	2009;	Kahler/Gore	2012;	Filteau	
2012;	Pires/Clarke	2012;	Crow/Shelley/Stretesky	2013;	Groff/Axelrod	2013).	Others	focus	on	the	rural–urban	
divide	(Brymer	1991;	Jacoby	2003;	Ingram	2009),	trophy	or	sports	hunting	versus	subsistence	poaching	
(Parker/Wolok	1992),	opportunistic	versus	sophisticated	or	organized	poaching	(Ayling	2013;	
Warchol/Zupan/Clack	2003;	Brymer	1991).	While	these	typologies	provide	useful	analytical	tools,	they	allow	little	
flexibility	as	regards	categorization	of	actors	in	more	than	one	category,	actors	morphing	from	one	category	to	
the	next,	or	their	relationships	with	the	state	or	wildlife	professionals.	For	example,	actors	seeking	upward	social	
mobility	may	graduate	from	opportunistic	poaching	to	pre–meditated	organized	poaching.	In	the	African	
context,	a	continuum	(rather	than	a	typology)	of	subsistence,	opportunity,	trophy	and	organized	poaching	
appears	appropriate	(my	idea).		
21	Scholars	have	made	normative	differentiations	between	“good”	and	“bad”	poachers,	which	ties	into	the	
greater	debate	on	the	morality	of	hunting	and	gun	ownership.	In	Western	folklore,	the	notion	of	poaching	
conjures	up	images	of	Robin	Hood	and	his	gang	sneaking	through	Sherwood	Forest,	hunting	the	King’s	deer	in	
defiance	of	the	Sheriff	of	Nottingham	(Muth	1998:	5).	In	this	historical	context,	the	act	of	poaching	is	shrouded	in	
mythologies	of	resistance	of	the	weak	against	the	powerful	or	the	oppressed	against	the	oppressor.	The	myth	of	
“good”	versus	“evil”	poaching	persists	in	many	societies	to	this	day.		“Good”	poachers	are	socially	sanctioned	or	
accepted	by	their	community	and	law	enforcement	agents	(von	Essen	et	al.	2014;	Fischer	et	al.	2013);	“bad	
poachers”	are	perceived	as	morally	repugnant	and	hence	lack	social	and	institutional	legitimization.	Hunters	that	
engage	in	thrill-seeking	(Muth/Bowe	1998;	Katz	1988;	Forsyth/Marckese	1993),	trophy	hunting	of	protected	
species	(Eliason	2011),	organized	poaching	to	supply	illegal	markets	(Cohen	1997)	or	hunting	more	than	what	
they	need	or	the	use	of	unethical	hunting	practices	(e.g.	blinding	animals	with	bright	lights	at	night	or	
electrofishing)	lack	social	sanctioning	amongst	large	sectors	of	society	and	the	hunting	fraternity	
(Bell/Hampshire/Topalidou	2007).	The	poachers	themselves	may	engage	in	poaching	for	a	number	of	reasons;	
some	might	be	socially	sanctioned,	others	not.	Micro-level	justifications	for	poaching	range	from	the	perceived	
harmlessness,	through	to	necessity	and	reasonable	action	due	to	unfair	rulemaking.	The	normative	
differentiation	between	“good”	and	“bad”	poachers	reveals	not	only	what	is	acceptable	to	the	poachers	
themselves,	fellow	community	members	and	law	enforcement	but	also	to	political	and	economic	elites,	who	are	
responsible	for	steering	the	moral	compass	in	society	and	hence,	the	development	and	implementation	of	
wildlife	rules	and	enforcement.		
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observance	of	the	socio-political	and	socio-economic	context	is	indeed	overlooked	in	many	
contributions,	some	scholars	consider	socio-political	factors	influencing	compliance	or	non–
compliance	with	hunting	or	poaching	rules.	Kahler	and	Gore	(2012)	undertook	a	study	of	
stakeholders’	perceptions	and	motivations	to	uphold	wildlife	laws	in	Namibia.	A	number	of	
motivations	extended	beyond	what	they	termed	“cooking	pot	and	pocket	book”	explanations	
for	poaching	behaviour.	Some	poachers	were	motivated	by	rebellion	or	disagreements	with	
the	rules.	These	were	linked	to	negative	sentiments	towards	the	establishment,	governance	
or	benefits	distribution	system	of	certain	community	conservancies	in	Namibia	(Kahler/Gore	
2012:	115).22	Filteau	(2012)	found	that	the	interaction	between	game	wardens	and	poachers	
was	an	important	determinant	of	voluntary	compliance	with	conservation	rules.	In	studying	
motivations	for	illegal	fishing	in	Lake	Kerkini	in	northern	Greece,	Bell	and	colleagues	(2007:	
415)	portray	poaching	as	a	form	of	collective	resistance	and	“violation	of	the	cultural	
aesthetics	of	the	human-nature	interaction”.	Poachers	are	seen	as	social	actors	“with	group	
solidarity	forming	an	important	part	of	poaching	behaviour”.	With	the	aid	of	a	case	study	on	
the	illegal	protest-driven	hunting	of	wolves	in	Nordic	countries,	von	Essen	and	Allen	(2015)	
argue	that	illegal	hunting	should	be	construed	as	a	crime	of	dissent.	Instead	of	focusing	on	
crime	and	punishment,	they	suggest	that	the	onus	is	on	regulatory	agencies	to	better	
communicate	hunting	directives	and	garner	buy-in	from	hunters.	Von	Essen	et	al.	(2014:	14)	
thus	recommend	an	examination	of	the	setting,	the	legitimacy	of	the	legislation	and	
interactions	between	hunters	and	the	rest	of	society.	They	suggest	defiance	theory23	as	a	
theoretical	anchoring	for	this	approach.	This	theory	has	been	tested	in	the	broader	field	of	
criminology;	however	few	wildlife	crime	studies	(Bell/Hampshire/Topalidou	2007;	Filteau	
2012;	Kahler/Gore	2012)	classify	illegal	hunting	as	an	expression	of	defiance	or	rebellion.24		
																																																						
22	Kahler	and	Gore	(2015)	conducted	a	follow-up	study	in	the	north-western	Zambezi	region	of	Namibia.	The	
study	looked	at	how	human–wildlife	conflict	(HWC)	might	influence	the	valuation	of	wildlife	and	potentially	lead	
to	poaching	decisions.	The	study	revisited	inequitable	benefit	distribution	systems,	suggesting	broader	
community	engagement	and	nuanced	open	communication	and	messaging	with	local	communities.	
	
23	The	originator	of	the	theory	of	defiance,	Sherman	(1993:	460)	theorized	that	shaming	offenders	and	excessive	
deserts	increased	the	likelihood	of	reoffending	under	conditions	where	weak	social	bonds	to	the	sanctioning	
society,	and	perception	of	unjust	laws	existed.	
	
24	Resource	governance	and	management	scholars	apply	the	environmental	justice	framework	to	explain	why	
actors	operate	outside	resource	management	rules	and	systems.	The	case	of	abalone	fishery	in	South	Africa,	for	
example,	is	used	to	demonstrate	how	management	and	anti-poaching	responses	have	failed	to	suppress	abalone	
poaching.	Maria	Hauck	(2009)	argues	that	social	justice	principles	were	not	considered	when	fisheries	law	and	
policy	were	formulated	and	adopted	after	the	end	of	the	apartheid	regime	in	South	Africa.	Local	fishers	do	not	
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One	technical	report	(Fenio	2014)	in	the	broad	literature	on	rhino	poaching,	references	anger	
and	marginalization	of	communities	living	adjacent	to	conservation	areas	as	drivers	of	rhino	
poaching.	The	socio-political,	economic	and	historical	context	of	village	communities	living	
adjacent	to	conservation	areas	and	their	interactions	with	the	state,	conservation	authorities	
and	broader	society,	as	well	as	consideration	of	how	these	contexts	might	tie	into	
conservation	objectives	and	rhino	poaching,	constitute	gaps	in	the	literature.		
While	this	stream	of	scholarly	work	provides	important	empirical	and	theoretical	
contributions	regarding	poaching	and	supply-side	dynamics,	there	is	limited	consideration	of	
actors	other	than	poachers,	the	consumer	market	or	demand	for	rhino	horn.	A	significant	
contribution	is	a	critical	engagement	of	some	scholars	regarding	the	usefulness	of	military	
interventions	to	disrupt	poachers	(green	militarization,	green	violence,	rhinofication).	Others,	
on	the	other	side	of	the	normative	spectrum,	regard	rhino	poaching	as	an	act	of	war	(Gwin	
2012)	or	as	a	“matter	of	national	security”	(Sellar	2015),	linking	the	resilience	of	rhino	
poaching	to	insufficient	law	enforcement,	inadequate	legislation	and	unjust	deserts,	lack	of	
political	will	and	the	need	for	more	boots	on	the	ground.	Some	scholars	propose	the	
legalization	or	free	market	regulation	of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn	as	a	viable	option	to	disrupt	
flows.25	The	resilience	of	the	supply	chain	is	hence	linked	to	a	failure	of	regulation	on	the	
supply	side.	
Other	open	questions	are:	How	do	poachers	and	buyers	locate	one	another?	Or	formulated	in	
more	general	terms:	How	do	supply-side	actors	find	buyers	for	illicit	wildlife	contraband	in	
																																																																																																																																																																											
support	fishing	governance	arrangements	due	to	socio–political	and	cultural	factors,	a	top–down	process	of	rule-
making	and	implementation	of	the	new	fishery	management	system	(Raemaekers	et	al.	2011;	Hauck	2009).	In	an	
expression	of	unhappiness	with	the	status	quo	and	the	quest	for	environmental	and	social	justice,	fishers	catch	
protected	species	of	fish	in	protected	areas	or	exceed	their	quotas.	In	order	to	satisfy	scientific	and	conservation	
agendas,	the	state	often	pays	little	attention	to	the	needs	of	local	people	living	in	or	near	conservation	areas.		
	
25	Several	scholars	offer	a	pro-trade	stance	in	peer-reviewed	journals	(Child	2012;	Conrad	2012;	Moyle	2013;	
Biggs	et	al.	2013;	Di	Minin	et	al.	2014),	technical	reports	(‘t	Sas–Rolfes	2011;	Martin	2012;	Ferreira/Pfab/Knight	
2014;	Vigne	2013)	and	grey	literature	(Eustace	2012;	‘t	Sas-Rolfes	2012).	The	surge	in	rhino	poaching	is	
frequently	linked	to	the	trade	ban.	Trade	in	horn	(and	other	wildlife	products)	is	suggested	as	a	viable	policy	
option	to	save	the	rhino	from	extinction.	Proponents	of	this	approach	offer	different	trade	models,	such	as	legal	
trade	through	a	central	selling	organization	(Martin	2012),	through	‘futures	trading’	(Interview	with	pro-trade	
activist,	2013)	or	once-off	auctions	(Msimang	2012).	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	is	the	anti-trade	faction,	
whose	stance	and	associated	remedial	policies	differ	in	levels	of	persuasion,	explanation	and	alternative	
strategies	offered	(Examples	include:	Scholtz	2012;	Nadal/Aguayo	2014;	Collins,	A./Fraser,	G./Snowball,	J.	2013;	
Mason/Bulte/Horan	2012).	
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overseas	markets?	And	vice	versa	(should	the	market	be	demand-driven):	How	does	the	
prospective	buyer	of	an	illicit	good	pinpoint	a	supplier	living	on	another	continent?	What	are	
the	roles	and	functions	of	other	actors	at	the	point	of	supply?		Is	the	contestation	of	rules	and	
rule-makers	an	issue	only	at	the	supply-end	of	the	market?	This	dissertation	aims	to	address	
these	open	questions.	
	
1.2.2	Rhino	horn	trade	as	a	transnational	organized	supply	chain	
	
Another	stream	of	literature	describes	rhino	horn	trade	as	a	“global	supply	chain”	or	“global	
production	chain”	that	is	demand–driven	and	dominated	by	organized	crime	networks.			
Australian	criminologist	Ayling	(2013)	provides	a	nuanced	structure	of	this	global	supply	chain.	
She	subsumes	poaching	and	organized	crime	networks	under	the	category	of	“harvesting	
networks”.	Ayling’s	classification	also	includes	theft	networks	that	obtain	rhino	horn	through	
theft	from	public	and	private	stockpiles.	Both	harvesting	and	theft	networks	are	linked	to	
distribution	networks	that	distribute	rhino	horn	to	consumers.	She	attributes	the	resilience26	
of	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain	to	the	inherent	features	of	criminal	networks	and	the	
operational	environment	they	operate	in.	Environmental	factors	that	facilitate	resilience	
include	“non-	or	partial	implementation	of	rules”,	“social	norms	that	contradict	the	rules”	and	
“the	existence	of	complex	or	ambiguous	rules	and	corruption”	(Ayling	2013:	76	–77).	She	
identifies	gaps	in	knowledge	gaps	with	regards	to	how	actors	find	each	other	and	proceed	to	
establish	trust–based	relationships	and	how	they	communicate	and	trade	across	national	
borders	(Ayling	2013:	75).	The	question	arising	here	is	whether	these	relationships	are	
necessarily	reliant	on	trust;	or	whether	a	healthy	dose	of	distrust,	as	suggested	by	Gambetta	
(1988b:	166)	in	his	analysis	of	the	Sicilian	mafia,	accompanied	by	secrecy,	duplicity,	
intelligence	sharing	and	betrayal,	characterize	such	relationships.	
The	question	of	whether	rhino	horn	poaching	in	specific	and	illegal	wildlife	markets	in	general,	
constitute	a	form	of	organized	crime27	or	whether	organized	crime	networks	are	the	main	
																																																						
26	Ayling	(2013:	69)	attributes	two	capacities	to	the	concept	of	resilience,	namely	“the	ability	to	absorb	and	
thereby	withstand	disruption”	and	“to	adapt,	when	necessary,	to	changes	arising	from	that	disruption”.	
	
27	The	concept	of	‘organized	crime’	is	contested.	I	will	problematize	this	in	later	sections	of	the	dissertation.	
Suffice	to	mention	here	that	the	term	is	used	interchangeably	to	depict	a	group	of	actors	or	criminal	activity.	
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players,	is	a	contested	issue	in	the	literature.	Ayling	is	somewhat	ambiguous	in	her	analysis,	
citing	an	authoritative	report	produced	by	Milliken	and	Shaw	(2012)	for	the	trade	monitoring	
network	TRAFFIC.	The	researchers	provide	a	detailed	description	of	South	African	actors	
involved	in	the	supply	chain	between	South	Africa	and	Vietnam	and	the	consumer	market	in	
Vietnam.	According	to	them,	“the	organization	and	planning	of	South	Africa’s	rhino	horn	trade	
has	rapidly	evolved	into	a	sophisticated	and	efficient	phenomenon”	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	76).	
The	assertion	that	multinational	crime	syndicates	specializing	in	a	bouquet	of	related	illicit	
trades28	have	moved	into	the	lucrative	trade	in	rhino	horn	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	12),	is	not	
further	explained	or	referenced	in	the	report.	Milliken	and	Shaw	proffer	a	hierarchical	
structure	of	the	levels	of	organized	crime	involved	in	the	rhino	horn	trade	(see	Graph	2).29		
	
Graph		2:	Structure	of	rhino	horn	conduits	
	
	Source:	adapted	from	Milliken	and	Shaw	(2012:	61	and	78)	and	data	provided	by	South	African	law	enforcement	
officials	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																																											
		
28	These	illicit	trades	include	drug	and	diamond	smuggling,	human	trafficking	and	economic	exchange	of	other	
wildlife	products	like	elephant	ivory	and	abalone.	
	
29	The	‘levels’	pyramid	reflects	the	thinking	of	South	African	law	enforcement	agencies	such	as	the	Directorate	
for	Priority	Crime	Investigations	(DPCI)	and	the	National	Wildlife	Crime	Reaction	Unit	(NWCRU).	
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It	is	suggested	that	local,	national	and	international	levels	of	organized	crime	manage	the	
transnational	trade	chain,	of	which	the	highest	level	“invariably	comprised	Asian	individuals”	
(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	62).		Montesh	(2013:	19)	also	points	to	the	role	of	African–based	Asian	
syndicate	leaders	in	the	supply	chain,	suggesting	links	to	organized	crime	groups	such	as	the	
Chinese	Triads	already	resident	in	South	Africa.	It	remains	unclear	how	the	different	levels	of	
organized	crime	are	connected	to	one	another.	Milliken	(2014:	18)	explains	in	a	subsequent	
TRAFFIC	report	that	Level	4	operatives	(international	exporter,	buyer	or	courier	as	per	Graph	
2)	are	“African-based	Asian	operatives	with	permanent	resident	or	long-term	status	within	
key	countries	such	as	South	Africa”.	These	operatives	associate	with	corrupt	actors	within	the	
private	sector	and	state.	They	are	highly	mobile	and	well-financed,	which	allows	them	to	
travel	in	the	southern	African	regions	and	Asia	to	set	up	deals	(Milliken	2014:	18).	While	not	
further	explained,	the	implicit	suggestion	is	that	the	Level	4	operatives	fulfill	a	bridging	
function	between	poachers	and	buyers	by	way	of	cooperative	alliances	and	corruption.	
Milliken’s	contribution	is	thus	the	acknowledgment	of	the	existence	of	an	interface	between	
illegality	and	legality	(the	significance	of	the	interface	is	explained	in	the	next	section)	and	the	
use	of	corruption	by	criminal	players	to	ensure	the	continued	flow	of	rhino	horn	from	the	
source	to	the	market.	Investigative	journalist	Julian	Rademeyer	(2012)30	supports	the	notion	
of	a	hierarchical	structure	underpinning	organized	rhino	and	wildlife	trafficking	networks	but	
he	also	points	to	the	flexibility	and	changeability	of	the	overall	network	structure	and	its	
components.	Rademeyer	tracked	down	the	“Pablo	Escobar	of	animal	trafficking”,	Laotian	
national	Vixay	Keosavang,	who	is	believed	to	head	the	Xayasavang	network.31	The	kingpin	
“remained	in	the	shadows,	a	distant	puppet–master	reaping	the	rewards	of	the	killing	but	
rarely	dirtying	his	own	hands”	(Rademeyer	2014b).	He	explains	the	resilience	of	the	
Xayasavang	network	by	way	of	Keosavang’s	arms-length	approach	to	running	the	network,	
protection	from	arrest	by	Laotian	law	enforcement	officials	and	huge	financial	resources	as	
compared	to	the	lesser	resources	of	law	enforcement	agencies,	bureaucratic	red–tape	and	
“investigations	[that]	stop	where	borders	start”.	Hendrik	and	Elise	Daffue	(2013)	provide	a	
																																																						
30	Rademeyer	researched	the	illegal	rhino	horn	trade	over	a	2-year	period,	culminating	in	the	publication	of	his	
non–fiction	book	Killing	for	Profit:	Exposing	the	illegal	rhino	horn	trade	in	2012.	
	
31	US	authorities	issued	a	one	million	Dollar	reward	for	information	leading	to	the	dismantling	of	the	network	in	
2013	(Kerry	2013).	The	criminal	network	was	involved	in	a	clever	scam,	which	involved	the	falsification	of	hunting	
permits.	The	scheme	will	be	discussed	in	later	sections	of	the	dissertation.	
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nuanced	structure	of	the	global	trade	chain	(see	Graph	3)	in	a	newsletter	publication	of	a	
rhino	conservation	NGO	(for	more	details	see:	Daffue	2013).	The	newsletter	provides	a	
detailed	analysis	of	the	composition	of	rhino	poaching	groups	and	their	modus	operandi,	
dealing	with	what	is	termed	the	“collection”	stage	of	the	supply	chain	in	the	graph.	The	
authors	provide	no	further	explanations	as	to	the	mechanisms	that	connect	the	‘collection’	
stage	to	the	subsequent	segments	of	the	horn	conduits,	other	than	the	sidebar	“some	leaders	
have	links	directly	into	Mozambique”.	
	
The	stated	role	of	organized	crime	in	rhino	and	wildlife	crimes	echoes	the	sentiments	of	
several	organized	crime	scholars	and	high-level	practitioners	(Sellar	2008;	Bennett	2012;	
UNODC	2010;	Nellemann	et	al.	2014;	Gosling/Reitano/Shaw	2014;	Felbab-Brown	2011).	These	
experts	see	transnational	organized	criminals	increasingly	entering	the	illegal	wildlife	trade	as	
a	“low-risk	and	high-reward	activity”	(Cook/Roberts	2002:	4).		
	
Graph		3:	Structure	of	organized	rhino	horn	networks	
		
Source:	Hendrik	and	Elise	Daffue	(2013)	
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Retired	CITES	law	enforcement	official	John	M.	Sellar	(2014c:	2)	notes	the	ability	of	organized	
crime	networks	to	innovate	and	to	venture	into	new	commodities,	territories	and	markets	–	
he	believes	that	the	trade	in	endangered	species	offers	a	lucrative	new	business	opportunity.	
Links	to	terrorist	and	rebel	groupings	have	also	been	suggested,	especially	in	relation	to	
elephant	poaching	and	ivory	trafficking	in	East	Africa	(Lopes	2014;	Cardamone	2012;	Levey	
2007;	Brooke	Darby	2014;	Vira/Ewing	2014).	Vira	and	Ewing	(2014:	3)	argue:		
	
“At	the	most	macro	level,	the	ivory	trade	is	essentially	a	large-scale	illicit	resource	
transfer	from	Africa	to	Asia;	on	the	ground,	however,	ivory	is	bush	currency	for	
militants,	militias,	and	terrorists,	and	one	of	the	most	valuable	pieces	of	illicit	
contraband	for	organized	criminals	and	corrupt	elites.”		
	
	
Organized	crime	scholars	and	practitioners	look	at	the	structure	and	composition	of	organized	
crime	to	provide	answers	as	to	why	this	group	of	actors	is	difficult	to	disrupt.	Within	the	
literature	four	models	of	organized	crime	have	been	suggested	(Standing	2006:	71–77):	the	
bureaucratic,	network,	clan	or	mafia,	and	business	model.	The	bureaucratic	model	(Cressey	
1969)	tallies	with	Max	Weber’s	understanding	of	a	rational	bureaucracy	(Weber	[1921]	1972:	
551–579).		Social	order	is	achieved	through	rules	and	planning,	a	hierarchical	award	structure,	
a	predetermined	contract	setting	out	norms	and	rules	of	engagement,	and	areas	of	
specialization.	According	to	the	network	model	(Chambliss	1988;	Williams	1998),	actors	
pursue	a	flat,	flexible	and	informal	approach	to	coordinating	criminal	activities.	Shared	
economic	objectives	are	achieved	through	relationships	based	on	trust	while	mutual	
dependency	operates	as	the	central	coordinating	mechanism	(Standing	2006:	72–73).	
Networks	are	formed	through	introductions	and	shared	connections,	which	complements	
Granovetter’s	theory	on	the	strength	of	weak	ties	(Granovetter	1983).32	Paoli	(2001)	has	
devised	the	‘clan’	model	of	organized	crime.	Family	and	kinship	ties	determine	membership	
while	group	loyalty	and	solidarity	are	the	central	coordinating	mechanisms.	According	to	the	
‘business’	or	‘enterprise’	model	of	organized	crime	(Reuter	1985;	Schelling	1967;	Schelling	
1978),	rational	economic	actors	coordinate	criminal	activities	on	the	basis	of	cost/benefit	
																																																						
32	Granovetter	(1983:	1378)	argues	that	weak	ties	are	essential	to	an	individual’s	opportunities	and	integration	
into	communities	while	strong	ties	lead	to	local	cohesion	but	overall	fragmentation.	I	will	return	to	Granovetter’s	
assumptions	in	the	next	section.		
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calculations.33		Market	forces	are	believed	to	shape	the	coordination	and	organization	of	
crime.	In	direct	contradiction	of	the	other	three	models,	Reuter	(1985)	argues	that	‘organized	
crime’	seldom	achieves	monopoly	control	in	illegal	markets	due	to	economic	forces	including	
economies	of	scale,	and	peculiarities	to	illegal	markets	(such	as	legally	unenforceable	
contracts).	According	to	Reuter,	organized	crime	may	make	use	of	violence	to	increase	its	
market	share	in	illegal	markets;	however,	the	use	or	threat	of	violence	comes	with	its	own	
potential	pitfalls	such	as	competition	by	other	violent	groups	or	unwanted	attention	from	law	
enforcers	(Reuter	1985:	20–21).	Both	elements	–	the	use	or	threat	of	violence	and	
competition	–	constitute	important	analytical	considerations	in	understanding	illegal	markets	
and	hence	deserve	further	attention	in	the	section	on	theoretical	framing	(discussed	in	the	
next	section).		
	
Cost/benefit	calculations	constitute	explicit	rational	choice	assumptions	of	the	business	model	
34	-	the	other	models	are	however	also	steeped	in	rational	choice	assumptions.	Scholars	
present	each	organized	crime	model	as	a	superior	crime	coordination	mechanism	against	
regulation	(law	enforcement).	Moreover,	the	officially	recognized	but	contested	definition	of	
organized	crime	emphasizes	the	profit	motif	of	organized	crime	irrespective	of	the	ideal	type	
or	model.35	Law	enforcement	responses	to	disrupt	or	dismantle	organized	crime	are	tailored	
according	to	the	assumptions	of	the	preferred	model	of	organized	crime,	ignoring	hybrid	
formations	or	the	transnational	reach	of	some	organized	crime	groups.	Nonetheless,	the	
composition	and	structure	of	organized	crime	groups,	as	suggested	by	these	models,	shed	
light	on	questions	of	trust,	group	cohesion,	and	control,	and	thus	on	the	issue	of	the	resilience	
of	such	groups.	These	insights,	however,	do	not	constitute	a	sufficient	explanation	of	the	
																																																						
33	Elements	of	the	previous	paragraph	were	used	as	part	of	a	paper	entitled	“Economic	sociology	and	
opportunities	for	organized	crime	research”	in	Economic	Sociology	–	The	European	Electronic	Newsletter.	The	
newsletter	was	published	in	July	2015	and	is	available	at:	http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_16-
3.pdf#page=38.	
	
34	Curiously,	economists	had	initially	snubbed	organized	crime	research	due	to	the	perception	that	criminal	
actors	were	irrational,	and	the	field	was	better	suited	“to	a	sociological	analysis	of	pathologies	and	deviances”	
(Fiorentini/Peltzman	1997:	2).		
	
35	State	actors	involved	in	the	Palermo	negotiations	leading	to	the	final	text	of	the	United	Nations	Convention	
against	Transnational	Organized	Crime	agreed	that	four	characteristics	were	essential	criteria	of	the	crime.	
Organized	crime	thus	involved	a	group	of	two	or	more	persons,	who	were	acting	in	concert	to	commit	a	
“serious”	crime	repeatedly	for	financial	or	material	gain	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	15	November	2000).	
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resilience	of	illegal	markets.	The	clan	model,	for	example,	suggests	that	trust	is	contingent	on	
membership	of	the	group	and	reproduced	through	family	or	kinship	ties.	The	internal	control	
structure	centres	on	omertà	36	and	enforcement	of	the	same	oath	against	those	who	break	it.	
As	suggested	by	Gambetta	(1988b),	distrust	of	one’s	associates	and	business	partners	might	
lead	to	additional	security	precautions.	Trust	within	network	or	business-like	structures	might	
be	negotiated	through	different	strategies	such	as	reputation	and	the	reliance	on	existing	or	
previous	network	connections	within	legal	and	illegal	markets.	Another	mechanism	relates	to	
the	tricky	issue	of	information	sharing:	operational	information	might	thus	be	shared	on	a	
need-to-know	basis	with	those	networks	or	nodes	necessary	for	the	execution	of	a	planned	
activity.	In	the	case	of	defection	or	neutralization,	only	those	directly	linked	to	the	node	or	
network	(strong	ties)	might	be	temporarily	or	permanently	disabled.		The	four	models	are	
presented	as	stand-alone	and	opposing	ideal	types	in	the	organized	crime	literature.	Each	
model,	therefore,	carries	explicit	normative	assumptions	with	regards	to	the	benefits	of	its	
associated	type	of	crime	coordination	and	suitable	law	enforcement	interventions.	Scholars	
face	the	danger	of	paradigmatic	convergence	by	presenting	or	tailoring	data	to	suit	the	
normative	and	theoretical	assumptions	of	their	chosen	model	(Standing	2003:	17).	Criminal	
entities	are	however	unlikely	to	conform	to	any	one	of	the	suggested	models	(ibid).	In	fact,	
crime	coordination	may	rely	on	hybrid	formations	that	align	with	the	geographic,	political	and	
temporal	context,	as	well	as	the	personal	preferences	of	those	involved	(Standing	2003:	20).		
	
A	final	noteworthy	aspect	of	organized	crime	literature	is	the	dominant	narrative	of	
stigmatizing	“the	other”.	Although	the	so-called	‘alien	conspiracy	theory’37	has	been	
discredited	in	the	literature	(Varese	2011;	Gambetta	2009;	Naylor	2004	(b);	Reuter	1987);	
stereotypical	notions	of	“good	versus	evil”	or	an	underworld	of	criminals	versus	a	sea	of	law-
abiding	citizens	persists	in	much	of	the	literature.38	Of	concern	in	the	rhino	literature	is	the	
																																																						
36	‘Omerta’	refers	to	the	code	of	silence	practised	by	some	mafia	groups,	preventing	Mafiosi	from	cooperating	
with	agents	of	the	state.	Similar	oaths,	signs,	and	symbols	have	been	observed	in	the	Triads,	Yakuza	and	street	
gangs.	
	
37	The	alien	conspiracy	theory	was	borne	out	of	findings	of	the	US	Senate’s	Kefauver	Committee.	The	report	
identified	organized	crime	with	the	mafia	or	mafia-like	groups	(foreigners).	These	groups	were	supposedly	
hierarchically	organized,	threatened	the	integrity	of	local	government	while	infiltrating	legitimate	business	and	
subverting	the	integrity	of	a	free	society.	
	
38	Beare	postulates	that	this	narrative	is	also	visible	in	the	international	conceptualization	of	organized	crime	as	
per	the	United	Nations	Convention	against	Transnational	Organized	Crime	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	15	
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“othering”	and	stigmatization	of	foreign	criminals	while	the	role	of	local	crime	syndicates,	
wildlife	industry	players	and	state	actors	is	downplayed	(Daffue	2013;	Montesh	2013).	This	
further	contributes	to	established	notions	of	foreign	or	“transnational”	organized	crime	
networks	disrupting	political	governance	and	economic	structures	in	southern	Africa	while	
local	or	“indigenous”	criminal	groups	serve	as	the	foot	soldiers	of	these	foreign	groups	(see	
for	example:	Standing	2003).	Corruption	is	presented	as	a	key	strategy	of	organized	crime	to	
undermine	the	government,	law	enforcement,	and	the	formal	economy.	The	idea	of	a	foreign-
dominated	parasitic	conspiracy	that	rides	on	the	weaknesses	of	regulatory	and	legislative	
structures	as	suggested	in	the	literature	is	critically	interrogated	in	this	dissertation.	The	
reliance	on	this	traditional	notion	of	‘organized	crime’	as	the	driving	force	behind	the	illegal	
rhino	horn	market	ignores	the	role	of	other	‘non-criminal’	actors	within	the	supply	chain,	such	
as	the	role	of	consumers,	cultural	frames	that	influence	valuation,	tastes	and	preferences	
(Dewey	2014a:	5–6).		
	
While	these	models	provide	partial	explananda	as	to	why	organized	crime	is	resilient	and	why	
some	illegal	markets	are	difficult	to	disrupt,	the	social	embeddedness	of	illegal	economic	
action,	the	impact	of	regulation	on	the	organizational	structure	of	illegal	markets,	the	
interface	between	legality	and	illegality,	as	well	as	cultural	explanations	for	the	resilience	of	
illegal	markets	constitute	gaps	in	existing	literature	and	research.	An	important	analytical	
consideration	is	whether	the	difficulty	of	disrupting	rhino	horn	markets	is	linked	to	the	profile	
of	the	actors	(such	as	the	composition	and	structure	of	organized	crime),	or	whether	intrinsic	
(valuation	of	rhino	horn)	and	structural	features	relating	to	the	market	and	different	flows	of	
horn	provide	sufficient	or	partial	explananda	of	the	resilience	of	rhino	horn	supply	chains.	
Similar	to	the	research	gap	pointed	out	in	the	previous	sub-section,	this	stream	of	literature	
falls	short	of	providing	a	convincing	answer	as	to	how	different	segments	in	the	rhino	horn	
supply	chain	are	interlinked.	Put	differently,	using	the	suggested	hierarchical	model	of	
organized	rhino	crimes:	How	do	the	various	levels	in	the	rhino	horn	organized	crime	hierarchy	
connect	to	one	another?	Put	into	a	sociological	perspective:	How	are	illegal	economic	actions	
																																																																																																																																																																											
November	2000).	According	to	her,	the	convention	“reproduces	a	global	hegemonic	rhetoric	and	
countermeasures	that	depend	on	the	public’s	perception	of	a	growing	threat	of	transnational	crime	that	
originates	from	countries	foreign	to	the	‘developed’	metropolis,	led	by	organized	‘mafia’-like	networks	and	
gangsters	who	are	seen	to	threaten	the	peace	and	security	of	the	core	capitalist	nations,	and	requiring	a	state	
response	of	strict	border	and	immigration	controls”(Beare	2003:	XVIII).	
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at	the	micro-level	(poaching,	illegal	harvesting	and	theft)	connected	to	trade	structures	at	the	
macro-level	(horn	trafficking	and	distribution)?	With	regards	to	the	overall	rhino	horn	market	
structure,	an	open	question	pertains	to	whether	the	notion	of	“organized	crime”	as	conceived	
in	the	rhino	and	broader	organized	crime	literature	is	a	useful	conceptual	and	theoretical	
construct,	or	whether	it	serves	to	muddy	the	analytical	waters	and	feeds	into	regulatory	
objectives.	
	
	
1.2.3	Rhino	horn	trade	as	a	multi-actor	business	enterprise	
	
The	dominant	narrative	assigns	organized	crime	as	a	rising	if	not	dominant	actor	in	illicit	
wildlife	markets,	a	few	researchers	(Ellis	1994;	Naylor	2004;	Wyatt	2009;	Wyatt	2011)	
nonetheless	point	to	the	significant	role	of	agents	of	the	state,	the	wildlife	industry	and	
conservation	NGOs	in	such	markets.	In	this	stream	of	literature,	illegal	rhino	horn	trade	is	
described	as	a	business	enterprise	facilitated	by	a	multitude	of	diverse	actors	with	close,	
limited	or	no	links	to	‘organized	crime’.	Insider	knowledge	of	market	structures	and	exposure	
or	access	to	political	or	economic	elites	render	such	actors	important	facilitators	or	
intermediaries	of	illegal	wildlife	markets.	The	issue	of	agency	in	the	illegal	wildlife	markets	is	
not	only	theoretically	significant	but	also	bears	policy	consequences	in	the	real	world.	
Regulatory	responses	to	‘insider	trading’	within	the	wildlife	industry,	corruption	and	collusion	
between	state	and	industry	players,	as	opposed	to	organized	crime	and	terror	networks,	are	
likely	to	differ	in	terms	of	the	perceived	seriousness	of	the	crime,	punishment	and	
recompenses.		
	
Several	reports	attempt	to	debunk	the	ascendancy	of	organized	crime	in	wildlife	crime.	A	
report	issued	on	behalf	of	WWF	and	TRAFFIC	in	2002	for	example,	found	limited	evidence	of	
the	involvement	of	“major”	organized	crime	groups39	in	illegal	wildlife	markets	(Cook/Roberts	
2002).	The	authors	observe	an	exception	with	regards	to	illegal	caviar	markets	in	Russia	and	
“in	key	drug	production	and	distribution	states	which	coincide	with	major	range	states	for	
wildlife”	(Cook/Roberts	2002:	23).	Schneider	(2012:	53)	postulates	that	due	to	transnational	
																																																						
39	The	authors	denote	as	“major”	organized	crime	groups	well–known	South	American,	West	African,	Chinese,	
West	Indian	and	Russian	networks.	
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criminals	having	mastered	the	art	of	trafficking	legal	and	illegal	contraband	and	people	across	
borders,	the	inference	that	such	criminals	might	be	involved	in	the	illegal	wildlife	trade	is	not	
far–fetched.	Beyond	the	illegal	trade	in	sturgeon/caviar,	abalone,	shark	fin	and	tigers,	she	
found,	however,	anecdotal	and	speculative	evidence	only	to	suggest	the	link	(Schneider	2012:	
57).	Naylor	(2004:	263)	refers	to	the	“recurrent	fables”	of	“Organized	Crime”	(Naylor’s	
capitalization)	operating	in	illegal	wildlife	markets	“along	with	stories	about	links	between	
wildlife	trafficking	and	drug	smuggling,	and	parallel	claims	that	the	contraband	in	wildlife	
ranks	second	only	to	that	in	drugs	in	terms	of	value”.	Naylor	(2004:	op	cit)	points	to	the	
dominant	role	of	the	wildlife	industry	and	corrupt	state	officials	in	the	illegal	wildlife	trade:		
	
“In	reality	this	is	a	business	largely	run	by	industry	insiders	from	the	forest	to	the	
factory,	from	primary	acquisition	to	final	sale,	although	it	may	be	aided	and	abetted	by	
complicit	politicians	and	corrupt	functionaries.”	
	
Green	criminologist	Tanya	Wyatt	(2009)	found	that	strict	regulation	of	the	Russian	fur	trade	
constituted	significant	barriers	to	entry,	preventing	‘organized	crime’	and	other	‘outsiders’	
from	entering	the	lucrative	illegal	trade.	Local	impoverished	villagers	from	the	taiga,	
registered	hunters,	wealthy	individuals,	and	law	enforcement	officials	poach,	hunt	or	lay	traps	
for	wild	animals	whose	pelts	are	destined	for	the	fur	trade.	Well–heeled	people	with	political	
connections	or	business	interests	in	the	legal	fur	trade	act	as	the	intermediaries	and	launder	
illegally	obtained	pelts	into	legal	trade	channels.	Cook	(2002:	23)	argues	that	familiarity	with	
trade	controls,	government	regulations,	and	transport	routes	would	provide	actors	already	in	
the	legal	trade	with	knowledge	of	the	‘tricks	of	the	trade’	and	possible	legal	loopholes	to	
exploit	opportunities	in	illegal	markets.40	
	
A	limited	number	of	scholars	cast	the	net	beyond	the	‘usual	suspects’	–	poachers	and	
organized	crime	–	in	research	analysing	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain.	Stephen	Ellis	(1994)	
provides	a	succinct	analysis	of	the	South	African	apartheid	state’s	involvement	in	the	ivory	
and	rhino	horn	trade	structures	of	the	1970s	and	1980s	by	showing	how	these	illicit	trades	
financed	the	South	African	secret	services	and	individuals	linked	to	them.	The	historian	
																																																						
40	Some	studies	point	to	the	falsification	of	CITES	permits,	import/export	customs	documents	or	to	the	
manipulation	of	domestic	permitting	systems	regulating	domestic	or	cross–border	trade	of	live	wildlife	or	wildlife	
products	(Naylor	2004;	Schneider	2012;	Felbab-Brown	2011),	and	specifically	in	the	case	of	rhinos	(Rademeyer	
2012;	Falberg	2013;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Orenstein	2013;	Leader-Williams	2003).	
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provides	fascinating	insights	on	the	nexus	between	the	military	apparatus	and	conservation	
actors	in	southern	Africa,	which	are	not	only	relevant	to	current	debates	relating	to	the	
militarized	conservation	paradigm	but	also	point	to	the	possible	beginnings	of	a	blurring	
between	legal	and	illegal	market	exchanges	in	rhino	horn.	Other	researchers	(Rademeyer	
2012;	Milliken	2014;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Animal	Rights	Africa	2009)	depict	the	complicit	role	
of	wildlife	industry	actors	along	rhino	horn	supply	chains.	Rademeyer	(2012),	for	example,	
shows	the	involvement	of	the	“boeremafia”	(white	Afrikaners	who	are	involved	in	the	wildlife	
industry)	in	the	illegal	rhino	horn	trade.	While	authors	describe	permit	fraud	and	the	
laundering	of	illegally	harvested	horn	into	legal	flows,	the	literature	remains	silent	on	the	
social	mechanisms	and	market	structures	that	enable	these	flows.		
	
It	also	remains	unclear	how	wildlife	industry	actors	(and	the	‘usual	suspects’)	are	connected	to	
Asian	distribution	networks.	Another	gap	relates	to	how	actors	make	initial	contact	and	
establish	business	relations	despite	cleavages	based	on	language,	culture,	nationality,	social	
status	and	ethnicity.	Moreover,	little	is	known	about	the	vertical	and	horizontal	integration	of	
these	diverse	actors	in	the	transnational	trade	chain.	While	the	public	discourse	on	the	“rhino	
crisis”	is	increasingly	steered	towards	the	‘underworld’	of	organized	crime	and	terrorism,	
important	questions	relating	to	the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality	remain	
unresolved.	
	
Meanwhile,	scholars	from	the	field	of	antiquities	trafficking	have	shifted	the	theoretical	focus	
from	static	structural	notions	of	‘organized	crime’	to	conceiving	of	hybrid	formations	that	
move	looted	cultural	objects	from	the	source	to	the	market.	Mackenzie	and	Davis’	research	
into	the	anatomy	of	antiquities	trafficking	networks	in	Cambodia	provides	significant	insights	
on	the	integration	of	‘groups’	and	‘networks’	of	actors	using	a	social	capital	approach	
(Mackenzie/Davis	2014).41	The	scholars	identify	trade	channels	along	which	looted	artefacts	
are	moved	from	cultural-historical	sites	to	the	international	market	buyer	(frequently	a	
legitimate	trade	outlet).	The	responsible	trafficking	networks	are	“stable,	hierarchical	and	
																																																						
41	Wing	Lo	(2010:	868)	pioneered	a	social	capital	framing	and	applied	it	to	a	study	of	Triad	societies	in	Hong	Kong	
and	China.	He	identified	internal	‘bonding	capital’	in	traditional	hierarchical	organized	crime	groups,	together	
with	horizontal	‘bridging’	and	vertical	‘linking’	capital.	These	social	coordination	mechanisms	provide	
opportunities	for	illegal	trade,	including	the	collusion	with	other	legitimate	and	illegitimate	groups,	or	corrupt	
state	interests.	
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repetitively	functioning	supply	chains”	(Mackenzie/Davis	2014:	16).	Given	the	many	parallels	
between	antiquities	and	wildlife	trafficking	supply	chains,42	their	conclusion	(Mackenzie/Davis	
2014:	4)	provides	helpful	hints	on	how	to	model	rhino	horn	supply	chains:	
	
“Broadly	stated,	our	conclusion	will	be	that	while	the	present	case	study	is	
undoubtedly	of	a	network,	in	which	nodes,	contacts	and	certain	types	of	social	capital	
are	useful	explanatory	concepts,	there	is	also	an	observable	stability,	and	identifiable	
forms	of	hierarchy,	both	along	the	chain	of	the	whole	network	and	within	each	of	its	
nodes.	We	conceptualize	the	network	as	a	repetitive	process,	having	developed	by	
way	of	linking	nodal	actors	in	long-term	trading	relations,	and	harnessing	the	benefits	
at	different	stages	in	the	chain	of	both	localized	territorial	‘structure-controlled’	
organized	crime	and	(as	the	trades	move	increasingly	towards	the	transnational)	more	
flexible	entrepreneurial	trafficker-dealers	who	are	less	tied	into	frameworks	involving	
territory	or	group.”	
	
	
	
1.2.4	Synthesizing	the	research	gaps	
	
The	earlier	sub-sections	were	aimed	at	highlighting	important	theoretical	contributions	and	
gaps	within	the	literature.	An	overview	of	the	literature	on	the	demand	or	consumer	market	
was	excluded	from	the	literature	review	as	too	little	is	known	to	warrant	a	separate	
subsection.	When	it	comes	to	the	distribution	and	trade	of	rhino	horn	in	consumer	markets,	
the	literature	predominantly	refers	to	the	traditional	medicines	markets	in	Asia	(‘t	Sas-Rolfes	
2012;	Nowell	2012a;	Drury	2009;	Rademeyer	2012).	Several	technical	reports	and	journalistic	
investigations	(Ipsos	Marketing	2013;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Gwin	2012;	Amman	2013b)	
reference	new	demand	and	user	groups	and	are	considered	as	such	in	the	chapter	dealing	
with	the	demand	and	valuation	of	rhino	horn.	With	regards	to	understanding	the	demand	for	
rhino	horn,	many	open	questions	remain.	It	is	unclear	why	consumers	are	willing	to	pay	a	
premium	for	a	keratin-like	substance	and	how	quality	control	is	enforced	in	light	of	the	high	
																																																						
	
42	Alder	and	Polker	(2005)	and	Brodie	(2003)	note	similarities	regarding	the	functioning	of	the	illicit	supply	chain,	
differentiation,	the	main	actors	and	roles,	exploitative	effects,	smuggling	networks	and	corruptive	influences.	
Bowman	(2008:	226)	argues	that	unlike	other	trafficked	goods,	the	trade	in	antiquities	is	legal	per	se;	however,	
the	illicit	source	has	to	be	disguised	to	render	the	stolen	artefact	profitable.	When	it	comes	to	gray	flows	of	
wildlife	contraband,	the	illicit	source	(poaching)	is	also	changed	to	legal	sources	(trophy	hunting).	Moreover,	
illegal	wildlife	contraband	is	equally	sold	at	high	prices	to	buyers	of	high	socio-economic	status	(Bowman	2008)	
or	those	seeking	upward	social	mobility.	
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incidence	of	fake	rhino	horn	at	the	source	and	in	the	consumer	market	(Amman	2013a).	Other	
unanswered	questions	pertain	to	the	structure	and	functioning	of	distribution	and	trade	
networks.	
	
In	synthesizing	the	contributions	of	existing	literature	on	the	illegal	rhino	horn	trade,	several	
gaps	and	shortcomings	have	been	noted.	The	different	streams	of	literature	suffer	from	
theoretical	separateness	in	that	only	a	specific	aspect	or	segment	of	the	illegal	trade	chain	is	
considered.	While	scholars	acknowledge	the	existence	of	a	“global	supply	chain”	or	of	a	
“transnational	trade	chain”,	it	remains	unclear	how	the	different	segments	of	the	supply	chain	
are	bridged	across	cleavages	from	different	nationalities,	ethnicities,	social	strata,	languages,	
and	cultures.	With	a	few	notable	exceptions	(Ellis	1994;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Rademeyer	
2012;	Naylor	2004),	scholars	focus	on	the	“usual	suspects”	–	poachers	and	organized	criminals	
–	without	interrogating	the	role	of	the	state,	the	wildlife	industry,	and	other	actors.	The	
resilience	of	the	supply	chain	is	linked	to	shortcomings	within	the	regulatory	framework.	
Scholars	recommend	that	the	state	should	put	more	“boots	on	the	ground”	(increased	
securitization	and	militarization),	amend	the	regulatory	framework	or	refocus	attention	to	the	
perceived	organized	crime	threat.	A	few	scholars	(Büscher/Ramutsindela	2016;	Lunstrum	
2014;	Massé/Lunstrum	2015)	have	questioned	the	prudence	of	such	measures,	thereby	
pointing	to	the	flawed	basis	of	the	regulatory	framework.	Others	(Ayling	2013;	von	
Essen/Allen	2015)	have	argued	that	the	perceived	illegitimacy	of	rules	and	norms	might	
provide	a	conducive	environment	for	wildlife	crime	to	flourish.	With	the	exception	of	the	final	
stream	of	literature	(subsection	1.2.3),	scholars	have	paid	limited	attention	to	the	interface	
between	legality	and	illegality.	An	open	question	relates	to	the	role	of	‘organized	crime’	in	the	
illegal	rhino	horn	trade	and	how	regulation	impacts	the	global	supply	chain.	None	of	these	
streams	of	literature	delivers	a	satisfactory	answer	as	to	why	the	rhino	has	not	been	better	
protected	in	light	of	the	myriad	measures	to	disrupt	illegal	rhino	horn	markets.	It	is	against	
this	background	that	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	the	sociology	of	markets	in	the	field	of	
economic	sociology	is	proposed	in	the	following	section.	
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1.3	Theoretical	framing	
 
A	theoretical	approach	grounded	in	economic	sociology	has	been	chosen	to	address	the	gaps	
identified	in	the	previous	section.	This	theoretical	lens	offers	both	theoretical	and	empirical	
integration	by	studying	networks,	institutions,	and	cognitive	frames.	The	recognition	that	
markets	are	socially,	culturally	and	politically	embedded	is	of	significance	here.	Economic	
sociologists	are	concerned	with	understanding	(“verstehen”)	the	social	embeddedness43	of	
economic	action	and	institutions	(Granovetter/Swedberg	2011:	XIX).	Granovetter	(1985:	487)	
explains:		
	
“Actors	do	not	behave	or	decide	as	atoms	outside	a	social	context,	nor	do	they	adhere	
slavishly	to	a	script	written	for	them	by	the	particular	intersection	of	social	categories	
that	they	happen	to	occupy.	Their	attempts	at	purposive	action	are	instead	embedded	
in	concrete,	ongoing	systems	of	social	relations.”	
	
Strategic	sites	of	inquiry	within	economic	sociology	include	markets,	social	networks	and	
institutions.	While	a	growing	body	of	literature	considers	the	structure	and	mechanics	of	the	
informal	economy,44	the	study	of	illegal	and	transnational	markets	remains	understudied	in	
the	field	of	economic	sociology.45	Specific	caveats	identified	by	Beckert	and	Wehinger	(2011),	
																																																						
43	Granovetter	revived	the	concept	of	“embeddedness”	in	his	much-cited	article	published	in	1985,	which	
suggested	that	economic	action	was	embedded	in	social	structures	(Granovetter	1985).	The	article	inspired	many	
sociologists	to	become	interested	in	the	field	and	gave	a	new	life	to	the	concept	of		“embeddedness”,	which	had	
featured	in	Karl	Polanyi’s	collaborative	book	‘Trade	and	market	in	the	early	empires’	(Polanyi/Arensberg/Pearson	
1957).	Polanyi’s	usage	of	the	concept	was	limited	to	pre-industrial	societies,	which	he	deemed	to	be	embedded	
in	social,	religious	and	political	institutions.	To	him	and	other	scholars,	the	Industrial	Revolution	presented	a	
watershed.	As	of	then,	economic	transactions	were	no	longer	defined	“by	the	social	or	kinship	obligations	of	
those	transacting	but	by	rational	calculations	of	individual	gain”	(Granovetter,	1985:	482).	
	
44	Labour	anthropologist	Keith	Hart	coined	the	term	“informal	economy”	after	conducting	research	on	urban	
labour	markets	in	Ghana	during	the	1970s.	He	postulated	a	dualist	system	of	income	opportunities	of	the	urban	
labour	force	by	distinguishing	between	wage	labour	and	self-employment.	The	World	Bank,	the	International	
Labour	Organization	(ILO)	and	many	others	have	since	re-appropriated	the	concept,	and	it	has	become	
somewhat	contested	in	development	literature.	Several	conceptually	and	theoretically	interesting	research	
studies	have	been	published	in	recent	years	(Hart	1990;	Portes/Haller	2005;	Portes	2010;	Feige	1989;	De	Soto	
1989;	Jenkins	1988;	Schneider	2002;	Fernández-Kelly/Shefner	2006).	Geertz	(1978:	120-121)	in	his	seminal	text	
on	informal	economies	shows,	for	example,	how	the	quest	for	information	in	Moroccan	bazaars		“is	an	advanced	
art	(…),	a	matter	upon	which	everything	turns.”		
	
45	Amongst	the	few	published	contributions	are	Beckert	and	Wehinger’s	theoretical	and	conceptual	framework	
for	illegal	markets	(Beckert/Wehinger	2011;	Beckert/Wehinger	2013);	Wehinger’s	monograph	comprising	a	
detailed	review	of	literature	on	illegal	markets	(Wehinger	2011);	and	journal	articles	on	the	emergence	of	illegal	
markets	after	a	crisis	scenario	(Dewey	2014a),	police	protection	in	the	used	car	parts	market	in	Argentina	(Dewey	
2011),	“street	capital”	and	cannabis	dealing	in	Norway	(Sandberg	2008),	the	importance	of	culture	in	the	illegal	
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include	amongst	others,	the	organizational	features	of	illegal	markets,	the	interface	between	
legal	and	illegal	markets	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	illegal	markets.	These	caveats	dovetail	
with	the	research	gaps	identified	in	the	previous	section.	In	spite	of	scholarly	interest	in	
globalization,	economic	sociologists	have	also	paid	scant	attention	to	‘global’	or	
‘transnational’	markets	(Aspers	2011:	175;	Quack	2009:	125).	Quack	(2009:	134)	attributes	the	
lacuna	to	scholarly	preoccupation	with	the	nation	state	as	the	sole	political	authority	and	the	
preference	for	perceiving	markets	as	unified	social	orders.	Transnational	markets	are	“likely	to	
be	populated	by	actors	with	heterogeneous	cultural	and	institutional	orientations”.	
	
The	discipline	of	economic	sociology	provides	nuanced	ideas	as	to	the	theoretical	integration	
of	social	networks,	institutions	and	cognitive	frames	when	explaining	the	structure	and	
functioning	of	markets.	The	following	sub-sections	will	highlight	theoretical	constructs,	the	
explanatory	approach	and	argument	of	the	dissertation.	
	
	
1.3.1	Rhino	horn	markets	are	socially	embedded	
	
Of	interest	to	my	project	is	the	subfield	of	the	sociology	of	markets,	which	attempts	to	
“understand	the	origins,	operations,	and	dynamics	of	markets	as	social	
structures”(Fligstein/Dauter	2007:	106).	The	subfield	includes,	amongst	others,	the	study	of	
firms	and	commodity	markets,	relationships	between	suppliers,	workers	and	regulatory	
institutions	and	the	role	of	local	cultures	as	systems	of	meanings	insofar	as	they	influence	
product	preferences,	and	the	role	of	moral	norms	in	the	generation	of	particular	kinds	of	
markets.	Markets	are	seen	as	the	core	economic	institutions	of	capitalist	economies.	While	
enabling	an	economic	mechanism	for	the	allocation	of	goods	and	services,	markets	are	also	
social	institutions,	inseparably	interwoven	with	the	political,	social,	and	cultural	environments	
in	which	they	operate	(Beckert	2009).	Economic	sociologists	have	employed	a	number	of	
explanatory	mechanisms	to	explain	the	emergence	and	functioning	of	markets,	such	as	
markets	as	networks	(Granovetter	1985;	White	1981);	markets	as	institutions	
																																																																																																																																																																											
drug	economy	(Sandberg	2012)	and	why	Norwegian	cannabis	growers	keep	a	small–scale	production	
(Hammersvik/Sandberg/Pedersen	2012)	.		
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(DiMaggio/Powell	1983;	Fligstein	2001a);	markets	as	fields	(Bourdieu	[2000]	2005	(a);	
Bourdieu	2005	(b));	and	the	performativity	approach	which	examines	the	role	of	economic	
theory	in	market	structuration	(MacKenzie	2003;	Callon	1998).	In	employing	one	of	these	
explanatory	mechanisms	or	by	focusing	on	specific	aspects	of	markets,	scholarly	contributions	
may	suffer	from	“theoretical	separateness”	(Fligstein/Dauter	2007:	2).	To	circumvent	this	
shortcoming	and	cognizant	of	the	lacunae	noted	in	the	literature	review,	the	notion	of	
markets	as	fields	is	used	as	the	theoretical	backbone	of	the	dissertation.		
	
This	approach	integrates	social	networks,	institutions	and	cognitive	frames,	and	regards	them	
as	irreducible	macrostructures	while	also	offering	a	nuanced	explanatory	mechanism	that	
incorporates	structure	and	agency	(Beckert	2010:	611).	According	to	this	train	of	thought,	
markets	are	composed	of	“a	heterogeneous	group	of	actors	that	constitute	a	social	arena	by	
orienting	their	actions	toward	each	other”	(Fligstein	2001b:	108).	Actors	in	the	market	field	
are	producers,	consumers	and	intermediary	regulatory	agencies	ranging	from	the	state	to	
unions,	lobbying,	advocacy	and	social	movement	groups	(Beckert	2010:	611).	Beckert	(2010:	
612)	posits	that:	“[e]	ach	of	the	three	structuring	forces	contributes	to	the	social	organization	
of	market	exchanges	by	shaping	opportunities	and	constraints	of	agents	as	well	as	
perceptions	of	legitimacy	and	illegitimacy.”	The	issue	of	agency	is	dealt	with	through	
recognising	the	following:	
	
“Agency	in	fields	is	structured	by	the	influences	that	social	forces	exercise	on	the	
actors	who	populate	the	field.	These	forces	consist	of	the	relational	topographies	of	
networks,	the	institutional	rules	prevalent	in	the	field,	and	cognitive	frames	structuring	
the	perceptions	of	agents”	(Beckert	2010:	611–612).		
	
Although	the	framework	was	conceived	for	legal	markets,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	same	
types	of	actors	are	relevant	to	illegal	and	grey	markets.	With	regards	to	the	chosen	product	
market	of	this	dissertation	–	rhino	horn	–	legal	and	illegal	producers	(poachers,	hunters,	
thieves,	wildlife	professionals	and	agents	of	the	state),	transporters	(organized	crime	groups,	
wildlife	professionals	and	agents	of	the	state),	intermediary	regulatory	agencies	(the	
international	community	through	CITES,	representatives	of	the	state,	conservation	NGOs,	
private	security	companies,	and	businesses),	as	well	as	consumers	interact	and	structure	the	
market	for	rhino	horn.	Of	significance	is	that	the	global	market	for	rhino	horn	consists	of	legal,	
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gray	and	illegal	flows,	which	raises	intriguing	questions	as	to	whether	the	same	actors	are	of	
importance	in	each	flow	and	whether	there	are	connections	between	the	different	flows	
(interface	between	legal,	gray	and	illegal	market),	as	opposed	to	understanding	the	
connections	between	different	segments	of	the	supply	chain	only.	The	institutional	rules	are	
but	one	of	the	structuring	forces	influencing	the	flow	of	rhino	horn.	
	
	
1.3.2	Defining	‘illegal	markets’	and	introducing	the	notion	of	‘flows’	
	
	
The	global	rhino	horn	trade	is	understood	in	terms	of	a	sociological	definition	of	markets,	
which	describes	markets	as	“arenas	of	regular	voluntary	exchange	of	goods	or	services	for	
money,	[goods	or	services	of	equitable	value]	46…	under	conditions	of	competition”	(Beckert	
and	Aspers	(2008)	cited	in:	Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	7).	Markets	are	thus	not	only	
characterized	by	economic	exchange	but	they	also	involve	competition	whereby	at	least	three	
actors	are	pitted	against	one	another	at	the	supply	and	demand	end	of	the	market	(Beckert	
2007:	7).	Weber	(quoted	in:	Abercrombie,	Nicholas/Hill,	Stephen/Turner,	Bryan	S.	[1984]	
2006)	defined	competition	as	a	peaceful	conflict	to	attain	control	over	scarce	resources.	In	the	
context	of	this	dissertation,	Weber’s	definition	is	particularly	interesting	as	rhinos	are	not	only	
rare,	but	they	are	also	endangered.	The	question	arising	here	is	whether	competition	is	likely	
to	become	less	‘peaceful’	and	more	violent	as	rhino	numbers	continue	to	dwindle.	The	
subsection	on	competition	will	deal	with	this	in	more	detail.	A	significant	factor	leading	to	the	
emergence	of	markets	is	that	market	actors	need	to	show	interest	in	the	exchange	of	the	
goods	or	services.	Conflicts	may,	however,	arise	as	regards	the	price	or	specifications	of	the	
products	or	services	to	be	traded.	Ultimately	the	actors	have	to	reach	a	compromise	for	the	
economic	exchange	to	succeed	(ibid).	Based	on	the	assumption	of	mutual	respect	for	property	
rights,	market	exchanges	ought	to	be	voluntary	and	peaceful	in	the	formal	sector	
(Aspers/Beckert	2011:	4-5).		
	
																																																						
46	Jens	Beckert	has	adjusted	his	definition	of	markets	to	include	exchanges,	which	are	not	subject	to	money	
transactions	but	could	involve	the	barter	or	exchange	of	similar	goods	or	services	(Ph.D.	consultation	between	
Jens	Beckert	and	Annette	Hübschle).	An	obvious	advantage	of	avoiding	monetary	transactions	is	the	lack	of	
paper	or	audit	trail,	thus	rendering	obsolete	the	“follow	the	money”	approach	of	law	enforcement	agencies.	
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Markets	are	considered	illegal	if	the	product	per	se,	its	exchange	or	consumption	violates	legal	
stipulations.	The	state	denies	property	rights	in	such	markets,	sets	and	enforces	no	quality	
standards	and	has	the	power	to	prosecute	market	actors	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	7).47		What	
renders	a	market	“illegal”	is,	therefore,	a	matter	of	legal	definition	and	may	differ	between	
legal	jurisdictions	and	across	time	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	7).		The	fact	that	an	element	of	an	
economic	exchange	is	deemed	illegal	in	a	specific	place	at	a	certain	point	in	time	bears	not	
only	actionable	consequences	for	the	actors	but	is	likely	to	impact	the	structure	and	
functioning	of	the	market	(compare	with	the	section	on	‘contested	illegality’).	A	distinction	
needs	to	be	made	with	regards	to	economic	exchanges	that	occur	at	the	interface	between	
legality	and	illegality;	these	markets	are	neither	legal	nor	illegal	as	they	hover	in	an	
undetermined	gray	zone.	Some	market	actors	may	exploit	legal	or	enforcement	loopholes	in	
what	I	term	‘gray	markets’.	Actors	capitalize	on	ambiguities	of	the	legal/illegality	nexus	by	
falsifying	the	provenance	of	a	traded	good	as	a	formerly	legal	commodity	(e.g.	pre–CITES	
horn)	or	convert	an	illegally	acquired	good	to	a	‘legal’	commodity	(e.g.	poached	horn	is	
converted	into	trophy	hunted	rhino	horn).		
	
A	further	consideration	relates	to	the	transnational	nature	of	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn.	
Historically,	market	and	place	were	closely	intertwined.	While	markets	often	involved	the	
inclusion	of	long	distance	trade	and	foreign	merchants,	markets	were	connected	to	the	social	
and	economic	lives	of	local	communities,	occurring	at	fixed	intervals	and	in	specific	places	–	
the	local	marketplace	(Zukin	1993:	6).	With	the	emergence	of	migrant	labour	and	hut	taxes	
during	the	colonial	era	in	the	southern	African	context,48	market	and	place	started	to	
separate.	Producers,	traders	and	consumers	no	longer	had	to	be	at	a	fixed	time	and	location	
to	engage	in	economic	exchange.	In	the	current	climate	of	instantaneous	capital	flows,	global	
transactions	and	virtual	marketplaces,	economic	transactions	are	fluid	and	difficult	to	police	
or	locate.	In	recognition	of	the	fluid	and	dynamic	structure	of	the	market,	the	concept	of	
transnational	flows	(instead	of	commodity	or	supply	chains)	is	employed	in	this	dissertation.	
	
																																																						
47	Government’s	ability	to	prosecute	market	actors	is	not	only	restricted	to	illegal	markets.	The	state	may	equally	
prosecute	market	actors	in	legal	or	gray	markets.	
	
48	A	similar	pattern	can	be	observed	in	Western	Europe	during	Industrialization	(see	for	example:	
Polanyi/Arensberg/Pearson	1957).	
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The	concept	of	flows	is	useful	in	showcasing	the	fluid	connections	and	crossovers	between	
legal,	illegal	and	gray	economic	exchanges.	Castells	(1999:	295)	introduced	the	concept	of	
“spaces	of	flow”,	suggesting,	“material	arrangements	allow	for	simultaneity	of	social	practices	
without	territorial	contiguity”.	Castells	(2011:	407)	and	others	(van	Sluis	et	al.	2012;	Côté-
Boucher	2015;	van	Sluis/Marks/Bekkers	2011)	use	the	concept	of	flows	with	specific	reference	
to	the	“network	society”,49	which	is	characterized	by	increasing	fragmentation	of	individuals	
and	communities,	necessitating	interdependent	relationships	between	individuals,	public	
services,	the	police,	information	communication	technology	(ITC)	and	modes	of	transport.	
According	to	this	view,	people,	money,	goods,	and	information	are	in	circulation,	traveling	to	
and	from	different	places,	employing	different	infrastructures	and	thereby	generating	
different	“flows”	which	connect,	collide	or	meet	in	nodes	(van	Sluis	et	al.	2012:	73).	The	
governance	of	flows	and	nodes	provides	a	complex	conundrum	to	regulators	while	offering	
immediacy,	connectedness	and	new	opportunities	for	economic	actors	operating	in	legal,	gray	
or	illegal	markets.	
	
In	the	context	of	this	dissertation,	the	idea	of	dynamic	flows	instead	of	supply,	commodity	or	
trade	chains	allows	flexibility	with	regards	to	trajectories,	influences	and	contingent	
relationships	that	may	evolve,	develop	or	perish	between	actors,	flows	and	institutions	in	the	
market	field.	Taken	in	a	literal	sense,	the	concept	of	‘flows’	may	invoke	different	
characteristics,	such	as	bifurcation	(flows	split	because	of	a	blockage,	disruption	or	
intervention),	directionality	and	interdependence	(what	happens	upstream	may	have	an	
impact	downstream),	the	confluence	of	tributaries	(flows	that	merge),	dead	ends	(flows	that	
dry	up	or	disappear),	deltas	(a	flow	splits	into	myriad	offshoots),	dry	riverbeds	that	flow	again	
upon	new	rains	(re-joining	flows).	The	idea	of	different	flows	forming	constitutive	elements	of	
the	aggregate	market	in	rhino	horn	presents	a	dynamic	model	that	integrates	market	
processes,	actors,	social	networks,	and	institutions	while	also	covering	spatial–temporal	
considerations.	It	will	be	argued	that	illegal,	gray	and	legal	flows	of	rhino	horn	cannot	be	
studied	in	isolation	because	they	merge,	converge	and	diverge,	impacted	by	one	another	and	
by	institutions,	networks	and	cognitive	frames	found	in	the	market	field.	Unlike	the	rather	
static	concept	of	a	singular	supply	chain,	the	concept	of	‘flows’	allows	for	dynamic	and	
																																																						
49	Castells	(2000:	5)	suggests	that	the	network	society	is	a	specific	form	of	social	structure	emblematic	of	the	
Information	Age.	
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interdependent	relationships.	
	
	
1.3.3	The	notion	of	contested	illegality	and	its	impact	on	the	emergence	and	functioning	of	
flows	
	
Criminologists,	anthropologists	and	human	geographers	have	commented	on	the	blurred	
boundaries	between	the	legal/illegal,	licit/illicit	and	legitimate/illegitimate	binaries	(see	for	
example:	Heyman/Smart	1999;	Heyman	2013;	Hall	2013;	Van	Schendel/Abraham	2005;	Rose-
Greenland/Heatherington	2014).	The	blurring	of	the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality	is	
of	particular	interest	in	the	study	of	transnational	flows.	For	example:	what	is	legal	in	one	
place	may	be	illegal	elsewhere.	Legality	or	illegality	may	also	change	over	time.	Social,	moral	
and	cultural	norms	may	diverge	from	legal	rules,	thus	delegitimizing	them.		
	
Most	scholars	rely	on	the	state	as	their	analytical	point	of	departure	when	studying	regulatory	
frameworks	and	their	impact.	While	the	state50	delineates	what	it	considers	as	legal	or	illegal,	
there	may	be	a	disconnect	between	the	state	and	society	regarding	such	legal	definitions,	
their	interpretation,	and	the	legitimacy	of	such	rules.	Both,	agents	of	the	state	and	members	
of	society,	might	flout	some	rules.	Once	an	economic	exchange	moves	beyond	the	political	
boundaries	of	the	state	(the	exchange	may	happen	in	several	different	states	or	none	at	all	–	
in	virtual	marketplaces),	issues	of	jurisdiction	muddy	the	waters.	Moreover,	the	constructed	
and	fixed	dichotomies	of	legal/illegal	or	state-approved/forbidden	ignore	how	illegal,	informal	
and	gray	economic	practices	are	frequently	intertwined	with	our	daily	lives	(Van	
Schendel/Abraham	2005:	4–6).		
	
This	dissertation	contributes	to	the	debate	by	introducing	the	concept	of	contested	illegality.	
While	a	formal	political	authority	may	have	criminalized	(declared	as	“illegal”)	an	act	at	some	
point	in	time,	actors	in	“illegal”	and	gray	flows	may	not	agree	with	the	label.	It	will	be	argued	
that	actors’	implicit	and	explicit	defiance	or	contestation	of	the	state–sponsored	label	of	
illegality	serve	as	a	legitimizing	and	enabling	mechanism,	which	facilitates	participation	in	gray	
																																																						
50	It	is	acknowledged	that	the	state	is	not	a	unitary	actor.	For	the	purposes	of	this	argument,	the	state	and	
different	arms	of	governance	are	presented	as	a	homogenous	unit.	
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or	illegal	flows;	occasionally	even	leading	to	the	creation	of	new	gray	or	illegal	flows	(see	for	
example:	Taylor	2015).	The	following	subsection	expands	on	important	aspects.		
	
The	stated	illegality	of	an	economic	exchange	may	be	subject	to	normative	contestation	and	
social	acceptance.	Diverse	cultural	frames	assign	moral	and	normative	meanings	to	the	
legitimacy	or	illegitimacy	of	economic	exchanges,	the	goods	or	services	to	be	exchanged,	the	
act	of	producing	or	exchanging	the	goods	or	services,	the	actor	constellations	involved	in	any	
of	the	stages/segments	of	the	market	exchange	or	the	impact	of	the	market	(see	for	
examples:	Satz	2010:	91–114).	Social	legitimation	of	some	goods	and	services	is	likely	to	
obtain	additional	challenges:	While	the	production,	exchange	or	consumption/use	of	such	
goods	or	services	may	have	been	declared	to	be	‘illegal’,	the	commodification	of	such	goods	
or	services	may	also	be	considered	morally	or	culturally	contested,	questionable	or	even	
repugnant	(Beckert	2009).	Important	actors	along	the	supply	chain	thus	have	to	overcome	
moral	scruples,	cultural	hurdles	or	personal	inhibitions	associated	with	transacting	in	such	
illegal	or	gray	markets	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	7).	However,	actors	may	find	it	less	daunting	
to	enter,	transact	in	or	establish	markets,	which	are	illegal	but	socially	accepted.	Levels	of	
social	acceptance	of	the	law	on	the	books	may	vary	based	on	new	information,	emergent	or	
ancient	cultural	preferences	or	trends	or	politico-legal	developments.51	Wildlife	contraband	
(especially	rhino	horn)	falls	into	what	has	been	called	a	“contested	market”	
(Steiner/Trespeuch	2013)	or	a	“contested	commodity”	(Radin	1996)	elsewhere.52		As	will	be	
shown	in	later	chapters,	there	are	competing	claims	as	to	whether	rhino	horn	should	or	
should	not	be	a	tradable	good	or	commodity,	calling	into	question	whether	the	label	of	
illegality	is	appropriate,	sufficient,	or	constitutes	a	case	of	ethnocentric	valuation	(valuation	
that	is	based	on	a	particular	cultural	outlook).		
	
																																																						
51	The	smoking	of	cannabis	derivatives	as	opposed	to	the	intravenous	use	of	opioid	substances,	for	example,	is	
subject	to	different	levels	of	societal	sanctioning.	The	differential	ranking	(progressive	sectors	of	society	are	
more	forgiving	with	regards	to	cannabis	consumption)	is	not	only	linked	to	the	seriousness	of	the	offence	but	
extends	to	moral	judgment	as	regards	the	broader	impact	on	society,	the	level	of	social	and	other	harms	
experienced	by	the	individual	(the	offender)	and	their	social	environment.	
	
52	Steiner	and	Trespeuch	(2013:	144)	define	“contested	markets”	as	“markets	in	which	contested	commodities	
are	bought	and	sold”.	The	authors	build	on	Radin’s	conception	of	contested	commodities,	which	are	goods	that	
may	be	open	to	moral	challenges.	
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The	process	of	social	legitimation	for	the	economic	exchange	of	goods	and	services	is	not	only	
significant	to	the	emergence	of	illegal	markets;	actors	encounter	similar	difficulties	in	the	legal	
field	(for	example:	organs,	sex	work,	and	genetically	modified	organisms).	The	difficulty	of	
transcending	societal	taboo’s	in	establishing	new	economic	ventures	has	been	shown	in	
empirical	studies	of	the	life	insurance	industry	in	nineteenth-century	America	(Zelizer	1979;	
Zelizer	[1978]	1992),	markets	for	adopting	children	(Zelizer	[1985]	1994),	organs	and	body	
tissue	(Healy	2006;	Scheper-Hughes/Wacquant	2002;	Steiner	2003/5)	and	whale	watching	
(Lawrence/Phillips	2004).	Moral	scruples	linked	to	religious,	cultural	or	societal	values	had	to	
be	bridged	before	stable	market	exchanges	could	emerge.	Regulatory	determinations	as	to	
the	legal	status	of	a	good	or	service	may	differ	across	jurisdictions	and	time	distantiations,	
offering	moral	windfalls	to	actors.		
	
The	corollary	is	also	true:	The	economic	exchange	for	certain	goods	–	such	as	wildlife	products	
–	was	legal	and	legitimate	until	regulators	declared	otherwise.	Ideally,	the	regulation	of	a	
formerly	legal	activity	or	product	should	involve	a	protracted	process	of	public	consultation	
with	affected	constituents,	negotiation,	drafting,	and	implementation.	Illegalization	per	se	
presents	a	socio-political	process	rather	than	a	static	condition,	likely	to	lead	to	social	and	
cultural	biases	that	tend	to	favour	the	preferences	of	the	rule-makers	(Heyman	2013:	304).	It	
is	important	to	note	the	significant	role	of	the	state,	regulatory	authorities	and	law	
enforcement	agencies	in	determining	legal	rules	and	norms	about	the	legality	or	illegality	of	
economic	exchange.	The	influence	of	professional	knowledge,	scientific	insights,	and	
disciplinary	regimes	is	likewise	not	to	be	discounted	in	the	process	of	legalization	or	
illegalization	(Heyman	2013:	306).	A	further	dimension	relates	to	the	sponsors	of	legal	rules	
and	norms,	who	may	be	economic	elites	or	corporations	seeking	to	protect	their	economic	
interests.	Moreover,	the	history	of		“overrule	that	either	suspended	legalities	or	deployed	
them	to	authorize	predation	and	criminalize	opposition”	has	led	the	poor	and	marginalized	
strata	of	postcolonial	society	in	southern	Africa	to	continue	to	distrust	the	state	and	its	
perceived	anti-poor	policies	by	(Comaroff/Comaroff	2006:	11).	The	following	observation	is	
insightful	in	this	regard:	
	
“As	privatization	and	enclosure	create	new	forms	of	property,	they	simultaneously	
define	new	forms	of	theft,	from	piracy	and	poaching	to	cloning	and	hacking.	Such	
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practices	are	not	always	deemed	illegitimate	across	social	and	national	divides.”	
(Comaroff/Comaroff	2006:	11)	
	
Of	significance	to	this	dissertation	is	thus	another	analytical	issue	concerning	the	illegal	status	
of	an	economic	exchange:	What	happens	when	the	economic	exchange	of	a	good	is	declared	
illegal	at	a	specific	point	in	time,	outlawing	or	banning	an	exchange	that	was	legal	and	
legitimate	up	until	the	prohibition	takes	effect?	Put	differently:	How	does	the	social	legitimacy	
or	illegitimacy	of	a	ban	affect	the	emergence	and	functioning	of	an	illegal	market?	Moreover,	
prohibition	only	applies	to	one	stage	or	segment	of	the	economic	exchange	in	some	economic	
exchanges.	A	changed	legal	status	of	a	good	further	downstream	or	upstream	may	be	
unknown	to	market	actors	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	10).	A	further	question	is	what	happens	
in	scenarios	where	international	actors	(such	as	a	multi-lateral	treaty	organization)	impose	a	
ban	that	lacks	legitimacy	at	the	local	level.	The	poaching	of	endangered	wildlife,	for	example,	
is	illegal	in	so-called	range	countries,53	whereas	trade	hovers	in	a	gray	zone	between	legality	
and	illegality,	and	consumption	is	socially	legitimate	in	consumer	countries.	Noteworthy	is	the	
partial	ban	on	the	trade	in	rhino	horn;	the	sale	of	live	rhinos	and	trophy	hunting	of	white	
rhinos	is	allowed	in	a	few	jurisdictions	while	a	full	trade	ban	applies	elsewhere.	Pre–
Convention54	processed	ivory	is	traded	legally	in	many	jurisdictions	whereas	no	commercial	
trade	of	post–Convention	raw	ivory	is	allowed	in	CITES	member	states.		
	
The	notion	of	‘contested	illegality’	is	introduced	in	this	dissertation	to	capture	a	legitimation	
strategy	employed	by	important	actors	to	justify	their	participation	in	illegal	or	gray	flows	of	
rhino	horn.	Such	actors	might	not	accept	the	law	on	the	books	for	a	variety	of	reasons	
including	the	perceived	unfairness	of	the	ban,	divergent	social	or	cultural	norms	that	clash	
with	the	ban,	or	they	might	not	accept	the	law	for	politico-historical	reasons.	Contestation	of	
the	law	on	the	books	may	be	linked	to	issues	of	agency.	Who	are	the	rule-makers?	Were	
important	and	affected	constituencies	consulted	before	the	enactment	of	the	ban?	How	is	the	
ban	implemented?	Divergent	views	regarding	the	legitimacy	of	a	prohibition-based	system	are	
likely	to	influence	the	functioning	of	illegal	markets.	It	will	be	argued	that	the	mechanism	of	
																																																						
53	Range	counties	refer	to	countries	where	specific	populations	of	wildlife	occur	in	the	‘wild’.	South	Africa,	
Namibia,	Kenya,	Swaziland	and	Zimbabwe	are	key	African	rhino	range	states.	
	
54	CITES	came	into	force	in	1977.	Any	wildlife	products	that	predated	the	enactment	of	CITES	can	be	traded	in	
most	CITES	members	states	provided	that	provenance	can	be	shown.	
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contested	illegality	is	closely	linked	to	the	valuation	of	the	banned	good	or	service.	The	
coordination	problem	of	valuation	is	unpacked	in	the	next	subsection;	suffice	to	mention	here	
that	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacral	good	or	as	a	miracle	cure	is	likely	to	override	concerns	
regarding	the	legal	status	and	provenance	of	rhino	horn.	The	other	coordination	problems	
considered	in	this	dissertation	–	competition,	cooperation,	and	security	–	are	also	influenced	
by	contested	illegality.	These	relationships	will	be	further	unpacked	in	the	relevant	
subsections.	
	
Following	the	trajectory	of	the	argument,	actors	may	contest	the	illegal	status	of	the	good	–	
rhino	horn	–	due	to	different	cultural	meanings,	political	jurisdictions	with	conflicting	or	non-
existent	regulations	about	its	legal	status,	spatial–temporal	considerations	and	other	social	
mechanisms.	This	dissertation	will	show	that	important	actors	refuse	to	accept	the	illegality	of	
the	rhino	horn	exchange	based	on	their	valuation	of	rhinos	and	rhino	horn.	Instead	of	bridging	
moral	scruples	linked	to	the	illegality	of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn,	these	actors	defy	the	ban	and	
legitimize	their	transgressions	through	their	valuation	of	rhinos	and	rhino	horn.	The	
legitimizing	mechanism	of	contested	illegality	thus	facilitates	the	flow	of	rhino	horn	from	the	
source	to	the	market.	Chapter	5	on	the	international	regulatory	system	highlights	historical,	
conceptual	and	political	issues	that	impact	the	legitimacy	of	the	ban.	Subsequent	chapters	
explain	how	the	trade	ban	is	intertwined	with	land	use	and	hunting	rights	of	local	
communities	living	in	or	close	to	conservation	areas.	
	
	
1.3.4	Resolving	coordination	problems	in	illegal	markets	
	
To	study	the	operation	and	structure	of	illegal	markets	systematically,	Beckert	and		
Wehinger	(2013:	12)	propose	the	use	of	the	typology	of	coordination	problems.	The	point	of	
departure	lies	in	the	recognition	that	for	markets	to	operate	“uncertainty	in	market	
transactions	must	be	reduced	in	several	dimensions”	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	12).	
Uncertainty	in	markets	stems	from	the	three	coordination	problems	concerning	value,	
competition,	and	cooperation.	Actors	in	illegal	markets	are	likely	to	be	confronted	with	
coordination	problems	similar	to	those	of	legal	markets,	subject	to	additional	challenges	due	
to	the	illegality	of	the	market	exchanges	(Beckert/Wehinger	2011:	7).	While	Beckert	and	
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Wehinger	(ibid)	argue	that	market	actors	require	“stable	worlds”	(Fligstein	cited	in:	Beckert	
2007:	23)	and	calculability	to	reproduce	legal	and	illegal	markets,	this	dissertation	argues	
against	the	notion	of	stability	in	illegal	markets.	Reuter	(1983)	introduced	the	notion	of	
‘disorganized	crime’,	suggesting	the	supply	of	illegal	commodities	takes	place	in	a	
disorganized	manner	due	to	the	constraint	imposed	by	illegality	and	the	lack	of	large-scale	
criminal	enterprises	in	illegal	markets	(Paoli	2002:	52).	Market	actors	may	seek	to	reduce	
uncertainty	in	illegal	markets;	however,	they	might	not	be	seeking	‘stable	worlds’	as	stability	
and	predictability	constitute	operational	weaknesses,	which	could	be	exploited	by	regulators	
(especially	law	enforcement	agencies)	who	seek	to	disrupt	illegal	markets.	The	coordination	
problems	of	value,	competition	and	cooperation	are	unpacked	in	the	following	sections.	An	
additional	coordination	problem	–	the	problem	of	security	–	is	introduced.	
	
	
a) The	coordination	problem	of	value	
	
The	problem	of	value	refers	to	“the	assignment	of	value	to	a	certain	category	of	goods	(for	
instance,	cars,	wine,	travel)	and	second,	to	the	assignment	of	different	values	to	
heterogeneous	products	within	the	same	market”	(Beckert	2011b:	764).	During	the	process	of	
valuation,	products	are	ranked	according	to	functionality	or	status	they	bestow	upon	the	
consumer.	While	actors	in	legal	markets	may	have	access	to	marketing,	advertising	resources,	
and	product	reviews,	the	suppliers’	role	in	preference	formation	and	the	consumer’s	access	
regarding	product	quality	may	be	limited	in	illegal	markets	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	12).	
However,	the	reputation	of	traders,	‘word	of	mouth’	referrals	and	product	reviews	in	online	
market–places	like	the	now	defunct	Silk	Road55	may	assist	market	actors	on	both	ends	of	the	
supply	chain	in	making	informed	choices.	This	dissertation	will	show	that	consumers	have	
developed	innovative	strategies	to	ensure	provenance	and	quality	control	in	illegal	rhino	horn	
markets.			
																																																						
55	Silk	Road	gained	notoriety	as	an	on–line	global	market–place	for	selling	mostly	drugs	and	related	
paraphernalia.	Operational	since	2011	and	effectively	shut	down	in	2014,	users	could	buy	drugs	with	the	
Internet–based	currency	Bitcoin.	Crowdsourcing	techniques	were	used	to	vet	best	sellers	and	identify	scammers.	
Consumers	avoided	street-based	transactions	with	the	associated	risks	of	violence	and	possibly	getting	“ripped	
off”.	They	also	could	do	quality	checks	and	price	comparisons	(Silk	Road	Drugs	2014).	Similar	sites	have	sprung	
up	since	the	much-publicized	arrest	of	the	alleged	mastermind	of	Silk	Road	in	February	2014.	
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Rhino	horn	falls	into	the	category	of	illegal	wildlife	products.	It	has	both	functional	and	
investment	value	in	that	it	is	used	in	traditional	medicines,	and	status	is	attributed	to	those	
able	to	afford	it.	Interestingly,	Asian	rhino	horn	is	valued	higher	than	the	horn	of	African	
species,	and	even	fake	rhino	horn	is	attributed	with	value.		Cognitive	frames	play	an	important	
role	in	the	process	of	valuation	as	they	enable	the	mental	organization	of	the	social	
environment.	Social	norms	and	rules	form	part	of	socially	inscribed	meaning	structures	
operating	in	a	market	field	through	which	the	various	actors	assess	situations	and	define	their	
responses	(Beckert	2010:	9).	This	dissertation	examines	social,	cultural	and	normative	beliefs	
as	they	relate	to	the	relationship	between	humans	and	nature.	With	its	prehistoric	features	
reminiscent	of	mammoths	and	other	creatures	long	gone,	the	rhino	has	been	compared	to	
mystical	images	such	as	the	unicorn	–	(for	example:	Unicorns	are	real	2009)	and	popular	
memes	on	social	media	platforms	of	the	rhino	as	a	“unicorn	with	curves”.	Actors	along	the	
supply	chain	assign	different	physical	(physical	performance	of	a	good)	and	symbolic	values	
(consists	of	imaginative	value	that	actors	ascribe	to	an	object	and	positional	value	ascribed	to	
an	object,	positioning	the	owner	in	the	social	space)	to	rhino	horn	(Beckert	2011a).	Poachers,	
wildlife	professionals,	conservators,	environmental	activists	and	consumers	attach	different	
cognitive	meanings	to	the	rhino	as	a	wild	beast	and	its	product,	the	rhino	horn.	It	will	be	
argued	that	these	cognitive	frames	and	associated	meanings	are	steeped	in	cultural	frames	
about	the	human–nature	nexus.	Can	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn	be	explained	in	reference	to	
cultural	frames?	Is	the	process	of	valuation	accompanied	by	process	of	sacralization56	of	rhino	
horn?	In	other	words,	have	cultural	frames	led	to	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacred	or	
magical	good?	Zelizer	distinguishes	between	“profane”,	“magical”	and	“sacred”	money	in	her	
research	on	the	life	insurance	industry	in	19th	century	America	(Zelizer	[1978]	1992:	291	-	
293).	In	borrowing	from	Zelizer,	profane	valuation	refers	to	the	valuation	of	goods	as	worldly,	
while	sacred	valuation	refers	to	transcendental	community	norms.	Of	importance	is	thus	a	
clear	delineation	of	the	different	factors	that	bear	on	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn,	the	
instrumentality	of	rhino	horn	(what	is	it	used	for)	and	how	different	actors	value	rhino	horn	at	
																																																						
56	Sacralization	refers	to	a	process	during	which		“value	shapes	[the]	price,	investing	it	with	social,	religious	or	
sentimental	meaning”	(Zelizer	[1985]	1994:	21).		
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different	stages	of	the	value	chain.	Moreover,	I	shall	investigate	whether	rhino	horn	has	
become	a	commodity	of	conspicuous	consumption.57		
	
A	further	consideration	pertains	to	the	notion	of	contested	illegality.	As	per	the	earlier	
section,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	is	closely	linked	to	the	legitimization	
device	of	contested	illegality.	The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	trumps	its	illegal	status	across	
important	actor	groups,	facilitating	its	flow	from	source	to	market.	
	
	
b) The	coordination	problem	of	competition	
	
The	second	coordination	problem	relates	to	the	issue	of	competition.	It	is	in	the	interest	of	
producers	and	suppliers	to	set	up	market	structures	that	provide	protection	against	
competitive	pricing	as	to	ascertain	viable	profit	margins.	Producers,	intermediaries	and	the	
state	compete	for	positions	in	the	formal	economy,	which	may	result	in	cartelization,	
monopolization,	product	differentiation,	innovation,	first–mover	advantages,	barriers	to	entry	
and	legal	regulations	that	determine	the	rules	of	engagement	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	14).	
While	the	state	provides	some	ground	rules	in	the	formal	economy,	illegal	market	actors	
regulate	competition	to	varying	degrees	themselves.	
	
Scholars	have	linked	the	self-regulation	of	competition	in	illegal	markets	to	the	use	or	threat	
of	violent	means	of	persuasion	and	corruption	(corruption	is	discussed	in	more	detail	below).	
The	earlier	discussion	of	the	different	models	of	organized	crime	made	reference	to	the	use	or	
threat	of	violence	by	some	criminal	entities	in	a	bid	to	enforce	contractual	obligations	in	illegal	
markets.	Reuter	(2009:	275)	argues	that	violence	may	be	a	feature	of	some	illegal	markets	
due	to	the	following	characteristics	typical	of	illegal	economic	exchanges:		
	
“The	markets	for	illegal	goods	and	services	operate	without	the	usual	protections	
against	fraud	and	violence	offered	by	the	court	system.	The	state	instead	of	
attempting	to	facilitate	transactions,	aims	to	disrupt	them.	Contracts	cannot	be	
enforced	through	written	documents	and	the	legal	system;	agreements	are	made	
																																																						
57	In	his	thesis	on	the	“leisure	class”,	Veblen	(1899)	argued	that	wealthy	individuals	often	consume	highly	
conspicuous	goods	and	services	in	order	to	showcase	their	wealth,	thereby	achieving	greater	social	status.	
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hurriedly,	sometimes	in	ambiguous	code,	and	orally.	Territories	cannot	be	allocated	
through	bidding	for	desirable	locations,	since	there	is	no	enforceable	ownership	of	
property	for	these	purposes.”	
	
While	some	of	the	mentioned	characteristics	deal	with	contract	enforcement,	the	power	
vacuum	and	opportunities	for	violence	due	the	absence	of	an	“independent”	arbitrator58	in	
illegal	markets,	others	(such	as	territorial	disputes)	deal	implicitly	with	matters	of	
competition.	Drug	markets	are	often	regarded	as	steeped	in	violence,	further	exacerbated	by	
the	“War	on	Drugs”	rhetoric	and	violent	measures	used	to	disrupt	such	markets.	Scholarly	
research	(Reuter	2009;	Reuter/Haaga	1989)	has	however	shown	that	drug	markets	are	
surprisingly	peaceful.	Several	sources	may	generate	violence	in	specific	drug	markets,	such	as	
intra-organizational	issues	(succession	planning	or	disciplinary	action),	inter-organizational	
issues	(territorial	or	transactional)	and	conflict	between	illegal	drug	market	actors	and	the	
state	or	its	representatives	(Reuter	2009:	275).	Reuter	and	Pollack	(2012)	show	that	the	travel	
distances	of	sellers	and	buyers	have	implications	for	violence	on	drug	markets.	Import	
markets	consisting	of	local	buyers	and	foreign	sellers	displayed	the	highest	levels	of	violence,	
suggesting	that	social	ties	between	buyers	and	sellers	may	reduce	the	readiness	to	use	
violence.	Gambetta	(1996:	1-2)	refers	to	the	Sicilian	mafia’s	trade	in	protection	services.	To	
him,	the	mafia’s	provision	of	protection	entails	an	insurance	policy	during	economic	
exchanges,	which	functions	as	“	a	poor	and	costly	substitute	of	trust”	(Gambetta	1996:	2).		
According	to	Paoli	(2002:	64-65),	illegal	entrepreneurs	will	resort	to	fraud	and	violence	to	get	
whatever	they	can	and	“resort	to	peaceful	dickering	only	where	they	are	confronted	with	a	
power	equal	to	their	own	or	where	they	regard	it	as	shrewd	to	do	so	for	the	sake	of	future	
exchange	opportunities”.	The	scholars	rely	on	the	artificial	division	of	‘underworld’	and	
‘upperworld’	typical	of	the	organized	crime	discourse,	allowing	limited	scope	for	the	nefarious	
activities	of	legal	actors.	Reuter	(1983:	187),	on	the	other	hand,	postulates	that	the	“magic	of	
the	marketplace”	resolves	the	distribution	of	illegal	goods	and	services	in	illegal	markets,	with	
the	“visible	hand”	of	violence	and	corruption	often	getting	trounced	by	market	economics.		
	
A	first	glance	at	the	illegal	rhino	horn	market	appears	to	suggest	that	criminal	actors	exude	a	
propensity	for	violent	means	of	execution,	which	may	also	include	fending	off	potential	
																																																						
58	It	is	acknowledged	that	regulators	may	tweak	regulations	to	suit	the	interests	of	the	state	and	its	non-state	
partners.		
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competitors.	The	act	of	harvesting	rhino	horn	illegally	59	–	the	poaching	of	a	live	rhino	–	is	a	
violent	act	per	se,	involving	the	wilful	killing	of	a	wild	animal.	The	question	arising	here	is	
whether	violence	is	reproduced	along	the	flow.	How	do	poachers,	kingpins,	wildlife	
professionals	and	others	deal	with	competition?	Does	rhino	poaching	lead	to	further	acts	or	
threats	of	violence	between	illegal	market	actors?	A	further	consideration	pertains	to	the	
dwindling	numbers	of	rhinos.	If	competition	is	found	to	be	“peaceful”	(as	per	Weber’s	
definition	of	competition)	in	the	current	climate,	what	is	the	outlook	as	rhino	numbers	grow	
less?	The	decreasing	rhino	numbers	may	not	only	lead	to	conflict	at	the	source	(with	poachers	
possibly	fighting	one	another	over	the	last	rhinos)	but	also	competitive	pricing	structures	in	
consumer	markets.	
	
Market	actors	may	also	rely	on	corruption	or	collusion	with	representatives	of	the	state	to	
‘take	out’	the	competition.		In	this	instance,	criminal	actors	may	work	in	concert	with	corrupt	
state	agencies	or	individual	agents	of	the	state.	The	state	“is	no	longer	able	to	implement	law	
because	state	officials	(the	agents)	make	law	enforcement	itself	a	tradable	commodity”	
(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	15).	The	practice	of	corruption	in	illegal	markets	is	not	relegated	to	
unlawful	relationships	between	criminal	actors	and	agents	of	the	state	only.	It	can	also	involve	
actors	from	the	formal	economy,	such	as	business	people,	representatives	of	multinational	
corporations	and	from	the	military–industrial	complex.	Corrupt	relationships	may	reduce	
uncertainty	in	illegal	markets	by	lowering	the	prospects	of	effective	law	enforcement	and	
criminal	prosecution	(Dewey	2012).	Contested	illegality	in	this	instance	may	facilitate	the	
participation	of	agents	of	the	state	in	illegal	markets.	If	prohibition	were	to	lack	legitimacy	and	
hence	acceptance	amongst	such	actors,	then	there	might	be	less	moral	scruples	to	participate	
in	illegal	market	transactions.	Corruption	of	state	agents	and	collusion	with	industry	
professionals	plays	a	significant	role	along	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain.	Such	strategies	are	
employed	at	several	nodes	from	the	point	of	origin	through	to	the	final	destination	of	the	
rhino	horn.	As	will	be	shown	in	later	chapters,	targeted	or	conditional	law	enforcement	plays	
an	significant	role	in	‘taking	out	the	competition’.		
	
																																																						
59	While	criminal	actors	can	employ	non-lethal	means	of	horn	removal	(such	as	the	darting	of	rhinos),	the	
harvesting	of	horn	usually	involves	the	killing	of	the	rhino.	
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In	looking	at	the	career	advancement	of	a	celebrated	drug	smuggler	‘Mr	Nice’,	Morselli	(2001:	
228)	found	that	Burt’s	structural	hole	argument60	offered	a	nuanced	alternative	to	framing	
competition	of	criminal	entrepreneurs:	
	
“Structuring	one’s	personal	working	network	to	include	trade	members	who	are	not	
directly	connected	to	each	other	but	who	may	have	interests	in	dealing	with	one	
another	represents	a	cooperative	way	of	being	competitive.	The	combination	of	
reputation,	know-how,	consistent	and	quick	access	to	privileged	information	sources,	
and	non-redundant	personal	networking	gives	a	player	the	competitive	edge	needed	
for	further	advancement.”	
	
The	maintenance	of	social	ties	that	stretch	beyond	one’s	social	group	(heterogeneous	social	
networks),	so	Morselli	argues,	may	thus	provide	a	competitive	advantage	to	criminal	players.	
The	role	of	the	intermediary	and	their	access	to	privileged	information	is	of	interest	here.	
Gambetta	(1996)	shows	the	importance	of	intermediaries	in	his	analysis	of	the	Sicilian	mafia.	
While	mafiosi	sell	guarantees,	patrons	(intermediaries)	sell	information.	In	this	context,	the	
role	of	the	intermediary	is	as	follows	(Gambetta	1996:	18):			
	
“They	provide	introductions,	recommendations,	advice	about	competition	for	public	
contracts,	the	names	of	key	people	to	approach;	they	back	new	legislation	or	
application	for	jobs	and	benefits;	they	translate	client	demands	into	appropriate	
language,	simplify	rules,	and	identify	means	of	avoiding	sanctions	and	obtaining	
favours.”	
	
It	will	be	argued	that	intermediaries	play	a	facilitating	role	between	source	and	market.61	They	
are	not	only	important	transmitters	of	information,	but	they	are	often	people	of	social	ranking	
that	inspire	trustworthiness	to	actors	further	downstream	and	upstream	the	supply	chain.	
																																																						
60	According	to	Burt	(1992:	17-18)	negotiating	early	access,	timing	and	referrals	to	information	may	provide	a	
competitive	advantage	to	savvy	actors.	Such	actors	cultivate	their	business	contacts	prudently	in	order	to	seize	
“structural	holes”.	Burt	differentiates	between	redundant	and	non-redundant	contacts.	The	number	of	non-
redundant	contacts	is	crucial	as	these	might	lead	to	privileged	information.	Redundant	contacts	fail	to	provide	
the	competitive	edge	as	they	lead	to	the	same	people	and	hence	the	same	pool	of	information	available	to	
others.	“Structural	holes”	refer	to	“the	separation	between	non-redundant	contacts”	(Burt	1992:	18).	By	
occupying	a	structural	hole,	actors	are	in	a	position	to	broker	a	deal	with	previously	unconnected	players.	
	
	
61	Intermediaries	are	significant	to	resolving	the	other	coordination	problems	too	due	to	their	central	role	in	
supply	chains.	They	provide	a	linkage	between	actors	further	upstream	and	downstream	the	supply	chain	and	
thereby	play	an	active	role	in	valuation	and	cooperation,	as	well	as	security	of	illegal	market	structures.	
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Intermediaries	may	well	have	seized	structural	holes	in	negotiating	their	role	in	illegal	and	
gray	flows,	and	as	will	be	argued	later,	in	legal	flows.	As	suggested	in	the	literature,	it	would	
appear	axiomatic	that	actors	from	the	legal	sector	command	a	competitive	advantage	in	
negotiating	the	flow	of	illegal	goods	where	a	legal	parallel	market	exists.	Such	actors	would	be	
apprised	of	regulatory	loopholes	and	the	tricks	of	the	trade.	They	also	have	intimate	
knowledge	of	supply	and	distribution	dynamics	along	legal	goods	flows	and	the	available	pool	
of	trade	partners.	Actors	with	heterogeneous	social	networks,	experience	in	legal	flows	and	
adaptability	(the	ability	to	react	swiftly	to	new	impulses)	are	significant	arbitrators	and	
facilitators	of	illegal	flows	with	a	coordinating	role	that	may	affect	cooperation,	competition,	
valuation,	and	security.	
	
A	further	consideration	relates	to	limited	competition	when	it	comes	to	determining	or	
accepting	the	pricing	of	goods	on	illegal	markets.	It	becomes	increasingly	difficult	to	
determine	“the	price/quality	nexus”	as	goods	move	along	the	value	chain	from	producer	to	
consumers.	Suppliers	and	customers	have	imperfect	information	about	both	quality	and	
prices	of	goods,	which	“distorts	competition”	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	16).	While	the	
demand	for	rhino	horn	has	ancient	cultural	roots,	one	cannot	automatically	assume	that	the	
market	is	purely	demand-driven.	Due	to	the	risk	associated	with	the	procurement	and	
transportation	of	rhino	horn,	horn	producers	and	intermediaries	may	be	able	to	leverage	the	
price	of	the	horn.	A	further	train	of	thought	pertains	to	the	high	incidence	of	fakes	entering	at	
various	stages	of	the	supply	chain.	Do	illegal	market	actors	consider	fake	rhino	horn	producers	
and	traders	as	competition?	What	impact	has	the	fake	rhino	horn	market	on	demand	and	
quality	control?	
	
	
c)	The	coordination	problem	of	cooperation	
	
Actors	also	have	to	face	the	coordination	problem	of	cooperation.	The	possibility	of	a	breach	
of	contract	or	non–performance	constitutes	a	risk	to	any	economic	exchange.	In	illegal	
markets,	these	risks	arise	from	“asymmetric	distribution	of	information	regarding	the	price,	
product	quality	and	the	possible	opportunism	of	exchange	partners	in	light	of	incomplete	or	
non–enforceable	contracts”	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	17).		
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Portes	and	Haller	identify	the	“paradox	of	embeddedness”	in	their	analysis	of	informal	
economies.	In	the	absence	of	state	regulation	in	informal	economies,	there	are	opportunities	
“for	violations	of	normative	expectations	and	widespread	fraud”	(Portes/Haller	2005:	406).	
The	paradox	lies	in	the	contention	that	the	more	the	informal	economy	approaches	the	ideal	
of	an	unfettered	market	exchange,	“the	more	it	is	dependent	on	social	ties	for	its	effective	
functioning”	(Portes/Haller	2005:	407).	The	significance	of	social	embeddedness	is	particularly	
clear	in	transactions	“where	the	only	recourse	against	malfeasance	is	mutual	trust	by	virtue	of	
common	membership	in	some	overarching	social	structure”.	Membership	of	the	same	social	
network	or	shared	social/cultural	identities	combined	with	the	certainty	that	wrongdoers	will	
be	penalized	or	excluded	from	future	transactions	bolsters	and	sustains	trust	(Portes	2010:	
136-137).	Gambetta’s	definition	of	trust	is	useful	in	this	instance.	Gambetta	(1988a:	217)	
defines	trust	as	“	a	particular	level	of	the	subjective	probability	with	which	an	agent	assesses	
that	another	agent	or	group	of	agents	will	perform	a	particular	action,	both	before	he	can	
monitor	such	action	(or	independently	of	his	capacity	ever	to	be	able	to	monitor	it)	and	in	a	
context	in	which	it	affects	his	own	action.”	
	
Portes	and	Haller	allude	to	significant	differences	between	informal	and	illegal	business	
practices.62	Illegality	robs	actors	of	legal	protection	of	property	rights	usually	provided	by	the	
state	for	legal	market	transactions	and	limits	the	business	strategies	and	organizational	forms	
available	to	actors	(Beckert/Wehinger	2011:	1).	The	state	does	not	enforce	contracts	in	illegal	
markets;	actors	thus	have	to	rely	on	different	enforcement	strategies,	such	as	the	use	or	
threat	of	violence	(Portes/Haller	2005).	Despite	the	absence	of	the	state,	Portes	and	Haller	
argue	that	actors	in	legal	and	illegal	markets	share	similar	systems	of	enforcement	and	
redress.	The	enforcement	of	contracts	or	removal	of	competitors	can	be	outsourced	to	
protection	brackets	(Beckert/Wehinger	2013:	15).		In	the	African	context,	the	trade	in	gems,	
gold,	ivory	and	other	high–value	export	products	is	often	highly	organized.	Major	exporters	
need	to	be	associates	or	members	of	organizations	that	are	either	“quasi–political”	or	“quasi–
																																																						
62	Beckert	and	Wehinger	(2013:	11)	argue	that	there	are	different	research	foci	in	studies	of	informal	and	illegal	
markets.	Conceptually,	studies	on	the	informal	economy	focus	on	how	poor	people	eke	out	a	living	beyond	state	
regulation;	meanwhile,	research	into	illegal	markets	looks	into	market	structures	and	coordination	problems	
beyond	the	realm	of	lawfulness.	
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criminal”	in	nature	as	the	exploitation	of	such	resources	requires	“the	exercise	or	threat	of	
physical	force”	(Ellis/MacGaffey	1996:	36).63		
	
However,	not	all	actors	in	illegal	markets	are	prone	to	use	violence	to	enforce	contracts.	
Violent	behaviour	or	the	threat	of	violence	is	likely	to	obtain	attention	from	unwanted	
spectators,	such	as	law	enforcement	agencies	or	the	media.	Unless	these	actors	are	actively	
seeking	out	attention	to	propel	their	business	interests	or	to	gain	a	reputation	for	a	
propensity	for	violence,	they	are	likely	to	forego	unwanted	attention.	The	reliance	upon	
relationships	based	on	trust	or	economic	exchanges	secured	through	corrupt	transactions	
constitutes	an	alternative	strategy	to	enforce	contracts,	and	may	also	circumvent	detection	
from	law	enforcement	(see	the	previous	subsection).	Moreover,	the	legitimization	device	of	
contested	illegality	may	sway	actors	to	cooperate	in	illegal	markets.		
	
Granovetter	(1985:	481-482)	introduces	the	notion	of	“honour	amongst	thieves”	in	a	case	
study	of	embezzlement	in	the	business	community.	He	argues	that	malfeasance	not	be	
possible	without	prior	existing	relationships	of	trust.	Gambetta	(1988a)	shows	however	that	
trust	may	grow	as	a	result	of	cooperation	rather	than	as	a	precondition	of	cooperation	
(compare	with	the	section	on	security).	Beckert	and	Wehinger	(2013)	argue	that	while	formal	
institutions,	social	networks,	and	cognitive	frames	are	necessary	for	the	stabilization	of	
market	exchanges	in	the	formal	sector,	illegal	markets	are	likely	to	rely	more	heavily	on	
personal	networks	and	trust	to	solve	coordination	problems.	Personalized	networks	based	on	
the	right	combination	of	arm’s	length	and	embedded	ties	(compare	with	the	notion	of	
‘integrated	networks’	in	Uzzi	1997)	and	reputation	based	on	social	kinship	are	likely	to	feature	
prominently.	While	some	actors	use	violence	or	the	threat	of	violence	to	enforce	contracts	in	
illegal	markets,	others	employ	corruption	to	secure	illegal	market	transactions.	The	
trustworthiness	of	new	business	partners	might	also	get	tested	(Gambetta	2009).		
	
A	diverse	assortment	of	actors	with	potentially	deep	cleavages		–	stretching	from	different	
languages,	nationalities,	cultural	backgrounds,	social	strata	to	ethnicity	–	is	involved	in	illegal	
and	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn.		Beyond	bridging	social,	cultural	and	other	differences	locally,	
																																																						
63	Liberian	warlord	Charles	Taylor,	former	UNITA	rebel	commander	Jonas	Savimbi	and	brokers	on	behalf	of	the	
apartheid	regime	in	South	Africa,	Mugabe’s	regime	in	Zimbabwe	and	RENAMO	negotiated	import–export	deals,	
which	were	protected	by	the	might	of	the	sword.	
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these	actors	also	have	to	establish	and	maintain	relationships	with	overseas	trading	partners	
in	suboptimal	conditions.	How	is	this	achieved?	Moreover,	what	is	the	role	of	intermediaries	
(see	the	previous	section)?	This	diverse	collection	of	actors,	their	personalized	networks,	and	
mechanisms	employed	to	evade	detection	from	law	enforcement	should	glean	interesting	
insights	on	how	illegal	markets	are	structured	and	operate	under	precarious	conditions.		
	
	
(d) The	coordination	problem	of	security	
	
The	production,	distribution	and	consumption	of	goods	and	services	traded	in	illegal	markets	
lead	to	another	coordination	problem,	the	problem	of	security.	Security	in	this	instance	
constitutes	a	multi-dimensional	problem	with	implications	for	the	personal	security	of	market	
actors,	security	of	the	supply	chain	and	the	illegal	goods	or	services	traded	in	illegal	markets	
and	the	potential	addition	of	a	security	premium	added	to	the	cost	of	illegal	goods.	Security	
measures	and	protection	(see	subsection	on	competition)	can	be	procured	locally	but	how	do	
actors	ensure	the	security	of	the	supply	chain,	the	safe	transfer	of	illegal	goods	from	source	to	
market	and	payment	for	the	goods	and	transfer	costs?		
	
The	coordination	problem	of	security	proposed	here	is	qualitatively	different	from	the	
problem	of	cooperation.	In	fact,	illegal	market	actors	have	to	strike	a	careful	balance	between	
cooperation	on	the	one	hand,	and	security	on	the	other.	While	cooperation	may	entail	
partnerships	and	resource	sharing,	security	may	curtail	cooperative	efforts	in	favour	of	
secrecy	and	concealment	(Morselli	2008:	63).	Ken	Hawkeye	Gross	(1992:	cover	page)	points	to	
the	dilemma	that	actors	face	by	surmising,	“…mistakes	can	cost	not	just	dollars	and	market	
share,	but	years	of	one’s	life”.	Central	to	what	Morselli	et	al.	(2007:	145)	describe	as	the	
“efficiency-security	trade	off”	is	whether	criminal	network	actors	can	rely	exclusively	on	
trusting	relationships	or	whether	they	have	to	engage	in	uncertain	and	potentially	risky	
relationships.	Reducing	risk	and	thereby	increasing	security	leads	to	a	sacrifice	in	terms	of	
time	and	efficiency,	as	“each	operation	and	the	transmission	of	information	take	longer	to	
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process	across	the	network”	(ibid).	In	reference	to	transaction	cost	theory,64	Basu	(2014:	4)	
proposes	that	due	to	regulatory	attempts	to	disrupt	illicit	trade	chains,	actors	have	to	factor	in	
“direct	or	indirect	costs	of	exchange	(concealment,	corruption,	evasion),	as	well	as	be	
prepared	to	write	off	a	certain	percentage	of	their	profits	due	to	circumstances	involving	
contraband	shipments	being	seized	by	customs	or	police”.	The	question	arising	here	is	
whether	the	suggested	security	premium	leads	to	an	escalation	of	the	overall	price	of	an	
illegal	good	or	whether	actors	can	conceive	of	innovative	mechanisms	that	increase	both	
efficiency	and	security	of	the	illegal	supply	chain.	The	illegal	and	transnational	status	of	goods	
may	perhaps	lead	to	cost	savings	elsewhere,	such	as	tax	and	tariffs	avoidance	or	a	structural	
adaptation	of	the	supply	chain	(e.g.	fewer	segments	or	shorter	more	direct	routes).	A	further	
consideration	relates	to	whether	all	market	actors	are	equally	affected	by	security	
considerations	and	precautions.	Are	certain	flows	or	segments	of	the	supply	chain	more	prone	
to	danger	than	others?	How	do	security	considerations	affect	the	flow	of	goods?		
	
The	issue	of	incomplete	information	is	also	of	importance	here.	The	notion	of	bounded	
rationality65	is	only	partially	useful	in	assessing	how	illegal	market	actors	might	deal	with	
assessing	security	risks	in	light	of	incomplete	information	available	to	them,	and	whether	they	
encounter	an	incomplete	information/security	dilemma.	In	following	the	trajectory	of	the	
bounded	rationality	argument,	there	may	be	a	mismatch	between	the	decision-making	
environment	(the	market	exchange	is	deemed	illegal)	and	the	decision	maker’s	choice	(Jones,	
B.	D.	1999:	298).	The	implicit	goal-oriented	rational	choice	approach	(for	more	details	see:	
Beckert	2003;	Dewey	2014b)	provides	limited	insights	as	to	how	illegal	market	actors	
undertake	security	assessments,	how	cultural	frames	and	social	embeddedness	may	influence	
choices.	The	social	embeddedness	of	illegal	markets	actors,	for	example,	may	provide	
operational	information	about	their	immediate	environment	and	their	social	network.	How	is	
																																																						
64	Transaction	costs	relate	to	the	costs	of	participating	in	a	market.	Williamson	(1989)	argued	that	frequency	of	
the	exchange,	specificity,	uncertainty,	limited	rationality	and	opportunistic	behaviour	are	determinants	of	such	
costs.	
65	According	to	the	notion	of	bounded	rationality	(Simon	1972),	the	pool	of	available	information,	the	actor’s	
cognitive	limitations	and	time	available	to	take	a	decision	might	explain	an	‘irrational’	decision	that	does	not	
optimize	utility	(profit).	
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information	about	actors	and	transactions	upstream	and	downstream	attained?	Do	the	
goalposts	change	as	the	product	travels	with	the	flow?	How	do	actors	ensure	payments?		
	
In	sociological	research	on	cross-border	trade	in	Medieval	Europe,	Quack	(2009)	found	that	
the	provision	of	security	was	a	prerequisite	for	such	trade	to	emerge.	Merchants	joined	in	
trading	communities.	These	self–regulatory	associative	orders	controlled	exclusive	trading	
rights	in	their	home	base	and	provided	protection,	information	sharing	and	social	bonding.	
The	emergence	of	an	interregional	financial	circuit,	maritime	insurance	and	early	forms	of	
transfer	pricing,	overdraft	facilities	and	credit	notes	further	eased	transnational	trade.	Cross-
border	law	and	regulatory	enforcement	were	equally	important,	including	the	extra-
jurisdictional	expansion	of	domestic	law,	the	emergence	of	specific	local	laws	in	trade	hubs	
and	the	signing	of	inter-city	agreements	allowing	for	mutual	jurisdiction	in	conflict	resolution	
(Quack	2009:	135–136).	African	migrant	trading	communities	had	crossed	huge	regions	of	
Africa	on	horseback,	donkey	or	camel	before	political	borderlines	drawn	by	colonial	rulers	
divided	tribes,	communities	and	clans.	Alliances	were	forged	between	local	entrepreneurs	and	
foreign	merchants	during	colonial	times	with	the	explicit	objective	of	supplying	overseas	
markets	with	exotic	goods	such	as	tea,	spices	and	ivory.	The	ability	to	engage	in	illicit	cross-
border	trade	continues	to	hinge	on	these	historical	connections	and	social	ties	to	holders	of	
political	office	and	the	quality	of	such	political	contacts	(Ellis/MacGaffey	1996:	31).	Ellis	argues	
that	transnational	trade	occupies	a	“crucial	strategic	position”	in	Africa	due	to	a	scarcity	of	
foreign	exchange	to	buy	manufactured	goods,	which	“can	play	a	vital	role	in	the	construction	
of	a	political	power-base”	(ibid).	The	access	to	hard	currency	such	as	US	Dollars	is	crucial	to	
enter	and	sustain	market	position:	“…	a	successful	exporter	from	Africa	requires	not	only	the	
usual	range	of	commercial	skills	and	capital,	but	also	political,	and	often	also	physical,	
protection	(Ellis/MacGaffey	1996:	34).”	Similar	to	the	trade	associations	in	Medieval	Europe,	
Ellis	also	identified	the	formation	of	trade	associations	of	Africans	with	fellow	Africans	living	in	
the	diaspora.	The	advantages	are	manifold	such	as	restricting	the	profits	to	members	of	a	
distinct	social	group	(usually	kin),	vertical	integration	of	the	trade	(e.g.	Nigerians	marketing	
drugs	in	European	or	US	cities	on	behalf	of	Nigerian	drug	trafficking	networks)	and	secure	
access	to	source	and	market	(Ellis/MacGaffey	1996:	37).	
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Of	importance	to	this	dissertation	are	the	mechanisms	employed	by	various	actors	along	the	
supply	chain	to	ensure	their	security	and	that	of	their	agents,	the	security	of	the	supply	chain,	
and	that	of	the	illegal	goods.	Are	the	above-mentioned	trade	associations	of	significance	in	
illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn?	Security	risks	may	arise	from	environmental,	regulatory,	intra-	or	
inter-organizational	factors,	further	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	market	exchanges	are	both	
illegal	and	transnational.	How	does	the	end-user	of	an	illegal	good	ensure	that	it	is	safe	for	
consumption?	How	does	the	buyer	ensure	that	another	actor	upstream	is	not	cheating	her?	
Do	illegal	market	actors	outsource	security?	What	mechanisms	are	employed	to	ensure	
security?	The	legitimization	device	of	contested	illegality	may	secure	the	flow	of	rhino	horn	in	
some	instances.	As	will	be	shown	later,	diplomats	and	agents	of	the	state	have	smuggled	
rhino	horn	from	the	source	to	the	market.	It	would	appear	axiomatic	that	security	concerns	
become	secondary	if	an	illegal	good	is	trafficked	inside	a	diplomatic	pouch.	The	question	
arising	here	is	whether	diplomats	are	recruited	by	illegal	market	actors,	whether	diplomats	
are	instigators,	or	perhaps,	opportunistic	actors.	
	
	
	
1.4	Structure	of	the	dissertation	
	
The	argument	of	the	dissertation	is	that	the	consecutive	conservation	regimes	and	protection	
economies	have	led	to	a	historical	lock-in	that	has	allowed	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	to	
flourish.	Scattered	along	the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality,	important	actors	do	not	
accept	the	trade	ban.	They	use	contested	illegality	as	a	legitimizing	device	to	justify	gray	or	
illegal	economic	activities.	
	
The	dissertation	continues	with	Chapter	2,	which	provides	background	and	justification	for	
the	chosen	research	approach,	selection	of	research	sites,	methods	of	data	collection	and	
analysis.	Many	ethical	issues	arose	during	inception	and	in	the	course	of	the	research	project.	
The	second	part	of	the	chapter	looks	at	issues	of	anonymity	and	confidentiality,	informed	
consent,	power	differentials	between	the	researcher	and	respondents,	reciprocity	and	
security	concerns.		
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Chapter	3	contributes	to	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacred	
good	for	which	consumers	are	willing	to	pay	a	high	price.	The	question	of	demand	and	the	
associated	coordination	problem	of	valuation	are	vital	to	understanding	why	flows	of	rhino	
horn	are	so	difficult	to	disrupt.	This	chapter	deals	with	the	demand	for	rhino	horn	by	tracing	
the	historical	roots	of	its	valuation	as	a	sacred	good	with	status-elevating	qualities.	It	
continues	with	a	short	overview	of	current	uses,	consumer	profiles	and	product	
differentiation.	
	
Chapter	4	points	to	the	path	dependency	of	conservation	regulators.	Wildlife	protection	was	
closely	linked	to	colonial	dispossession,	subjugation,	exploitation	and	loss	of	hunting	rights	of	
the	local	and	indigenous	communities	during	the	colonial	period.	Problematic	conservation	
approaches	and	paradigms	have	led	to	a	historical	lock-in,	where	romantic	and	utopian	
notions	of	‘Africa’s	Wild	Eden’	continue	to	undermine	the	support	and	buy-in	from	local	
communities	in	wildlife	conservation.	The	chapter	also	shows	how	legal	rhino	horn	supplies	
were	established	through	the	economic	valuation	of	rhinos	on	private	land.		
	
Chapter	5	explores	the	international	political	protection	regime	that	led	to	the	illegalization	of	
the	trade	in	rhino	horn.	State	actors	conceived	of	the	multi-lateral	environmental	treaty	more	
than	forty	years	ago.	The	trade	ban	itself	is	ambiguous	as	it	only	concerns	international	trade	
of	rhino	horn,	leaving	space	for	illegal	market	actors	to	manoeuvre	at	the	domestic	level.	
While	most	countries	have	illegalized	rhino	horn	trade,	horn	consumption	continues	to	hover	
in	a	gray	zone.	The	chapter	shines	a	light	on	why	CITES	is	losing	credibility	amongst	state	
actors	and	important	actors	in	the	Global	South	and	why	diffusion	of	trade	bans	may	run	into	
obstacles	in	the	modern	context.	
	
Chapter	6	revolves	around	gray	and	sub-legal	flows	of	rhino	horn.	These	flows	involve	wildlife	
professionals	with	intimate	knowledge	of	rhino	horn,	the	institutional	and	legislative	
framework	governing	the	international	trade	of	rhino	horn.	These	actors	belong	to	influential	
and	transnational	social	networks	with	links	to	political	and	economic	elites	in	supply,	transit	
and	consumer	countries.	A	key	feature	of	these	flows	is	the	exploitation	of	legal	and	
regulatory	loopholes	within	the	system,	as	actors	ride	on	the	edge	of	legality.	
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The	dissertation	continues	with	Chapter	7,	which	deals	with	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horns.	It	is	
argued	that	rhino	poaching	is	not	only	a	crime	driven	by	greed	and	impoverishment	but	also	
motivated	by	environmental	and	social	justice	principles.	This	chapter	demonstrates	the	
historical	lock	in	linked	to	conservation	paradigms,	which	renders	disruption	of	these	flows	a	
difficult	if	not	impossible	undertaking.	The	increasing	militarization	of	anti-poaching	
operations	is	contributing	to	further	alienation	of	local	communities,	which	under	different	
circumstances,	could	act	as	the	first	line	of	defence	against	rhino	poaching.	Actors	in	this	flow	
have	mastered	the	coordination	problems	of	competition,	cooperation	and	security.	
	
The	final	chapter	analyses	fake	and	‘Ersatz’	rhino	horn.	The	chapter	begins	with	the	
differentiation	of	different	types	of	fake	rhino	horn	before	looking	at	actors	involved	in	the	
production	and	distribution	of	such	horns.	The	research	identified	the	role	of	the	rhino	horn	
assessor,	who	fulfils	the	function	of	quality	control	and	risk	mitigation.	The	chapter	illustrates	
how	actors	bridge	several	coordination	problems,	namely	the	coordination	problems	of	value,	
cooperation	and	security.	In	light	of	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn,	it	is	not	surprising	that	
criminal	entrepreneurs	as	well	as	actors	from	the	legal	sector,	have	seized	this	thriving	
business	opportunity.	
	
The	dissertation	concludes	with	an	assessment	of	why	transnational	flows	of	rhino	horns	have	
been	so	difficult	to	disrupt.	
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Chapter	2:	Researching	illegal	markets	
	 	
“The	illegality	of	the	drug	industry	precludes	the	use	of	many	common	research	
sources	and	techniques	and	imposes	strong	constraints	on	the	interpretation	of	
available	information.	The	complexity	of	the	subject	matter	and	the	data	limitations	
make	it	impossible	to	draw	a	complete	and	accurate	picture	of	the	industry.	
Researching	illegal	drugs	is	like	painting	impressionistic	rather	than	realistic	pictures.	
The	painter	hopes	that	the	picture	provides	an	approximate	and	slightly	distorted	
vision	of	reality,	highlighting	the	main	aspects;	he	or	she	does	not	pretend	to	paint	an	
exact	replica.”	(Thoumi	2003:	2)	
	
	
	
2.1	Introduction	
	
Francisco	Thoumi’s	opening	quotation	to	this	chapter	succinctly	captures	the	difficulty	of	
researching	illegal	markets.	Researchers	face	multiple	challenges	ranging	from	access	to	
informants	to	verification	of	data.	As	shown	in	the	previous	chapter,	limited	empirical	
research	exists	on	illegal	rhino	markets.	With	the	exception	of	a	well-researched	journalistic	
exposé	(see:	Rademeyer	2012),	streams	of	scholarly	and	policy	literatures	take	a	‘top-down	
approach’.	While	collecting	data,	researchers	thus	engage	almost	exclusively	with	rule-makers	
including	conservators,	government	regulators	and	other	economic	and	political	elites.	As	a	
result	of	this,	there	are	only	a	handful	of	studies	that	deal	with	the	entire	market	exchange,	
from	“production”	(poaching,	hunting	or	theft)	of	rhino	horn	and	transnational	“product”	
exchange	through	to	understanding	the	consumer	markets	(Ayling	2013;	Milliken/Shaw	2012).	
It	is	from	this	point	of	departure	that	I	chose	to	study	the	illegal	rhino	horn	market	in	its	
entirety,	taking	a	bottom-up	and	sideways66	approach	to	understanding	economic,	political	
and	social	structures,	power	constellations,	rule-making	and	cultural	framing.	The	following	
chapter	hones	in	on	the	difficulties	associated	with	studying	illegal	markets	in	general,	and	the	
illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	in	specific.	My	methodological	choices	are	explained	and	how	
impasses	were	bridged.	The	final	section	delves	into	ethical	concerns.67	
	
																																																						
66	Dubow	(1995:	8)	argues	that	the	notion	of	bottom-up	or	top-down	ideas	oversimplifiy	the	transmission	
process.	At	any	given	point	in	time	there	are	many	fashionable	thoughts;	whether	“they	get	picked	up”	and	
popularized	by	thought-leaders	is	linked	to	the	extent	“that	they	may	resonate	with	wider	social	concerns”.	
	
67	As	this	chapter	deals	with	personal	as	well	as	scholarly	choices,	I	chose	to	write	in	the	first	person.	In	later	
chapters,	I	revert	to	the	less	personal	third-person	narrative.		
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2.2	Researching	illegal	markets	
	
Scholars	from	the	fields	of	criminology,	sociology	and	anthropology	have	undertaken	
intriguing	qualitative	and	mixed	methods	research	into	illegal	markets	and	associated	
criminal,	political	and	economic	structures.	The	study	of	crime,	criminal	actors	and	illegal	
markets	in	situ	has	a	long	tradition	in	these	disciplines	(Jacques/Wright	2008).	Several	
ethnographic	studies,	including	research	into	crack	cocaine	dealing	(Jacobs	1999),	hustling	
(Pryce	1979),	Venkatesh’s	book	based	on	the	decade	he	spent	with	the	‘Black	Kings’	gang	in	
Chicago	(Venkatesh	2008)	or	Steinberg’s	research	into	South	African	prison	gangs	(Steinberg	
2004;	Steinberg	2005b)	are	recognized	for	their	scholarly	contributions	on	the	inner	workings	
of	illegal	markets	and	gangs	at	the	local	level.	However,	studying	illegal	markets	and	actors	
beyond	the	confines	of	the	nation-state	(transnationally	or	regionally)	is	laden	with	additional	
logistical	and	other	challenges,	and	hence	done	less	frequently.	Exceptional	transnational	
studies	include,	amongst	others,	research	into	organ	trafficking	(Scheper-Hughes	2000),	
human	trafficking	(Chin/Finckenauer	2011;	Shelley	2010;	Bales	1999),	people	smuggling	
(Zhang/Chin	2002;	Zhang/Gaylord	1996),	the	cocaine	trade	(Kenney	2007;	Thoumi	2003),	
trafficking	of	antiquities	and	cultural	objects	(Mackenzie/Davis	2014),	cigarette	‘bootlegging’	
in	the	European	Union	(Hornsby/Hobbs	2007),	the	illicit	arms	industry	(Ruggiero	1996),	and	
the	world	heroin	market	(Paoli/Reuter/Greenfield	2009;	McCoy	[1972]	2003).		
	
With	the	notable	exception	of	Rebecca	Wong’s	doctoral	research	into	the	organization	of	the	
illegal	tiger	parts	trade	(Wong	2013)	and	Moyle’s	study	on	the	same	subject	(Moyle	2009),	
Tanya	Wyatt’s	research	into	the	illegal	fur	and	falcon	trades	in	Russia	(Wyatt	2009;	Wyatt	
2011),	research	into	ivory	markets	(Gao/Clark	2014),	caviar	(Zabyelina	2014),	parrots	(Pires	
2014),	abalone	(Hauck	1997)	and	a	few	others,	scholars	have	chosen	to	analyse	illegal	wildlife	
markets	from	the	comfort	of	their	offices.68	Desktop	studies	are	attractive	when	ample	
empirical	and	secondary	data	including	media	and	technical	reports,	exist	and	are	easy	to	
access	(see	for	example:	Moreto/Clarke	2014;	Moreto	et	al.	2014).	In	countries	where	crime	
																																																						
	
68	The	literature	review	acknowledged	existing	research	into	illegal	rhino	horn	trades.	Rademeyer	(2012)	did	
fieldwork	at	the	source	and	in	markets.	Ayling	(2013)	used	secondary	data	while	others	(Büscher/Ramutsindela	
2016;	Lunstrum	2014;	Montesh	2013;	Massé/Lunstrum	2015;	Fenio	2014)	conducted	targeted	fieldwork	in	
poaching	hotspots.	Technical	reports	relied	largely	on	documentary	and	trade	analysis	(see	for	example:	Milliken	
2014;	Milliken/Shaw	2012).		
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data,	police	reports	and	court	materials	are	readily	available,	researchers	might	want	to	
forego	heading	out	into	the	field.	Fieldwork,	however,	does	provide	access	to	“fields	of	action	
and	experiences	that	otherwise	receive	scant	or	no	academic	analysis”	(Goldsmith	2003:	104).	
	
The	cited	scholars	interviewed	active	or	convicted	criminals,	and	sometimes	their	law	
enforcement	counterparts	were	included	in	the	sample,	situating	the	illegal	market	in	broader	
social	and	political	structures.	Engaging	with	illegal	market	actors	and	regulators	is	not	only	
important	for	data	verification;	it	also	provides	a	juxtaposition	of	“underworld”	versus	
“upperworld”	views.	This	inclusive	approach	stands	at	loggerheads	with	traditional	top-down	
approaches.	In	choosing	the	conventional	route	researchers	would	typically	conduct	a	handful	
of	expert	interviews	with	political	or	economic	elites,	which	often	results	in	data	assimilation	
to	suit	political	or	economic	interests	(see	Lombardo’s	analysis	of	how	policing	narratives	
influenced	the	perpetuation	of	the	“alien	conspiracy	theory”	in	the	US:	Lombardo	2013).		
	
Many	of	the	aforementioned	studies	extend	beyond	the	political	boundaries	of	the	nation-
state	and	involve	months	of	painstakingly	conducted	fieldwork	stretching	over	months,	
sometimes	years,	often	far	away	from	the	researcher’s	comfort	zone.	Researchers	face	
multiple	challenges	in	the	field	when	undertaking	multi-sited	or	cross-border	research	into	
illegal	markets.	Beyond	logistical	concerns	(mobility,	language	proficiency	and	finances),	
additional	problems	may	arise	due	to	unfamiliar	regulatory	frameworks	governing	data	
collection,	security	of	the	research	team,	ethics	and	positionality.	For	example,	the	lead	
researchers	responsible	for	the	world	heroin	study	outsourced	individual	country	studies	to	
local	experts.	Outsourcing	data	collection	might	provide	a	local	foothold	but	the	lead	
researcher	has	limited	control	over	the	quality	of	the	data.	Local	experts	might	get	exposed	to	
associational	risks	such	as	accusations	of	spying	on	behalf	of	foreign	interests	(Glazer	1970).	
The	remarks	of	the	lead	authors	of	the	world	heroin	study	(Paoli/Reuter/Greenfield	2009:	7)	
are	instructive	with	regards	to	undertaking	transnational	research	into	illegal	activities:	
	
“It	is	difficult	to	gather	this	information	even	in	democratic	nations	with	relatively	
open	governments	and	sophisticated	data	collection	systems.	It	is	exceptionally	
difficult	in	nations	that	are	closed,	have	weak	data	collection	systems,	or	have	little	
tradition	of	publishing	policy-relevant	data.	Drug-related	corruption	creates	still	
further	obstacles	in	some	countries.”	
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Undertaking	fieldwork	into	the	social	life	of	others	comes	with	its	challenges	and	even	more	
so	when	entering	the	realm	of	grey	or	illegal	activities.	The	targeted	assassination	of	
sociologist	Ken	Pryce	(he	was	researching	high	murder	rates	in	Jamaica	at	the	time	of	his	
death)	or	the	homicide	of	a	“fixer”	(research	facilitator)	involved	in	preparatory	work	for	a	
study	of	the	Russian	shipping	industry	(Belousov	et	al.	2007)	are	the	exception.	Violations	that	
threaten	the	researcher’s	well-being	and	safety	(Jacobs	2006:	157)	are	one	facet	of	the	danger	
spectrum.	While	conducting	a	study	of	police	accountability	in	Colombia,	Australian	
researcher	Goldsmith	(2003),	for	example,	was	thought	to	be	a	US	Drug	Enforcement	Agency	
(DEA)	“spy”	(intelligence	operative)	when	he	walked	the	streets	of	a	poor	neighbourhood	in	
Bogota	in	the	company	of	two	Columbian	community	police	officers.	He	managed	to	escape	
the	tense	situation	unharmed	but	emotionally	shaken.		Bruce	Jacobs	(1998)	was	less	lucky.	
One	of	his	trusted	sources	in	an	on-going	research	project	into	street-level	crack	cocaine	
dealing	robbed	him	at	gunpoint	and	telephone	stalked	him	after	that.	Less	dangerous	but	
equally	concerning	is	the	researcher’s	exposure	to	legal	dangers	such	as	being	considered	an	
accessory	to	a	crime	(Jacobs	2006:	158).	Polsky	(1967:	141)	captured	how	uncalculated	risks	in	
the	field	might	derive	from	unexpected	sources:	
	
“[I]f	one	refuses	to	be	a	sociologist	of	the	jailhouse	or	court	system,	takes	Malinowski	
to	heart,	and	goes	out	into	the	field,	there	is	risk	involved	.	.	.	It	is	the	sort	of	risk	that	
writers	of	criminology	texts,	for	all	their	eagerness	to	put	down	fieldwork,	surprisingly	
don’t	mention:	most	of	the	danger	for	the	fieldworker	comes	not	from	the	cannibals	
and	headhunters	but	from	the	colonial	officials.”	
	
With	a	few	exceptions	(such	as	the	earlier	mentioned:	Venkatesh	2008),	a	handful	of	scholars	
has	undertaken	embedded	research	into	illegal	markets	or	gangs.	While	few	academic	
institutions	would	allow	their	staff	or	students	to	undertake	overtly	dangerous	fieldwork,	
investigative	journalists	are	likely	to	face	fewer	institutional	obstacles	(such	as	a	grilling	by	
ethics	committees	at	universities)	when	embarking	on	study	tours	of	the	“underworld”.	
Investigative	journalist	Roberto	Saviano	(2007),	for	example,	studied	the	Neapolitan	mafia	
while	embedded	in	the	Camorra’s	structures.	After	his	book	Gomorrah	was	published,	he	
received	death	threats	from	his	former	mafia	colleagues	and	continues	to	live	under	24-hour	
police	guard	to	this	day.	While	Saviano’s	book	has	provided	ample	material	for	scholarly	
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analysis	(see	for	example:	Varese	2006),	scholars	have	questioned	the	credibility	of	data	
presented	elsewhere	(for	a	critique	of	Glenny's	"McMafia"	see:Levi	2009).	Although	
journalistic	investigations	are	often	criticized	for	lacking	in	academic	rigour	and	verifiable	
data,	scholars	are	not	shielded	from	such	critiques.	Goffman’s	ethnography	(Goffman	2013;	
Goffman	2009)	into	the	lives	of	young	black	men	in	a	low-income	neighbourhood	in	
Philadelphia	has	led	to	a	public	witch-hunt	against	the	sociologist	(see	for	example:	Lubnet	
2015;	Parry	2015).	Reviewers	expressed	concerns	about	the	accuracy	of	her	portrayal	of	the	
black	experience,	the	soundness	of	her	methods,	the	possibility	that	her	book	might	harm	its	
subjects,	and	she	was	even	accused	of	being	an	accomplice	in	the	commission	of	a	crime	
(Lubnet	2015;	Parry	2015).	Parry	(2015)	surmises:		
	
“The	dust-up	reveals	anxieties	that	go	beyond	the	censure	of	Ms.	Goffman,	opening	a	
fresh	debate	over	longstanding	dilemmas	of	ethnographic	research:	the	ethical	
boundaries	of	fieldwork,	the	tension	between	data	transparency	and	subjects'	privacy,	
and	the	reliability	of	one	ethnographer's	subjective	account	of	a	social	world.	Some	
sociologists	worry	that	the	controversy	may	put	a	chill	on	sensitive	fieldwork.	Others	
fear	that	it	could	damage	the	credibility	of	ethnography	at	a	time	when	sociologists	are	
being	exhorted	to	get	more	involved	in	public	debates.”	
	
Some	of	Goffman’s	critics	display	a	limited	understanding	of	long-standing	debates	as	regards	
“going	native”69	or	not	(Stoller	2015)	in	the	discipline	of	anthropology.	The	fallout	(and	
collegial	support	by	some)	from	Goffman’s	ethnography	demonstrates	the	importance	of	
documenting	and	justifying	methodological	and	ethical	choices	made	in	pursuit	of	research.		
	
This	short	reflection	acknowledges	past	scholarly	ventures	into	the	field	while	also	being	
mindful	of	exposing	potential	dangers	and	shortfalls.	I	have	purposefully	focused	on	research	
that	extended	beyond	the	reach	of	the	armchair	and	desktop	(the	proverbial	ivory	tower).	It	
follows	from	the	above	that	data	verification,	mediation	of	potential	dangers	and	positionality	
are	of	particular	importance	when	studying	transnational	illegal	markets.	Personal	experience	
and	exposure	to	fieldwork	in	the	past	rendered	this	the	preferred	option,	especially	in	light	of	
the	sparse	first-hand	data	regarding	social,	economic	and	political	structures	and	systems	of	
meaning	underpinning	illegal	and	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn.	Much	thought	went	into	the	
planning	and	execution	of	the	data	collection	phase	of	this	project.	Given	critiques	of	
																																																						
69	‘Going	native’	refers	to	embedded	research.	
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subjectivity	(see	next	section)	and	the	lack	of	reproducible	data	sets,	triangulation	and	
verification	of	data	were	vital	components	of	the	research	process.	The	rhino	field	is	steeped	
in	narratives,	controversies	and	myths.	Sorting	fact	from	fiction	and	situating	narratives	in	
specific	political,	economic	or	historical	contexts	were	essential	steps	in	the	research	process.	
The	following	sections	will	expand	on	the	challenges,	opportunities,	strengths	and	weaknesses	
of	the	chosen	approach.		
	
	
2.2.1	Choosing	the	qualitative	route	
	
On	the	basis	of	the	earlier	observations,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	large	factions	of	the	
academic	community	consider	the	study	of	active	criminals	and	illegal	markets	a	challenging	
and	potentially	dangerous	undertaking.	Fieldwork	is	often	shunned	because	of	the	dangers	
and	risks	associated	with	delving	into	the	“underworld”	(Wong	2015:	1).	Scholars	encounter	
difficulties	in	generating	their	data,	as	the	research	object	or	subject	may	not	only	be	
shrouded	in	secrecy,	but	security	concerns	may	arise	as	well.	These	may	lead	to	an	
overreliance	on	contested	crime	and	interdiction	statistics	or	secondary	data,	rendering	many	
a	research	study	methodologically	unsound	or	repetitive.	Fioramonti	(2014)	makes	a	
convincing	argument	regarding	the	dangers	and	sometimes	hidden	agendas	underpinning	
numbers	and	statistics,	especially	when	such	numbers	are	used	to	reinforce	the	logic	of	the	
market	on	social	and	political	life.	Statistics	about	the	size	and	value	of	illegal	wildlife	markets	
are	particularly	contested	(Naylor	2004:	263;	Harken	2011:	11),	the	numbers	are	nonetheless	
co-opted	into	policy	and	scholarly	literature	on	the	subject.	Available	statistics	in	the	narrow	
field	of	rhino	research	fail	to	inspire	confidence	and	reliability.	Conservation	NGOs	claim	that	
rhino	poaching	statistics	are	manipulated	(Schrader	2015),	arrest	data	and	convictions	rates	
are	unreliable	(Interview	with	rhino	expert,	2015;	interview	with	police	investigators	and	
prosecutors,	2013),	and	the	current	rhino	population	numbers	are	contested	(du	Toit	2015).	
The	request	for	what	would	appear	to	be	“harmless”	numbers	(such	as	the	number	of	anti-
poaching	and	general	staff	deployed	in	parks),	potentially	explosive	data	(such	as	the	size	of	
anti-poaching	budgets	and	basic	salary	information	of	park	employees)	or	unequivocally	
controversial	data	(number	of	alleged	poachers	killed	in	South	African	parks	or	rhino	horn	
traffickers	prosecuted	and	convicted	in	Vietnam)	in	pursuit	of	this	research	all	proved	
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immensely	difficult	to	attain	if	forthcoming	at	all.	While	the	political	sensitivities	and	potential	
fallout	underpinning	the	latter	request	are	understandable,70	the	‘rhino	issue’	has	become	
securitized	and	as	a	result,	many	probing	questions	or	legitimate	requests	for	quantitative	
data	are	dismissed	as	“for	privileged	access	only”	(I	will	return	to	this	later	in	this	chapter).		
	
When	studying	illegal	markets,	traditional	quantitative	methods	such	as	the	administration	of	
questionnaires	and	surveys	could	easily	be	misconstrued	as	police	interrogations,	likely	to	
lead	to	limited	and	biased	results	(Sissener	2001:	6).	Quantitative	researchers	tend	to	
disengage	from	the	people	and	the	subject	they	are	studying	by	focusing	on	statistical	
correlations	of	variables	(Gray	2009:	165).	The	virtues	of	quantitative	approaches	are	not	
disputed	here;	the	literature	review	referred	to	substantial	contributions.	Moreover,	
qualitative	and	quantitative	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive	given	the	recent	interest	in	
mixed	methods	research	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	35).	However,	number	crunching	and	statistical	
analyses	of	potentially	biased	and	incomplete	datasets	appear	ill	suited	in	pursuit	of	a	
sociological	understanding	of	illegal	rhino	horn	markets.		
	
In	contrast	to	the	implied	objectivity	and	validity	of	the	quantitative	approach,	qualitative	
researchers	sustain	their	research	by	engaging	with	“people’s	social	and	cultural	constructions	
of	their	reality”	(Gray,	op	cit)	and	their	lived	experiences.	The	analysis	of	specific	cases	in	their	
temporal	and	spatial	particularity	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	22)	provides	useful	sources	for	analysis	
and	theory–building.	Some	of	the	key	elements	of	qualitative	research	listed	by	Miles	and	
Huberman	(1994:	6)	illuminate	why	the	qualitative	approach	is	well-suited	for	a	study	of	
illegal	and	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn:	It	is	conducted	through	intense	or	prolonged	contact	with	
the	field.	The	researcher’s	role	is	to	gain	a	“holistic”	overview	of	the	context	through	a	
“process	of	deep	attentiveness,	of	empathetic	understanding	(Verstehen),	and	of	suspending	
or	“bracketing”	preconceptions	about	the	topics	under	discussion”.	The	researcher	captures	
data	“from	the	inside”,	which	need	to	be	reviewed	and	verified	with	respondents.	In	light	of	
the	insufficient	quantitative	data	available,	limited	possibilities	of	quantitative	data	
																																																						
70	The	rhino	poaching	crisis,	as	well	as	the	great	number	of	Mozambican	citizens,	killed	inside	the	Kruger	National	
Park	(according	to	Mozambican	sources,	400	Mozambicans	have	lost	their	lives	inside	the	KNP	since	2009	–	see	
Chapter	7),	have	led	to	further	complications	in	the	already	acrimonious	diplomatic	relations	between	South	
Africa	and	Mozambique.	At	the	time	of	fieldwork,	Vietnamese	authorities	were	pointing	to	China	as	the	major	
consumer	market.	
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generation	and	my	preference	for	fieldwork,	a	qualitative	research	approach	was	the	
preferred	choice.	The	research	sought	an	alternative	to	the	dominant	narrative,	which	cannot	
be	gained	from	crunching	numbers	but	from	engaging	with	people’s	lived	individual	
experiences.	The	following	sub-section	expands	on	the	chosen	research	design	of	multi-sited	
ethnography.	
	
	
2.2.2	Research	design:	A	multi-sited	ethnography	
	
The	discipline	of	anthropology	is	known	for	its	frequent	application	of	ethnographic	research.	
Amongst	the	virtues	of	the	approach	are	the	researcher’s	intense	interaction	with	actors,	
getting	immersed	in	the	field	(“going	native”)	and	in	situ	exposure	to	systems	of	cultural	
meaning	(see	for	example:	Hart	1988;	Malinowski/Young	1979).	However,	the	ethnographer’s	
focus	on	specific	places	or	groups	has	been	critiqued	for	static	and	atomic	reproductions	of	
social	relations	(Desmond	2014)	and	“methodological	nationalism”	–	the	reduction	of	lived	
experiences	to	the	nation-state	instead	of	acknowledging	a	variety	of	macro	social	and	
transnational	contexts		(Weiß/Nohl	2012).	For	the	purposes	of	studying	flows	of	rhino	horn,	
an	ethnographic	research	design	appealed	due	to	its	focus	on	systems	of	cultural	meaning	
within	temporal-spatial	contexts.	A	nuanced	variant	–	the	multi-sited	ethnography	–	eschews	
the	critique	of	methodological	nationalism,	in	so	far	as	the	ethnographer	focuses	on	dynamic	
relationships	and	connections	that	transcend	the	local	context	and	the	confines	of	the	nation-
state.	
	
When	applying	the	research	design	of	multi-sited	ethnographies,	researchers	replace	micro-
perspectives	with	the	study	of	relationships	or	connections	between	sites,	ideas,	informants	
and/or	things	(Marcus	1999:	7).	Proponents	of	the	research	design	have	co-opted	elements	of	
the	world-systems	approach	as	theorized	by	Wallerstein	and	others	in	the	1970s.71	However,	
																																																						
71	Wallerstein’s	world	systems	approach	was	novel	and	revolutionary	in	the	1970s,	questioning	key	elements	of	
the	theory	of	modernization	such	as	the	state-centred	approach	and	Eurocentric	perspectives	on	the	
development	discourse.		The	approach	received	a	fair	amount	of	critique	(see	for	example:	Skocpol	1977);	for	
the	purposes	of	the	discussion	here	Wallerstein’s	notion	of	the	world	system	as	a	set	of	mechanisms	employed	
to	redistribute	surplus	value	from	the	‘periphery’	(Global	South)	to	the	‘core’	(Global	North)	suffices	(Wallerstein	
2011).	With	the	exception	of	trophy	hunting,	theft	of	rhino	horn	and	horn	artefacts,	the	rhino	horn	exchange	
occurs	largely	outside	what	Wallerstein	defined	as	“core”	nations.	However,	in	light	of	changing	geopolitics	and	
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for	investigating	“commodity	chains”	or	“flows”,	the	theoretical	orientation	of	employing	the	
world-system	as	the	unit	of	analysis	creates	practical	problems	as	it	focuses	at	the	macro–
level	only	(Talbot	2004:	5-6).72	To	the	cultural	anthropologist	Marcus	(1995),	the	application	
of	multi-sited	ethnographies	presents	a	complementary	research	design	that	incorporates	the	
structural	elements	of	the	world-	systems	approach	without	relying	on	it	for	the	“contextual	
architecture	framing	a	set	of	subjects”	(Marcus	1995:	96).	It	also	provides	a	manageable	
research	approach	and	units	of	analysis.	He	observes:		
	
“Multi-sited	research	is	designed	around	chains,	paths,	threads,	conjunctions	or	
juxtapositions	of	locations	in	which	the	ethnographer	establishes	some	form	of	literal,	
physical	presence,	with	an	explicit,	posited	logic	of	association	or	connection	among	
sites	that	in	fact	defines	the	argument	of	the	ethnography	(Marcus	1995:	105).”	
	
Proponents	of	multi–sited	research	follow	the	trajectories	of	people,	images,	plots	and	ideas	
(Marcus	1995:	107).	Latour	(1993)	and	Haraway	(1991)	were	pioneers	in	extending	the	realm	
and	sites	of	scientific	inquiry	through	the	investigation	of	non-human	actors	and	cyborgs.	The	
“follow	the	thing”	approach	has	gained	recognition	in	recent	years.73	Appadurai	(1994:	76-91)	
demonstrates	in	the	introduction	to	The	Social	Life	of	Things	how	the	status	of	things	as	
“commodities,	gifts,	and	resources”	in	circulation	change	across	time	and	spatial	context	by	
drawing	on	different	types	of	“scapes”(local	contexts).	People	experience,	define	and	
interpret	global	processes	from	their	particular	local	frame	of	reference;	and	“global	forces	
are	plotted	against	constellations	of	local	circumstance,	fragmentary	to	an	outside	observer	
but	forming	a	coherent,	fixed	view	–	a	“scape”–	to	a	local”	(Bestor	2001:	80).	Kopytoff	(1986:	
																																																																																																																																																																											
the	ascendancy	of	China	as	the	world’s	second	largest	economy,	the	notion	of	an	unequal	distribution	of	surplus	
value	attached	to	rhino	horn	from	“peripheral	states”	in	southern	Africa	to	Vietnam	(not	a	core	nation)	and	
China	(arguably	a	‘core’	nation)	is	hence	only	partially	valid.		
	
72	Talbot	used	the	commodity	chain	approach	for	his	analysis	of	the	global	coffee	supply	chain.	This	approach	
presents	“an	intermediate	level	of	analysis,	bigger	than	the	nation-state	but	smaller	than	the	entire	world	
system”	(Talbot	2004:	6).	While	focusing	on	the	specific	commodity	at	hand,	the	flow	or	commodity	chain	is	
interdependent	on	other	flows.	He	argues	that	it	is	impossible	to	analyze	producers,	consumers	and	other	actors	
without	situating	the	commodity	flow	within	the	broader	world	economy	(ibid).	
	
73	The	approach	is	not	to	be	confused	with	Marx’	notion	of	‘commodity	fetishism’,	according	to	which	producers	
and	suppliers	perceive	of	one	another	in	terms	of	the	money	and	goods	that	they	exchange	(Marx	[1867]	2015).		
Critical	fetishism,	on	the	other	hand,	is	qualitatively	closer	to	the	“follow	the	thing”	approach	because	it	
incorporates	a	“heightened	appreciation	for	the	active	materiality	of	things	in	motion”	(Foster	2006:	286).	
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66)	adds	that	as	commodities	travel	across	time	and	geographies,	their	value	and	meanings	
change	and	they	take	on	their	own	“cultural	biography”.		According	to	Foster	(2006:	285),	the	
renewed	focus	of	academia	on	the	movement	of	commodities	shows	“how	such	movement	
links	geographically	separate	locales	and	connects	producers	and	consumers	stratified	by	
class,	ethnicity,	and	gender”.	The	approach	is	however	far	removed	from	a	mechanical	joining	
the	dots	between	‘a’	and	‘b’;	instead	scholars	trace	“social	relations	and	material	linkages	that	
this	movement	creates	and	within	which	the	value	of	commodities	emerges”	(Foster	2006:	op	
cit).	While	globalization	may	have	led	to	a	geographic	distance	between	producers,	
consumers	and	other	market	actors	as	far	as	transnational	supply	chains	are	involved,	the	
flow	of	goods,	information,	and	capital	connect	actors	on	a	cultural,	economic	and	social	level	
that	transcends	time	and	place.74	Mintz’	research	(1985)	on	sugar,	for	example,	traces	the	
commodity’s	origins	backward	in	time	from	domestication	through	to	its	spread	throughout	
the	Western	industrial	world.	Tsing	(2005)	shows	how	a	complex	explanation	of	deforestation	
in	Indonesia	is	not	found	in	the	rainforests	of	Indonesia	alone	but	by	undertaking	an	
“ethnography	of	global	connection”.	Bestor	(2001:	92)	investigates	the	global	popularity	of	
sushi	as	a	“complex	economic	relationship”	between	the	East	and	the	West.	With	regards	to	
illicit	commodities	and	services,	several	scholars	have	likewise	‘followed	the	thing’.	Nancy	
Scheper-Hughes	(2004)	explores	the	illegal	circulation	of	humans	and	their	body	parts	across	
the	planet.	Gordon	Mathews’	(2011)	depiction	of	migrants	from	across	the	world	living	in	
Chunking	Mansions	in	Hong	Kong	reveals	their	close	connection	to	the	international	
circulation	of	goods,	money	and	ideas.	Carolyn	Nordstrom	(2007:	207)	sketches	the	flow	of	
“il/legal”	goods	and	people	(Nordstrom’s	wordplay)	beyond	the	reach	of	the	state,	which	she	
depicts	as	“static”,	“bounded”	and	“defined”.	The	static	nature	of	the	‘state’	as	a	monolith	
stands	at	loggerheads	with	the	dynamic	notion	of	circuits	and	flows	in	which	non-state	actors	
play	a	significant	role,	which	is	likely	to	rattle	long-standing	conceptions	of	power	and	
authority	as	espoused	in	Western	theories	of	the	state	and	state	building.	
	
An	important	element	of	multi-sited	ethnographies	relates	to	the	careful	observation	of	how	
goods	circulate	instead	of	assuming	the	influence	of	governance	structures	a	priori.	In	this	
																																																						
74	This	trail	of	thought	connects	to	one	of	the	main	theses	of	economic	sociology,	namely	that	markets	are	
embedded	in	social	networks.	
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research	project,	I	sought	to	follow	the	flows	(pathways)	of	rhino	horn	from	the	source	to	the	
market.	The	research	design	comes	not	without	its	shortfalls.	Marcus	(1995)	provides	a	
thought-provoking	assessment	of	the	approach,	detailing	methodological	problems	while	
drawing	the	reader’s	attention	to	its	greatest	advantage,	the	bridging	of	the	dualistic	“them–
us	frame	of	conventional	ethnography”(Marcus	1995:	100).	To	Marcus,	the	loss	of	the	
subaltern,	the	substitution	of	quality	and	depth	with	quantity	and	superficiality,	as	well	as	the	
intensity	and	impracticality	of	fieldwork	due	to	spreading	the	analytical	lens	across	multiple	
research	sites	are	legitimate	concerns.	He	observes:	“The	inevitable	connotation	of	multi-sited	
as	a	term	is	something	that	is	profligate,	impatient,	unfocused,	emphasizing	surface	rather	
than	depth,	and	requiring	effort	beyond	the	capacity	of	the	single	fieldworker”	(Marcus	1999:	
7).	Bestor	(2001:	78)	likewise	warns	of	the	danger	of	presenting	“drive-by	ethnography”	when	
undertaking	a	whistle-stop	tour	of	research	sites	without	sufficient	time	and	preparation	set	
aside	to	understand	the	intricacies	of	the	research	site,	its	connections,	and	significance	to	the	
overall	commodity	chain,	flow	or	market.	
	
Cognizant	of	the	dangers	of	superficial	analysis,	this	multi-sited	ethnography	is	centred	on	the	
global	flows	of	one	specific	thing:	rhino	horn.	Although	the	research	entailed	visits	to	several	
different	research	sites	(described	below),	great	care	was	taken	not	to	dilute	the	research	
focus.	The	proverbial	crossing	of	the	bridge	between	“us	and	them”	led	to	a	better	
understanding	of	actors’	motivations,	frames	and	institutions.	As	will	be	shown	in	later	
sections,	the	designation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	commodity	is	contested	amongst	certain	actors,	
who	believe	rhino	horn	should	not	be	for	sale	or	considered	a	commodity	in	the	first	place.	
The	‘follow	the	thing’	approach	is	thus	seen	as	a	neutral	point	of	departure	in	lieu	of	using	the	
terminology	of	commodity	chains.		Rhino	horn	itself	is	used	as	the	integrating	perspective	
around	which	diverse	data	are	organized	and	analysed.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	deals	
with	methodological	and	ethical	choices	made	during	this	project,	some	of	which	speak	to	
critiques	of	(multi-sited)	ethnographies	and	how	they	were	resolved.	
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2.2.3	Single-case	study	and	theoretical	development	
	
	
Case	studies	have	been	praised	for	the	achievement	of	high	conceptual	validity,	the	capacity	
to	address	causal	complexity	and	to	derive	new	hypotheses	(George/Bennett	2005:	20–22).	A	
single–case	study	involves	the	intensive	empirical	inquiry	of	a	particular	case	with	the	purpose	
of	“shed	[ding]	light	on	a	large	class	of	cases	(a	population)”	(Gerring	2007:	20).	There	are	a	
number	of	limitations	and	possible	“trade-offs”,	such	as	case	selection	bias,	the	exchange	of	
parsimony	for	thick	descriptions,	as	well	as	indeterminacy	and	limitations	to	the	
generalizability	of	findings	(George/Bennett	2005:	22).	The	choice	of	a	single	case	study	may	
be	questioned	on	the	basis	of	the	above	arguments.	However,	‘following’	several	‘things’	
(broadening	the	research	scope	beyond	rhino	horn)	would	have	rendered	the	research	
impractical	and	data	volumes	unmanageable;	notwithstanding	the	threat	of	further	amplifying	
the	pitfalls	of	“drive-by	ethnography”	(see	previous	section).	This	dissertation	is	organized	
around	flows	of	rhino	horn	–	the	journey	of	rhino	horn	from	the	bush	to	the	market.	While	
the	analysis	focuses	on	rhino	horn,	different	‘cases’	are	investigated	and	contextualized.	
Multiple	research	sites	and	informants	from	heterogeneous	backgrounds	in	southern	Africa	
and	Southeast	Asia	enrich	this	single	case	study.	Moreover,	Yin	(1994:	38–40)	submits	that	the	
selection	of	a	single	case	study	is	justified	if	the	case	constitutes	a	“critical	case”,	“an	extreme	
or	unique	case”	or	a	“revelatory	case”.75	
	
In	this	instance,	Yin’s	three-pronged	criteria	apply.	The	charismatic	rhino	has	garnered	
worldwide	attention	from	conservation	NGOs,	international	organizations,	military	and	
security	outfits,	government	departments	and	civil	society,	and	caused	a	moral	panic	amongst	
some	of	these	actors.	The	rhino	field	is	steeped	in	controversies,	ranging	from	a	lacking	
acknowledgment	of	the	colonial	legacies	underpinning	African	wildlife	conservation	through	
to	contested	solutions	aimed	at	disrupting	the	market.	Few	social	scientists	(see	literature	
review)	have	engaged	with	the	rhino	issue,	rendering	this	study	timeous.	The	rhino	is	
emblematic	of	other	endangered	species	of	fauna	and	flora,	and	hence,	certain	findings	
regarding	the	structure	and	functioning	of	gray	and	illegal	flows	may	be	of	relevance	to	
																																																						
75	A	revelatory	case	exists	when	the	researcher	has	“an	opportunity	to	observe	and	analyze	a	phenomenon	
previously	inaccessible	to	scientific	investigation”	(Yin	1994:	40).	
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analyses	of	other	wildlife	markets.	For	example,	a	cross-case	analysis	of	shadow	cases	may	be	
useful	in	determining	which	factors	lead	to	specific	market	outcomes	and	assist	in	
constructing	an	explanation	as	to	why	the	rhino	case	may	be	different	from	other	illegal	
wildlife	markets,	or	why	it	is	the	same.	Cross-case	analysis	also	makes	sense	of	unique	findings	
and	assists	in	articulating	hypotheses	and	theories	discovered	during	data	collection	
(Khan/VanWynsberghe	2008).		
	
In	my	former	role	as	applied	policy	researcher	at	a	South	African	research	institute,	I	first	
engaged	with	the	‘rhino	poaching	problem’	through	a	regional	project	on	organized	crime	
trends	in	Southern	Africa	in	2009.76		A	decade-long	research	career	prior	to	embarking	on	the	
journey	towards	the	doctorate	allowed	me	to	build	up	a	professional	and	social	network	of	
contacts	within	the	broader	field	of	crime	research	in	the	southern	African	region	and	beyond.	
These	networks,	knowledge	of	the	research	subject	and	fieldwork	experience	facilitated	
(sometimes	privileged)	access	to	a	broad	spectrum	of	relevant	actors.		
	
While	the	theoretical	and	explanatory	approaches	of	this	dissertation	are	grounded	in	
economic	sociology,	the	research	approach	was	partially	guided	by	principles	of	grounded	
theory.	In	essence,	grounded	theory	involves	a	reiterative	research	process	where	data	
collection	is	interspersed	with	periods	of	data	analysis	and	concept	formation.	The	underlying	
expectation	of	grounded	theory	is	that	“theoretical	preconceptions	should	be	avoided	in	
order	to	allow	theory	to	emerge	from	data”	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	84).	As	data	accumulate,	the	
researcher	begins	to	frame	interpretations.	It	was	important	to	check	data	against	those	
interpretations	because	“the	data	themselves	do	not	lie”	(Strauss/Corbin	1998:	45).	While	
grounded	theory	allows	for	flexibility	as	regards	data	collection	as	theories	evolve,	three	
techniques	are	essential:	“making	comparisons,	asking	questions,	and	sampling”	
(Strauss/Corbin	1998:	46).		
	
Data	collection	and	sampling	was	driven	by	theoretical	and	empirical	gaps;	initially,	these	
related	to	the	general	structure	and	functioning	of	illegal	markets.	I	added	and	compared	data	
																																																						
76	Rhino	poaching	was	identified	as	a	growing	organized	crime	concern	at	the	time.	I	provided	research	findings	
and	policy	recommendations	to	the	regional	policing	organization,	the	Southern	African	Regional	Police	Chiefs	
Cooperation	Organization	(SARPCCO),	and	conservation	NGOs	on	rhino	poaching	and	its	connections	to	
‘organized	crime’.	
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gleaned	from	respondents	to	explore	theoretical	hunches	and	“illustrate	new	variations”	(Flick	
[1998]	2014:	86).	Important	conceptual	and	theoretical	elements	emerged,	such	as	the	notion	
of	contested	illegality,	the	structural	importance	of	the	interface	between	legality	and	
illegality,	and	the	securitization	of	rhino	conservation.	The	research	question	evolved	and	the	
theoretical	focus	was	sharpened	during	the	reiterative	process.		Grounded	theory	has	been	
criticized	on	many	accounts.	Critics	doubt	whether	researchers	can	undertake	research	
without	preconceived	ideas	and	practice	an	unbiased,	neutral	approach,	not	tainted	by	pre-
existing	values,	assumptions,	and	values	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	94).	A	healthy	dose	of	naïveté	
underpins	the	assumed	neutrality	of	grounded	theory,	as	it	demands	of	researchers	the	
capability	to	play	what	Donna	Haraway	called	the	‘God	trick’	(Haraway	1991).77	Mindful	of	this	
limitation,	I	considered	my	positionality	(the	ethics	section	deals	with	this	in	more	detail)	and	
Weltbild	(situated	perspectives)	in	approaching	data	collection	and	analysis.	
	
	
2.4	Methods	
	
The	following	section	considers	the	different	methods	of	data	collection	employed	during	the	
course	of	this	research	project,	including:	(a)	a	literature	review,	(b)	archival	research,	(c)	Web	
2.0	research,	(d)	interviews,	(e)	focus	groups,	(f)	participant	observation	and	(g)	participation	
in	meetings.	Each	method	comes	with	a	set	of	limitations	and	ethical	considerations.	I	refer	
briefly	to	these	ethical	considerations	under	each	heading;	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	is	
dedicated	to	broader	ethical	considerations	and	security	concerns.	The	literature	review,	
archival	and	Web	2.0	research	were	undertaken	in	library	settings.	The	interviews,	focus	
groups,	participant	observations	and	participation	in	meetings	formed	part	of	the	fieldwork	
component.		
	
																																																						
77	Haraway	(1991)	argues	convincingly	against	traditional	notions	of	objectivity	in	science	and	philosophy,	which	
assume	that	the	investigator	can	remove	herself	from	the	object	of	inquiry.	She	believes	that	this	type	of	
objectivity	is	impossible	to	achieve;	she	associates	the	“God-trick”	with	scholars,	who	eschew	argumentation	and	
taking	a	clear	position	based	on	their	perspectives	and	positionality.	
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2.4.1	Desktop	and	archival	research	
(a) Literature	review	
	
Literature	reviews	are	not	usually	listed	as	methods	for	data	collection.	This	research	project,	
however,	relied	heavily	on	insights	gleaned	from	academic	contributions,	technical	reports,	
court	records,	parliamentary	submissions	and	government	documents	throughout	the	
research	process.	Not	all	of	these	materials	were	easily	accessible;	in	some	instances,	the	right	
‘gate-keeper’	had	to	be	found.		Unless	written	permission	was	received	to	reference	the	
materials,	confidential	documents	were	treated	as	background	information.	Technical	reports,	
arrest	and	conviction	databases,	court	files,	CITES	documentation,	newspaper	reports	and	op-
ed	contributions	provided	useful	insight	as	to	how	actors	perceive	and	frame	the	‘rhino	
problem’.		Some	information	was	integrated	into	the	dissertation;	the	remainder	served	as	
background	information	to	prepare	for	the	interviewing	process.	
	
	
(b) Archival	research	
	
Attempts	were	made	to	gain	access	to	evidence	given	at	the	“Kumleben	Commission	of	
Inquiry	into	the	Alleged	Smuggling	of	and	Illegal	Trade	in	Ivory	and	Rhinoceros	Horn	in	South	
Africa”.	In	1994,	former	South	African	President	Nelson	Mandela	appointed	Justice	Kumleben	
to	investigate	the	involvement	of	the	South	African	Defence	Force	in	the	illicit	trade	of	rhino	
horn	and	ivory	during	the	bush	wars	in	Angola,	Namibia	and	Mozambique.	Unfortunately,	my	
attempts	were	unsuccessful.		The	original	materials	(such	as	eyewitness	testimony)	had	been	
moved	from	the	state	archives	to	an	undisclosed	repository.	Kumleben’s	final	report	has	been	
scanned	and	is	accessible	on-line.	The	report	was	regarded	a	whitewash	by	some	(Interviews,	
2013	and	2014)	as	allegations	remained	unsubstantiated	and	important	witnesses	failed	to	
appear	in	front	of	the	Commission,	leading	to	no	successful	prosecutions.	I	supplemented	
potential	knowledge	gaps	by	interviewing	informants,	who	had	intimate	knowledge	of	the	
proceedings	and	findings.		
	
I	also	visited	the	archives	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	in	Skukuza,	where	I	accessed	reports	and	
articles	that	dealt	with	rhinos	and	the	history	of	the	Park.	While	rhino	poaching	was	my	
principal	interest,	I	cast	the	net	wider	in	order	to	situate	the	rhino	issue	within	the	broader	
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social	and	political	context	of	the	Park	and	its	development.	The	world’s	most	comprehensive	
on–line	archive	of	knowledge	on	rhinos,	the	Rhino	Resource	Centre78	and	Julian	Rademeyer’s	
Killing	for	Profit	archive79	were	useful	in	accessing	up-to-date	information	on	rhino	issues.		
	
	
(c) Web	2.0	research	
	
Web	2.0	refers	to	‘big	data’	(boyd/Crawford	2012)	or	‘user–generated	content’	on	the	
Internet	(Snee	2008:	3).	The	use	of	Web	2.0	technologies	for	the	purposes	of	social	research	is	
in	its	infancy.	Some	scholars	question	the	usefulness	(boyd/Crawford	2012;	Bollier	2010;	
Anderson	2008);	others	fear	that	social	scientists	may	be	left	behind	in	the	brave	new	world	
of	social	media	platforms	(Savage/Burrows	2007;	Snee	2008;	Murthy	2008;	Robinson/Schulz	
2009).	If	history	is	anything	to	go	by	(the	use	of	tape	recording	technologies	in	the	1950s	
provided	a	bone	of	contention	in	research	communities),	then	the	initial	trepidation	will	blow	
over	by	the	end	of	the	decade.80		
	
Social	networks	such	as	Facebook,	Twitter	and	LinkedIn	are	built	upon	the	principle	of	
establishing	networks	through	friends	and	compound	relations	(Murthy	2008:	844).	Murthy	
(2008:	845)	argues	that	such	networks	would	be	useful	to	researchers	because	they	act	as	
“virtual	gatekeepers”	to	chains	of	friends,	who	can	act	as	research	informants	or	may	have	
connections	to	persons	of	interest.	I	used	Facebook,	LinkedIn,	and	blogs	for	the	purposes	of	
identifying	research	informants,	research	assistants,	transcribers	and	interpreters,	engaged	in	
on-line	debates	and	accessed	documents	and	multi-media	resources.	While	some	
																																																						
78	Dr	Kees	Rookmaaker	is	the	editor	of	the	archive,	which	can	be	accessed	at	
http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/.	
79	The	archive	was	started	by	investigative	journalist	and	author	Julian	Rademeyer	and	can	be	accessed	at	
http://killingforprofit.com/.	
	
80	Computer	access	and	the	spread	of	Internet	technologies	have	led	to	a	wider	range	of	entities	such	as	
marketing	companies,	government	agencies	and	motivated	individuals	to	generate,	analyze,	organize	and	share	
data.	Savage	and	Burrows	(2007)	warn	of	a	crisis	in	empirical	sociology	due	to	data	sets	previously	in	the	
exclusive	domain	of	social	scientists	“now	being	aggregated	and	made	easily	accessible	to	anyone	who	is	curious,	
regardless	of	their	training”(boyd/Crawford	2012:	664).	Regardless	of	the	type	of	training	received	by	the	data	
generator,	all	data	sets	should	be	equally	scrutinized	for	possible	bias	and	put	in	context	(e.g.	Who	is	behind	the	
research?	Who	is	funding	it?	What	is	the	objective?).	For	the	purposes	of	data	collection	on	the	Internet,	all	data	
was	scrutinized	and	triangulated.	
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ethnographic	researchers	hide	behind	pseudonyms	and	avatars	in	on-line	platforms	
(boyd/Crawford	2012:	672),	I	used	my	full	name	and	disclosed	my	research	interest	while	
engaging	on-line.	I	‘met’	several	informants	on-line,	which	led	to	interviews	in	the	real	world.	
These	social	media	portals	proved	particularly	useful	when	I	prepared	for	fieldwork	in	Hong	
Kong	and	Vietnam,	research	sites	that	I	had	not	visited	before.	Through	the	on–line	
accommodation	service	AirBnB,	I	managed	to	find	affordable	lodging	with	locals	across	
Vietnam,	which	gave	me	a	local	foothold	and	unexpected	access	to	invaluable	research	
informants.	On-line	friends	and	connections	provided	introductions	to	their	social	and	
professional	networks	in	Mozambique,	Hong	Kong,	and	Vietnam,	many	of	whom	I	met	in	face-
to-face	interviews	and	social	gatherings.		
	
Social	network	sites	hold	vast	stores	of	multimedia-resources	“regarding	even	the	most	
marginal	social	movements	or	groups”	(Murthy	2008:	845).	The	rhino	has	most	certainly	an	
enormous	social	media	presence.	Facebook	groups	like	The	Great	Big	NO	Trade/PRO	Trade	
Debate,81	Focus	Africa	Foundation,82	Outraged	SA	Citizens	against	Poaching,83	Rhino	News,84	
Rhino	S.O.S./Wild	and	Free	SA,85	personal	blogs86	and	the	Facebook	and	Twitter	pages	of	
conservation	NGOs,	Anti–Poaching	Units	(APUs)	and	Intergovernmental	Organizations	(IGOs)	
provide	useful	links	to	documents	and	databases,	news	reports	and	insights	as	to	how	the	
rhino	problem	is	framed	in	public	discourse.	Several	hard	to	find	policy	papers	and	reports	
were	‘crowd–sourced’	from	such	platforms.	Moreover,	‘on–line	observation’	was	conducted	
																																																						
81	Accessible	at	https://www.facebook.com/groups/RhinoTradeDebate/	
	
82	Accessible	at	https://www.facebook.com/pages/Focus-Africa-Foundation/640463866006417?fref=nf	
	
83	Accessible	at	https://www.facebook.com/groups/OSCAP/	
	
84Accessible	at	https://www.facebook.com/groups/506340646046722/	
	
85Accessible	at	https://www.facebook.com/groups/rhinosos/	and	
https://www.facebook.com/groups/WILDANDFREESA/?fref=ts.	The	Wild	and	Free	SA	group	had	replaced	Rhino	
S.O.S.,	which	was	the	operational	group	when	I	undertook	scoping	research	for	the	project.	
	
86	The	personal	blog	of	Brian	Sandberg	is	a	great	example	of	thought-provoking	ideas	being	shared	via	social	
media.	Brian	frequently	published	on	rhino–related	matters	on	his	personal	blog	
(https://vivaafrika.wordpress.com/).	I	contacted	him	upon	reading	a	blog	about	the	villages	on	the	Mozambican	
border	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	and	the	villagers’	links	to	rhino	poaching.	We	connected	over	coffee	a	few	
days	later.	Unfortunately,	Brian	passed	away	in	April	2014.		
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in	virtual	marketplaces87,	where	rhino	horn	and	other	wildlife	contraband	were	traded.	I	also	
accessed	the	Deepnet	(also	known	as	the	Darknet	or	Hidden	Web)	through	the	anonymity	
network	Tor	to	cast	the	net	wider	and	assess	opportunity	structures	accessible	to	criminal	
players.		
	
These	new	technologies	are	not	only	generating	new	kinds	of	data	and	granting	access	to	
difficult	to	reach	populations,	but	they	carry	with	them	ethical	and	methodological	challenges	
(McKie/Ryan	2012:	5).	Firstly,	there	are	ethical	concerns	tied	to	privacy88	–	some	Facebook	
updates,	tweets	or	chat-room	ramblings	were	created	in	“highly-context	sensitive	spaces”,	
the	originators	thus	may	not	consent	to	their	data	being	used	elsewhere	(boyd/Crawford	
2012:	673).89		Sally	Hambridge,	developer	of	the	“Netiquette	Guidelines”	(cited	in:	Ess/AoIR	
Ethics	Working	Committee	2002:	5)	qualifies	the	openness	of	communication	by	warning	that	
not	even	e–mail	correspondence	is	safe	from	prying	eyes:		
	
“Unless	you	are	using	an	encryption	device	(hardware	or	software),	you	should	
assume	that	mail	on	the	Internet	is	not	secure.	Never	put	in	a	mail	message	anything	
you	would	not	put	on	a	postcard.”90		
	
I	used	common	sense	to	judge	whether	the	interactions	of	social	media	users	were	intended	
as	public	and	“performative”	(Ess/AoIR	Ethics	Working	Committee	2002:	7)	or	private	and	
protected.	Anonymity,	protection	of	confidentiality	and	informed	consent	guided	data	
																																																						
87	Using	a	crime	script	analysis	approach,	Lavorgna	(2014)	argues	that	the	Internet	is	not	only	a	communication	
tool	for	wildlife	traffickers	but	has	also	transformed	the	structure	of	the	criminal	wildlife	market	by	lowering	
barriers	to	entry.	Asian	informants	likewise	suggested	that	on-line	marketplaces,	social	network	platforms	and	
auction	websites	offer	rhino	horn	in	various	forms	(TCM,	carvings,	unprocessed	horn).	My	Vietnamese	research	
assistant	introduced	me	to	several	auction	websites,	which	ostensibly	sold	rhino	horn	products.	However,	
criminal	investigators	stated	that	rhino	horn	traded	on–line	is	mostly	fake	(Interview	with	organized	crime	
experts,	Bangkok,	Hanoi	and	Hong	Kong,	2013).	Several	on-line	auction	and	marketplaces	have	been	shut	down	
(such	as	the	former	www.kerwawa.com),	and	listings	on	several	reputable	auction	websites	have	been	flagged,	
reported	and	deleted.	My	empirical	investigation	could	only	partially	confirm	Lavorgna’s	thesis	–	the	part	of	the	
Internet	being	used	as	a	communication	tool	(see	chapter	8);	however,	interviews	with	rhino	horn	consumers	
revealed	that	they	relied	on	personal	introductions	and	word-by-mouth	referrals	to	reputable	horn	sellers.	
	
88	The	on-going	revelations	tied	to	the	National	Security	Agency	(NSA)	scandal	have	shone	a	light	on	how	social	
media	platforms	are	used	for	intelligence	gathering	purposes.	
		
89	Unbeknownst	to	many	Internet	users,	deleting	an	update,	tweet	or	comment	may	remove	it	from	one’s	
computer	screen	while	back-ups,	mirror	images	and	screenshots	may	remain	in	circulation	long	after.	
	
90	Available	at	http://www.pcplayer.dk/Netikette_reference.doc	
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collection	throughout	the	research	process.	In	return,	some	social	networkers	requested	
assistance	with	specific	tasks,	such	as	referrals	to	the	relevant	literature	supporting	their	
stance	for	or	against	the	legalization	of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn,	input	into	movie	scripts	and	
op–ed	pieces,	or	introductions	to	sources	of	information.91	I	assisted	with	the	requests	as	long	
as	they	did	not	clash	with	my	research	ethics	and	time	constraints.	
	
Secondly,	administrators	of	social	media	interfaces	have	the	power	of	the	“delete”	button.	In	
other	words,	on-line	contents	is	often	censored,	mediated	and	condensed	as	not	to	upset	the	
mainstream	or	catch	the	attention	of	law	enforcement	and	intelligence	bodies.	In	some	cases,	
social	media	users	practice	self-censorship	and	delete	their	comments	upon	receiving	
negative	sanctioning	from	others.	I	have	often	watched	comments	‘disappear’	from	my	laptop	
screen;	these	include	amongst	others,	racist	remarks,	personal	attacks	aimed	at	fellow	users	
and	death	threats	to	poachers	or	Asian	nationals.	The	“new	digital	divide”	(boyd/Crawford	
2012:	673)	presents	another	limitation	because	of	the	growing	rift	between	the	mostly	urban	
wealthy	strata	of	society	with	high-speed	Internet	access	and	data	volumes	and	the	less	
fortunate	ones	(often	in	rural	settings)	who	cannot	afford	access	or	use	restricted	wireless	
access	to	connect	to	the	Internet.	Arguably,	access	to	social	media	is	largely	limited	to	the	
“digital	haves”	while	“ethnic/gender	digital	divides	strongly	persist”	(Murthy	2008:	845).	
Conscious	efforts	were	made	to	contact	‘digital	have–nots’	and	difficult	to	reach	populations	
in	the	‘real’	world.		
	
	
2.4.2	Fieldwork	
	
Fieldwork	refers	to	primary	research	“that	transpires	‘in	the	field’	…		outside	the	controlled	
settings	of	the	library	or	laboratory”(McCall	2006:	3).	The	duration	of	the	fieldwork	
component	stretched	over	14	months	and	entailed	two	phases.	During	the	initial	exploratory	
phase,	the	case	study	and	key	experts	were	identified	(and	interviewed	to	inform	the	research	
approach)	and	the	research	sites	were	determined.	I	also	initiated	the	process	of	obtaining	
research	permission	to	undertake	research	in	South	Africa’s	national	parks	and	correctional	
																																																						
91	A	number	of	journalists	requested	contact	data	of	rhino	criminals.	For	reasons	of	anonymity,	confidentiality	
and	safety,	the	contact	data	was	not	shared.	
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centres	(prisons),	as	well	as	with	officials	from	law	enforcement	agencies	and	government	
departments.	The	second	phase	involved	12–months	of	immersed	fieldwork	in	southern	
Africa	and	Southeast	Asia.	The	timing	of	field	trips	was	largely	flexible,	contingent	on	the	
availability	of	informants	and	weather	conditions,92	and	scheduled	not	to	coincide	with	
elections	or	major	holidays.	
	
I	visited	several	research	sites	more	than	once,	which	allowed	time	to	establish	trust	and	
rapport	with	informants.	Due	to	the	geographic	scope	and	the	remoteness	of	most	research	
sites	in	southern	Africa,	I	used	cars	and	took	occasional	flights	to	get	around.	In	Southeast	
Asia,	I	used	public	transportation	(trains,	ferries,	bus	and	motor	bikes).	My	hometown	of	Cape	
Town	in	the	Western	Cape	region	of	South	Africa	was	the	base	from	where	I	embarked	on	
immersed	field	trips	(see	Appendix	A	for	a	detailed	list	of	research	sites	and	maps).	I	made	pit	
stops	at	several	private	game	reserves	and	rhino	farms,	informal	settlements	and	villages	in	
the	vicinity	of	conservation	areas,	as	well	as	formal	and	unofficial	border	crossings.	Interviews	
and	focus	groups	were	frequently	arranged	away	from	the	respondent’s	place	of	work	or	
office	to	encourage	an	open	and	informal	approach.	
	
While	I	could	visit	all	major	rhino	poaching	hot–spots,	critical	thinking	and	planning	were	
invested	in	the	“places”	of	research.	Beyond	the	physical	properties	such	as	the	demarcation	
of	boundaries,	“figurative”	and	“metaphorical”	aspects	were	also	relevant	(Stein	2006:	61).	
The	identification	of	divided	geographies	and	contested	spaces	became	an	important	aspect	
of	attributing	meaning	and	context.		
	
	
	
	
																																																						
92	Due	to	the	heightened	risk	of	flooding	(leading	to	impassable	roads),	malaria	infection	and	extremely	hot	and	
humid	weather	conditions,	it	is	not	advisable	to	travel	to	Mozambique	and	the	KNP	during	the	rainy	season	
(December	to	February).	I	was	also	cautioned	to	avoid	traveling	to	Southeast	Asia	during	the	southern	summer	
monsoon	season.	Moon	cycles	were	also	important	considerations	as	poaching	used	to	surge	around	full	moon.	
Poachers	use	the	natural	moonlight	to	guide	them	through	the	bush	at	night.	The	role	of	lunar	phases	has	
become	less	important	due	the	great	number	of	poaching	teams	and	incursions	occurring	at	all	times	of	day	and	
night.		
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(a) Interviews	
	
Research	informants	were	interviewed	in	face-to-face	semi-structured	or	unstructured	
interviews.	Research	interviews	are	“professional	conversations”	about	social	life,	upon	which	
“knowledge	is	constructed	in	the	interaction	between	the	interviewer	and	the	interviewee”	
(Kvale/Brinkmann	2009:	4).	Before	discussing	sampling	(which	is	also	relevant	to	sub-section	
(e),	which	deals	with	focus	groups),	an	overview	of	the	interviewing	approach	and	process	is	
given.	
	
The	approach	taken	was	one	of	stepping	back	and	“relinquish(ing)	expert	status”	(Simpson	
2006:	126),	listening	to	respondents’	life	stories,	insights	and	ascribed	meanings	of	illegal	
economic	action	involving	rhino	horn.	This	type	of	“responsive	interview”	is	useful	in	eliciting	
responses	as	it	underscores	“the	importance	of	building	a	relationship	of	trust	between	the	
interviewer	and	interviewee	that	leads	to	more	give-and-take	in	conversation”	(Rubin/Rubin	
2012:	37).	Great	care	was	taken	to	provide	an	interview	setting	that	was	informal	and	relaxed;	
the	questions	were	flexible,	open-ended	and	“evolved	in	response	to	what	the	interviewees	
have	said,	and	new	questions	were	designed	to	tap	the	experience	and	knowledge	of	each	
interviewee”	(Rubin/Rubin	2012:	37).	Once	the	subject	of	illegality	(for	example:	involvement	
in	poaching)	was	broached,	I	erred	on	the	side	of	caution	when	it	came	to	asking	follow-up	
questions	or	probing	further	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	208).	Due	to	the	possibility	of	interviewer	
effects,93	concerted	efforts	were	made	to	avoid	“prompting”	respondents	to	produce	an	
answer	(Fielding/Thomas:	250).	Attempts	were	made	to	discourage	informants	from	
anticipating	the	response	they	thought	I	was	seeking.	To	minimize	respondent	effects	
(irreducible	ambiguity	of	questions	due	to	different	backgrounds	of	the	researcher	and	the	
researched),	local	interpreters	were	employed	to	help	explain	questions	rather	than	the	
researcher	ticking	off	questions	in	a	predetermined	questionnaire	(Burawoy	1998:	12).	
Research	into	sensitive	issues	tends	to	engender	resistance	amongst	those	interviewed	due	to	
feelings	of	shame,	fear	of	reprisals	and	other	consequences	linked	to	continuity	in	work–
based	relationships.	Based	on	previous	fieldwork	experience,	the	use	of	controversial	
terminology	or	‘loaded	terms’	such	as	corruption	was	hence	sidestepped	by	describing	the	
																																																						
93	Personal	attributes	of	the	interviewer	(such	as	gender,	ethnicity	or	religion)	or	the	interview	schedule	(order	or	
form	of	questions)	–	so-called	interview	effects	–	can	impact	the	interview	(issues	of	positionality	of	the	
researcher	will	be	discussed	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter).		
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concept	in	loose	terms	(Hübschle/Van	der	Spuy	2012	:	326).	The	assurance	of	confidentiality	
and	anonymity	in	and	beyond	the	field	was	crucial	to	obtaining	data	that	delved	beyond	
standard	one-line	responses.	
	
Attempts	were	made	to	interview	respondents	more	than	once.	The	first	interview	was	used	
to	establish	rapport	with	the	informant(s)	and	follow–up	interviews	would	serve	the	purpose	
of	data	collection	and	verification.	In	light	of	the	geographical	scope,	time	and	institutional	
constraints	of	the	study,	this	was	not	always	possible.	The	research	permits	to	undertake	data	
collection	in	the	national	parks,	and	correctional	centres	were	approved	and	processed	
halfway	through	the	research	process	and	demanded	further	logistical	preparations.	
Unfortunately,	in	this	instance	respondents	could	only	be	interviewed	once.	However,	follow-
up	phone	calls	and	emails	were	made	to	‘keep	in	touch’	and	verify	information	with	many	
respondents	beyond	the	initial	interview	process.		
	
Key	informants	provided	introductions	to	their	professional	networks,	acting	as	gatekeepers.	
Through	the	interviews	conducted	in	the	initial	exploratory	phase,	I	established	relationships,	
which	I	cultivated	throughout	the	research.	Conservators,	investigators,	officials	and	
community	leaders	are	important	‘gatekeepers’,	who	provided	introductions	to	their	
professional	and	social	networks.	Moreover,	purposive	sampling	was	employed	to	target	
specific	persons	of	interest	as	a	means	of	assisting	with	filling	gaps	in	the	data	and	
contributing	towards	theory	building	(Gray	2009:	152).	I	used	snowball	sampling	to	recruit	
other	respondents	through	pre-existing	social	and	professional	networks.	Typically,	the	
sample	group	grows	over	time	(like	a	snowball)	until	enough	data	is	gathered	to	satisfy	the	
research	objective.	This	technique	is	particularly	useful	for	accessing	data	from	hidden	
populations	–	such	as	kingpins,	smugglers	or	poachers	–	where	group	membership	may	be	
concealed	due	to	the	illegal	nature	of	the	activity.	Moreover,	snowballing	can	be	used	to	
access	marginalized	communities,	like	the	rural	dwellers	interviewed	in	the	Mozambican	
borderlands.	The	technique	relies	heavily	on	personal	recommendations	that	“vouch	for	the	
legitimacy	of	the	researcher”	(Sturgis	2011:	180).	It	allows	researchers	to	gain	access	and	
information	as	trust	is	built	amongst	hidden	and/or	marginalized	populations.	The	process	of	
securing	entry	into	a	given	social	network	allows	researchers	to	understand	the	inter-group	
relationships,	hierarchies,	and	connections	between	participants.	While	it	is	acknowledged	
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that	snowball	sampling	is	inexact	(Miller	2005:	69),	it	can	offer	useful	insights	into	illegal	or	
marginal	sectors	provided	the	data	is	verified	or	triangulated.	416	interviews	(including	focus	
groups)	were	conducted	during	this	research.	This	includes	360	face-to-face	interviews	with	
respondents,	some	of	whom	were	interviewed	more	than	once.	In	light	of	confidentiality	and	
anonymity	requirements,	two	general	tables	of	informants,	their	role	within	the	rhino	supply	
chain	and	a	breakdown	by	region	are	given.	Table	2	lists	the	field	of	expertise	of	research	
informants.	
	
Table	2:	Number	of	respondents	by	function	
Function	 Number	of	respondents	
Prisoners94	 30	
Criminal	actors95	 38	
Community96	 43	
Conservation97	 47	
Law	enforcement	&	intelligence	
(public)98	
46	
Private	security	&	intelligence99	 25	
Wildlife	industry100	 29	
Academia	 34	
Journalism	 21	
Social	movement101	 47	
Total:	 360	
																																																						
94	For	all	intents	and	purposes,	the	‘prisoner’	category	could	be	subsumed	under	‘criminal	actors’.	The	purpose	of	
separating	the	two	serves	to	indicate	that	both,	active	and	convicted	rhino	criminals,	were	interviewed.	
	
95	Poachers,	kingpins,	traders,	corrupt	officials,	rogue	wildlife	industry	actors	and	consumers	are	considered	in	
this	category.	
	
96	Criminal	actors	are	embedded	in	community	structures.	It	was	thus	important	to	interview	community	
members	directly	affected	by	illegal	trade.	Typically,	such	respondents	would	provide	the	broader	societal	
context	of	the	study.	
	
97	A	clear	delineation	was	made	between	conservators	and	respondents	representing	social	movements	or	
special	interest	groups.	The	primary	function	of	conservators	is	linked	to	nature	conservation.	Respondents	in	
this	category	work	in	parks	or	carry	out	official	duties	linked	to	conservation.	
	
98	This	category	includes	state-run	police,	military,	customs	and	prosecutorial	agencies.		
	
99	Private	anti-poaching	units,	intelligence	gatherers	and	private	investigators	are	included.	
	
100	This	category	includes	people	that	are	professionally	linked	to	the	rhino	horn	exchange	such	as	wildlife	
veterinarians,	professional	hunters,	game	capturers	and	wildlife	insurance	brokers.	
	
101	Representatives	of	charities,	NGOs	and	other	civil	society	organizations	were	interviewed.		
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In	some	instances,	the	categorization	was	not	straightforward.	A	criminal	actor,	for	example,	
may	also	fit	the	community,	conservation	or	law	enforcement	category.	The	salient	
categorization	relevant	to	the	research	question	was	chosen	in	such	cases.	
	
Table	3	provides	an	overview	of	respondents	by	region.	The	majority	of	respondents	hail	from	
either	Sub-Saharan	Africa	or	Southeast	Asia.	The	categorization	relies	on	the	knowledge	base	
and	context	of	the	respondent.	For	example,	some	Asian	respondents	were	interviewed	in	
South	Africa	and	Mozambique.	As	the	interpretation	of	their	data	is	relevant	to	understanding	
the	Asian	dimensions	of	the	supply	chain,	they	fall	under	the	“Asia”	category.	
	
Table	3:	Respondents	by	region	
Region	 Number	of	respondents	
Sub–Saharan	Africa	 239	
Asia	 102	
Australia	 5	
Europe	 10	
North	America	 4	
		 360	
	
	
Qualitative	studies	seldom	encompass	a	big	sample;	the	present	study	is	thus	unusual.	
Critiques	of	case	studies,	snowballing	and	purposive	sampling	techniques	fault	the	lack	of	
adherence	to	standards	of	representativeness	and	thus	generalizability	(Miller	2005:	70).	
While	cognizant	of	such	critiques,	the	big	size	of	this	sample	is	attributable	to	the	illegality	of	
the	rhino	horn	exchange,	the	related	difficulty	of	negotiating	access	to	‘experts’	(rhino	
criminals),	and	most	importantly,	the	importance	assigned	to	data	verification.	In	some	
instances,	the	trust	of	gatekeepers	or	the	proverbial	‘foot	in	the	door’	had	to	be	negotiated	
over	a	series	of	interviews	with	several	different	respondents.	In	other	instances,	it	took	a	few	
interviews	until	introductions	to	the	‘right	person’	were	made.	Unstructured	informal	
interviews	were	conducted	when	the	opportunity	arose	to	speak	to	officials	“off	the	record”	
after	workshops	or	formal	meetings.		Sometimes	impromptu	interviews	developed	at	
research	sites	with	informants	from	unexpected	corners,	such	as	patients	waiting	to	see	a	
TCM	doctor	or	people	going	about	everyday	business.	The	length	of	interviews	varied	from	10	
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minutes	to	close	to	5	hours,	averaging	at	approximately	2	hours	per	interview.	The	research	
project	benefitted	greatly	from	respondents’	good	will,	time,	and	trust.	
	
The	need	for	data	triangulation	and	verification	grew	as	collected	data	started	diverging	from	
insights	found	in	the	literature	or	differed	from	official	positions	taken	by	gatekeepers	or	
social	control	agents.	While	fact-checking	constituted	one	research	strategy,	equally	
important	was	the	requirement	to	establish	the	“sociological	pertinence	and	analytical	
adequacy	for	explaining	the	social	practices”	of	respondents	(Waquant	2002:	1481).		During	
the	interviewing	process,	it	proved	important	to	reflect	on	who	was	being	interviewed,	their	
role	in	the	community	and	society,	and	in	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain.	Moreover,	I	
interrogated	the	process	and	implications	of	‘othering’,102	leading	to	“alienation	and	social	
distance”	between	key	actors	and	‘supporting	roles’	(Krumer-Nevo/Sidi	2012:	300).	Early	in	
the	research	phase,	the	fluid	interface	between	illegality	and	legality	was	recognized.	For	
example,	the	ambiguous	role	of	social	control	agents	and	big	business	was	duly	included	and	
researched.	
	
	
(b) Focus	groups	
	
Focus	groups	were	arranged	with	villagers,	conservation,	law	enforcement	and	government	
officials.	Gatekeepers	and	key	informants	initiated	some	focus	groups;	I	organized	the	others.	
In	some	instances,	focus	groups	constituted	the	follow-up	interaction	of	one-on-one	
interviews	actively	sought	out	by	respondents	who	preferred	a	group	setting.	On	other	
occasions,	focus	groups	and	meetings	provided	the	springboard	for	one-on-one	exchanges	
later	on.	Barbour	and	Kitzinger	(1999:	4–5)	regard	as	focus	group	“any	group	discussion…	as	
long	as	the	researcher	is	actively	encouraging	and	attentive	to,	the	group	interaction”.		What	
differentiates	focus	groups	from	plain	group	interviews	is	the	“explicit	use	of	group	
interaction	to	generate	data”	(Kitzinger/Barbour	1999:	4).	The	size	of	focus	groups	ranged	
																																																						
102	I	use	the	sociological	understanding	of	the	concept	of	‘othering’,	which	refers	to	“the	process	of	attaching	
moral	codes	of	inferiority	to	difference”	(Krumer-Nevo/Sidi	2012:	300).	Krumer-Nevo	and	Sidi	(ibid)	identify	
objectification,	de-contextualization,	de-historicization,	and	de-authorization	as	othering	mechanisms	employed	
with	regards	to	women	living	in	poverty.		
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from	three	to	eight	participants.	Focus	group	interactions	proved	particularly	useful	in	
encouraging	people	to	talk	freely	about	the	impact,	drawbacks	and	benefits	of	poaching	to	
the	community,	government	policy	and	action	and	sensitive	topics	such	as	public	sector	
corruption.	
	
Michel	(1999:	36)	warns	that	while	focus	groups	are	useful	for	the	identification	of	collective	
experiences	and	shared	identities,	they	may	silence	the	voices	of	participants	lower	in	the	
social	“pecking	order”	(especially	when	on-going	social	relations	may	be	affected	by	public	
disclosure).	Contrary	to	this	warning,	scholars	from	the	feminist	tradition	have	found	that	
respondents	were	more	likely	to	“self–disclose	or	share	personal	experiences	in	a	group	
setting	than	in	dyadic	settings”	due	to	feeling	“empowered	and	supported	in	a	group	setting”	
(Faraquhar/Das)	1999:	47).	The	researcher’s	identity	and	linked	asymmetric	power	relations	
due	to	race,	gender	and	age	may,	however,	amplify	the	sensitivity	of	the	research	topic.	The	
presence	of	a	youngish103	white	woman	influenced	the	process	of	data	collection	and	will	be	
further	problematized	in	the	final	section.	Focus	groups	helped	to	level	the	playing	field,	as	
some	respondents	expressed	comfort	of	being	surrounded	by	members	of	their	peer	group	or	
support	structures.	Assurance	of	confidentiality	and	anonymity	was	particularly	important	for	
focus	group	settings.		
	
	
(c) Participant	observation	
	
Participant	observation	assisted	in	understanding	and	interpreting	the	research	context	and	
how	actors	interact	within	a	given	environment.	It	involves	“the	systematic	viewing	of	
people’s	actions	and	the	recording,	analysis	and	interpretation	of	their	behaviour”	(Gray	2009:	
397).	Observation	is	integral	to	most	qualitative	researcher’s	toolbox	and,	like	the	other	
methods	employed	carries	ethical	and	security	concerns	particularly	where	it	involves	illegal	
activities.	While	the	researcher	observes	the	field,	she	also	influences	what	she	is	observing	
due	to	her	participation	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	312).	Covert	observation	(when	people	do	not	
know	that	they	are	being	observed)	is	favoured	when	the	validity	of	the	research	results	might	
																																																						
103	I	was	in	my	mid-30s	during	the	period	of	active	fieldwork.		
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be	influenced	by	prior	knowledge	of	the	observation.	However,	this	form	of	observation	is	
ethically	questionable	and	falls	short	of	spying	on	others.		
	
For	this	project,	overt	and	invited	participant	observation	was	the	preferred	method,	which	
included,	amongst	others:	accompanying	investigators	to	crime	scene	investigations;	visiting	
the	fence	line	between	Kruger	National	Park	and	private	concessions	on	the	Mozambican	
side;	anti–poaching	patrols;	consultations	with	TCM	doctors;	rhino	horn	consumption	and	the	
observation	of	organizational	and	institutional	processes	in	government	departments,	law	
enforcement	agencies,	anti-poaching	units,	conservation	NGOs	and	IGOs.	Due	to	security	
concerns,	observations	at	some	sites	remained	unannounced,	such	as	visits	to	the	medicines	
streets	and	districts	of	Hong	Kong,	Hanoi,	Cat	Ba	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City;	TCM	paraphernalia	
stalls	and	shops	in	Hanoi,	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	and	Bat	Thienh;	TCM	wholesalers	in	Hanoi;	and	
observations	of	village	life	in	border	towns	and	villages	in	Mozambique.	These	observations	
assisted	in	contextualizing	the	social	setting	and	the	level	of	embeddedness	of	criminal	actors,	
the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality,	interactions	between	respondents,	how	they	
carried	themselves	in	their	daily	routines,	and	behaved	in	their	interactions	with	the	state.	
Beyond	the	listed	observations,	observational	techniques	were	used	to	determine	the	
credibility	of	respondents	(Becker	1958:	654),	whether	respondents	volunteered	or	directed	
information	(Becker	1958:	655)	and	the	significance	of	body	language	of	respondents	in	the	
interview,	meeting	or	everyday	social	settings.	It	is	difficult	to	categorize	such	observations	
and	use	them	as	evidentiary	proof	for	theoretical	conclusions	(Becker	1958:	666).	To	
compensate	for	this	deficiency,	the	empirical	sections	of	this	dissertation	rely	on	‘thick	
narratives’	and	triangulation	of	data	and	methods.	The	use	of	thick	narrative	conveys	the	
richness	of	the	data	collected	during	this	project.		
	
	
(d) Participation	in	meetings	
	
The	opportunity	to	participate	in	meetings,	workshops	and	roundtable	discussions	dealing	
with	rhino-related	matters	contributed	greatly	to	understanding	and	contextualizing	policy	
matters.	This	also	provided	the	opportunity	to	network	with	key	stakeholders,	leading	to	
follow-up	interviews	or	introductions	to	important	gatekeepers.	Particularly	useful	were	
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invitations	to	present	the	objectives	of	this	research	project	to	the	South	African	National	
Biodiversity	Investigators’	Forum,	the	DPCI	(Department	of	Priority	Crime	Investigations	in	
South	Africa),	and	stakeholders	of	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Conservation	Area,	as	well	
as	members	of	the	Policing	Studies	Forum	at	the	University	of	Hong	Kong.	Other	meetings	
(such	as	attending	the	annual	congress	of	Wildlife	Ranching	South	Africa,	an	awareness	raising	
campaign	undertaken	by	the	CITES	Scientific	Authority	at	a	primary	school	in	Hanoi	or	
meetings	of	private	rhino	owners)	were	less	formal	but	equally	informative	and	provided	
insights	on	stakeholder’s	perceptions	of	the	rhino	issue.	
	
	
2.5	Triangulation	and	data	analysis	
	
The	research	design	of	multi-sited	ethnography	facilitated	the	garnering	of	insights	and	
perspectives	from	different	actors	and	places	along	rhino	horn	flows,	allowing	for	
juxtaposition	and	comparison.	Qualitative	data	analysis	has	been	criticized	due	to	supposed	
lack	of	“methodological	rigour”,	bias	due	to	researcher	subjectivity,	the	smallness	of	cases,	as	
well	as		“limited	evidence”	to	inform	empirical	and	theoretical	conclusions	(Gray	2009:	493).	
Earlier	sections	of	this	chapter	served	to	show	that	a	“rigorous	and	logical	process”	(ibid)	was	
followed	in	attaching	meaning	and	subsequent	analysis	to	the	collected	data.	Moreover,	
multiple	qualitative	methods	were	adopted	as	a	strategy	to	promote	scientific	rigour.	The	
original	idea	behind	the	so-called	method	of	triangulation	was	to	institute	measurement	
practices	in	social	and	behavioural	research.	Triangulation	serves	as	a	research	strategy		“to	
compare	the	evidence	collected	from	different	sources	to	better	understand	the	biases	or	
omissions	of	each	and	to	produce	a	more	comprehensive	view	of	the	social	phenomena”	
(Espeland	2005).		It	also	refers	to	the	use	of	different	data	sources	(such	as	studying	
phenomena	at	different	times,	in	different	places,	as	well	as	gathering	data	from	different	
people),	the	use	of	different	interviewers	and/or	the	use	of	multiple	perspectives	and	
hypotheses	to	generate	theories	(Flick	[1998]	2014:	183).104	According	to	Flick	([1998]	2014),	
																																																						
104	Denzin	(1970)	differentiates	between	data,	investigator,	theoretical	and	methodological	triangulation.	For	the	
purposes	of	Ph.D.	research,	the	use	of	several	investigators	would	be	construed	as	cheating.	Nonetheless,	
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triangulation	is	not	a	strategy	or	tool	to	test	data	validity	but	serves	as	an	alternative	to	
validation.	I	used	different	types	and	sources	of	data,	approximating	fact-checking	undertaken	
by	investigative	journalists	to	verify	information	and	sources	(Espeland	2005:	66),105	as	well	as	
multiple	methods	of	data	collection.	In	addition,	the	considerable	number	of	research	
informants,	as	well	as	snowball	and	purposive	sampling	led	to	heterogeneity	of	the	overall	
sample	and	ensured	that	hidden	populations	received	a	voice.	Thus,	the	blend	of	multiple	
methods,	empirical	materials	and	perspectives	added	“rigour,	breadth	complexity,	richness,	
and	depth”	(Denzin	2012:82)	to	the	study.	
	
For	the	purposes	of	analysis,	data	emanating	from	both	fieldwork	and	desktop	research	were	
analysed	throughout	the	data	collection	phase.	The	process	continued	once	the	active	
fieldwork	phase	had	ended.	Field	notes,	audio	recordings	and	documents	made	up	the	raw	
data.	Throughout	the	data	collection	process,	extensive	field	notes	of	interviews	and	
observations	were	created.	Interviews	were	recorded,	dependent	on	the	consent	of	the	
research	informant.106	The	transcribing	services	of	native	speakers	of	Shangaan/Tsonga107	and	
Vietnamese	were	employed	for	interviews	that	were	conducted	in	languages	not	known	to	
the	researcher.	Local	research	assistants	were	asked	to	do	in	situ	translations	in	the	field.	It	
was	hoped	that	the	transcribers	would	catch	details	that	may	have	been	‘lost	in	translation’	in	
the	field.	The	interviews	were	transcribed,	re-checked	for	accuracy,	anonymized	and	stored	in	
secure	and	encrypted	folders.	Relevant	newspaper	articles,	policy	documents	and	academic	
articles	were	collected	throughout	the	project	and	inserted	into	a	self-devised	database	on	my	
laptop.	I	also	created	memos	to	reflect	on	thought-provoking	aspects	of	the	data,	which	
provided	the	basis	for	deeper	analysis	(Miles/Huberman	1994:	44).		
	
While	initial	data	analysis	and	the	development	of	the	conceptual	framework	were	done	
																																																																																																																																																																											
collaborative	projects	using	more	than	one	researcher	are	useful	not	only	for	triangulation,	but	could	also	deal	
with	issues	of	positionality	and	related	biases.	
		
105	Investigative	journalists	usually	confirm	a	set	of	information	through	three	independent	sources.	
	
106	Recording	was	not	always	possible	due	to	the	sensitivity	of	the	subject	matter	and	the	request	by	respondents	
not	to	be	recorded.		
	
107	Tsonga	and	Shangaan	are	local	languages	spoken	by	many	people	living	adjacent	to	the	KNP	on	both	sides	of	
the	border.	The	two	languages	are	similar.	
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manually,	the	NVivo	data	analysis	software	was	used	in	the	later	stages.	Open	coding	allowed	
for	the	development	of	codes	that	captured	the	essence	of		‘new’	theoretical	ideas	and	
meanings	of	data	that	could	not	be	integrated	into	preconceived	codes	such	as	the	notion	of	
contested	illegality	and	the	coordination	problem	of	security.	This	allowed	the	data	“to	speak	
for	themselves”	(Glaser/Strauss	1967:	101).	Of	importance	was	the	application	of	theoretical	
rather	than	descriptive	codes,	which	I	developed	through	primary	data	collection.	Moreover,	
the	views	of	respondents	were	verified,	critically	assessed	and	interpreted	in	the	process	
(Gibbs	2007:	54–55).	Data–driven	coding	was	supplemented	with	concept-driven	coding	
derived	from	previous	studies	in	the	literature,	topics	covered	during	the	interview	process	
and	hunches	(Gibbs	2007:	44–45).	Frames	and	framing	processes	were	also	considered	during	
the	analysis	of	both	primary	and	secondary	data.	Goffman	(1974:	21)	conceived	of	the	notion	
of	frames	to	denote	“schemata	of	interpretation”,	which	allows	individuals	“to	locate,	
perceive,	identify	and	label”	events	in	their	everyday	lives	and	the	wider	social	system.	He	
argues	that	as	people	frame	the	“organization	of	their	experience,	they	buttress,	and	
perforce,	self–fulfillingly”	which	leads	them	to	“develop	a	corpus	of	cautionary	tales,	games,	
riddles,	experiments,	newsy	stories	and	other	scenarios	which	elegantly	confirm	a	frame–
relevant	view	of	the	workings	of	the	world”	(Goffman	1974:	563).	Texts	were	scrutinized	for	
attribution	of	causality,	blame	and	delineation	between	‘good’	and	‘evil’	(adversarial	framing)	
(Schwellnus	2012).	Forms	of	othering,	differentiation	between	good	versus	bad	(such	as	the	
notion	of	“good	hunters”	versus	“bad	poachers”)	and	cultural	relativist	frameworks	were	
significant	elements	in	the	analysis	of	cognitive	frames.	
	
	
	
2.6	Gray	areas	of	social	research:	Research	ethics	
	
When	researching	the	social	world	and	people,	social	scientists	should	consider	the	impact	of	
their	research	on	the	research	participants,	the	social	environment,	and	the	emotional	and	
psychological	impact	on	themselves.	This	research	project	falls	into	the	category	of	what	
Sieber	and	Stanley	(:	49)	describe	as	“socially	sensitive	research”:	
	
	 99	
“Socially	sensitive	research	refers	to	studies	in	which	there	are	potential	social	
consequences	or	implications,	either	directly	for	the	participants	of	the	research	or	the	
class	of	individuals	represented	by	the	research.”	
	
While	the	pursuit	of	greater	knowledge	is	laudable,	“respect	for	human	dignity”	should	be	the	
guiding	principle	of	social	research	(Bulmer	2008:	146).	In	the	aftermath	of	controversial	social	
sciences	experiments	such	as	those	undertaken	by	Milgram,	Zimbardo	and	Rosenhan,	the	
infamous	Project	Camelot	(David/Sutton	2011:	31–32)	and	social	research	interpreted	
through	a	racial,	racist	or	ideological	lens	during	the	apartheid	regime	in	South	Africa	
(Bless/Higson-Smith/Kagee	2006:	140–141),108	the	need	for	an	honest	engagement	with	
ethics	of	any	social	sciences	research	has	become	axiomatic.	Sieber	and	Stanley	(1988:	50)	list	
four	aspects	of	scientific	activity	that	require	scrutiny,	including:	“the	formulation	of	theories	
or	research	questions,	the	conduct	of	research	and	the	treatment	of	participants,	the	
institutional	setting	in	which	the	research	is	conducted,	and	the	interpretation	and	application	
of	the	research	findings.”		
	
Although	the	Max	Planck	Society	109	endorses	freedom	of	research,110	restrictions	apply	
concerning	research	that	undermines	“other	significant	constitutionally	protected	values”	
																																																						
108	The	Carnegie	Corporation	of	New	York	funded	the	first	major	sociological	study	in	South	Africa,	which	delved	
into	the	poor	Whites	phenomenon	(Welsh	1981:	28).	In	its	1932	report,	the	Commission	recommended	that	
transitional	job	reservation	should	be	introduced	in	order	to	address	the	“poor-White	problem”	(Webster	1981:	
90).	No	consideration	was	paid	to	the	problems	of	poor	black	people.	The	research	was	designed	to	proffer	
ideologies	of	white	supremacy	during	the	colonial	era	(Bless/Higson-Smith/Kagee	2006:	139).	Hendrik	Verwoerd,	
the	intellectual	father	of	apartheid,	started	his	dubious	career	as	a	sociologist	at	the	University	of	Stellenbosch.	
He	declared	that	black	South	Africans	needed	to	“’administered’	and	‘properly	serviced’	so	that	they	can	function	
in	their	prescribed	role”	(Adam	1981:	119).		Verwoerd’s	career	and	the	abuse	of	social	research	to	firmly	
entrench	the	apartheid	ideology	is	a	matter	of	historical	record.	During	the	apartheid	regime,	many	questionable	
research	and	science	programmes	were	introduced	and	used	to	uphold	the	dominant	Calvinist	and	racist	
apartheid	ideology.	Another	notorious	example	is	Project	Coast,	the	covert	chemical	and	biological	warfare	
programme	led	by	Wouter	Basson,	also	known	as	‘Doctor	Death’.	The	programme	produced	and	tested	narcotic	
drugs	and	poisons	for	the	use	against	anti–apartheid	activists	(Singh,	J.	A.	2008:	5).	Scores	of	scientists	
collaborated	on	Project	Coast,	which	also	included	a	eugenic	strategy	to	control	population	growth	amongst	the	
black	population	by	developing	a	clandestine	anti–fertility	vaccine.	The	vaccine	was	going	to	be	selectively	
administered	to	black	South	Africans	(Singh,	J.	A.	2008:	6);	fortunately,	the	end	of	apartheid	subverted	these	
plans.	Chandre	Gould	(2002)	argues	that	Project	Coast	offers	important	lessons	on	why	scientists	get	involved	in	
questionable	research,	such	as	professional	ambition,	the	desire	to	do	interesting	science,	patriotism	and	
financial	gain.	Between	1960	and	1991,	the	South	African	Defence	Force	also	implemented	aversion	therapy	to	
‘heal’	gay	men	and	lesbians	from	their	‘deviant’	sexual	preferences.	This	so-called	therapy	included	forced	sex	
change	operations,	chemical	sterilization	and	electric	shock	treatments	(Eybers	2000;	Kaplan	2004).	
	
109	The	Max	Planck	Institute	for	the	Study	of	Societies	(MPIfG)	provided	financial,	administrative	and	advisory	
assistance	for	this	project.	The	MPIfG	is	one	of	82	research	institutes	that	operate	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Max	
Planck	Society.	
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(Max	Planck	Society	2010:	3).	It	also	acknowledges	the	danger	of	misappropriation	of	“neutral	
or	useful	per	se”	research	“for	harmful	purposes”	by	third	parties	(ibid).111	All	research	
(including	this	research	project)	conducted	through	institutes	affiliated	with	the	Max	Planck	
Society	are	governed	by	strict	ethical	and	legal	limitations.112	An	Ethics	Commission	provides	
support	on	“issues	of	research	ethics,	mediates	differences	of	opinion	between	researchers	
on	relevant	matters	and	issues	recommendations	on	the	implementation	of	research	
projects”	(Max	Planck	Society	2010:	10).	The	Max	Planck	Society’s	principles	of	ethically	
responsible	research	provided	the	institutional	blueprint	to	navigating	through	ethical	issues	
during	the	project.	In	addition,	I	had	previous	experience	in	undertaking	fieldwork	into	
human,	drug	and	natural	resource	trafficking	and	broader	organized	crime	issues	amongst	
vulnerable,	disenfranchised	and	criminal	populations	in	southern	Africa.	Members	of	the	
Ph.D.	advisory	committee,	fellow	researchers	and	sociologists,	as	well	as	the	relevant	
authorities	(for	example	the	research	guide	appointed	by	the	Department	of	Correctional	
Services)	advised	on	specific	aspects	such	as	the	interviewing	process	in	prisons.	
	
Many	ethical	issues	were	encountered	during	inception	and	in	the	course	of	the	research	
project.	In	the	following	subsections,	issues	of	anonymity	and	confidentiality,	informed	
consent,	power	differentials	between	the	researcher	and	respondents,	reciprocity	and	
security	concerns	are	discussed.		
																																																																																																																																																																											
	
110	Considerations	of	what	is	ethical	or	unethical	in	broader	society	influence	the	success	of	research	questions	
and	proposals	(David/Sutton	2011:	39).	Rhino	narratives	are	fraught	with	ethical	concerns,	such	as	whether	to	
endorse	legal	trade	of	a	keratin-like	substance	with	limited	proven	medical	effects,	the	use	of	rhino	horn	for	
medicinal	purposes	(cancer	cure),	the	higher	valuation	of	wild	animals	over	human	beings,	calls	for	shoot-to-kill	
enforcement	against	poachers,	or	cultural-relativist	assessments	over	the	use	of	animal	products	in	traditional	
medicines.		
	
111	The	Kaiser	Wilhelm	Society,	the	Max	Planck	Society’	s	predecessor,	carried	out	unethical	experiments	and	
research	during	the	national	socialist	regime	in	Germany.	This	legacy	has	led	to	the	development	of	
comprehensive	guidelines	not	only	dealing	with	general	research	ethics	but	also	with	clearly	delineated	
responsibilities	of	individual	researchers	and	research	institutes	(Max	Planck	Society	2001).	
	
112	An	excerpt	from	the	Max	Planck	Society’s	principles	of	ethically	responsible	research	states:			
	
“The	Max	Planck	Society	undertakes	to	carry	out	research	which	extends	the	boundaries	of	knowledge	
and	enhances	the	welfare	of	mankind	and	the	protection	of	the	environment.	Scientists	must	therefore	
prevent	or	minimize	direct	or	indirect	harm	to	humans	and	the	environment	as	far	as	possible.	
Researchers	must	not	satisfy	themselves	with	adhering	to	legal	regulations	when	making	applicable	
decisions,	but	must	also	take	account	of	ethical	principles	(Max	Planck	Society	2010:	6).”(Author’s	
emphasis)	
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2.6.1	Informed	consent	
	
The	principle	of	informed	consent	is	well-established	in	the	medical	fraternity.	It	became	a	
research	standard	in	the	aftermath	of	atrocities	committed	against	concentration	camp	
inmates	in	the	name	of	medical	sciences	at	the	Nuremberg	trials	(Gilbert	2008:	150).	Since	
then,	the	principle	has	become	a	cornerstone	of	natural	and	social	science	research	involving	
human	subjects.	According	to	Berg	(cited	in:	David/Sutton	2011:	43),	informed	consent	entails	
“the	knowing	consent	of	individuals	to	participate	as	and	exercise	of	their	choice,	free	from	
any	element	of	fraud,	deceit,	duress,	or	similar	unfair	inducement	or	manipulation.”	While	the	
principle	provides	a	“legal	remedy”	primarily	in	health	research,	informed	consent	is	by	no	
means	the	stopgap	for	ethical	concerns	(Malone	2003:	813).	O’Neill	comments	that	many	
research	designs	are	too	complex	for	lay-persons	to	make	an	informed	decision	about	the	
impact	of	the	research	(based	on	a	presentation	by	O’Neill,	which	is	cited	in:	
Richardson/McMullan	2007:	1116).	Despite	these	valid	concerns,	the	principle	of	informed	
consent	was	upheld	in	this	research	project.	
	
With	the	exception	of	the	covert	participant	observations	mentioned	earlier,	all	respondents	
consented	to	participating	in	the	research.	Usually	an	interview	or	focus	group	was	preceded	
by	either	a	telephonic,	email	introduction	or	an	introductory	visit.	The	researcher	pointed	out	
that	participation	in	the	interview	was	voluntary	and	that	the	informant	could	withdraw	at	
any	stage.	It	is	customary	to	exchange	business	cards	in	some	settings	(e.g.	Asia).	I	always	
carried	institutional	business	cards,	which	provided	a	local	contact	number	and	email	address.	
No	physical	address	(other	than	the	MPIfG’s	address	in	Cologne)	was	given	as	a	security	
precaution.	After	personal	introductions,	the	institutional	background	and	research	were	
introduced.	Prior	to	commencing	any	interview,	I	explained	the	objectives	of	the	research,	
issues	of	confidentiality,	anonymity	and	data	protection.	Respondents	were	encouraged	to	
discuss	their	concerns	and	any	issues	arising.		
	
Researchers	have	to	apply	for	research	permits	to	conduct	research	within	public	institutions	
in	South	Africa.113	The	research	registration	process	can	stretch	over	several	months.	Permits	
																																																						
113	Although	common	in	other	countries,	the	strict	research	permit	system	appears	to	be	a	relic	of	South	Africa’s	
apartheid	past.	Back	then	researchers	were	required	to	obtain	research	permits	from	either	the	central	
government	or	local	authorities	to	conduct	research	in	South	African	homelands	and	townships.	The	permit	
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stipulate	with	whom	the	researcher	may	interact,	how	the	data	is	to	be	used	and	
disseminated.	Due	to	the	‘sensitive	nature’	of	rhino	poaching,	the	relevant	research	and	
scientific	committees	scrutinize	research	proposals	carefully	and	at	length,	vetting	prospective	
researchers	as	they	may	well	be	‘wolves	in	sheepskin’.	There	are	obvious	and	less	obvious	
dangers	to	conducting	fieldwork	in	national	parks,	where	highly–armed	poachers	and	anti–
poaching	personnel	roam	the	bush.	Not	only	is	there	the	risk	of	accidental	death	of	the	
researcher	in	the	field	(a	publicity	disaster	is	likely	to	ensue),	there	are	justified	fears	that	
institutional	weaknesses	and	operational	procedures	may	be	shared	with	third	parties	or	
exposed	on	public	platforms.	Throughout	the	research	process,	I	had	to	confirm	that	I	was	not	
affiliated	with	intelligence	bodies,	law	enforcement	authorities	or	media	houses.	Once	my	
academic	credentials	had	been	confirmed	and	fears	of	intelligence	gathering	had	been	
dismissed,	my	presence	was	either	accepted	or	endured	–	depending	on	the	general	attitude	
and	approachability	of	the	research	participants,	their	workload,	other	institutional	pressures	
and	idiosyncrasies.	The	request	to	share	datasets	with	the	permitting	authorities	(SANParks	
and	Ezemvelo	KZN	Wildlife)	was	gently	declined,	and	graciously	accepted	upon	explanation	
why	it	would	be	unethical	to	do	so.	The	standard	research	contract	is	aimed	at	natural	science	
researchers,	who	conduct	ecological	or	biological	research	in	the	parks.	Unlike	most	social	
sciences	research	that	deals	with	people,	society	and	their	meanings,	natural	sciences	
datasets	can	be	shared	and	checked	for	reproducibility.			
	
The	research	permission	obtained	from	the	Department	of	Correctional	Services	(DCS)	
stipulates	that	researchers	need	to	obtain	written	permission	from	each	offender	before	
commencing	interviews.	The	research	guide114	provided	a	departmental		“indemnity	form”	
(Appendix	B),	which	was	translated	into	Vietnamese	and	Mandarin	to	enable	offenders	to	
read	the	form	in	their	native	tongue.	One	out	of	thirty	offenders	refused	to	sign	the	form	on	
grounds	of	allegedly	having	been	duped	by	law	enforcement	agencies	into	signing	an	
admission	of	guilt	form.	The	interview	could	not	proceed.	
																																																																																																																																																																											
stipulated	that	permit-holders	have	to	share	their	drafts	with	the	permitting	authority	prior	to	publication	
(Welsh	1981:	34–35).	Several	draft	research	contracts	for	this	project	stipulated	prior	approval	of	the	draft	
research	report	(the	Ph.D.	dissertation)	prior	to	submission.	These	contracts	were	amended	to	reflect	that	the	
dissertation	would	be	shared	with	the	permitting	authority	once	it	had	been	submitted	and	accepted.	
	
114	The	DCS	Research	Committee	appoints	departmental	research	guides	that	act	as	research	coordinators	
between	the	researcher	and	the	Department.	
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Informed	consent	should	not	be	a	once-off	engagement	but	an	on-going	process	(Sieber:	38).	
Some	respondents	were	visited	more	than	once;	it	was	hence	important	to	re-check	their	
willingness	to	engage	with	the	researcher,	whether	they	were	content	with	the	interview	
process	or	had	any	suggestions	for	improvement.	Moreover,	updates	on	the	fieldwork	and	
subsequent	writing	process	were	provided	to	some	key	informants	and	others	who	had	
requested	updates	on	the	progress	of	the	project.	
	
	
2.6.2	Anonymity	and	confidentiality	
	
Since	the	economic	exchange	of	rhino	horn	is	illegal,	the	assurance	of	anonymity,	
confidentiality	and	data	protection	was	very	important	in	establishing	trust	and	rapport	with	
respondents.	According	to	veteran	scholars	of	informal	and	illegal	markets	in	sub-Saharan	
Africa	Ellis	and	MacGaffey	(1996:	24),	the	likelihood	of	gaining	the	trust	of	informants	“will	
depend	in	part	on	the	degree	of	illegality	of	the	commodities	being	exchanged,	on	local	
politics,	on	state	policies	and	their	implementation	or	lack	of	it	and	on	the	extent	of	
involvement	of	state	officials	and	the	degree	to	which	they	enforce	the	law”.		
	
The	principles	of	anonymity,	confidentiality	and	data	protection	were	adhered	to	throughout	
and	in	the	aftermath	of	data	collection.	Although	some	interviewees	were	indifferent	about	
anonymity,	for	the	sake	of	consistency	all	quotes	from	interviews	and	focus	groups	were	
anonymized.	Where	direct	quotes	are	used,	the	general	attributes	and	context	of	the	
interviewee	are	given	(as	per	the	break	down	in	the	sampling	section).	Respondents	who	had	
privileged	knowledge	of	illegal	activities	connected	to	rhino	poaching,	trafficking	or	trade	
were	requested	not	to	talk	about	specific	persons	(or	at	least	not	to	mention	their	real	
names),	crime	locations	or	planned	criminal	acts.	A	guiding	rule	was	that	if	the	researcher	
were	to	learn	about	a	serious	offence	being	planned,	she	would	inform	the	authorities.	Unlike	
relationships	based	on	the	principle	of	privileged	communication	found	between	doctors	and	
patients	or	lawyers	and	clients,	researchers	and	their	respondents	are	not	protected	by	the	
same	principle	(Sandberg/Copes	2013:	189).	The	researcher	took	a	guarded	and	cautious	
approach	during	the	interview	process	in	South	African	prisons	because	“in	dealing	with	
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inmates,	a	researcher	is	in	a	position	where	inadvertently	perhaps,	he	might	be	informed	of	
unresolved	crimes,	of	plans	to	disturb	prison	routine	or	to	break	jail,	of	corruption	amongst	
guards,	or	of	vice	within	the	walls”	(Newman	quoted	inSchlosser	2008:	8).	Inmates	were	
requested	to	focus	on	their	life	stories	and	involvement	with	rhinos	only	and	to	forego	
mentioning	specific	names	and	places.	While	assuring	prisoners	of	no	linkages	to	the	police	or	
media,	they	were	discouraged	from	disclosing	potentially	damaging	information	during	the	
interview.	
	
During	fieldwork,	the	National	Assembly	of	South	Africa	passed	the	controversial	Protection	of	
State	Information	Act	(2010);	at	the	time	of	writing,	the	State	President	had	not	yet	signed	off	
the	Act.	Concerned	with	the	regulation,	classification,	and	dissemination	of	state	information,	
the	Act	is	already	impacting	data	collection	of	researchers	and	newsgathering	of	journalists.	
Once	enacted,	obtaining	classified	state	information	“unlawfully	and	intentionally”	is	
punishable	with	extended	prison	sentences.115	While	laws	governing	espionage	are	standard	
around	the	world,	there	are	reasonable	fears	that	South	African	ministers	and	intelligence	
staff	will	obtain	discretionary	powers	of	classification	through	the	new	legislation.	South	
African	government	representatives	are	aware	of	the	new	law,	which	made	the	official	
authorization	of	the	research	project,	in	the	form	of	research	permits,	an	absolute	necessity.	
Many	government	officials	took	a	cautious	approach	by	providing	the	official	position	on	rhino	
issues.	South	African	park	officials	(including	anti-poaching	personnel)	have	to	sign	a	secrecy	
clause	in	their	employment	contract.	Disclosure	of	incriminating	or	privileged	information	to	
third	parties	could	potentially	lead	to	the	termination	of	the	employment	contract	(Interview	
																																																						
115	Section	41	of	the	Act	deals	with	the	possession	and	disclosure	of	classified	information:	
	“Any	person	who	unlawfully	and	intentionally	discloses	or	is	in	possession	of	classified	state	information	in	
contravention	of	this	Act	is	guilty	of	an	offence	and	is	liable	to	a	fine	or	imprisonment	for	a	period	not	exceeding	
five	years,	except	where	such	disclosure	or	possession—	
(a)	is	protected	or	authorised	under	the	Protected	Disclosures	Act,	2000	(Act	No.26	of	2000),	the	Companies	Act,	
2008	(Act	No.	71	of	2008),	the	Prevention	and	Combating	of	Corrupt	Activities	Act,	2004	(Act	No.	12	of	2004),	the	
National	Environmental	Management	Act,	1998	(Act	No.	107	of	1998),	or	the	Labour	Relations	Act,	1995	(Act	No.	
66	of	1995);	
(b)	is	authorised	in	terms	of	this	Act	or	any	other	Act	of	Parliament;	or	
(c)	reveals	criminal	activity,	including	any	criminal	activity	in	terms	of	section	45of	this	Act.  
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with	park	officials,	2013).	This	clause	seems	to	ensconce	an	atmosphere	of	secrecy	and	
concealment	as	regards	to	what	happens	at	“Ground	Zero”	in	conservation	areas.116	
	
Research	assistants	and	transcribers	had	to	sign	confidentiality	agreements,	and	an	encrypted	
platform	was	used	to	transmit	recordings	and	transcriptions.	Moreover,	once	their	
assignments	were	concluded,	all	data	relating	to	the	project	had	to	be	deleted.	All	devices	
used	in	the	course	of	the	research	are	password	protected;	data	is	encrypted	and	securely	
stored.	At	no	stage	was	interview	data	shared	with	third	parties	although	such	requests	were	
received	on	occasion	from	law	enforcement	agents	and	journalists	(the	section	on	reciprocity	
will	deal	with	this	in	more	detail).	
	
	
	
2.6.3	Positionality	of	the	researcher	
	
There	is	a	need	to	contextualize	the	background	of	the	researcher	and	explain	why	this	may	
be	important	in	situating	research	methods,	data	limitations,	and	validity.	I	am	a	white	young	
married	South	African	woman	with	Namibian	and	German	roots,	who	conducted	the	research	
with	institutional	and	financial	backing	by	a	German	research	institute.	There	is	no	doubt	that	
these	personal	and	institutional	attributes	influenced	the	research	process	and	outcome.	
Any	explanation	of	social	life	is	“filtered	through	the	lenses	of	language,	gender,	social	class,	
race	and	ethnicity”	(Weiner-Levy	2009:	8).	In	essence,	a	person’s	background,	socialization,	
social	capital	and	personal	attributes	impact	access	in	the	field,	choice	of	methods	and	
research	outcomes.	Within	the	social	sciences,	a	long–standing	rift	exists	between	proponents	
of	either	‘insider’	or	‘outsider’	research.	In	his	analysis	of	the	‘insider	doctrine’,	Robert	Merton	
(1972:	11)	commented:	
	
“Within	[the]	context	of	social	change,	we	come	upon	the	contemporary	relevance	of	
a	long-standing	problem	in	the	sociology	of	knowledge:	the	problem	of	patterned	
differentials	among	social	groups	and	strata	in	access	to	certain	types	of	knowledge.	In	
its	strong	form,	the	claim	is	put	forward	as	a	matter	of	epistemological	principle	that	
particular	groups	in	each	moment	of	history	have	monopolistic	access	to	particular	
kinds	of	knowledge.	In	the	weaker,	more	empirical	form,	the	claim	holds	that	some	
																																																						
116	In	some	instances,	simple	requests	for	uncontroversial	data	or	follow-	up	interviews	had	to	be	cleared	by	the	
immediate	superior	despite	the	research	authorization.		
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groups	have	privileged	access,	with	other	groups	also	being	able	to	acquire	that	
knowledge	for	themselves	but	at	greater	risk	and	cost.”	
	
The	‘doctrine	of	insiderism’	emerged	in	the	1960s	as	a	counterpoint	to	the	dominance	of	
white	men	in	Western	academic	institutions.	It	holds	that	only	insiders	can	truly	understand	
and	interpret	the	social	life	of	the	‘underdog’,	including	studies	on	African	Americans	(Merton	
1972:	13),	women	in	the	Global	South	(Narayan	1999)	or	indigenous	people	(Brayboy/Deyhle	
2000;	Zinn	1979).	Advocates	of	the	doctrine	argue	that	members	of	the	dominant	or	
privileged	strata	cannot	relate	or	understand	mechanisms	of	domination.	In	fact,	the	
‘whiteness’	of	researchers	may	reinforce	systems	of	exploitation	(Zinn	1979),	perpetuate	the	
superiority	of	‘the	self’	juxtaposed	next	to	‘the	other’	(Cesara	1982)	or	normalize	a	
‘homogenized’	approach	(Abbott	2006:	326).	Edward	Said	(1979:	43)	adds	the	filter	of	
‘orientalism’	–	the	‘west	is	best’	–	a	vision	that	promotes	“the	difference	between	the	familiar	
(Europe,	the	West,	‘us’)	and	the	strange	(the	Orient,	the	East,	‘them’).”	Followers	of	the	
positivist	science	paradigm,	on	the	other	hand,	promote	“inquiry	from	the	outside”.	The	
approach	recommends	that	scholars	detach	from	the	research	subject	and	act	neutrally	
(Brannick/Coghlan	2007:	60).	It	is	argued	that	“overfamiliarity”	and	“insider	knowledge”	
compromises	the	research	process	(Lawhon/Herrick/Daya	2014:	18).		Moreover,	the	
assumption	that	insiders	“automatically	have	a	more	sophisticated	and	appropriate	approach	
to	understanding	social	reality	in	‘their’	society”	is	referred	to	‘as	falling	into	the	fallacy	of	
Third	Worldism’	(Sidaway	1992:	406).117	It	may	be	useful	to	avoid	bifurcation	of	insiders	and	
outsiders	because	resourceful	‘outsiders’	have	shown	the	ability	to	move	along	the	‘outsider–
insider	continuum’	and	achieve	acceptance,	even	‘insider’	status	amongst	the	researched	–	
“going	native”	–	as	evidenced	in	legendary	ethnographies	undertaken	by	Rabinow	(1977)	in	
Morocco,118	Malinowski	(1979)	in	the	Western	Pacific	region,	and	Geertz	and	his	wife	on	Java	
(1976).	Pragmatists	are	likely	to	recommend	the	middle	ground;	Merton’s	call	(1972:	44)	for	
insiders	and	outsiders	to	unite	is	perhaps	instructive	in	this	instance.	
	
																																																						
117	The	fallacy	of	‘Third	Worldism’	reneges	on	the	assumption	that	researchers	from	the	Global	South	should	only	
research	Third	World	topics.	
		
118	Rabinow	achieved	notoriety	or	cult	status	(depending	on	who	is	judging)	for	sharing	details	of	a	sexual	
encounter	with	a	Berber	woman	in	his	book	reflecting	on	his	experiences	during	fieldwork	in	Morocco	–	no	
doubt,	a	bold	attempt	to	achieve	‘insider	status’.		
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It	stands	to	argue	that	this	research	project	comprises	both	‘insider’	and	‘outsider’	
perspectives.	While	the	hermeneutic	tradition	of	“subjective	interpretation”	(understanding	
social	reality	“by	interpreting	the	meanings	held	by	social	actors	or	members	of	the	social	
group”)	was	followed,	I	would	step	back	and	consider	the	reliability	and	validity	of	data	
(Brannick/Coghlan	2007:	63–64),	and	how	my	own	biases	might	influence	the	interpretation	
of	meanings	(Maykut/Morehouse	1994:	123).	Despite	my	parents’	active	opposition	to	the	
apartheid	regime	in	pre-independent	Namibia,	there	is	no	denying	that	I	was	born	into	“white	
privilege”	or	what	Lawhon	and	colleagues	(2014:	18)	label	“the	most	affluent	and	empowered	
social	stratum”.119	It	is	not	unusual	for	researchers	from	a	privileged	background	to	take	top-
down,	‘self	versus	others’	approaches	to	sampling	and	interviewing	without	critically	assessing	
the	power	differentials	between	the	researcher	and	the	researched	(Schmid	2010:	170–172).		
Given	the	legacy	of	apartheid	and	colonialism	in	Southern	Africa	(and	in	Asia),	I	was	concerned	
about	acknowledging	possible	bias,	dismissing	stereotyped	perceptions	and	I	took	note	of	
forms	of	‘othering’	expressed	during	the	interviewing	process.	While	‘othering’	and	situational	
power	dynamics	can	happen	unknowingly	and	subliminally	in	interpersonal	interactions,	so	
can	feelings	of	empathy,	understanding,	comprehension	of	attendant	life	experiences	and	
ideologies	contribute	to	the	bridging	of	cleavages	(Weiner-Levy	2009:	3).	My	approach	was	to	
exude	empathy	and	understanding	without	being	dismissive	or	judgmental	during	the	
research	project.	Several	scholars	have	shown	that	‘emotion	work’	can	overrule	the	
researcher’s	positionality	and	level	the	playing	field	(Weiner-Levy	2009;	Dickson-Swift	et	al.	
2009).		
	
In	practice,	the	winds	of	change	blow	slowly	through	many	parts	of	southern	Africa,	where	
cleavages	based	on	asymmetrical	power	relationships	of	yesteryear	persist.		Most	of	the	
actors	involved	in	the	illegal	rhino	horn	trade	chain	are	men,	which	may	lead	to	a	one-
dimensional	focus	on	men’s	lived	experiences	(Chambers	1983:	77).	The	market	is	embedded	
in	society,	and	thus,	I	purposefully	included	women	to	assess	how	poaching,	trafficking,	and	
consumption	of	rhino	horn	impacted	their	daily	lives	and	societal	structures.	Concerted	
																																																						
119	In	its	2013	assessment	of	inequality	across	countries,	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	found	
South	Africa	to	be	the	most	unequal	society	in	the	world	(United	Nations	Development	Programme	2013).	The	
assessment	was	based	on	the	controversial	Gini	coefficient	method,	which	has	been	criticized	on	many	accounts,	
including	that	it	disregards	the	social	grants	system	in	South	Africa	(Donnelly	2013).	Controversies	aside,	deep	
and	growing	economic	and	social	cleavages	persist	more	than	20	years	after	the	end	of	apartheid.	
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efforts	were	made	to	level	the	playing	field	between	the	researcher	and	the	researched.	As	
mentioned	earlier,	the	principles	of	informed	consent,	anonymity,	confidentiality	and	data	
protection	were	ethical	cornerstones.	Moreover,	respondents	were	encouraged	to	take	
control	of	the	research	process	by	having	the	option	to	withdraw	from	the	interview	at	any	
stage,	invite	others	to	participate	in	the	interview,	direct	the	flow	of	information	by	
withholding	or	only	partially	answering	sensitive	questions	(Scheyvens	2014:	9).	Due	to	the	
unstructured,	interactive	and	narrative-conversational	style	of	the	interviews,	research	
participants	had	considerable	and	implicit	control	over	the	interview	process	(Corbin/Morse	
2003:	338).	Research	informants	only	told	their	story	if	they	felt	at	ease	with	the	researcher.	
Unless	there	were	security	concerns,	respondents	chose	the	location	of	the	interview	and	
determined	how	much	time	they	were	going	to	dedicate.	When	a	suitable	interpreter	was	
available,	they	were	given	the	option	of	getting	interviewed	in	their	preferred	language.	
	
I	took	account	of	the	priorities	of	respondents	on	the	ground	(Raghuram/Madge	2006:	276)	
and	reassessed	the	relevance	of	the	research	question,	methods	and	approach	throughout	
the	data	collection	process.	Academic	procedures	and	processes	usually	allow	little	flexibility	
once	research	projects	have	been	approved.	In	this	instance,	the	MPIfG,	my	advisors,	and	the	
research	coordinator	supported	unscheduled	changes	or	additions,	such	as	adapting	the	
research	focus,	extending	stays	and	adding	additional	research	sites.	Great	care	was	taken	to	
respect	and	comply	with	local	customs	and	traditions	in	southern	Africa	and	Southeast	Asia.	
Local	research	assistants	were	employed	to	bridge	cultural,	social	and	language	divides.	
Permission	to	visit	and	conduct	interviews	was	sought	from	community	leaders,	traditional	
chiefs	or	community	gatekeepers	when	entering	village	communities.120	
																																																						
120	Village	communities	living	on	the	edge	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	have	been	labelled	as	“smuggler	towns”,	
“poaching	villages”	or	“criminalised	communities”	in	public	narratives.	Many	private	and	public	spooks,	as	well	as	
journalists	and	filmmakers,	have	visited	the	region,	often	disrespecting	the	most	basic	rules	of	social	engagement	
such	as	respect	for	the	dignity	of	community	members,	privacy	and	politeness.	I	learnt	of	outright	disrespect	and	
trespassing	at	the	hand	of	such	actors	during	focus	groups	with	community	members	in	2013.	Spooks	and	
journalists	would	take	random	pictures	of	villagers	and	their	dwellings	without	their	consent,	labelling	them	as	
‘poachers’	and	‘houses	built	from	the	proceeds	of	poaching’	in	subsequent	publications.	For	example,	a	private	
intelligence	report	(in	my	possession)	reproduced	the	picture	of	a	well-known	conservator	going	about	daily	
chores	in	Massingir,	fingering	him	as	a	person	of	interest.	While	many	community	members	might	be	living	
below	the	breadline,	they	do	have	ready	access	to	the	media	further	aggravating	a	sense	of	‘othering’,	and	the	
implicit	criminalization	of	the	whole	community	instead	of	a	few.	In	hot	pursuit	of	an	interview	with	a	poaching	
kingpin	in	Mozambique,	a	Swedish-German	journalist	team	bore	the	brunt	of	the	growing	anger	and	fatigue	of	
affected	communities	(Grill	2015).	They	went	to	seek	out	a	poaching	kingpin	at	his	private	residence	without	an	
invitation	or	introduction.	On	instruction	by	the	kingpin,	a	big	group	of	villagers	accused	the	duo	of	trespassing.	
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Attempts	were	made	to	seek	out	assistants	to	whom	the	research	would	be	beneficial	not	
only	in	financial	terms	but	also	in	furthering	personal	ambitions	such	as	career	advancement	
in	the	field	of	research,	translation,	transcription	or	acting	as	a	‘fixer’.	As	the	research	was	
undertaken	towards	a	Ph.D.,	co–authorship	or	any	assistance	beyond	research	facilitation	
would	constitute	a	breach	of	intellectual	ownership	and	is	not	allowed	by	the	doctoral	degree	
regulations	of	the	University	of	Cologne.121	To	show	courtesy	and	respect,	I	picked	up	basic	
language	skills	to	be	able	to	greet	and	thank	research	informants	in	their	mother	tongue.122		
	
The	sample	also	included	the	interviewing	of	political	and	economic	elites	in	southern	Africa	
and	Southeast	Asia.	The	aim	was	to	assess	their	role	and	agency	in	the	development	and	
implementation	of	wildlife	conservation	policies.	In-depth	knowledge	of	the	rhino	field,	
familiarity	with	the	respondent’s	background,	organizational	culture	and	cultural	norms	of	
behaviour	facilitated	gaining	their	trust	and	establishing	rapport	(Mikecz	2012:	482).	
Decorum,	etiquette,	punctuality	and	formal	dress	sense	assisted	in	improving	the	researcher’s	
positionality.		Elite	interviewers	recommend	that	the	researcher	should	show	flexibility	to	
accommodate	the	busy	schedules	of	elites	(Odendahl/Shaw	2001:	312).	The	researcher	did	
not	differentiate	between	elite	and	other	interviewees.	It	was	assumed	that	each	respondent	
had	more	important	things	to	take	care	of	than	talk	to	a	researcher.	As	a	consequence,	I	
displayed	utmost	flexibility	as	regards	the	time,	length	and	venue	of	the	interview.	I	had	
undertaken	interviews	with	elites	in	the	past	decade.	With	increasing	maturity	and	a	growing	
professional	reputation,	elites	appeared	to	‘take	me	more	seriously’.	Odendahl	shares	this	
																																																																																																																																																																											
They	were	arrested	allegedly	on	instruction	by	two	rhino	poaching	kingpins	and	held	in	police	holding	cells	for	a	
few	days.	The	journalists	acknowledged	that	they	should	have	introduced	themselves	to	the	community	elder	in	
a	magazine	article	after	their	release,	which	was	brokered	through	high-level	diplomatic	intervention.	
Bartholomäus	Grill’s	side	of	the	story	can	be	accessed	at:	
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/investigation-into-rhino-poaching-turns-into-kidnapping-a-
1022611.html	
	
121	I	participated	in	the	joint	Ph.D.	programme	of	the	International	Max	Planck	Research	School	on	the	Social	and	
Political	Constitution	of	the	Economy	and	the	Faculty	of	Management,	Economics	and	Social	Sciences	of	the	
University	of	Cologne.	The	“Promotionsordnung”	can	be	found	at:	
http://www.wiso.uni-
koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/fakultaet/dokumente/forschung/Promotion/Promotionsordnung_EN.pdf	
	
122	Respondents	spoke	the	following	languages:	Shangaan,	Tsonga,	Zulu,	Xhosa,	Venda,	Afrikaans,	English,	
Portuguese,	Vietnamese,	Cantonese	and	Mandarin.	I	am	fluent	in	Afrikaans	and	English	and	have	some	very	basic	
Xhosa	and	Portuguese	language	skills.	
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observation	(ibid)	and	warns	that	elites	are	used	to	being	in	charge	and	researchers	should	
read	non–verbal	cues	(2001:	312).	Although	conscious	of	status	and	power	differentials,	I	did	
not	make	special	provisions	(being	more	submissive	or	assertive)	when	dealing	with	elites.	An	
egalitarian	approach	was	pursued	whereby	all	respondents	were	treated	like	“elites”.	
	
While	empathy	and	shared	ideologies	can	bridge	pre–existing	cleavages	of	ethnicity,	religion,	
and	gender,	sociologists	and	criminologists	are	often	accused	of	bias	in	favour	of	the	
“underdog”	(Becker	1967;	Liebling	2001).	Becker	(1967:	241–242)	describes	the	charge	of	bias	
as	follows:		
	
“As	sociologists,	we	provoke	the	charge	of	bias,	in	ourselves	and	others,	by	refusing	to	
give	credence	and	deference	to	an	established	status	order,	in	which	knowledge	of	
truth	and	the	right	to	be	heard	are	not	equally	distributed.	“Everyone	knows”	that	
responsible	professionals	know	more	about	things	than	laymen,	that	police	are	more	
respectable	and	their	words	ought	to	be	taken	more	seriously	than	those	of	deviants	
and	criminals	with	whom	they	deal.	By	refusing	to	accept	the	hierarchy	of	credibility,	
we	express	disrespect	for	the	entire	established	order.”	
	
How	do	researchers	deal	with	taking	sides?	Becker	argues	that	it	is	impossible	not	to	take	
sides.	However,	researchers	should	ensure	that	research	“meets	the	standards	of	good	
scientific	work”	by	using	“precautionary	measures”	designed	to	guard	against	the	
manipulation	of	research	tools,	theories,	and	techniques	(Becker	1967:	246).	The	danger	of	
presenting	one’s	research	as	“objective,	scientific	and	precise”	(Bosworth	et	al.	2005:	258)	lies	
in	the	superficial	treatment	of	power	differentials	between	the	researcher	and	the	
researched.		
	
Nowhere	are	the	power	differentials	between	the	researcher	and	the	researched	more	
evident	than	in	a	prison	environment.	The	most	crucial	difference	relates	to	the	researcher’s	
ability	to	extract	herself	at	liberty	and	leave	the	physical	confines	of	the	prison	at	her	behest.	
Inmates	“sleep,	play	and	work”	in	one	and	the	same	place,	in	what	Goffman	([1957]	1970:	
314)	classified	as	a	“total	institution”.	Typical	of	total	institutions	are	tight	time	schedules	with	
no	leeway	for	manoeuvring.	Routine	activities	are	imposed	“through	a	system	of	formal	
rulings	and	a	body	of	officials”	(ibid).	A	visit	by	a	complete	stranger	is	thus	an	extraordinary	
event,	which	sets	into	motion	several	bureaucratic	and	social	processes.	In	preparation	for	my	
	 111	
visit,	social	workers	attached	to	the	individual	correctional	centres	introduced	my	project	and	
research	objectives	in	preliminary	meetings.	I	had	several	contact	persons	at	each	prison	with	
whom	I	interacted	in	the	months	preceding	the	interviews.	Some	of	the	inmates	expressed	
initial	concerns,	fearing	that	I	was	attached	to	the	police	and	that	their	sentence	might	
increase,	should	they	say	“something	wrong”.	Conversely,	some	inmates	hoped	that	by	
opening	up	to	me,	I	would	put	in	a	good	word	to	have	their	sentence	reduced.	The	
significance	of	daily	routines	and	schedules	was	also	apparent	when	it	came	to	scheduling	the	
interviews,	which	had	to	happen	either	straight	after	breakfast	and	before	lunch	or	after	
lunch	and	before	lock-down.123	Adhering	to	institutional	regulations,	acknowledging	and	
accommodating	daily	routines	(such	as	lunch	or	physical	exercise)	were	important	aspects	of	
showing	respect	to	inmates.124	Interviews	took	place	in	prison	offices	(such	as	the	office	of	the	
social	worker,	administrators	or	head	of	prison	and	board	rooms).	In	some	instances,	I	was	
allowed	to	conduct	interviews	with	prisoners	on	a	one-by-one	basis	with	no	one	else	present.	
While	perhaps	less	than	ideal	concerning	security	considerations,	these	interviews	were	the	
most	open	and	fruitful.	In	other	instances,	prison	wardens,	DCS	supervisory	staff,	and	
interpreters	were	present,	which	failed	to	inspire	confidentiality	and	anonymity,	and	
consequentially	(and	understandably)	led	to	less	rewarding	exchanges.		
	
In	the	words	of	Liebling	(2014:	482):	”	This	is	no	ordinary	research	environment”.		Each	prison	
came	with	its	own	“barriers	to	access”	(ibid),	which	the	researcher	had	to	negotiate	with	staff	
and	prisoners.	As	mentioned	in	earlier	sections,	the	Department	of	Correctional	Services	
sanctioned	the	research	by	way	of	a	research	permit.	Numerous	regulations	and	restrictions	
were	implemented	prior,	during	and	after	the	research	process.	Security	and	background	
checks	were	undertaken	(criminal	record	disqualifies	entry	onto	prison	grounds).	Goffman	
portrays	the	“mortification	of	self”	when	individuals	first	enter	total	institutions.	Personal	
																																																						
123	Lock-down	refers	to	the	time	when	inmates	have	to	return	to	their	cells	for	the	night.	In	some	correctional	
centres,	the	lock	down	process	happens	as	early	as	3	or	4	PM.	The	lock	down	procedure	involves	a	head	count,	
early	dinner	and	return	to	the	prison	cells	for	the	night.	
	
124	I	had	to	re-schedule	one	interview	at	short	notice	due	to	traffic	congestion,	which	led	to	the	inmate’s	gym	
routine	getting	uprooted.	Upon	my	late	arrival,	I	sensed	anger	and	unhappiness.	After	some	probing,	I	got	to	the	
core	of	my	interview	partner’s	annoyance.	Upon	acknowledging	the	inmate’s	anger	as	justified,	apologizing	and	
explaining	why	I	arrived	late,	I	could	go	ahead	with	the	interview	–	which	turned	out	to	be	highly	insightful	and	
interesting.	
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belongings	are	removed	through	“stripping	processes”	and	inmates	have	to	submit	to	the	
prison	“staff	class”,	leading	to	the	minimization	of	“ego–invested	separateness	from	fellow	
inmates”	(Goffman	[1957]	1970:	317–318).	Prison	gangs	impose	another	layer	of	mortification	
through	their	social	order,	system	of	privileges	and	rules	within	the	South	African	prison	
system.125	Upon	entering	the	Los	Angeles	county	jail	for	the	first	time	(similar	to	my	
experience),	sociologist	Wacquant	(2002:	373)	observes:		
	
“What	grabs	you	immediately	and	before	all	else	upon	penetrating	into	this	
humongous	human	storehouse	is	the	deafening	and	disorienting	noise:	doors	banging,	
bolts	opening	and	closing,	keys	jangling,	feet	shuffling,	shrill	shouts,	blunt	orders,	and	
tattered	shreds	of	conversations	that	russle,	ripple	and	resound	in	a	high-density	sonic	
mishmash	unlike	any	other.”	
	
	
Although	my	entry	into	prisons	was	temporary,	I	experienced	a	sense	of	“mortification”	and	
alienation	from	the	rest	of	society	while	on	the	“inside”.	I	had	been	asked	to	wear	plain	
clothing,	practical	shoes	and	no	jewellery.	No	bags	or	mobile	phones	were	to	be	taken	into	
prisons.	I	had	to	obey	instructions	from	prison	staff.	What	made	the	series	of	interviews	less	
daunting	was	my	frequent	contact	with	inmates	and	former	inmates	since	teenage	years	due	
to	my	mother’s	professional	career	in	the	prison	sector.	
	
	
2.6.4	Reciprocity	
	
The	issue	of	reciprocity	provides	a	difficult	conundrum	in	qualitative	research.	Different	stages	
of	research	rely	on	“negotiating	complex	social	situations”	(Harrison/MacGibbon/Morton	
2001:	323),	which	rely	on	degrees	of	reciprocity	between	the	interviewer	and	interviewee.	
This	section	deals	less	with	the	social	aspects	of	proving	the	researcher’s	trustworthiness	to	
respondents;	the	focus	is	directed	at	the	researcher’s	ability	to	reciprocate	for	the	time	and	
effort	of	respondents.	It	could	be	argued	that	research	per	se	serves	the	common	good,	which	
in	itself	signals	reciprocity.	In	his	analysis	of	the	convertibility	of	different	forms	of	capital,	
																																																						
125	Similar	to	penitentiary	institutions	around	the	world,	competing	prison	gangs	are	active	in	South	African	
prisons.	Often	referred	to	as	the	number	gangs,	the	26s,	27s	and	28s	fulfil	specific	functions	and	run	illicit	prison	
economies.	Steinberg’s	‘The	number’	offers	a	fascinating	ethnographic	account	of	the	number	gangs	operating	in	
Cape	Town’s	Pollsmoor	prison	(2005b).	
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Bourdieu	(1986:	48)	ponders	the	role	of	academic	qualifications	in	reproducing	social	
structure	“by	sanctioning	the	hereditary	transmission	of	cultural	capital”.	Unlike	other	forms	
of	capital,	the	transmission	of	cultural	capital	(an	academic	qualification	is	its	institutionalized	
form)	is	“neither	transmissible	nor	negotiable”	(Bourdieu	1986:	55).126		
	
While	the	doctoral	degree	is	obviously	to	the	researcher’s	benefit,	the	substantial	product	of	
the	research	is	the	written	dissertation.	Many	of	the	respondents	gave	me	several	hours	of	
their	time	(often	after	hours),	which	could	have	been	spent	at	work	or	with	their	families	or	
friends.	Some	altruistic	respondents	had	no	expectations	of	direct	reciprocity:	“Everyone	is	
trying	to	save	their	rhino	their	way”	(Interview	with	conservator,	2013).	Some	respondents	
have	requested	feedback	or	copies	of	the	dissertation	once	it	has	been	finalized.	I	will	write	
up	an	executive	summary	of	the	research	findings	to	be	distributed	amongst	interested	
respondents,	which	is	more	accessible	to	laypersons	than	a	lengthy	academic	dissertation.	
	
Anthropology	Southern	Africa,	a	regional	association	of	anthropologists,	has	codified	the	
practice	of	reciprocity	in	its	professional	code	of	ethics.127	Where	possible,	anthropologists	are	
responsible	“for	feeding	the	benefits	that	flow	from	the	research	back	into	the	research	
communities	that	participated	in	the	research”(Anthropology	Southern	Africa	2014:	3).	In	its	
‘Code	of	Ethics’,	the	International	Sociological	Association	deals	with	issues	of	security,	
anonymity,	and	privacy	of	research	subjects.	Perhaps	due	to	the	ascendency	of	quantitative	
methodologies	in	sociology	over	the	past	decades,	the	issue	of	reciprocity	is	only	considered	
in	general	terms:	
	
																																																						
126		Bourdieu	(1986:	55)	argues	that	cultural	capital	is	transferred	continuously	within	the	family	unit.	It	is,	
however,	difficult	to	measure	and	control.	
	
127	As	most	of	the	fieldwork	was	carried	out	in	southern	Africa,	it	only	seems	to	appropriate	to	consult	local	
ethics	standards	and	cross–comparing	them	with	international	standards.	Anthropologists	seem	to	have	given	
ample	consideration	to	ethical	issues	that	might	occur	in	fieldwork.	The	American	Anthropological	Association	
has	developed	several	position	papers	and	an	ethics	blog	(http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/ethics/Ethics-
Resources.cfm),	and	the	World	Council	of	Anthropological	Associations	has	established	an	ethics	task	force	to	
review	global	ethics	guidelines	(http://www.wcaanet.org/about/task_force.shtml#et).	While	sociological	
associations	also	have	a	code	of	ethics	(e.g.	the	American	Sociological	Association:	
http://www.asanet.org/images/asa/docs/pdf/CodeofEthics.pdf	or	the	above	mentioned	International	
Sociological	Association),	the	codes	are	aimed	at	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	researchers.	Thus,	issues	that	
are	particularly	pertinent	to	qualitative	researchers	are	dealt	with	in	general	terms,	if	at	all.	
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“Payment	of	informants,	though	acceptable	in	principle,	should	be	discouraged	as	far	
as	possible	and	subject	to	explicit	conditions,	with	special	regard	to	the	reliability	of	
the	information	provided	(International	Sociological	Association	2001).”	
	
While	I	never	compensated	respondents	for	information	or	interviews,	I	paid	for	coffee,	lunch	
or	refreshments	on	occasion.	In	return	for	the	time	and	effort	of	those	interviewed,	requests	
for	research	materials,	advice	on	general	organized	crime-related	issues	and	calls	for	progress	
reports	were	heeded.	Any	requests	to	share	research	data	or	findings	prematurely	were	
declined.		
	
Once	published,	there	is	a	risk	that	others	may	use	research	findings	to	further	their	political	
agendas.	While	it	is	beyond	the	researcher’s	control	how	the	work	will	be	used	or	interpreted,	
great	care	was	taken	to	“guard	against	abuses”	(David/Sutton	2011:	21).	The	guiding	
principles	were	the	protection	of	research	respondents	from	personal	identification	and	
responsibility	as	regards	any	claims	made	in	this	dissertation	(ibid).	The	International	
Association	of	Sociologists	furthermore	suggests	that	in	case	of	“distortions,	simplifications	
and	manipulations”	of	research	material,	the	researcher	should	“intervene	to	correct	any	kind	
of	misinterpretation	or	misuse	of	their	work”	(International	Sociological	Association	2001).	I	
reserve	the	right	to	do	so,	should	the	need	arise.	
		
The	issue	of	reciprocity	constitutes	a	serious	ethical	challenge	in	prison	interviews.	The	DCS	
indemnity	form	stipulates	(see	Appendix	B):	“I	do	not	want	or	expect	any	reward	of	any	
nature	for	partaking	in	the	interview”.	There	is	hence	little	incentive	to	participate	in	research,	
other	than	there	being	no	punitive	consequences	for	participation,	and	talking	to	someone	
“from	the	outside”	may	be	beneficial	to	the	inmate	(Schlosser	2008:	9).	US	research	on	the	
perceptions	of	benefits	and	harms	of	prison	interviews	showed	that	inmates	experienced	
“psychological	satisfactions,	a	respite	from	the	boredom	of	prison	life,	and	monetary	gain”	
and	no	one	felt	coerced	into	partaking	or	harmed	during	the	interview	
(Copes/Hochstetler/Brown	2013:	182).	I	offered	no	money	in	exchange	for	the	interviews.	
Several	inmates	requested	that	I	should	return	during	visiting	hours	reserved	for	family	
members,	perhaps	signalling	loneliness,	stigmatization	and	irregular	visits	by	family	members.	
Others	requested	practical	items	such	as	soap	or	food.	I	was	very	clear	about	my	personal	
space	and	ethical	restrictions.	Due	to	time	constraints,	prisons	and	inmates	could	only	be	
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visited	once	for	this	research	project.	A	relationship	based	on	honesty	and	trustworthiness	is	
difficult	to	establish	during	a	once-off	visit.	The	researcher	undertook	to	share	her	dissertation	
with	social	workers	responsible	for	the	inmates	that	were	interviewed.128	
	
	
2.6.5	Security	concerns	
	
The	security	of	respondents	and	research	assistants	was	of	major	importance.	Before	entering	
the	field,	researchers	should	err	on	the	side	of	caution	and	ensure	that	“informants	are	not	
jeopardized	in	any	way”(Ellis/MacGaffey	1996:	29).	Lengthy	scoping	assessments	were	
undertaken	to	assess	risks	to	respondents,	research	assistants,	and	the	researcher.	A	further	
dimension	relates	to	the	trustworthiness	of	research	assistants,	as	they	may	constitute	a	
security	risk	or	may	be	linked	to	intelligence	services.	The	researcher	relied	on	referrals	from	
trusted	sources.		
	
Research	that	investigates	inter-personal	violence	carries	the	risk	of	secondary	victimization	
or	traumatization	of	respondents.	Interestingly,	both	poachers	and	game	rangers	shared	
personal	tales	of	fear,	loss	and	danger.	While	some	narratives	were	disturbing	(to	the	
researcher,	research	assistants,	and	transcribers),	respondents	expressed	gratitude	
(sometimes	even	relief)	to	be	able	to	share	their	“version	of	the	truth”.	Social	workers	
provided	pre–	and	aftercare	for	incarcerated	respondents,	the	researcher	debriefed	research	
assistants	and	transcribers.	I	was	conscious	of	the	risk	of	becoming	desensitized	as	a	
consequence	of	what	I	had	witnessed	in	the	field	(Dickson-Swift	et	al.	2007)	and	“war	stories”	
shared	by	convicted	rhino	criminals	and	anti-poaching	personnel.	Talks	with	advisors,	fellow	
researchers,	and	family	members129	assisted	my	own	process	of	debriefing.	Bahn	and	
Weatherill	(2013:	22)	warn	that	desensitization	could	lead	to	researchers	becoming	less	
vigilant	about	their	personal	security.	The	positionality	of	the	researcher	regarding	having	
lived	the	better	part	of	her	life	in	southern	Africa	and	the	unfortunate	experience	of	
aggravated	assault	in	the	past	precluded	reckless	behaviour.	
																																																						
128	The	prospect	of	“teaching	an	old	cat	new	tricks”	by	disseminating	the	research	to	convicted	rhino	poachers	
and	traffickers	is	unlikely.	In	this	instance,	dissemination	of	the	research	will	be	handled	at	the	discretion	of	the	
responsible	social	workers.		
	
129	My	mother	runs	an	NGO	that	deals	with	the	reintegration	of	ex-prisoners	into	society.		
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Despite	undertaking	research	in	far-flung	rural	areas	with	little	or	no	phone	signal,	I	made	
sure	that	my	husband	or	an	assigned	person	knew	where	I	was	and	how	to	get	hold	of	me.	
However,	accurate	information	on	detailed	itineraries	and	respondents	was	shared	on	a	
‘need-to-know’	basis	(Felbab-Brown	2014:	2).	As	a	rule,	meetings	were	scheduled	in	public	
spaces	unless	it	would	have	been	rude	to	reject	an	invitation	to	attend	dinner	or	a	social	
occasion	in	the	private	space	of	known	respondents.	Sensitive	information	including	the	
names	and	telephone	numbers	of	gatekeepers	and	respondents	were	destroyed	upon	leaving	
the	research	site	(Felbab-Brown	2014:	3).	My	husband	accompanied	me	on	the	second	field	
trip	to	Mozambique,	which	added	a	layer	of	security	and	was	useful	during	interviews	with	
community	members,	poachers	and	kingpins.	My	positionality	as	the	“wife”	rendered	the	
interview	less	threatening	and	even	though	I	was	doing	the	interviewing,	respondents	would	
often	address	their	responses	to	him.	
	
Gaining	access	to	rhino	poachers	and	establishing	trust	was	surprisingly	easy	in	Massingir	and	
surrounding	villages	in	Mozambique.	A	few	days	were	spent	walking	around	the	village,	
chatting	informally	to	people	on	the	streets,	in	bars	and	markets.130	For	security	reasons,	I	was	
initially	guarded	about	my	research	subject.	Upon	explaining	that	I	was	writing	a	book	that	
deals	with	the	journey	of	rhino	horn	from	Africa	to	Asia	to	a	primary	gatekeeper	(‘Mr	Big’	131	
in	a	village),	great	opportunities	arose	and	our	initial	meeting	served	as	an	‘icebreaker’.	
Respondents	were	keen	to	provide	their	side	of	the	story.	Perhaps	most	significantly,	some	
respondents	regarded	their	activities	or	those	of	their	fellow	villagers	as	legitimate	and	
provided	legal	labels:	“poacher”	became	“hunter”,	“kingpin”	became	“businessman”	and	
“poaching	in	the	Kruger	National	Park”	became	“visiting	Skukuza”132	(this	will	be	discussed	in	
more	detail	in	the	empirical	chapters).	Once	we	had	been	in	Massingir	for	more	than	one	
week,	it	became	clear	that	we	should	not	‘overstay	our	welcome’.	Naturally,	I	had	interviewed	
those	kingpins	and	poachers	that	were	willing	to	talk	to	me.	Animosity	and	competition	
between	different	poaching	gangs	and	kingpins	made	for	a	difficult	terrain	riddled	with	‘turf	
																																																						
130	The	services	of	a	native	Shangaan-speaker	were	employed	to	assist	with	translations.	
	
131	Organizers	of	rhino	hunts	(kingpins)	are	often	referred	to	as	‘Mr	Big’	(there	are	no	Mrs	Big’s	at	this	level).	
	
132	Skukuza	is	the	main	camp	and	administrative	centre	of	the	Kruger	National	Park.	
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issues’.	Towards	the	end	of	our	stay,	rival	poachers	started	following	us,	our	photo	was	taken,	
and	we	found	a	screwdriver	wedged	into	the	thick	tire	of	our	vehicle.	We	were	sent	clear	
signals	that	it	was	time	to	leave.133	Our	next	stop	was	in	Chokwe,	formerly	known	as	the	‘Wild	
West’	of	Mozambique	‘where	anything	goes’.134	Informants	warned	us	to	cover	up	our	South	
African	vehicle	number	plate	at	night	despite	the	fact	that	the	car	was	parked	behind	a	locked	
gate	with	a	security	guard	in	attendance.	
	
The	expectation	of	‘tea	money’135	provided	a	further	security	and	time	concern.	Certain	
popular	Mozambican	routes	are	notorious	for	formal	and	unofficial	roadblocks.	Public	officials	
are	underpaid	and	some	use	their	official	status	(and	uniform)	to	augment	their	income.	
Foreign-registered	cars	are	easy	prey.	We	arrived	at	one	official	border	crossing	one	hour	
before	it	was	due	to	close.	Although	we	were	in	possession	of	all	the	required	paperwork,	
traffic	triangles,	special	stickers	and	bibs,136	the	officials	were	stalling	the	process	with	several	
security	teams	‘searching’	our	car.	Despite	the	legitimate	fear	that	we	would	not	make	it	
across	the	border	that	day	and	the	prospect	of	having	to	drive	back	to	the	closest	settlement	
about	2	hours	from	the	border,	we	did	not	take	the	bait.	Eventually,	one	of	the	officials	asked	
for	a	visible	T-shirt	in	the	car,	which	we	happily	parted	with	and	then	were	allowed	onward	
passage	moments	before	the	border	post	was	due	to	close	for	the	day.	Obviously,	corruption	
is	a	two-sided	affair	of	someone	soliciting	a	bribe	and	the	counterpart	being	willing	to	pay	a	
bribe	to	forego	worse	scenarios	such	as	being	holed	up	in	the	middle	of	nowhere	with	
																																																						
133	I	returned	to	Massingir	a	few	weeks	after	the	screwdriver	incident,	pursuant	to	receiving	confirmation	from	
another	kingpin	and	his	associate	(an	active	poacher	and	transporter)	that	they	were	willing	to	talk	to	me.	I	had	
been	in	contact	with	the	kingpin	for	several	weeks	after	getting	a	personal	introduction	and	referral	to	him.	My	
husband	had	returned	to	Cape	Town	in	the	meantime,	so	I	took	along	a	friend	as	a	security	precaution	on	my	
third	trip	to	Massingir.	The	kingpin	did	his	security	verification.	I	felt	safe	and	welcome	throughout	the	
encounter.	Basic	rules	of	engagement	had	been	followed	on	both	sides.	As	a	result,	the	interview	was	long,	
intensive	and	insightful.	
	
134	According	to	South	African	police	sources,	many	vehicles	stolen	in	South	Africa	are	trafficked	through	or	
traded	in	Chokwe.	Interestingly,	we	noticed	that	many	poachers	and	kingpins	were	driving	luxury	four-wheel	
drive	vehicles	with	South	African	number	plates	with	no	valid	registration	disks.	Law	enforcement	sources	
confirmed	the	existence	of	barter	trade	of	rhino	horn	for	luxury	items	including	cars	and	seaside	properties	in	
Mozambique.	
	
135	Law	enforcement	officials	seldom	ask	straight	out	for	a	bribe;	corruptibility	is	hidden	behind	modest	demands	
for	a	donation	towards	tea/juice/lunch	or	visible	luxury	items	in	one’s	possession.	
	
136	The	omission	of	any	of	these	can	lead	to	hefty	‘fines’.	We	met	one	South	African	holiday–maker,	who	was	
fined	R2	500	(approximately	220	Euros)	for	only	carrying	one	reflective	bib.		
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nowhere	to	go.	In	this	instance,	parting	with	a	T-shirt	seemed	the	smaller	price	to	pay.		We	
were	spared	from	any	further	incidents	despite	driving	through	11	roadblocks	during	the	
Mozambican	field	trip.		
	
Before	traveling	to	Vietnam,	I	was	warned	that	the	rhino	issue	was	“sensitive”	and	that	it	was	
best	not	to	mention	my	country	of	origin	(South	Africa)	or	research	topic.	The	fall-back	
position	was	interest	in	the	practice	of	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine.	A	judgment	call	was	
made	on	a	case-by-case	basis;	I,	however,	found	that	playing	open	cards	about	the	real	
objective	of	the	research	led	to	better	access	and	data.	Moreover,	the	interview	questions	
were	never	targeted	at	obtaining	intelligence,	names	of	criminals	or	information	that	could	
put	respondents,	research	assistants	or	the	researcher	(myself)	at	risk.		
	
The	need	for	checking	security	arrangements	at	field	sites	was	not	a	one-sided	affair.	Once	an	
interview	had	been	secured	and	confirmed	with	two	high-level	actors	in	the	illegal	rhino	horn	
supply	chain,	I	was	directed	to	a	restaurant	in	a	public	square	and	waited	for	nearly	four	hours	
for	the	research	informants	to	arrive.	They	had	sent	several	advance	parties	to	check	out	the	
research	team.	Once	they	were	satisfied	that	I	was	a	bona	fide	researcher,	the	pair	arrived,	
and	the	interview	could	start.	Several	other	respondents	also	did	their	‘due	diligence’,	
phoning	up	my	reference	or	confirming	with	law	enforcement	that	I	was	‘trustworthy’.		
	
Even	in	societies	where	gender	equality	is	more	or	less	respected,	female	researchers	have	to	
overcome	additional	hurdles	when	it	comes	to	studying	“hardboiled	men’s	topics”	such	as	
organized	crime	or	illegal	markets	(Felbab-Brown	2014:	11).	I	had	previous	experience	in	
conducting	interviews	with	security	forces,	law	enforcement	agents,	and	others.	Key	to	
conducting	successful	interviews	is	to	“stay	[…]	calm	but	confident”	and	to	establish	“one’s	
professional	credibility	and	depth	of	knowledge”	(ibid)	throughout	the	interaction.	I	briefed	
local	security	forces	and	law	enforcement	agencies	on	my	research,	not	only	to	receive	their	
buy	in	and	participation	in	interviews	but	also	as	a	precautionary	measure	so	that	other	local	
informants	could	not	be	blamed	for	collaboration	in	interviews	(Wilson	1992:	195).	While	
undertaking	my	fieldwork,	I	continually	assessed	whether	my	research	posed	a	risk	to	those	
interviewed	(Brooks	2014:	37).	
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Sexual	harassment	or	sexual	advances,	frequently	encountered	by	female	researchers	in	the	
field,	seldom	gets	problematized	in	research	reports	or	methods	sections.	The	power	of	
wearing	a	wedding	ring	needs	to	be	acknowledged	although	this	may	serve	as	even	more	
encouragement	in	some	circles.	Unfortunately	once	embedded	in	the	field,	I	had	to	forget	
about	feminist,	religious	or	political	beliefs	for	the	length	of	the	interview	or	field	visit.	Several	
sexual	advances	were	laughed	off.	It,	however,	proved	more	difficult	to	navigate	through	
interactions	with	respondents	who	expressed	racist	attitudes	or	incitement	to	kill	alleged	
poachers.	In	normal	circumstances,	this	would	have	led	to	my,	at	least,	leaving	the	
conversation,	if	not	reporting	the	offending	person	to	Equality	Courts137	for	the	use	of	
derogatory	terms,	the	use	of	which	is	banned	under	South	African	law.		
	
	
2.7	Concluding	remarks	
	
The	aim	of	this	chapter	was	to	expand	on	the	research	design,	methodological	choices	and	the	
salient	ethical	issues	encountered	during	the	14	months	of	fieldwork.	The	breadth	and	length	
of	fieldwork	merits	engagement	with	methodological	choices	and	ethical	concerns,	and	may	
be	useful	to	other	researchers	wanting	to	undertake	multi-sited	ethnographies	with	
respondents	from	different	social	strata,	nationalities,	cultural	backgrounds	and	gender.	
Verification	and	triangulation	of	data	were	essential	elements	of	data	collection	and	analysis,	
necessitating	the	huge	sample	and	the	different	methods	of	data	collection	employed.	While	
ethical	considerations	contribute	little	to	the	research	findings	and	theoretical	contribution	of	
the	study	per	se,	they	are	nonetheless	deemed	significant	in	explaining	methodological	
choices,	potential	shortcomings,	merits	and	interpretation	of	the	data.	The	legacy	of	social	
sciences	experiments	and	research	‘gone	wrong’	reverberates	the	need	for	critical	reflection	
on	one’s	own	reasons	and	objectives	for	doing	sensitive	research.	Despite	the	earlier	
mentioned	‘unethical’	research	being	labelled	as	‘misguided’	or	‘reprehensible’,	the	scientists	
																																																						
137	Created	through	the	Promotion	of	Equality	and	Prevention	of	Unfair	Discrimination	Act	of	2000,	South	African	
equality	courts	are	specialized	courts	that	deal	with	matters	of	unfair	discrimination,	hate	speech	and	
harassment	(see	more	at	http://www.justice.gov.za/EQCact/eqc_faq.html#sthash.Jg72gwSO.dpuf).	
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were	“prominent	intellectuals	who	occupied	influential	positions	and	generally	conformed	to	
the	accepted	standards	of	academic	rigour	of	the	day”(Dubow	1995:	3).	
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Chapter	3:	Of	unicorns	and	rhino	horns:	The	demand	for	rhino	horn	
	
3.1	Introduction	
	
Currently	rhino	horn	trades	as	one	of	the	world’s	most	expensive	goods	(compare	with	Graph	
1	in	Chapter	1).	According	to	standard	economic	principles,	without	demand	there	is	no	
supply	and	hence	no	market.	The	question	of	demand	and	the	associated	coordination	
problem	of	valuation	are	vital	to	understanding	why	flows	of	rhino	horn	are	so	difficult	to	
disrupt.	This	chapter	deals	with	the	demand	for	rhino	horn	by	tracing	the	historical	roots	of	its	
valuation	as	a	sacred	good	with	status-elevating	qualities.	Scholars	have	largely	focused	on	its	
use	in	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	(TCM).138	From	a	Western	perspective,	the	demand	is	
difficult	to	understand	given	scientific	assessments	of	its	perceived	uselessness	in	medicinal	
preparations.	However,	the	ancient	history	of	the	curative	properties	of	rhino	horn	dates	back	
several	millennia	and	spans	across	the	Occidental,	African	and	Oriental	realm,	even	extending	
to	European	mythologies	of	the	unicorn.	The	chapter	starts	with	an	examination	of	the	
physical	and	chemical	properties	of	rhino	horn	before	delving	into	a	global	history	of	‘belief’	
and	ancient	forms	of	use.	I	conclude	with	a	short	overview	of	current	uses,	consumer	profiles	
and	product	differentiation.	While	trade	structures	were	researched	during	this	project,	they	
are	only	discussed	in	reference	to	flows	of	rhino	horn	in	later	chapters	of	this	dissertation.139	
A	chapter	is	included	later	in	the	dissertation	(Chapter	8)	that	deals	with	fake	rhino	horn	due	
to	its	impact	on	the	structure	and	functioning	of	the	overall	market.	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	
to	contribute	to	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacred	good	for	
which	consumers	are	willing	to	pay	a	high	price,	which	may	ultimately	lead	to	the	unfortunate	
extinction	of	the	pachyderm.			
																																																						
138	The	term	‘traditional’	medicine	is	used	with	caution	in	this	dissertation.	Stream	of	policy	and	academic	
literature	use	the	term	frequently	without	acknowledging	the	juxtaposition	of	‘modern’	versus	‘traditional’.	
When	I	conducted	data	collection	in	Southeast	Asia	and	Hong	Kong,	I	asked	doctors,	academics	and	policy-
makers	whether	‘traditional’	was	indeed	the	correct	label.	The	response	was	that	the	use	of	the	term	‘traditional’	
was	legitimate	as	it	related	to	a	millennia-old	tradition.	The	juxtaposition	of	Western	versus	traditional	medicine	
was	controversial,	however,	as	the	development	of	modern	evidence-based	medicine	was	a	global	achievement.	
	
139	My	postdoctoral	research	will	delve	into	trade	and	distribution	structures,	which	were	also	researched	during	
the	course	of	my	fieldwork	in	Southeast	Asia.	For	reasons	of	space	and	brevity,	these	trade	structures	are	only	
discussed	in	reference	to	transnational	flows	of	rhino	horn.	
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3.2	The	physical	and	chemical	properties	of	rhino	horn	
	
Many	millennia	ago,	crashes	of	rhinos	in	many	forms	and	sizes	were	roaming	across	most	of	
the	planet’s	forests,	savannahs	and	deserts.	Second	in	size	only	to	elephants,	rhinos	are	
resilient	and	adaptable	herbivores.	The	forebears	of	the	African	rhino	species	split	from	the	
Asian	one–horned	species	at	the	peak	of	the	rhino	evolution	about	17	million	years	ago	
(Borchert	2012).	Scientists	believe	that	most	rhino	lineages	went	extinct	at	the	end	of	
Miocene	period	about	five	million	years	ago	when	massive	climatic	changes	occurred	
(Orenstein	2013:	25).		
	
Of	the	remaining	five	species,	the	white	or	square–lipped	rhinoceros	and	the	black	rhinoceros	
(Diceros	bicornis)	live	in	southern	and	east	Africa.	The	other	three	species	(the	Indian,	Javan	
and	Sumatran	Rhinos)	survive	in	Asia;	although	the	Asian	species	are	ultimately	one	of	the	
triggers	for	the	demand	for	rhino	horn	in	Asia,	they	play	a	limited	role	in	current	illegal	flows.	
The	two	African	species	are	neither	black	nor	white;140	they	are	different	shades	of	gray.	
While	rhinos	are	not	as	asocial	and	solitary	as	previously	thought,	they	lack	the	complex	social	
structures	found	in	herds	of	elephants	(Orenstein	2013:	26).	Black	Rhinos	are	known	for	their	
“ferocity,	chronic	bad	temper	and	cunning”	(Drummond	1875:	128);	the	overtly	aggressive	
behaviour	(such	as	charging	when	they	feel	threatened)	is	linked	to	their	poor	eyesight,	
possibly	serving	as	a	defence	mechanism	(Orenstein	2013:	27).	
	
Both	African	rhino	species	carry	two	horns,	which	serve	as	“their	chief	weapons	of	defence	
and	offense”	(ibid).	Male	rhinos	use	their	anterior	horns	to	fight	each	other	for	domination	
and	territorial	supremacy.	The	longer	and	more	slender	horns	of	female	rhinos	are	used	to	
defend	themselves	and	their	calves	against	predators.	Female	rhinos	guide	their	calves	with	
their	horn	as	they	walk	in	front	of	them.	Black	rhinos	also	use	their	horns	to	break	off	
branches	to	reach	better	browsing	or	to	greet	one	another	by	way	of	rubbing	horns	together.	
																																																						
140	There	is	a	fair	amount	of	confusion	about	the	denotation	of	African	rhino	species	as	‘black’	or	‘white’.	One	
theory	(which	was	repeated	and	became	the	accepted	explanation)	suggests	that	the	Dutch	word	‘wijd’	(wide)	
was	wrongly	translated	to	white	(Feely:	111).	Traveler	John	Barrow	was	believed	to	have	appropriated	the	term	
‘white	rhino’	to	recount	Griqua	Afrikaner’s	tale	of	hunting	seven	giraffes	and	three	white	rhinoceroses	in	one	day	
(Walker/Walker	2012:	18).	Recent	research	shows	that	the	oldest	written	Dutch	records	unequivocally	referred	
to	‘black’	and	‘white’	rhinos	(Feely:	112).	Another	theory	suggests	that	the	name	might	not	refer	to	the	
appearance	of	the	two	rhino	species	but	their	different	tempers	(ibid).	While	the	debate	of	the	semiotic	origin	
remains	unresolved,	the	names	remain	and	have	been	integrated	into	language	traditions.	
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Interestingly,	scientists	have	not	found	a	specific	explanation	for	the	use	of	the	smaller	horn	
on	both	rhinos	(Africa	Geographic	2012a:	14).	Unlike	the	tusks	of	elephants,	rhino	horns	grow	
at	a	rate	of	6	to	10	centimetres	or	0,6	kg	to	1	kg	in	female	white	rhinos	and	0,8	kg	to	1,5	kg	in	
male	white	rhinos	per	annum	(Interview	with	rhino	breeders	and	wildlife	veterinarians,	2013).	
Horn	growth	is	contingent	on	gender,	sex,	age,	population	type	(i.e.	free-	range	versus	
captive-bred)	and	species	(compare	with:	Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens	1991).	The	anterior	
horn	is	usually	the	bigger	horn	in	both	species:	shorter	and	sturdy	in	the	white	rhino,	and	
longer	and	narrower	in	the	black	rhino.	Under	exceptional	circumstances,	anterior	horns	of	
black	rhinos	in	the	wild	can	grow	as	long	as	1,2	meters	(Interview	with	wildlife	veterinarian,	
2012).		
	
The	two	horns	on	the	African	rhino’s	forehead	have	become	one	of	the	most	expensive	
commodities	in	the	world.	What	explains	the	high	cost	of	rhino	horn?	Scientific	tests	show	
that	rhino	horn	is	made	up	of	keratin	–	a	constituent	substance	found	in	hair	and	nails.	It	
would,	however,	be	incorrect	to	suggest	that	rhino	horn,	hair	and	nails	are	identical141	as	the	
chemical	composition	of	each	is	different	(Patton	2011:	2).	Rhino	horn	grows	in	layers	from	
specialized	skin	cells	with	no	cellular	functions.	The	cells	become	keratinized,	inert	and	
hardened	(Nowell	2012a:	1).	Unique	among	horned	animals,	the	rhino	horn	is	not	an	
extension	of	the	rhino’s	skull.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	rhino	horn	has	no	bony	core	but	consists	of	
a	fibrous	composite	(compare	with	Figure	1);	it	is	hence	“an	independently	derived	example	
of	a	cornified	papillary	epidermal	appendage	(Hieronymus/Witmer/Ridgely	2006:	1176).”	
	
To	protect	the	rhino	horn	against	physical	wear	and	tear	its	core	is	strengthened	with	calcium	
salts	while	melanin	offers	protection	against	harmful	UV	light	exposure	(Nowell	2012a:	6).	The	
horn	also	consists	of	nuclear	DNA,	which	allows	for	identification	of	individuals	and	
traceability	by	matching	of	rhino	carcasses	to	confiscated	horns	through	DNA–analysis	
(Harper	2011:	3).	The	conical	shape	of	the	horn	derives	from	rhinos	constantly	rubbing	their	
horns	on	the	ground,	and	other	surfaces	(Africa	Geographic	2012b:	16),	and	the	denser	core	
leads	to	the	pointed	structure	of	the	horn	(Yang	2011:	8).	The	entire	horn	can	be	removed	
																																																						
141	Several	consumer	awareness-raising	campaigns	suggest	that	ingesting	rhino	horn	is	like	chewing	one’s	
fingernails,	see	for	example	http://envietnam.org/our-work/rhino-horn-trade-in-Vietnam.html	(accessed	18	
August	2014)	
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surgically	with	a	small	cutting	knife	along	the	soft	dermis,	which	separates	the	horn	from	the	
bony	tissue	of	the	skull		(Interview	with	wildlife	veterinarian	1,	2013)142	or	in	the	words	of	an	
experienced	poacher	(Interview	with	poacher	17,	2013):		
	
“The	horn	is	not	attached	to	the	skull.	It	moves,	but	it	is	a	bit	rigid.	It	is	like	a	kneecap.	
With	a	panga,143	it	can	take	over	ten	minutes,	but	if	it	is	an	ax,	it	takes	less	than	10	
minutes,	five	minutes	or	so.”	
	
The	efficacy	of	rhino	horn	in	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	(TCM)	or	Traditional	Vietnamese	
Medicine	(TVM)144	has	been	the	focus	of	several	scientific	studies;	with	many	more	being	
conducted	in	Vietnam	and	China	at	present	(Interviews	in	Hong	Kong	and	Vietnam,	2013).		
Rhino	horn	was	traditionally	used	for	dispelling	heat,	cooling	blood,	relieving	convulsion	and	
counteracting	toxins	(But/Lung/Tam	1990:	158).	Recently,	it	has	been	applied	to	treat	a	host	
of	other	diseases	such	as	cancer,	stroke	and	impotence	(Đỗ	Tất	Lợi	1962;	Anonymous	2013)	–	
the	new	uses	are	discussed	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter.145		The	appearance	and	
chemical	composition	of	rhino	horn	are	similar	(but	not	identical)	to	that	of	the	horns	of	water	
buffalos,	cattle,	yak	and	saiga	antelopes	(Shengqing/Endong/Lijun	2011),	all	of	which	are	used	
to	substitute	or	fake	rhino	horn.	In	taking	a	science-based	approach,	the	chemical	
composition	of	rhino	horn	may	be	significant	in	determining	the	pharmacological	effects	of	
rhino	horn.	Keratin	the	constituent	component	of	rhino	horn,	for	example,	is	believed	to	be	
indigestible	in	mammals,	as	there	are	no	known	digestive	enzymes	(so-called	keratinases)	
with	the	ability	to	hydrolyse	keratin	inside	the	human	digestive	tract	(written	communication	
with	pathologist,	2015).146	Keratinases	are	present	in	certain	microbes,	insects	and	fungi	
																																																						
142	No	scientific	studies	were	found	that	describe	the	impact	of	removing	the	horn	off	a	live	rhino	in	this	manner.	
Removing	the	horn	a	few	centimetres	above	the	growth	point	(dehorning)	is	practiced	by	some	private	rhino	
owners	in	South	Africa,	and	in	public	parks	in	Namibia	and	Zimbabwe.	
	
143	A	‘panga’	is	a	machete.	Skilled	poachers	use	knives	to	loosen	the	horn	off	the	base	plate.	Unskilled	poachers	
tend	to	resort	to	axes	and	pangas.	
	
144	Although	there	are	some	geographic	nuances	in	the	practice	of	TVM,	TVM	is	essentially	an	offspring	of	TCM.	
The	label	of	‘TCM’	is	applied	in	scholarly	and	policy	literature	on	the	matter	and	is	used	for	the	purposes	of	
consistency	and	continuity	in	this	dissertation.	
	
145	The	use	of	rhino	horn	as	an	aphrodisiac	was	a	Western	myth	until	fairly	recent.	The	practice	of	using	rhino	
horn	to	curb	impotence	and	as	a	sexual	stimulant	is	a	new	development,	specifically	in	Vietnam	(Interviews	with	
consumers,	2013).	
	
146	Both	pepsin	and	trypsin,	enzymes	in	the	stomach	and	small	intestine	respectively,	cannot	hydrolyze	keratin.		
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(Gupta/Ramnani	2006);147	bezoars	(hairballs)	and	trichobezoars	(the	Rapunzel	syndrome)	can	
lead	to	obstructions	in	the	gastric	tract	and	cause	complications	in	humans.	However,	bezoars	
originating	from	the	water	buffalo,	ox	or	cow	are	precious,	expensive	and	rare	ingredients	in	
TCM.	
	
Figure	1:	CT	scan	of	a	white	rhinoceros	
	
	
Explanatory	note:	Red	areas	show	denser	areas	of	melanin	and	calcium	content	while	the	blue	areas	are	the	least	
dense.	The	scan	also	shows	that	the	horns	are	not	bone	protrusions	of	the	skull.	
	
Source:	Yang	(2011:	6)	adapted	from	Hieronymus/Witmer/Ridgely	(2006)	
	
Like	rhino	horn,	so-called	niu	huang	is	used	to	clear	heat	and	toxicity	–	and	when	used	in	
conjunction	with	rhino	horn	or	the	horn	of	water	buffalo,	it	treats	legionnaire’s	disease,	
meningitis	and	encephalitis	(Borten	2014).	To	date,	no	specific	experiments	have	been	
conducted	to	test	the	overall	digestibility	of	rhino	horn	(Nowell	2012a:	7).148	It	is	also	not	
known	which	or	whether	components	of	rhino	horn	need	to	be	digested	to	achieve	curative	
effects.	Rhino	horn	is	either	ground	up	with	a	bit	of	purified	or	cold	boiled	water	in	a	grinding	
bowl	(see	Figure	2),149	or	powered	rhino	horn	is	taken	in	conjunction	with	other	herbal	
																																																						
147	The	Tinea	fungus	can	infect	human	toenails	by	way	of	keratinase,	leading	to	athlete’s	foot	(Nowell	2012a:	7).	
	
148	Nowell	(2012a:	8),	for	example,	suggests	that	keratin	might	be	digested	in	the	alkaline	environment	of	the	
large	intestine	instead	of	the	acidic	stomach	environment.	
	
149	Grinding	bowls	are	made	from	clay.	The	clay	bowl	has	a	saturated	bottom	(feels	like	sanding	paper),	which	
facilitates	the	grinding	process.	The	bowls	come	in	many	forms	and	sizes.	The	researcher	visited	a	ceramic	
factory	north	of	Hanoi,	where	‘organic’	grinding	bowls	were	produced.	According	to	the	ceramicist	(Interview,	
2013),	affluent	Japanese	and	Vietnamese	buyers	were	ordering	these	bowls.	He	mentioned	that	conventional	
grinding	bowls	were	finished	with	chemical	paints	and	stamps,	which	undermined	the	curative	properties	of	
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ingredients.	The	process	of	grinding	the	horn	and	the	addition	of	supplementary	ingredients	is	
believed	to	facilitate	absorption	(Interviews	with	TCM	doctors,	2013).		
	
Possibly	the	most	well-known	series	of	scientific	studies	to	date	were	conducted	by	Professor	
But	and	his	research	team	at	the	Chinese	University	of	Hong	Kong	in	the	1980s,	and	published	
in	1990	and	1991	respectively.	The	studies	found	that	rhinoceros	horn	extract	demonstrated	
antipyretic	(fever–reducing)	activities	in	rats	but	so	did	water	buffalo	extract	and	the	herbal	
mixture	used	in	Qingying	Decoction150	without	rhino	horn	as	an	active	ingredient	(But	1991).	
	
Figure	2:	Rhino	horn	grinding	bowls	
	
Source:	Taken	by	the	researcher	during	fieldwork	in	Vietnam151	
	
Higher	volumes	of	water	buffalo	and	cattle	horn	had	to	be	used	to	achieve	antipyretic	effects,	
which	is	consistent	with	claims	of	Chinese	doctors	that	a	dosage	of	water	buffalo	horn	had	to	
be	increased	tenfold	to	achieve	the	same	effect	as	rhino	horn	(But/Lung/Tam	1990:	165,	
Interview	with	TCM	doctors,	Hong	Kong	and	Vietnam,	2013).	Interestingly,	the	injections	of	
the	horn	of	saiga	antelope	into	febrile	rats	achieved	stronger	antipyretic	effects	than	rhino	
																																																																																																																																																																											
rhino	horn.	Mechanical	grinding	machines	were	sold	in	marketplaces	in	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	–	similar	in	
appearance	to	manual	meat	grinders.		
	
150	Rhino	horn	is	often	used	in	compound	prescriptions	such	as	the	Qingying	Decoction.	First	mentioned	in	Wu’s	
1798	classic	work	Wenbing	Tiaobian	(Itemized	Dialectic	Analysis	of	Feverish	Diseases),	the	prescription	is	used	to	
treat	feverish	diseases	and	contains	eight	herbs	and	rhino	horn	(But	1991:	46).	
	
151	The	first	image	depicts	an	organic	grinding	bowl,	which	comes	with	a	higher	price	tag	than	the	conventional	
grinding	bowl	pictured	in	the	second	photo.	
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horn	at	high	dosages	(But/Lung/Tam	1990:	162).	But	and	his	colleagues	(1990:	166)	warned	
that	further	studies	were	necessary	to	differentiate	between	the	two	horns	as	there	were	
differing	conceptual	and	subjective	meanings	underpinning	the	use	of	each	in	Chinese	
pharmacopeia.152	In	a	bid	to	curb	rhino	poaching	in	the	1990s,	conservation	groups	
encouraged	saiga	hunting	instead	and	promoted	the	use	of	its	horn	as	a	viable	alternative	to	
rhino	horn	(Pearce	2003;	Ellis	2013:	140).	Once	numerous	across	the	vast	steppes	of	central	
Asia,	the	numbers	of	saiga	antelope	dropped	due	to	illegal	hunting	from	1.250.000	in	the	
mid–1970s	to	an	estimated	50	000	mostly	hornless	females	at	present	(The	IUCN	Red	List	of	
Threatened	Species	2014b).	The	fate	of	the	saiga	antelope	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	
chapter	dealing	with	fake	and	ersatz	rhino	horn	(see	Chapter	8).	
	
At	the	request	of	board	member	Luc	Hoffmann	(also	co–founder	of	the	conservation	
organization	WWF),	the	pharmaceutical	corporation	Hoffmann-LaRoche	conducted	a	series	of	
experiments	to	test	the	pharmacological	effects	of	rhino	horn	from	August	1980	to	February	
1981.	After	the	results	of	“the	special	pharmacological	study	of	rhino	horn”	had	been	released	
to	the	public,	the	former	director	of	conservation	at	WWF	(Anonymous	author	for	The	
Environmentalist	1983)	is	said	to	have	remarked:	
	
“You	would	get	the	same	effect	from	chewing	your	own	finger	nails.”		
	
The	negative	test	results	were	disseminated	to	a	wide	audience	(Anonymous	author	for	The	
Environmentalist	1983;	Nowell	2012a;	Ellis	2013:	238).	However,	the	article	was	never	peer-	
reviewed	or	published	in	a	scientific	journal	detailing	findings	and	methods	(thus	allowing	for	
the	reproducibility	and	scientific	scrutiny	of	the	experiments).	This	omission	has	led	to	some	
actors	suggesting	that	the	‘study’	may	have	been	a	publicity	stunt	(Interviews,	2013	and	
2014).153	As	it	turns	out,	scientists	at	the	Roche	Basel	and	Welwyn	laboratories	did	indeed	
conduct	a	series	of	experiments,	testing	the	powdered	horn	of	a	white	rhino	for	antipyretic	
and	anti-bacterial	effects	in	stress-induced	rats.	The	results	were	compared	with	the	effects	of	
																																																						
152	Rhino	horn	is	thus	considered	superior	in	“cooling	blood	and	counteracting	toxins”	while	saiga	horn	is	better	
suited	for	“cooling	liver	and	quenching	wind”(But/Lung/Tam	1990:	166).	
	
153	The	experiments	were	portrayed	as	“a	special	pharmacological	study	of	rhino	horn”	(Anonymous	author	for	
The	Environmentalist	1983).	Such	studies	are	usually	subject	to	scientific	scrutiny	by	peers	and	fellow	scientists.	
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paracetamol,	a	pharmaceutical	drug	commonly	used	to	reduce	fever.	Rhino	horn	tested	
inactive	(negative)	for	antipyretic	and	anti-bacterial	activities	(Protocol	of	experiments	
provided	by	Roche	to	the	author,	2014).	Since	there	were	no	plans	to	develop	pharmaceutical	
drugs	containing	rhino	horn,	the	series	of	experiments	were	atypical	of	the	diagnostic	work	
usually	undertaken	at	the	pharmaceutical	giant	(Telephonic	interview	with	representative	of	
LaRoche,	August	2014).	As	the	initial	screening	results	supported	Hoffmann’s	hypothesis	(that	
rhino	horn	had	no	fever-reducing	or	anti-bacterial	qualities),	the	experiments	were	
abandoned.	All	that	remains	is	a	brief	entry	of	the	screening	results	in	a	laboratory	journal	in	
the	company	archives	of	Roche.154	
	
In	2012,	TRAFFIC-affiliated	researcher	Kristin	Nowell	conducted	a	comprehensive	literature	
review	and	survey	of	NGO	information	on	the	general	pharmacological	effects	of	rhino	horn	
for	the	CITES	Secretariat.		In	relation	to	the	handful	of	scientific	studies	examined,155	Nowell	
(2012a:	38)	remarked		“stark	geographic	differences	in	the	pattern	of	results”	with	Chinese	
researchers	documenting	antipyretic	and	anti–inflammatory	effects	of	rhino	horn.	Two	tests	
that	were	performed	in	South	Africa	(Laburn/Mitchell	1997)	and	the	United	Kingdom	
(Bell/Simmonds	2006)	found	no	positive	results.	These	differences	may	be	linked	to	
methodological	differences	and	perhaps	to	what	Nowell	(2012a:	38)	described	as	“publication	
bias	for	positive	results”.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	studies	were	looking	at	substituting	
rhino	horn	with	other	horn	or	plant–based	medicines,	thus	not	actively	promoting	the	use	of	
rhino	horn.	One	double-blind	study	undertaken	at	a	hospital	in	Taiwan	in	1993	examined	
rhino	horn’s	antipyretic	effect	in	humans	(Tsai	quoted	in:	Nowell	2012a),	with	rhino	horn	
																																																						
154	The	series	of	experiments	would	not	meet	the	modern	standards	of	a	scientific	investigation	or	clinical	trials	
(which	was	not	the	intention)	but	they	were	undertaken	in	good	faith	to	inform	the	debate	with	no	financial	
benefit	to	Hoffmann-LaRoche.	According	to	a	senior	WWF	representative	(Interview,	2014),	any	efforts	to	further	
engage	with	the	results	of	the	“study”	and	claims	of	the	supposed	effectiveness	of	rhino	horn	would	only	serve	
the	purpose	of	“perpetuating	the	myth	of	its	usefulness”.		
	
155	Of	the	seven	studies	that	looked	into	the	fever-reducing	capabilities	of	rhino	horn,	six	found	rhino	horn	to	
lower	fever	in	laboratory	animals.	Only	one	clinical	trial	involving	human	subjects	had	been	conducted,	which	is	
discussed	in	more	detail	in	footnote	154.	Five	studies	tested	for	other	pharmacological	effects,	including	
analgesic,	antibacterial,	sedative,	anti–haemorrhagic	and	anti-inflammatory	effects	(Nowell	2012a:	16).	A	study	
sponsored	by	the	UK	Department	for	Environment	Food	and	Rural	Development	and	conservation	group	
International	Fund	for	Animal	Welfare	(IFAW)	found	rhino	horn	to	be	inactive	as	an	antibacterial,	antipyretic	and	
anti-inflammatory	agent	(Bell/Simmonds	2006).	This,	however,	was	the	only	study	to	apply	in	vitro	rather	than	in	
vivo	methodologies	(Nowell	2012a:	16).	
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achieving	a	statistically	significant	reduction	of	fever	in	toddlers	15	minutes	after	
administration.156			
	
The	results	of	the	various	studies	are	contradictory.	The	outcome	appears	to	be	contingent	on	
the	geographic	context	and	the	chosen	methodological	approach.	When	evidence-based	
scientific	standards	are	applied	to	test	the	efficacy	of	Chinese	medicine	in	specific,	or	
traditional	medicines	in	general,	they	tend	to	fall	short	of	acknowledging	vast	epistemological	
and	ontological	differences	underpinning	the	practices	of	‘traditional’	versus	evidence-based	
medicine	(Shea	2006).	In	light	of	the	paradigmatic	differences,	Shea	warns	of	the	dangers	of	
oversimplification	of	an	extensive	ancient	knowledge	system	through	the	application	of	
scientific	standards	linked	to	the	practice	of	evidence-based	medicine.	For	example,	there	are	
enormous	differences	in	the	pathologies	of	fever	underpinning	evidence-based	medicine	and	
TCM.	Febrile	diseases	in	TCM	can	manifest	without	an	increase	in	body	temperature	whereas	
they	are	linked	to	an	increase	in	body	temperature	in	evidence-based	medicine	(Patton	2011:	
4).	It	stands	to	argue	that	perhaps	not	only	chemical	substances	but	also	other	factors157	
contribute	to	the	putative	efficacy	of	rhino	horn	medicines.		
	
Although	this	sub-section	has	differentiated	between	‘evidence-based’	medicine	and	TCM,	it	
needs	to	be	pointed	out	that	registered	TCM	doctors	in	Vietnam	undergo	the	same	six	years	
of	basic	medical	training	as	conventional	medical	practitioners	before	specializing	in	the	field	
of	TCM.	Elsewhere	in	Asia,	traditional	doctors	also	undergo	rigorous	professional	training	of	
seven	years	or	more	(Interviews	with	TCM	doctors,	Hong	Kong	and	China,	2013	and	2014).	
Moreover,	TCM	equally	relies	on	years	of	evidence-based	trials	and	research	for	the	
development	of	TCM	pharmaceutical	products	(Interviews	with	TCM	and	TVM	practitioners,	
																																																						
156	Nowell	(2012a:	10–11)	summarized	the	details	of	the	study	as	follows:	142	children	aged	between	3	and	114	
months,	suffering	from	fever	(average	of	39.2°	Celsius)	were	given	rhino	horn,	water	buffalo,	a	placebo	or	
acetaminophen	(an	anti–inflammatory	drug)	mixed	with	water	by	means	of	oral	administration.	Acetaminophen	
achieved	the	best	results	while	rhino	horn	achieved	a	statistically	significant	reduction	after	the	first	15	minutes	
but	the	reduction	stopped	thereafter	and	ended	with	a	0.4°	C	reduction	overall.	57%	of	the	children	who	were	
given	rhino	horn	ended	up	with	temperatures	lower	than	38.5°C	and	no	follow-up	treatment	was	necessary.	Tsai	
found	“since	the	Rhino	is	going	to	extinction	and	antipyretic	efficacy	of	rhino	horn	is	less	effective	than	
acetaminophen,	rhino	horn	is	not	recommended	for	isolated	use	in	febrile	children”	(Tsai	quoted	in:	Nowell	
2012a:	11).	
	
157	The	‘placebo	effect’	has	been	documented	in	scientific	literature,	showing	that	some	patients’	belief	in	the	
therapeutic	qualities	of	medicine	may	lead	to	an	improvement	in	their	condition.	for	an	investigation	of	the	
‘placebo	effect’	in	alternative	medicines	see:	Kaptchuk	(2002).	
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Hong	Kong	and	Vietnam,	2013).	TCM	doctors	are	providing	basic	and	advanced	health	services	
to	a	great	portion	of	the	Southeast	and	East	Asian	population.	Ridiculing	them	as	“snake	oil	
salesmen”,	“quacks”	or	“charlatans”	(excerpts	from	social	media)	shows	little	understanding	
of	the	methodologies	and	ancient	practice	of	TCM.	It	is	important	to	note	that	China	banned	
the	use	of	rhino	horn	in	the	TCM	pharmacopeia	in	1993.	The	ban	is	still	in	place.	TCM	doctors	
and	pharmacists	interviewed	in	the	course	of	this	research	project	acknowledged	the	curative	
qualities	of	rhino	horn;	some	were	actively	prescribing	it	to	patients	suffering	from	a	number	
of	ailments	(discussed	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter).	Several	substitutes	such	as	the	horn	
of	water	buffalo,	yak	or	saiga	antelope	and	herbal	medicines	were	actively	promoted	in	lieu	of	
using	body	parts	of	endangered	animal	species.		
	
In	conclusion,	the	physical	and	chemical	composition	of	rhino	horn	fails	to	explain	its	
valuation	and	the	high	price.	As	will	be	shown	later	in	this	chapter,	the	scientific	proof	is	of	
little	consequence	to	patients	who	trust	their	doctors	and	support	the	ancient	practice	of	
traditional	medicine,	or	who	are	simply	seeking	a	miracle	cure	to	heal	or	stop	the	spread	of	
cancer,	for	their	loved	ones	or	themselves.	In	addition,	rhino	horn	use	in	Vietnam	ranges	from	
detoxifier/hangover	cure	to	status	symbol.	It	will	be	argued	that	the	different	uses	are	
interlinked	by	virtue	of	the	horn’s	valuation	as	an	extraordinary,	sacral	good	traditionally	used	
in	medicinal	preparations.		
	
	
3.3	A	global	history	into	the	mythology	of	the	rhino	
	
Of	significance	to	understanding	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacral	good	is	the	ancient	
history	of	its	use	as	a	magical	potion,	linking	to	global	myths	of	rhinos,	unicorns	and	alicorns.	
The	following	section	highlights	belief	systems	and	cultural	meanings	attached	to	the	rhino	
and	its	horn.		
	
Rhino	fossils	dating	back	more	than	60	million	years	have	been	found	in	North	America,	
Europe,	Africa	and	Asia.	The	earliest	cave	paintings	depicting	53	images	of	the	woolly	rhino	
date	back	some	30	000	years	ago	were	discovered	in	the	Chauvet	cave	in	the	valley	of	
Ardeche	in	France	(Clottes	October	2002).	The	Lascaux	caves	near	Montignac	in	France	host	
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another	image	of	the	long-extinct	woolly	rhino,	also	from	the	Upper	Palaeolithic	period,	some	
17	000	years	ago	(Kleiner	2009:	9).	Human	remains	were	laid	to	rest	with	those	of	now	extinct	
species	of	rhino	in	pre–historic	caves	(Briggs	1931:	277).	After	the	last	Ice	Age,	there	were	no	
rhinos	left	to	hunt	or	paint	in	Europe	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	12)	and	the	rhino	only	rears	
its	horn	again	in	the	writings	of	Arab	traveller	Ahmad	ibn	Fadlan	(to	whom	I	return	later)	in	
the	10th	century	BCE.158	When	rhino	horn	became	a	popular	antidote	to	poisoning	during	the	
16th	century,	European	caves	and	ancient	gravesites	were	searched	and	emptied	of	all	
remaining	rhino	horn	(Briggs	1931:	277).	
	
On	the	African	continent,	the	San	people159	left	unique	rock-art	drawings	in	caves	strewn	
across	southern	Africa,	dating	back	at	least	14	000	years	(Ouzman	2001).	Compared	to	other	
imagery	in	rock	art,	the	drawings	and	engravings	of	rhinos	are	very	detailed,	a	greater	variety	
of	engraving	techniques	are	used,	and	repeated	rubbing	can	be	observed	(Ouzman	2001:	
245).160		The	rhino	and	the	eland	antelope	were	of	spiritual	significance.	The	rubbing	of	the	
rock	carrying	the	imagery	is	linked	to	the	San’s	belief	that	some	rocks	acted	as	gateways	
between	the	ordinary	and	spirit	worlds	(Ouzman	2001:	244).	Archaeologists	attribute	the	
spiritual	significance	of	the	rhino	to	its	sheer	body	size,	its	aggressive	nature	(in	the	case	of	
the	black	rhino)	and	its	role	in	the	San’s	immediate	environment	(Walker/Walker	2012:	11).		
The	golden	foil	of	a	one-horned	rhino	was	found	in	one	of	three	royal	graves	in	Mapungubwe	
(see	Figure	3),	a	UNESCO	world	heritage	site	in	South	Africa,	situated	on	the	southern	banks	of	
the	Limpopo	River	bordering	Zimbabwe	in	the	north	and	Botswana	to	the	west.	The	small	
rhino	(it	is	152	millimetres	long)	was	crafted	by	an	indigenous	civilization	that	had	developed	
																																																						
158	A	conscious	choice	was	made	to	use	a	neutral	calendar	terminology	in	lieu	of	the	Christian–	inspired	‘Anno	
Domini’	and	‘Before	Christ’	denotations.	The	CE–denotation	or	Common	Era	equates	the	same	period	as	
envisaged	by	‘Anno	Domini’	–	“in	the	year	of	our	Lord”	and	BCE	refers	to	the	period	before	the	common,	current	
or	Christian	era.	Both	calendars	omit	the	year	0	and	are	numerically	equivalent.	
	
159	The	name	‘San	people’	is	applied	collectively	here	to	refer	to	the	indigenous	peoples	of	South	Africa.	
Development	workers	and	Western	researchers	used	the	term	to	move	away	from	the	derogatory	label	of	
“bushmen”.	Dutschke	(2015)	problematizes	the	use	of	labels	and	names	denoting	first	nation	peoples	in	
southern	Africa.	For	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	it	is	acknowledged	that	indigenous	peoples	refer	to	
themselves	by	their	chosen	names,	which	depict	their	ancient	culture	and	traditions.	Due	to	the	reliance	on	
archaeological	research	in	this	section,	there	was	regrettably	no	information	available	as	to	specific	group	
identities;	the	collective	denotation	of	‘San	people’	was	thus	applied.	
	
160	It	was	believed	that	the	rubbing	of	the	images	would	allow	access	to	the	potency	of	the	animal	in	the	spirit	
world	(Ouzman	2001:	245).	
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sophisticated	political,	social	structures	and	trade	relations	by	the	13th	century,161	more	than	
400	years	before	the	arrival	of	European	colonizers	(York	2012).162	Archaeologist	Huffman	
believes	that	the	foil	represents	a	black	rhino.		
Figure	3:	The	golden	rhinoceros	of	Mapungubwe	
	
Source:	Tim	Hauf/Corbis163	
Known	for	its	unpredictability,	pugnaciousness	and	power,	the	association	between	royal	
Zimbabwean	leadership	and	the	rhino	appears	apt.164	There	were,	at	least,	another	two	rhino	
in	the	royal	graveyard	(Huffman	2007:	58).	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	black	rhino	had	symbolic	
																																																						
161	Mapungubwe	was	abandoned	after	400	years	of	settlement	in	1290	CE	due	to	the	onset	of	the	‘Little	Ice	Age’,	
possibly	a	severe	bout	of	drought	and	the	centre	of	regional	power	had	shifted	to	Great	Zimbabwe	(Carruther	
2006:	2).		
	
162	Although	the	hill	of	Mapungubwe	and	its	treasures	were	“discovered”	by	a	group	of	five	white	Afrikaners	in	
1932	(black	people	had	long	revered	the	site),	there	was	no	room	in	colonial	or	apartheid	discourse	for	a	black	
civilization	that	created	sophisticated	and	complex	walled	sites	such	as	Mapungubwe	or	Great	Zimbabwe.	The	
land	around	the	site	was	given	to	white	farmers	and	the	military	during	the	apartheid	period.	Charactristic	of	the	
Mapungubwe	civilization,	the	golden	rhino	became	celebrated	once	apartheid	had	been	abolished	in	1994	and	
the	Order	of	Mapungubwe	has	become	South	Africa’s	highest	national	decoration,	honouring	excellence	in	
science	and	creativity	(York	2012).	
	
163	Image	available	at	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/17/british-museum-may-seek-loan-of-the-
golden-rhinoceros-of-mapungubwe	(accessed	18	August	2015)	
	
164	Although	there	were	white	rhinos	in	the	region	surrounding	Mapungubwe,	the	extraordinarily	one–horned	
golden	rhino	might	have	been	inspired	by	tales	of	merchants	from	China,	India	or	the	Middle	East,	who	were	
trading	gold,	copper,	ivory,	hides	and	rhino	horn	along	the	Indian	Ocean	coastline	of	southern	and	East	Africa	
(Walker/Walker	2012:	11–13).	
	
	 133	
value	among	Venda	and	Shona–speaking	tribes	living	in	the	early	Shona	state.	Boeyens	and	
van	der	Ryst	(2014:	25),	for	example,	describe	the	significance	of	the	ceremonial	pembera	
dance	(mimicking	the	movement	of	the	black	rhino	known	as	chipembere	in	Shona).	The	king	
of	the	Matupa	state	and	his	warriors	would	act	out	the	ritual	dance	to	determine	who	was	the	
most	accomplished	and	courageous	warrior.	The	juxtaposition	of	the	behavioural	attributes	of	
the	black	rhino	(such	as	dangerous,	unpredictable	and	powerful)	with	the	leadership	style	of	
the	ancient	leaders	of	Mapungubwe	and	Great	Zimbabwe	has	been	asserted	(Huffman	2007:	
58).	The	sacred	pembela	ritual	or	rhinoceros	dance	in	Venda	culture	is	equally	linked	to	
chieftainship	(Boeyens/van	der	Ryst	2014:	26).	The	rhinos	captured	in	San	rock	art,	and	the	
golden	rhino	of	Mapungubwe	signify	the	deep	connection,	reverence	and	cultural	significance	
of	the	rhino	in	those	days.		
Returning	to	the	earlier	mentioned	Ahmad	ibn	Fadlan,	who	appears	to	have	captured	the	first	
written	record	of	the	rhino	based	on	his	journey	from	Baghdad	to	the	Volga	region	in	922	CE.	
He	observed	rhinos	in	the	wilderness	and	found	three	large	bowls	made	out	of	horn	
(ostensibly	rhino	horn)	at	the	king’s	palace	(Walker/Walker	2012:	8).	Ctesias,	the	Greek	
private	physician	to	Kings	Darius	II	and	Artaxerxes	I	of	Persia,	gives	the	earliest	Western	
account	of	the	rhino	in	the	fifth	century	BCE.165	His	description	of	the	one-horned	creatures	is	
widely	interpreted	to	represent	an	inspired	combination	of	the	Indian	rhino	and	Indian	ass	
(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	13).	In	the	words	of	Ctesias	(quoted	in:	Shepard	1930):	
"There	are	in	India	certain	wild	asses	which	are	as	large	as	horses,	and	larger.	Their	
bodies	are	white,	their	heads	dark	red,	and	their	eyes	dark	blue.	They	have	a	horn	on	
the	forehead	which	is	about	a	foot	and	a	half	in	length.	The	dust	filed	from	this	horn	is	
administered	in	a	potion	as	a	protection	against	deadly	drugs.	The	base	of	this	horn,	
for	some	two	hands'-breadth	above	the	brow,	is	pure	white;	the	upper	part	is	sharp	
and	of	a	vivid	crimson;	and	the	remainder,	or	middle	portion,	is	black.	Those	who	drink	
out	of	these	horns,	made	into	drinking	vessels,	are	not	subject,	they	say,	to	
convulsions	or	to	the	holy	disease	[epilepsy].	Indeed,	they	are	immune	even	to	poisons	
if,	either	before	or	after	swallowing	such,	they	drink	wine,	water,	or	anything	else	from	
these	beakers.	Other	asses,	both	the	tame	and	the	wild,	and	in	fact	all	animals	with	
solid	hoofs,	are	without	the	ankle-bone	and	have	no	gall	in	the	liver,	but	these	have	
both	the	ankle-bone	and	the	gall.	This	ankle-bone,	the	most	beautiful	I	have	ever	seen,	
is	like	that	of	an	ox	in	general	appearance	and	in	size,	but	it	is	as	heavy	as	lead	and	its	
																																																						
165	Some	scholars	suggest	that	Ctesias	gave	the	first	Western	account	of	the	unicorn,	which	influenced	many	
artists’	renditions	of	the	mystical	figment	of	their	imagination.	It	is,	however,	accepted	that	the	Indian	rhinoceros	
(rhinoceros	unicornis)	inspired	the	Greek	doctor’s	vivid	description	(Nichols	2011:	128–129).	
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colour	is	that	of	cinnabar	through	and	through.	The	animal	is	exceedingly	swift	and	
powerful,	so	that	no	creature,	neither	the	horse	nor	any	other,	can	overtake	it."	
While	the	account	is	embellished	and	mythical,	it	is	significant	in	showing	that	rhino	horn	has	
been	attributed	with	special	healing	properties	over	many	centuries	(Martin/Martin/Amin	
1982:	13).	No	animal	has	been	shrouded	in	as	many	myths	and	myth	creation	as	the	rhino	has.	
A	diverse	assortment	of	one-horned	beasts	was	sprinkled	across	ancient	Chinese,	Egyptian,	
Babylonian,	Indian	and	Assyrian	mythology,	the	Bible,	and	Greek	and	Roman	fables	
(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	277).	Across	the	ages,	the	rhino	has	often	been	compared	and	
confused	with	the	mythical	unicorn.	Even	scholars	like	Aristotle,	Pliny	and	Leornardo	da	Vinci	
firmly	believed	in	the	existence	of	the	unicorn.	For	a	long	time,	Romans	and	Greeks	upheld	
the	belief	that	the	unicorn	(monoceros	to	the	Greek	and	unicornis	to	the	Romans)	was	
different	to	the	rhino	since	there	was	a	huge	market	for	the	horns	of	the	unicorn	from	China	
due	to	its	medicinal	properties.	By	the	times	of	the	late	Antiquity,	the	use	of	rhino	horn	
derived	from	the	one-horned	Asian	varieties	had	been	firmly	established	in	the	East	
(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	277),	so	the	Europeans	most	certainly	were	not	consuming	unicorn.	 
Before	Europeans	had	seen	actual	rhinos,	tales	of	the	beast	fed	their	phantasy	and	led	to	
bizarre	myths	such	as	rhinos	being	impartial	to	music	and	perfume.166	In	the	6th	century	CE,	
Saint	Isidore	of	Seville	declared	the	monoceros,	unicorn	and	rhinoceros	to	be	the	same	
creature:	
“The	rhinoceros	(rhinoceron)	is	named	with	a	Greek	word;	in	Latin	it	means	‘horn	of	
the	nose’.	This	is	also	the	monoceron,	that	is,	the	unicorn	(unicornus),	because	it	has	a	
single	four-foot	horn	in	the	middle	of	its	forehead,	so	sharp	and	strong	that	it	tosses	in	
the	air	or	impales	whatever	it	attacks.	It	often	fights	with	the	elephant	and	throws	it	to	
the	ground	after	wounding	it	in	the	belly.	It	has	such	strength	that	it	can	be	captured	
by	no	hunter's	ability,	but,	as	those	who	have	written	about	the	natures	of	animals	
claim,	if	a	virgin	girl	is	set	before	a	unicorn,	as	the	beast	approaches,	she	may	open	her	
lap	and	it	will	lay	its	head	there	with	all	ferocity	put	aside,	and	thus	lulled	and	
disarmed	it	may	be	captured	(Bishop	Isidore	of	Seville	[6th	Century	AD]:	252).”	
As	there	was	little	contact	between	Europe,	Africa	and	China	during	the	medieval	period,	the	
																																																						
166	According	to	the	myth,	if	a	man	were	to	dress	up	like	“a	highly	perfumed	virgin	girl”	he	would	be	irresistible	to	
the	rhino.	Should	the	disguise	fail,	he	then	should	climb	onto	the	closest	tree	and	urinate	in	the	rhino’s	ear	to	
avert	further	charges.	Such	myths	may	have	been	based	on	tales	by	fellow	travellers	passing	through	colonial	
entrepôts	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	13).	
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classical	knowledge	of	the	rhino	converged	with	the	unicorn	legend.	It	was	commonly	held	
that	the	unicorn	was	endowed	with	mammoth	strength,	which	was	concentrated	in	its	horn	
(ibid).	Contaminated	water	could	be	clarified	if	stirred	with	the	horn	of	a	unicorn	–	a	method	
that	was	called	“water	conning”	(Mould	1996:	130).	Many	fables,	fairy	tales,	paintings	and	
tapestries	(the	Metropolitan	Museum	of	Art	in	New	York	is	host	to	a	series	of	seven	tapestries	
entitled	The	hunt	of	the	unicorn)	attest	to	the	popularity	of	the	unicorn,	which	became	a	
symbol	of	purity	and	chastity	during	the	medieval	period	and	Renaissance.	It	is	perhaps	not	
surprising	that	the	horn	of	the	unicorn	became	known	as	a	powerful	aphrodisiac	and	was	
used	for	virginity	testing.	None	of	the	classical	medical	authors	in	the	Occidental	tradition	
mentioned	the	unicorn	and	its	curative	properties	until	Hildegard	of	Bingen	in	the	12th	
century.	According	to	the	medieval	medic	and	nun,	an	ointment	made	of	powered	unicorn	
liver	mixed	with	egg	yolks	cured	leprosy,	a	belt	made	of	unicorn	hide	worn	around	the	waist	
protected	its	owner	against	the	Plague,	fevers	and	sore	feet,	and	its	hoof	could	detect	poisons	
(Throop	1998).167	All	along	“unicorn”	pieces,	fragments	and	horns	were	used	to	test	food	and	
beverages	of	the	wealthy	and	royals	for	poisoning,	and	abbeys,	churches	and	principalities	
were	stockpiling	horns,	which	were	treasured	possessions,	signifying	status	and	opulence	
(Mould	1996:	130–131).	As	no	European	had	seen	lions,	elephants,	panthers	or	unicorns	at	
this	time	in	history,	they	were	equally	content	and	unquestioning	in	their	acceptance	of	the	
existence	of	all	these	creatures	(Shepard	1930:	29).	
	
According	to	Prothero	and	Schoch	(2002:	278),	the	mysticism	surrounding	horns	may	be	
linked	to	the	curative	properties	associated	with	the	imported	tusks	of	the	narwhal,	a	small	
artic	whale.	These	tusks	can	reach	a	length	of	up	to	3	meters168	and	were	first	introduced	by	
Scandinavian	fishermen	upon	returning	from	expeditions	to	the	Arctic.	While	Arctic	whalers	
harpooned	some	narwhals,	most	of	the	precious	resource	derived	from	bartering	trade	with	
Inuit	hunters	(Ellis	2013:	83).		Apothecaries	across	Europe	proceeded	to	market	narwhal	horn	
																																																						
167	Hildegard	of	Bingen	wrote	extensively	about	the	unicorn	fable,	elaborating	her	version	of	the	virgin-capture	
legend	and	suggesting	the	unicorn	was	symbolic	of	Jesus	Christ.		
	
168	Unicorn	whales	(as	they	are	also	known)	prefer	the	deep	waters	of	the	Atlantic	Arctic	Ocean.	While	the	
impact	of	global	warming	and	hunting	is	not	known,	the	IUCN	regards	their	populations	as	stable.	Narwhals	are	
hunted,	and	their	tusks	are	traded	in	Greenland	and	Canada.	Greenland	has	however	banned	the	export	of	the	
narwhal’s	ivory	(The	IUCN	Red	List	of	Threatened	Species	2014a).	
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as	unicorn	horn	and	sold	it	for	its	supposed	medicinal	properties.	As	narwhals	were	rarely	
seen	south	of	Greenland,	their	existence	remained	the	Scandinavian	seafarer’s	best-kept	
secret	for	nearly	500	years	while	they	were	selling	‘unicorn’	worth	several	times	its	weight	in	
gold	(Winick	2014).	The	horn	of	the	unicorn,	or	alicorn	as	it	came	to	be	known,	was	likewise	
imputed	with	magical	powers	such	as	counteracting	toxins	and	curing	melancholia.	
Apothecaries	chained	down	the	valuable	tusks	and	sold	shavings	to	affluent	customers.169		
Alicorn	was	also	converted	into	cups	that	were	thought	to	neutralize	any	poisons	slipped	into	
beverages	consumed	out	of	the	cups.	Other	types	of	‘unicorns’	used	in	European	apothecaries	
were	probably	Indian	rhino	horn	in	powdered	form,	prehistoric	mammoth	ivory	and	fossils	
(Mould	1996:	131).	The	value	of	alicorn	depended	on	available	supplies.	At	the	peak	of	the	
market,	pieces	and	powder	of	alicorn	could	sell	for	up	to	ten	times	their	weight	in	gold	while	
entire	horns	(which	were	rare)	could	be	worth	double	(ibid).	As	was	to	be	expected,	shrewd	
entrepreneurs	forged	the	expensive	commodity	by	substituting	alicorn	with	the	horn	of	
domesticated	animals	and	walrus,	whale	bones,	stalactites	and	limestone.	To	protect	
prospective	buyers,	several	tests	were	devised	to	check	the	authenticity	of	the	alicorn	
(ibid).170	Chapter	8	discusses	the	high	incidence	of	fake	horn	in	modern	markets	and	novel	
ways	of	testing	its	authenticity.	
	
Unicorn	remained	officially	recognized	as	a	drug	to	be	stored	in	registered	pharmacies	in	
England	until	in	1741	(Mould	1996:	131–132),171	the	French	court	used	alicorn	to	test	whether	
the	royals’	food	and	drinks	had	been	poisoned	up	until	the	French	Revolution,	Queen	Victoria	
I	had	an	alicorn	mounted	in	her	bedroom	at	Windsor	and	even	Pope	Gregory	XIV	was	offered	
powered	horn	on	his	deathbed	in	1591	(he	died	nonetheless)	(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	278).	
The	belief	in	the	curative	properties	of	alicorn	was	such	that	the	symbol	of	the	unicorn	
																																																						
169	A	prince	of	Saxony	is	said	to	have	paid	the	sum	of	one	hundred	thousand	thalers	for	a	single	alicorn	while	the	
English	King	Charles	V	paid	his	outstanding	debt	to	the	Margrave	of	Bayreuth	with	two	narwhal	horns	
(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	278).	
	
170	One	such	test	involved	the	soaking	of	the	suspicious	horn	in	water	and	then	drawing	a	circle	around	a	
scorpion	with	the	same	waters.	If	the	scorpion	remained	inside	the	circle,	then	the	alicorn	was	considered	to	be	
the	real	deal	(Mould	1996:	131–132).	
	
171	The	official	drugs	list	of	items	to	be	kept	in	stock	by	registered	pharmacies	in	England	included	unicorn	from	
1651	to	1741.	It	was	deleted	from	the	list	in	1746	(Mould	1996:	132).	
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became	associated	with	pharmacopoeias	and	apothecaries	in	the	Western	world	(ibid).172	
Despite	the	alicorn’s	widespread	popularity,	doubt	and	scepticism	about	its	efficacy	became	
widespread	when	evidence-based	medicine	became	the	order	of	the	day	during	the	Age	of	
Reason.	While	the	Japanese	were	using	alicorn	for	the	treatment	of	impotence	until	the	late	
18th	century,	demand	had	tapered	off	by	the	18th	century	elsewhere	in	the	world	(Mould	
1996:	133).	As	the	price	dropped	significantly,	the	wealthy	moved	on,	but	the	poor	continued	
to	buy	alicorn	for	some	time	after	that	(Shepard	1930:	84).	
The	rhino	was	‘rediscovered’	in	Europe	after	the	Dark	Ages.	In	1292,	Venetian	explorer	Marco	
Polo	saw	Indian	rhinos	during	his	expeditions	to	Asia	and	related	them	to	the	fabled	unicorn,	
sincerely	doubting	whether	rhinos	and	virgin	maidens	would	enjoy	propinquity	(Mould	1996:	
130).	Finally	in	1593,	Europeans	got	to	see	their	first	live	rhino	gifted	to	King	Manuel	the	Great	
of	Lisbon,	who	upon	tiring	of	it	sent	it	to	Pope	Leo	X.	The	ship	sank	en	route,	drowning	
everyone	on	board,	and	the	pope	eventually	received	the	stuffed	and	skinned	carcass	(an	
early	trophy	of	sorts)	some	time	later	(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	279).	German	painter	Albrecht	
Dürer	(see	Figure	4)	was	crucial	in	disentangling	the	rhino	from	the	unicorn	through	his	
famous	woodcut,	which	was	based	on	a	drawing	of	a	rhino	by	a	Portuguese	artist	(Dürer	never	
saw	a	live	rhino)	(Edwards	2008:	291).	The	mystical	element	remained,	however,	as	Dürer’s	
rhino	had	a	unicorn	with	a	spiral	twist	protruding	from	its	shoulders.		
The	reliance	upon	hearsay	and	oral	traditions	is	perhaps	best	demonstrated	in	Edward	
Topsell’s	‘The	history	of	four-footed	beasts	and	serpents’,	an	authoritative	natural	history	
book	first	published	in	the	Renaissance	and	reproduced	in	its	original	form	over	several	
centuries	(Prothero/Schoch	2002:	279).	Amongst	the	colourful	descriptions	of	serpents,	sea	
monsters,	unicorns	and	dragons,	Topsell	regards	the	rhino	as	“the	second	wonder	in	nature”	
(after	the	elephant).173	Topsell	(1658)	explains	at	length	why	the	unicorn	and	rhino	were	two	
distinct	creatures,	also	refuting	the	longstanding	myth	of	the	missing	female	rhino.	Early	
writers	and	philosophers	were	of	the	wrongful	belief	that	only	male	rhinos	were	roaming	the	
planet	(Keller	1909:	384).	
																																																						
172	The	British	pharmaceutical	company	Burroughs	Wellcome,	for	example,	used	the	unicorn	as	its	logo	between	
1908	and	1995	(Dorman	2014).	
	
173	The	profile	is	sprinkled	with	curious	descriptions,	such	as:	“On	his	forehead	there	grow	hairs	which	seem	a	
little	red”;	or:	“His	back	is	distinguished	with	certain	purple	spots	upon	a	yellow	ground	(Topsell	1658).”	
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The	use	and	trade	of	rhino	horn	in	Europe	appears	to	coincide	with	Portuguese	seafarers	
returning	from	India.	Caspar	Bartholinus	observed	the	sale	of	rhino	horn	in	several	Italian	
cities	in	1620,	where	it	was	prescribed	for	the	treatment	of	poisoning,	fevers,	small–pox,	
epilepsy,	vertigo,	worms,	impotence	and	stomachache.	Initially	rhino	horn	was	not	as	popular	
as	alicorn	as	the	horn	was	too	short	and	the	imagery	of	the	rhino	failed	to	inspire	in	
comparison	to	the	mythical	unicorn.	This	attitude	changed	over	the	next	decades.	By	1699,	
Pierre	Pomet	recounts	that	rhino	horn	was	used	in	the	belief	that	it	would	be	as	effective	as	
alicorn	(Shepard	1930:	176).	
Figure	4:	Albrecht	Dürer's	'Rhinoceros'	
	
Source:	The	British	Museum	174	
Not	surprising,	the	first	few	generations	of	colonial	settlers	at	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope	in	South	
Africa	shared	those	beliefs.	Botanist	and	avid	traveller	Charles	Thunberg	(1793)	observes	that	
rhino	horns	were	kept	as	rare	ornaments	and	as	a	means	to	detect	poison.	He	wrote:		
“The	fine	shavings	of	the	horns,	taken	internally,	were	supposed	to	cure	convulsions	
and	spasms	in	children,	and	it	was	firmly	believed	that	goblets	made	of	these	horns	in	
a	turner’s	lathe	would	discover	a	poisonous	draught	by	making	the	liquor	ferment.”		
																																																						
174	Available	at	
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/pd/a/albrecht_d%C3%BCrers_rhinoceros.a
spx	(accessed	18	August	2015)	
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The	difficulties	associated	with	translocating	rhinos	in	those	days	precluded	a	scientific	
investigation	into	the	mythical	rhino	and	its	horn	until	the	19th	century	(Prothero/Schoch	
2002:	280).	It	bears	mentioning	that	many	of	the	traits	of	the	unicorns	would	have	been	
derived	or	embellished	from	stories	told	by	rhinoceros	hunters.	Rhinos	have	bad	eyesight,	but	
they	have	an	augmented	sense	of	smell,	which	tallies	with	elements	of	the	virgin-capture	
legend	(Shepard	1930:	175).	As	will	be	shown	in	the	following,	rhino	horn	had	a	long	history	of	
medicinal	and	alexipharmic	use	in	the	East.	Scholars	of	the	unicorn	legend	tend	to	object	to	
the	notions	that	the	unicorn,	“an	animal	of	such	delicacy	and	refinement”	would	be	the	same	
as	“the	gross,	grunting,	slime-wallowing	rhinoceros”	(Shepard	1930:	177).	The	rather	harsh	
assessment	intimates	cognitive	frames	of	yesteryear,	some	of	which	may	have	affected	
modern	day	perceptions	of	the	ancient	creature.		
Much	of	the	unicorn	and	rhino	mythology	in	the	Occident	seems	to	have	been	inspired	by	
tales	from	the	Far	East,	with	the	earlier-mentioned	Ctesias	being	the	first	of	many	travellers	to	
bring	back	stories	and	observations,	which	were	either	assimilated,	adopted	or	appropriated	
into	Western	cultural	traditions.	Supernatural	events	associated	with	the	unicorn	date	back	to	
2600	BCE	in	Chinese	mythology	(Briggs	1931:	278).	The	earliest	representations	of	the	unicorn	
were	found	on	seals	in	the	northern	Indus	region	dating	back	to	the	same	era	around	2600	
BCE	(Abraham	et	al.	2013:	107).175	The	unicorn	or	similar	apparitions	also	featured	in	Hindu	
and	Buddhist	written	and	oral	traditions.	The	Mahābhārata	introduced	the	legend	of	
Rishyasringa,	a	deer–horned	anthropomorphic	creature	while	Buddhist	literature	refers	to	the	
same	creature	as	Ekashringa	(which	translates	to	unicorn)	(Nichols	2011:	130).	The	
archaeologist	responsible	for	excavations	that	led	to	the	unearthing	of	vast	areas	of	the	Indus	
Valley	Civilization	in	the	early	20th	century,	Sir	John	Marshall	believed	that	the	unicorn	and	
other	mythical	creatures	derived	from	it	were	inspired	by	the	rhino	(cited	in:	Abraham	et	al.	
2013:	122).	Indus	merchants	were	frequent	and	long-distance	travellers,	who	may	have	
spread	the	idea	of	the	unicorn	to	Mesopotamia	and	the	Middle	East.	The	oldest	unicorn	
bronze	statue	found	in	that	region	dates	back	to	the	days	of	the	proto-Iranian	culture	of	
Amlash	around	the	9th	to	8th	century	BC	(Tagliatesta	2007:	176).	From	there	the	idea	of	the	
mythical	unicorn	may	have	gradually	diffused	through	the	Mediterranean	region	finally	
																																																						
175	Scholars	have	long	debated	whether	the	animals	depicted	on	the	seals	are	unicorn	or	bicorn	creatures.	The	
debates	are	of	little	relevance	here	(Tagliatesta	2007:	175).	The	significant	aspect	is	that	Sir	John	Marshall	and	
other	archaeologists	thought	that	rhinos	inspired	the	depiction	of	these	creatures.	
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reaching	continental	Europe	and	beyond	(Abraham	et	al.	2013:	122).	Medieval	Muslim	
scriptures	also	describe	a	winged	antelope-like	creature	with	a	horn	on	its	forehead	called	
karkadan,	the	Arab	term	for	rhinoceros	(Ettinghausen	1950:	6).	According	to	the	Shahnama	
(the	Book	of	Kings),	Alexander	the	Great	slayed	a	unicorn–like	creature	from	the	land	of	
Habash	(Ethiopia).	There	are	many	accounts	of	heroes	triumphing	over	what	is	often	
described	as	a	monstrous	apparition,	perhaps	indicative	of	how	hunters	were	in	awe	of	the	
rhino	(Ettinghausen	1950:	36)	–	compare	with	the	next	section	of	this	chapter.	The	earliest	
accounts	of	rhino	hunts	date	back	to	the	earlier	mentioned	Arab	traveller	Ibn	Fadlan	in	922	
AD,	who	was	told	that	bowmen	would	climb	on	top	of	trees	and	kill	rhinos	with	poisoned	
arrows	while	they	were	asleep	(Ettinghausen	1950:	45).		
Arab	writers	mention	different	uses	of	rhino	horn	during	the	early	medieval	period.	Chinese	
royalty,	for	example,	adorned	themselves	with	girdles	made	out	of	rhino	horn	(Ettinghausen	
1950:	54)176	or	wore	necklaces	made	of	rhino	horn	to	fend	off	evil	spirits	(Ettinghausen	1950:	
55).	Japanese	ornaments	and	containers	were	carved	out	of	rhino	horn;	thrones	were	covered	
with	rhino	horn	(not	attached	to	a	specific	geography	but	most	likely	in	reference	to	China),	
and	the	handles	of	medieval	Muslim	knives	and	swords	were	made	out	of	rhino	horn	
(Ettinghausen	1950:	56).	The	demand	for	horn	seems	to	have	been	met	by	suppliers	from	
India	and	Africa	(ibid)	with	Arab	merchants	being	the	principal	exporters	to	China	
(Ettinghausen	1950:	101).	There	seems	little	doubt	that	the	rhino	and	unicorn	were	one	and	
the	same	creature	in	Arab	writings.	As	of	the	1500s,	the	so–called	karkadan	is	often	compared	
to	buffalo’s	and	the	domestic	ox.177	Interestingly,	the	earliest	reference	in	Arab	texts	of	the	
antidotal	effect	of	rhino	horn	appeared	to	have	coincided	with	the	European	discovery	of	the	
curative	properties	of	alicorn	(Ettinghausen	1950:	111).	Before	that,	the	horn	of	khutu	was	
reputed	with	alexipharmic	qualities	(Lavers	2009).	Al-Qazwini	makes	the	first	explicit	
suggestion	of	the	usefulness	of	rhino	horn	in	detecting	toxins	while	also	noting	its	suitability	
																																																						
176	During	the	10th	century,	a	royal	decree	abolished	the	custom	of	wearing	girdles	made	of	rhino	horn	and	
required	girdles	to	be	made	of	gold	and	other	valuable	materials	instead	(Ettinghausen	1950:	55).	It	is	unclear	
what	precipitated	the	royal	decree;	however,	it	led	to	a	massive	drop	in	the	price	of	rhino	horn	(ibid).	
	
177	Even	Sindbad	the	Seafarer	provides	an	inspired	description	of	the	karkadan,	which	he	encountered	during	his	
second	voyage.	Successive	translators	of	‘Thousand	and	One	Nights’	appear	to	have	embellished	the	length	of	its	
horn	tenfold	(Compilation	of	folk	tales	of	Middle	Eastern	and	Indian	descent	1850):	“It	is	a	remarkable	animal	
with	a	great	and	thick	horn,	ten	cubits	long,	a	middleward	its	head,	wherein,	when	cleft	in	twain,	is	the	likeness	
of	a	man.”	
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for	knife	handles.	Later	texts	confirm	that	if	the	handles	of	royal	knives	were	pleated	with	
rhino	horn,	then	they	would	“become	moist	and	agitated”	when	poisoned	food	was	placed	on	
the	dining	table	(Ettinghausen	1950:	131).	It	seems	somewhat	plausible	that	this	may	have	led	
to	the	use	of	the	ceremonial	daggers	in	the	Arab	peninsula.	The	hilts	of	the	earlier	mentioned	
jambiya	are	made	with	rhino	horn	(compare	with	the	subsection	on	jambiyas	in	this	chapter).	
To	this	day,	they	are	indispensable	to	the	traditional	attire	of	men	of	Northern	Yemen	and	
equally	coveted	in	Oman	and	Saudi	Arabia	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	19:	6).	
In	greater	India,	home	to	the	one-horned	Indian	rhino,	there	are	many	references	to	the	rhino	
as	a	sacred	animal	including	Asoka	declaring	it	as	such	in	his	Pillar	Edicts,	its	perceived	
similarity	to	Ganesha	(an	Indian	deity)	or	the	famous	chorus	“Let	him	wander	alone	like	a	
rhinoceros”	from	the	Sutta	Nipata	(a	Buddhist	scripture)	(Briggs	1931:	280).		The	rhino	
became	associated	with	virtue	and	wisdom	(Keller	1909:	388),	and	it	remained	highly	valued	
as	a	sacred	animal	amongst	yogis	into	the	20th	century.	During	the	practice	of	sun	salutations,	
yogis	would	wear	a	ring	made	out	of	rhino	horn	on	the	right	index	finger	while	others	adorned	
their	ears	with	huge	rings	made	out	of	rhino	horn	pulled	through	the	cartilage.	Yogis	also	used	
powdered	rhino	hide	for	dusting	open	wounds	(Briggs	1938:	131–132).	
Unlike	the	earlier	mentioned	communities	or	nations,	the	Chinese	did	not	conflate	the	rhino	
with	the	mystical	unicorn.	It	is	commonly	held	that	the	unicorn	or	ki–lin	originates	from	a	
distant	place,	possibly	heaven,	at	irregular	intervals.	According	to	the	legend,	the	unicorn’s	
appearance	coincided	with	the	reign	or	the	birth	of	a	great	man	(Shepard	1930:	66).	The	
rhino,	on	the	other	hand,	is	accurately	described	as	a	separate	species,	and	suppliers	and	
traders	of	its	horn	never	attempted	to	sell	rhino	horn	as	ki–lin,	rendering	the	unicorn	a	
mystical	creature	uncontaminated	by	trade	(Shepard	1930:	69).	However,	rhinos	were	rarely	
seen	in	China	by	the	times	of	the	Western	Han	dynasty,	and	perhaps	their	rarity	would	explain	
why	they	acquired	mythic	status	in	Chinese	society.	Rhinoceros	bones	were	found	at	fossil	
sites	dating	back	to	the	Neolithic	era	(about	six	thousand	years	ago).	Various	Asian	species	are	
believed	to	have	flourished	in	ancient	China	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	16).	No	rhinos	survived	
north	of	the	Yangtze	River	by	the	time	the	Han	dynasty	(206	BCE	–	220	CE).	When	the	Tang	
dynasty	ruled	from	618	CE	to	907	CE,	rhinos	lived	in	an	area	south	of	the	Yangtze	River	and	in	
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the	regions	that	are	known	as	modern-day	Guangdong	and	Guangxi	(Laufer	1914:	137),	and	
may	have	survived	in	Sichuan	until	the	medieval	period		(Laufer	1914:	118).	
In	ancient	times,	the	primary	interest	in	the	rhino	seems	to	have	been	linked	to	its	hide	
(Jenyns	1954:	39).	The	Guoyu	(‘Discourse	of	the	States’)	recorded	that	103,	000	troops	of	the	
State	of	Wu	were	equipped	with	armour	made	of	rhino	hides	and	fish–scales	around	400	BCE	
(cited	in:	Parker	2013).	While	this	account	appears	ever	so	slightly	embellished,	Parker	(2013:	
Chapter	16:	5)	interprets	this	as	an	indication	of	the	existence	of	significant	numbers	of	rhino	
in	the	southern	regions	during	the	Warring	period.	In	those	days,	rhinos	were	killed	for	their	
hide.	Once	the	hide	had	dried	out,	it	hardened	and	provided	protection	against	the	weapons	
of	the	day.	Deer	antlers	and	rhino	horn	were	also	used	to	produce	bows	in	ancient	times	
(Parker	2013:	Chapter	16:	5).	Parker	(2013:	Chapter	6:	6)	argues	that	rhino	numbers	were	
greatly	reduced	during	the	Warring	period	due	to	increasing	demand	for	rhino	hide	armour.	
Moreover,	gradual	cooling	of	the	climate	affected	the	rhino’s	habitat	and	led	to	a	southward	
migration	in	the	direction	of	Laos	and	Vietnam.	The	relentless	slaughter	during	the	Eastern	
Zhou	dynasty	led	to	the	demise	of	the	rhino	in	China,	and	it	entered	the	realm	of	legends	and	
myths	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	16:	6).	
The	oldest	Chinese	art	piece	depicting	a	rhino	is	an	ancient	bronze	wine	vessel	in	the	form	of	a	
two–horned	rhino.	The	vessel	is	believed	to	date	back	to	the	reign	of	the	last	emperor	of	
Shang	during	the	first	half	of	the	11th	century	BCE	(Sickman/Soper	1971:	30).	According	to	
Bretschneider	(1875:	19),	Chinese	classics	frequently	refer	to	goblets	made	out	of	rhino	horn	
and	the	rhino	in	general.178	Art	historian	Jan	Chapman179	argues	that	the	ritual	libation	cups	
used	during	ceremonies	honouring	ancestors	may	have	been	made	of	Asian	rhino	horn	before	
bronze	came	into	use	in	ancient	China	around	2000	BCE.	Curiously,	Bronze	Age	drinking	
vessels	(made	out	of	bronze)	were	shaped	in	the	form	of	their	rhino	horn	precursors	
(Chapman	1999:	17).	From	the	days	of	the	Eastern	Zhou	dynasty	(770	–	221	BCE),	carvers	
created	intricate	bowls,	libation	cups	and	other	decorations	out	of	rhino	horn	(Parker	2013:	
																																																						
178	The	sinologist	believed	that	the	Indian	and	Chinese	use	of	rhino	horn	in	the	detection	of	poisons	was	a	
separate	development	albeit	both	nations	started	the	usage	at	approximately	the	same	time	(Bretschneider	
1875:	19).	
	
179	Chapman	has	published	a	seminal	book	on	the	art	of	rhino	horn	carvings	in	China	‘The	Art	of	Rhinoceros	Horn	
Carving	in	China’,	which	documents	the	history	and	beauty	of	ancient	carvings	made	out	of	rhino	horn.	
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Chapter	17:	2).	Unlike	other	horns	(antlers	of	antelopes,	cow	or	sheep	horns),	rhino	horn	was	
not	hollow	on	the	inside	and	thus	could	be	carved	into	cups	and	bowls	(Laufer	1914:	168).180		
Libation	cups	were	used	for	the	consumption	of	rice	wine	(see	Figure	5).	The	belief	was	that	
the	curative	elements	of	the	rhino	horn	(analgesic	and	life	lengthening)	would	dissolve	from	
the	cups	into	the	wine.	The	two	ancient	uses	of	rhino	horn	(decoration	and	medicine)	thus	
were	intertwined	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	17:	2).		
Figure	5:	Rhino	horn	libation	cup	originating	in	the	Qing	dynasty	
	
Source:	Sotheby’s181	
As	mentioned	earlier,	the	official	girdles	of	royal	mandarins	were	studded	with	pieces	of	rhino	
horn	during	the	Tang	dynasty,	which	lasted	from	618	CE	to	905	CE.	Official	attires	were	ranked	
in	the	order	of	jade,	gold,	rhino	horn	and	ivory	during	the	Kin	dynasty	(1115–1234	CE).	The	
emperor	wore	a	hat–pin	made	of	rhino	horn	and	a	girdle	of	black	horn	while	the	imperial	
saddles	were	pleated	with	gold,	silver,	rhino	horn	and	ivory	(Laufer	1914:	143).	There	is	also	a	
religious	element	associated	with	rhino	horn	in	ancient	China,	as	Wang	Ming	(33	BCE	to	23	CE)	
																																																						
180	Bovine	and	other	horns	have	been	transformed	into	drinking	vessels	across	different	cultures.	However,	
usually	the	entire	horn	is	used.	
	
181	The	libation	cup	depicted	in	the	image	originates	from	the	times	of	the	Qing	dynasty	(17/18th	century).	A	
dragon	is	the	main	feature	of	this	cup.	The	cup	was	sold	for	8	420	000	HKD	at	a	Sotheby’s	auction	in	Hong	Kong.	
The	image	and	more	information	are	available	at	
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2011/rhinoceros-horn-carvings-from-the-edward-and-
franklin-chow-collection-hk0370/lot.2714.html	(accessed	18	August	2015).			
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offered	bones	of	storks,	tortoise	shell	and	rhino	horn	to	the	Gods	(Jenyns	1954:	45).	Jenyns	
(1954:	45)	also	found	references	to	rhino	horn	beads,	which	appeared	to	be	linked	to	holding	
an	important	office	in	ancient	China.	The	manufacture	of	rhino	horn	prayer	beads	(Buddha	
beads)	and	bangles	was	observed	in	Hanoi	in	2013	(Amman	2013b),	suggesting	that	rhino	
horn	is	still	imbued	with	transcendental	and	religious	value.	
The	origin	of	rhino	horn’s	prophylactic	valuation	in	traditional	medicine	is	a	matter	of	debate.	
Huang-ti	Nei	Ching	(‘The	Yellow	Emperor’s	Classic	of	Internal	Medicine’),	the	generational	
knowledge	of	traditional	medicines	is	said	to	have	been	compiled	by	Huang-ti	around	2	600	
BCE.	The	ancient	art	of	healing	was	passed	on	orally	until	it	was	finally	captured	in	written	
form	around	the	3rd	century	CE.	‘Prevention	is	more	important	than	cure’	was	the	underlying	
philosophy	of	the	Nei	Ching.	Any	health	issues	had	to	be	addressed	by	looking	at	the	body	as	
an	interdependent	organic	system.	It	advocated	the	consumption	of	certain	foods	to	adjust	
imbalances;	however,	no	animal	substances	or	herbs	were	included	in	the	early	versions	(Ellis	
2013:	35–39).	The	Chen	Nung	Ben	Cao	Chien	or	‘The	Herbal	Classic	of	the	Divine	Ploughman’	
was	published	around	100	BCE,	recommending	the	use	of	365	different	herbs	and	animal	
substances	for	each	day	of	the	year	(Huang	1998:	3).	Its	origin	is	traced	back	to	the	mythical	
emperor	Chen	Nung,	who	was	believed	to	have	lived	around	2700	BCE.	The	classic	work	
classifies	powdered	rhino	horn	as	a	cold	drug,	which	is	suitable	for	cooling	blood	from	hot	
diseases	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	17:	1)	and	it	“cures	the	hundred	poisons”	(Bretschneider	1910:	
153).	It	is	accepted	that	the	Chinese	use	of	rhino	horn	for	medicinal	purposes	dates	back	to	
the	times	of	Chen	Nung.	Medicinal	use	of	rhino	horn	thus	dates	back	to	approximately	2700	
BCE,	rendering	it	an	ancient	practise	of	more	than	4	800	years.	Jeanie	Parker,	the	author	of	
‘The	mythic	Chinese	unicorn’,	found	many	written	references	about	the	antidotal	properties	of	
rhino	horn	during	the	Bronze	Age	in	China.	For	example,	she	noted	that	the	zhen	bird	(the	
‘poison–feather	bird’)	and	the	rhino	lived	in	the	same	southern	regions	during	the	Spring	and	
Autumn	Period.	Poison	could	be	extracted	by	pouring	rice	wine	over	the	feathers	of	the	zhen	
bird.182	The	link	between	the	rhino	and	the	zhen	bird	was	confirmed	in	the	Pi	Ya	during	the	
Song	dynasty	(960	–	1279	CE),	which	stated	under	the	entry	of	the	poison–feather	bird:	“The	
																																																						
182	An	ornithologist	consulted	by	Parker	believes	that	the	zhen	may	be	the	crested	serpent	eagle,	a	species	that	is	
spread	across	huge	parts	of	tropical	continental	Asia	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	18:	2).	
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only	thing	that	can	counteract	this	poison	is	rhinoceros	horn	(quoted	in:	Parker	2013:	Chapter	
18:	1).”	183	
Taoist	philosopher	Ge	Hong	(quoted	in:	Laufer	1914:	137–138)	provides	an	intriguing	account	
of	rhino	horn	in	the	4th	century	CE,	suggesting	that	the	horn	could	communicate	with	the	sky.	
Ko	Hung	asserts	in	Baopuzi	(‘The	Master	who	embraces	simplicity’)	under	the	section	dealing	
with	“Method	to	be	used	in	order	to	walk	on	water	or	stay	long	under	water”:		
“The	(rhino)	horn	is	made	into	a	hairpin.	When	poisonous	medicines	of	liquid	form	are	
stirred	with	the	horn	hairpin,	a	white	foam	will	bubble	up.	After	the	foam	has	bubbled	
up,	the	harmful	effect	of	the	poison	is	gone.	When	non–poisonous	substances	are	
stirred	with	the	horn	hairpin,	no	foam	will	rise.	In	this	manner	the	presence	of	poison	
can	be	ascertained	(translated	by:	Parker	2013:	Chapter	18:	4).”		
What	is	of	particular	interest	is	his	explanation	as	to	why	rhino	horn	is	capable	of	neutralizing	
poison.	He	establishes	a	link	of	the	“horn	communicating	with	the	sky”	and	its	alexipharmic	
properties	due	to	the	rhino’s	diet	consisting	of	poisonous	plants	and	trees	(Jenyns	1954:	
41).184	The	symbolism	attached	to	the	rhino	horn’s	celestial	connection185	may	have	
																																																						
183	The	entry	in	the	Pi	Ya	describes	the	poison–feather	bird	as	follows:		
	
“If	there	is	a	zhen	bird	with	poisoned	feathers	(because	it	eats	poisonous	snakes),	and	you	dip	them	in	
wine,	you	will	produce	poison.	The	zhen	bird	looks	like	a	goose	but	its	colour	is	dark	purple.	Its	beak	is	
7–8	cun	(Chinese	inch)	long	and	copper–coloured.	It	eats	snakes	which	dissolve	it	its	mouth.	If	the	
droppings	of	the	zhen	bird	touch	stone,	then	the	stone	will	dissolve.	The	feathers	have	poison.	If	they	
are	mixed	in	wine	then	poison	is	produced.	The	only	thing	that	can	counteract	this	poison	is	rhinoceros	
horn.	Therefore	in	the	place	where	the	zhen	bird	lives,	there	are	also	rhinos	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	18:	
1).”	
	
184	Several	TCM	doctors	consulted	during	data	collection	in	Asia	likewise	explained	the	rhino	horn’s	alexipharmic	
and	detoxing	properties	in	reference	to	the	Asian	rhino’s	diet.	According	to	the	interviewed	doctors	(Interviews,	
Vietnam	and	Hong	Kong,	2013),	Asian	rhinos	were	feeding	on	poisonous	leaves,	shrubs	and	fruits	in	tropical	
rainforests.	Unlike	cattle,	deer	or	buffalo,	the	rhino	can	digest	these	poisonous	substances;	its	horn	is	hence	
regarded	as	an	excellent	antidote	to	poisons.	Doctors	prefer	Asian	rhino	horn	as	the	Asian	species’	diet	consists	
largely	of	medicinal	plants	and	herbs,	rendering	the	horn	more	potent	and	superior	in	terms	of	healing	
properties.	The	diets	of	African	species	were	checked	for	the	purposes	of	verification.	The	white	rhino	is	a	pure	
grazer,	surviving	on	grass	while	the	black	rhino’s	hooked	upper	lip	allows	it	to	pull	off	twigs,	branches	and	fruit	
from	more	than	200	different	varieties	of	trees	and	shrubs	(Gibson	2015).	Many	of	these	plants	are	used	in	
African	medicines	(Interviews,	2013).	Scientists	also	found	that	desert-adapted	black	rhinos	in	Namibia	were	
living	on	a	diet	rich	in	the	poisonous	succulent	Euphorbia	damaran,	also	known	as	milk	bush	(Lehmann	et	al.	
2013;	Luske	et	al.	2009).	While	the	black	rhino	may	have	a	multi-faceted	diet	that	includes	medicinal	and	
poisonous	plants,	the	traditional	doctors’	preferences	were	based	on	generational	knowledge	and	traditions,	as	
well	as	their	environmental	milieu.	Other	preferences	included	fresh	versus	old	horn	(but	it	needs	to	be	
processed	as	soon	as	possible);	the	horn	of	the	Indian	rhino	species	versus	horn	from	the	other	two	Asian	species	
(which	are	tinkering	on	the	brink	of	extinction);	ideally	the	horn	should	be	harvested	at	the	peak	of	a	rhino’s	life	
(at	mid-age	when	the	rhino	is	about	20	years	old)	–	preferably	from	a	live	animal	as	the	efficacy	of	the	medicine	
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contributed	to	the	unicorn’s	sanctity	in	Europe,	where	the	healing	powers	of	alicorn	were	
venerated	in	churches	and	monasteries	more	than	one	thousand	years	later	(Parker	2013:	
Chapter	26:	1).	
Dating	back	from	the	11th	to	the	7th	century	BCE,	the	Chijing	(the	ancient	‘Book	of	Songs’)	
provides	poetic	evidence	that	the	rhino	was	indeed	hunted	in	ancient	times.186	Laufer	(1914:	
160)	quotes	a	metaphor	employed	by	soldiers	complaining	about	their	own	cruel	treatment:	
“We	are	not	rhinoceroses,	we	are	not	tigers,	to	be	kept	in	these	desolate	wilds.”	Once	the	
local	reserves	of	rhino	had	been	depleted	during	the	Han	dynasty	(206	BCE–	220	CE),	Roman	
and	Arab	traders	started	supplying	the	Chinese	markets	with	rhino	horn	(Jenyns	1954:	41).	
Rhino	horn	cups	had	become	precious	artefacts	during	the	Western	Han	dynasty	and	were	
buried	with	their	owners.	Those	less	fortunate	were	buried	with	imitation	rhino	horn	cups	
made	from	clay	or	wood	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	19:	1).	Chapman	(1999:	15)	found	evidence	
that	Chinese	entrepreneurs	created	forgeries	of	horn	carvings,	cups	and	girdles	as	early	as	the	
14th	century,	often	substituting	rhino	horn	with	the	much	cheaper	horn	of	the	water	
buffalo.187	With	the	depletion	of	rhino	numbers	came	the	sacralisation	or	mythical	
transformation	of	the	rhino.	Artistic	representations	became	replete	with	images	of	the	
mythic	rhinoceros–unicorns	and	rhino	horn	was	attributed	with	supernatural	curative	
capabilities	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	22).	
The	decimation	of	indigenous	rhino	populations,	as	well	as	the	southward	expansion	of	the	
empire	increased	demand	for	rhino	horn	during	the	Western	Han	dynasty.	Ancient	Chinese	
writings	suggest	that	Chinese	emperor	Qin	Shihuang	(who	reigned	from	221	BCE	to	209	BCE)	
																																																																																																																																																																											
decreases	when	horn	is	harvested	from	a	dead	carcass	–;	and	the	top	part	of	the	horn	was	the	most	coveted	and	
expensive	part	of	the	horn	when	used	for	medicinal	purposes.	
	
185	Parker	(2013:	Chapter	26:	1–9)	also	identifies	the	concept	of	the	“spirit	rhinoceros	unicorn”,	conceived	by	Li	
Shangyin,	a	poet	during	the	Tang	dynasty.	The	notion	that	the	mythic	rhinoceros	unicorn	was	using	its	horn	to	
communicate	with	the	sky	was	repeated	in	many	texts	until	the	18th	century.	From	about	that	time,	the	mythic	
creatures	no	longer	resemble	the	rhino	but	continue	to	gaze	up	at	the	moon.	
	
186	A	hunting	expedition	of	King	Suan	is	described	in	the	following	words:	“We	have	bent	our	bows:	we	have	our	
arrows	on	the	string.	Here	is	a	small	boar	transfixed;	there	is	a	large	rhinoceros	killed	(quoted	by:	Laufer	1914:	
160).”	
	
187	In	their	quest	to	assemble	curiosities	from	distant	lands,	European	collectors	often	fell	victim	to	fake	horn	
sellers.	German	Emperor	Rudolf	II	(1522–1612)	was	believed	to	have	paid	high	prices	for	his	collection	of	rhino	
horn	trinkets,	which	was	found	to	include	several	water	buffalo	imitations	(Chapman	1999:	15).	
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sent	out	his	army	to	open	south-east	trades	to	acquire	rhino	horn	and	elephant	ivory	(An	Liu	
cited	in:	Chapman	1999:	26).	Due	to	the	tropical	climate	in	the	southern	regions,	demand	
increased	for	fever-reducing	medicines	that	could	lower	life–threatening	tropical	fevers.	
While	the	Chinese	under	the	Western	Han	dynasty	were	colonizing	the	south,	seafarers	and	
merchants	from	the	Arab	peninsula	and	Europe	learnt	to	use	the	southwest	monsoon	winds	
to	sail	to	southern	India,	resulting	in	increased	communication	and	trade	between	Asia	and	
Europe	along	the	Asian	sea	routes	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	19:	2–3).	Tributes	to	Chinese	
emperors	often	included	rhino	horn,	ivory	and	tortoise	shell	during	those	early	days	of	Sino–
Arab	trade	(Hirth	1885:	70–71,	79,	154,	222).	
The	routes	did	not	only	serve	the	purpose	of	exchanging	spices,	silk,	ivory	and	rhino	horn	but	
stories	and	information	were	also	passed	on,	and	hence	the	myth	of	the	unicorn	moved	
westward	along	the	silk	route,	filtering	through	Indian	culture	and	reviving	the	ancient	Indian	
story	of	Ekashringa	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	19:	5).	Inspired	rhino	horn	traders	from	southern	
Asia	are	believed	to	have	come	up	with	the	myth	that	rhino	horn	had	aphrodisiac	qualities	in	
order	to	market	their	product	to	Western	markets.	The	aphrodisiac	or	virile	qualities	are	not	
mentioned	in	any	of	the	ancient	Chinese	scriptures	(Parker	2013:	Chapter	19:	6).		
The	objective	of	this	section	was	to	show	the	millennia-long	quasi-global	appreciation	of	the	
rhino	as	a	mythical	creature	with	transcendental	and	supernatural	qualities.	Interwoven	with	
tales	of	the	unicorn	and	other	mythical	apparitions,	rhino	horn	was	imbued	with	alexipharmic,	
curative	and	status–elevating	properties.	It	is	noteworthy	that	in	certain	cultures	the	horn	was	
seen	as	a	separate	entity	from	the	animal	(Europe	and	the	Arab	world)	whereas	others	(such	
as	the	Chinese	and	Indians)	acknowledged	the	rhino	as	a	powerful	even	sacred	animal.	
Historically,	the	use	of	rhino	horn	(alicorn)	appears	to	have	been	a	privileged	affair.	The	ruling	
political	and	military	elites	were	able	to	afford	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn	whereas	the	poor	
relied	on	cheap	knock-offs.			
	
3.4.	Hunting	tales	and	myths	
The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	precious	and	sacral	good	had	no	impact	on	the	valuation	of	
the	rhino	as	the	original	owner	of	the	horn	during	the	colonial	period.	Wild	animals	
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commanded	no	extraordinary	or	intrinsic	value	at	the	time.	The	sacralisation	of	rhino	horn	
due	to	its	ascribed	health	benefits,	as	well	as	links	to	European	royals	and	Asian	emperors,	led	
to	growth	in	global	demand.	Initially,	the	demand	could	be	met	with	horn	gathered	from	
natural	mortalities	and	through	(mostly)	sustainable	hunting	expeditions.	Whatever	mystical	
links	were	sustained	between	humans	and	animals	in	medieval	Europe,	with	the	onset	of	the	
Age	of	Reason	wild	animals	were	seen	as	beasts	incapable	of	sentience	and	the	capacity	to	
experience	pain	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	29).	As	the	mythology	of	the	unicorn	and	other	
animal	mythologies	waned	into	obscurity,	open	hunting	season	was	declared	on	big	game	
animals,	including	the	various	species	of	rhino.	Although	Eastern	beliefs	held	that	humans	
“should	do	no	harm	to	beast	nor	bug”	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	op	cit),	the	rhino	also	
escaped	immunity	from	hunting	in	Asia	and	was	hunted	to	extinction	in	most	of	its	original	
Asian	range.	
Aside	from	the	extinction	of	all	rhino	species	in	China	by	the	late	Middle	Ages,	there	were	vast	
numbers	of	rhinos	left	elsewhere	in	Asia.	Conquerors	and	bandits	started	targeted	hunting	of	
Indian	rhinos	in	the	16th	century.	The	great	conqueror	Babur,	who	laid	the	foundation	of	the	
Mughal	dynasty	in	the	Indian	subcontinent,	was	known	for	his	brutal	rhino	hunts	(Kisling	
2000:	255).	As	human	populations	started	increasing,	the	Indian	rhino	was	pushed	out	of	
fertile	flood	plains	and	grasslands.	The	government	of	Bengal	is	said	to	have	paid	a	bounty	of	
20	rupees	for	every	rhino	killed	until	1896.	Sports	hunting	greatly	reduced	Indian	rhinos	
numbers	during	the	19th	century.	By	the	late	20th-century	British	colonial	forces	had	been	
introduced	to	modern	firearms	and	sports	hunting	became	a	deadly	pastime	of	bored	colonial	
troops.	Shooting	rhinos	and	other	wild	animals	became	associated	with	masculinity,	status	
and	prestige	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	29).	Indigenous	royals	such	as	the	Maharajah	of	
Cooch	Behar	(he	shot	dead	207	rhinos	between	1871	and	1907)	matched	the	colonial	pastime	
with	equal	vigour	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	30).	At	the	last	count	in	2012,	about	3500	Asian	
rhinos	(Emslie/Milliken/Talukdar	2013:	12)	survived	the	deadly	impact	of	sports	hunting,	
poaching	and	human	encroachment.	As	the	Asian	species	are	not	the	focus	of	this	
dissertation,	suffice	to	mention	that	their	decimation	(amongst	other	factors)	had	a	deadly	
domino	effect	on	the	African	rhino.		
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A	fair	amount	of	rhino	and	elephant	hunting	happened	during	the	early	modern	period	in	
Africa.	Indigenous	populations	were	nomadic	hunter–gatherers	during	the	Stone	Age.	Their	
frequent	migration	ensured	that	natural	resources	were	used	sustainably.	The	San	rock	
paintings	(described	earlier)	attest	to	the	respect,	even	reverence	nomadic	tribes	had	for	
wildlife	and	hunting	(Carruthers	1995:	7).	As	the	Iron	Age	approached,	many	African	tribes	
settled	and	led	an	agricultural	or	pastoralist	life-style.	Conservation	strategies	similar	to	those	
in	Medieval	Europe	were	employed	to	deal	with	the	demands	of	trade	and	crop	protection.	
Wealth	accumulation	led	to	social	stratification,	and	hunting	became	a	politicized	matter	
(Carruthers	1995:	7).	Historian	Jane	Carruthers	(1995:	7–8)	argues	that	the	impact	of	pre–
colonial	hunting	was	small	in	relation	to	the	abundant	wildlife:		
“Desirable	wildlife	species	came	to	be	controlled	by	the	elite	who	alone	could	initiate	a	
hunt,	control	trade	in	wildlife	products,	and	enjoy	the	spoil	of	certain	species.	There	
were	even	royal	hunting	preserves,	out	of	bounds	to	commoners,	the	best	known	of	
which	was	Shaka’s	reserve	in	the	Umfolozi	district	of	Zululand,	set	aside	in	the	1820s.	
Strict	protection	proscription	extended	to	clan	totems,	such	as	crocodile	or	lion,	which	
could	not	be	destroyed.”	
This	state	of	affairs	changed	with	the	arrival	of	colonial	settlers,	who	introduced	firearms	and	
a	strong	market	economy.	Ultimately	the	increasing	commodification	of	wildlife	led	to	its	
overexploitation	(Carruthers	1995:	8).	The	first	superintendent	of	the	South	African	Museum	
of	Natural	History	Sir	Andrew	Smith	commented	on	the	relationship	between	rhinos	and	
humans	in	1838:		
“The	present	species,	under	the	name	of	Rhinoster,	has	been	familiarly	known	to	the	
colonialists	of	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope	ever	since	1652.	In	that	year,	when	the	Dutch	
first	formed	their	settlement	on	the	shores	of	Table	Bay,	this	animal	was	a	regular	
inhabitant	of	the	thickets	which	clothed	the	lower	slopes	of	Table	Mountain.	The	
abandonment	by	this	animal	as	a	measure	of	safety,	probably	constituted	the	
commencement	of	a	forced	migration,	which	has	continued	to	extend	ever	since,	and	
which	has	led	not	only	to	the	disappearance	of	the	species	from	the	districts	within	the	
present	colonial	limits,	but	also	in	a	great	measure	to	its	removal	from	countries	
beyond	those	limits,	as	far	as	hunters	efficiently	armed	are	accustomed	to	resort.	If	a	
system,	such	as	has	hitherto	prevailed,	continues	to	exist,	and	the	larger	animals	
persevere	in	flying	to	avoid	the	effects	of	firearm,	the	time	may	arrive	when	the	
various	species	which	formerly	may	have	been	scattered,	each,	in	a	peculiar	locality	of	
a	large	continent,	will	be	huddled	together;	and	indeed	an	advance	towards	that	
period	is	in	progress,	as	may	be	inferred	from	the	concentration	which	is	present	
taking	place	in	the	interior	of	South	Africa	(Smith	1838:	56).”	
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As	European	colonizers	and	explorers	were	penetrating	more	remote	parts	of	Africa,	they	
were	commenting	on	the	abundant	numbers	of	rhinos	across	the	continent	
(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	35).	It	is	estimated	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	35;	Kisling	2000)	
that	there	were	between	400	000	to	one	million	black	rhinos	(they	were	more	numerous	than	
the	white	species)	in	the	early	1800s.	The	‘Scramble	for	Africa’	was	accompanied	by	the	
colonial	arrivals	engaging	in	‘leisurely’	past-times	such	as	sports	and	trophy	hunting.	
MacKenzie	argues	that	the	colonial	frontier	“was	also	a	hunting	frontier	and	the	animal	
resource	contributed	to	the	expansionist	urge.”	Hunting	became	a	“ritualized	and	occasionally	
a	spectacular	display	of	white	dominance	(Mackenzie	1988:	7).”		
It	is	difficult	to	establish	where	the	hunting	fraternity’s	enthrallment	with	the	collection	of	
hunting	trophies	originates.	There	appears	to	be	a	confluence	of	several	factors	such	as	
hunters	wanting	to	show	off	a	collection	of	wildlife	specimens	back	home,	showmanship	and	
keeping	mementos	of	specific	hunting	expeditions.	Trophies	also	served	more	practical	
purposes	such	as	interior	decoration,	collecting	specimens	of	species	for	scientific	purposes	
and	as	proof	of	breeding	success	in	later	years	(Mackenzie	1988:	28–29;	Damm	2008:	6).	The	
opportunity	of	being	intricately	involved	in	the	writing	of	natural	history	offered	hunters,	
explorers	and	colonial	governors	their	chance	at	fame.	Many	hunters	collected	species	and	
trophies	for	museums	and	collections;	a	few	lucky	ones	had	species	named	after	them	
(Mackenzie	1988:	38–39).		
Interestingly	in	the	early	years	of	the	colonial	empire,	the	rhino	inspired	yet	another	myth	–	a	
hunting	myth.	Like	fireside	tales,	hunters	are	known	to	embellish	or	romanticise	their	hunts.	
In	the	case	of	the	rhino,	colonial	hunters	wrote	about	the	attacks	of	rhinos	on	caravans	and	
hunting	parties,	imputing	the	rhino	with	a	pugnacious	nature.	Sir	Andrew	Smith,	the	first	
superintendent	of	the	South	African	Museum	of	Natural	History,	related	a	supposed	Kenyan	
tale	of	a	rhino	charge:		
“Its	disposition	is	extremely	fierce	and	it	universally	attacks	man	if	it	sees	him.	The	
usual	method	of	escape	adopted	by	the	natives	is	to	climb	up	a	high	dense	tress,	so	as	
to	avoid,	if	possible,	being	seen.	If	the	animal	misses	his	sight	of	the	fugitive,	he	
immediately	gallops	off	to	his	haunt;	from	whence	it	may	be	inferred	that	he	is	not	
empowered	with	the	power	of	keen	scent.	Should	he,	however,	espy	his	object	in	the	
tree,	woe	to	the	unfortunate	native,	–	he	begins	to	butt	with	his	horns,	–	strikes	and	
penetrates	the	tree,	and	continues	piercing	it	till	it	falls	when	his	victim	seldom	
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escapes	being	gored	to	death.	Unless	the	tree	is	of	a	large	girth,	he	never	fails	in	
breaking	it	down.	Having	killed	his	victim,	he	leaves	him	without	devouring	the	carcase	
[spelling	of	original	author].	The	male	is	only	provided	with	the	horn.	The	female	has	
not	anything	of	the	kind	(Smith	1838:	42).”	
The	“charge	of	the	rhino”	became	notorious	until	big	game	hunters	laid	the	myth	to	rest.	A	
passionate	hunter,	former	US	President	Theodore	Roosevelt	declared	that	the	supposed	
charge	was	little	more	than	the	curious	wild	animal	moving	closer	to	the	strange	human	
apparition	on	account	of	its	poor	eyesight	(Hornaday	[1922]	1979:	358).	The	black	rhino	is	
known	for	its	aggressive	nature,	but	there	is	certainly	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	rhinos	
regularly	attacked	caravans	or	hunting	parties.	Hunters	such	as	Roosevelt188	and	the	author	
Ernest	Hemingway	were	nonetheless	in	awe	of	the	rhino	(Enright	2008:	72).	In	describing	a	
chat	with	his	son	Kermit	during	a	hunting	safari,	Roosevelt	(1910:	206–208)	may	have	
unwittingly	prophesized	what	lay	ahead	for	the	rhino:			
“Look	at	him,	“	said	Kermit,	“standing	there	in	the	middle	of	the	African	plain,	deep	in	
prehistoric	thought.”	Indeed	the	rhinoceros	does	seem	like	a	survival	from	the	elder	
world	that	has	vanished;	he	was	in	place	in	the	Pliocene;	he	would	not	have	been	out	
of	place	in	the	Miocene;	but	nowadays	he	can	only	exist	at	all	in	regions	that	have	
lagged	behind,	while	the	rest	of	the	world,	for	good	or	for	evil,	has	gone	forward.”	
Roosevelt’s	remark	points	to	the	fascination	of	Western	hunters	with	the	rhino.	The	rhino	
assumes	a	symbolic	value	of	an	era	long	gone	where	the	pre–historic	creature	had	the	upper	
hand	and	was	not	easily	overcome.	On	a	political	level,	Roosevelt’s	association	of	the	rhino	
with	“regions	that	have	lagged	behind”	is	perhaps	ironic	and	inadvertently	points	to	the	
divergence	between	the	conservation	and	development	paradigms	(which	are	often	at	
loggerheads	and	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter).	
There	were	many	similarities	between	the	demise	of	Asian	and	African	species	of	rhino	during	
the	19th	century.189	As	was	the	case	on	the	Asian	subcontinent,	colonial	hunters,	settlers	and	
																																																						
188	In	1909,	Roosevelt	and	his	son	Kermit	embarked	on	a	one-year	expedition	to	collect	specimens	for	the	
Smithsonian	Institute.	The	glorified	hunting	safari	started	in	British	East	Africa	(modern	Kenya)	through	to	
Belgian	Congo	(modern	DRC	Congo	and	Republic	of	Congo)	and	ended	in	Khartoum	(Sudan).	Roosevelt	‘collected’	
more	than	1,100	specimens	(after	shooting	and	killing	them)	including	20	rhino	trophies	(Anonymous	writer	for	
EyeWitness	to	History	1997).		
	
189	Details	about	rhino	hunts	undertaken	by	the	Hamran	Arabs	of	Sudan	are	not	explored.	Suffice	to	mention	
here	that	they	perfected	the	art	of	hunting	rhinos	on	horseback,	killing	them	with	swords.	Hundreds	of	rhino	
horns	were	shipped	out	annually	from	Somali	ports	until	the	end	of	the	19th	century	when	rhinos	became	rare	
and	eventually	extinct	in	those	parts	of	Africa	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	36–41).	
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their	indigenous	collaborators	had	decimated	rhinos	across	Africa	by	the	20th	century.	The	
notorious	British	colonial	big–game	hunter	and	military	official	Frederick	Selous	surmised:		
“There	can	be	no	doubt	that	the	black	rhinoceros	has	become	very	scarce	or	even	
ceased	to	exist	in	many	parts	of	British	East	Africa,	where	only	ten	years	ago	it	was	
very	plentiful,	and	the	returns	of	those	shot	on	sportsmen's	or	settlers'	licenses	do	not	
altogether	account	for	their	disappearance	(quoted	in:	Casada	1998:	179).”	
	
Like	in	colonial	India,	the	improved	firepower	and	accuracy	of	hunting	rifles	allowed	even	
amateurs	to	engage	in	sports-hunting	and	big-game	hunting.	The	horns	were	sold	to	both	
European	and	Asian	markets	while	both	Africans	and	Europeans	ate	the	meat	
(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	35).	Table	4	(below)	provides	a	bird’s	eye	view	of	exports	of	
several	wildlife	products	from	the	port	town	of	Durban	in	colonial	Natal	during	the	19th	
century,	including	high	volumes	of	rhino	horn.		
	
Table	4:	Wildlife	exports	from	the	port	of	Durban,	1844-1904	
	
Source:	extracted	from:	McCracken	(2008:	27–28)	
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Durban	was	one	of	the	several	African	harbours	190	that	acted	as	nodal	points	connecting	
wildlife	suppliers	to	northern	markets.	The	major	markets	for	rhino	horn	were	India	(which	
also	served	as	a	transshipment	point	for	China	and	Southeast	Asia)	and	Europe,	specifically	
Germany	and	Great	Britain	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	91).	The	massacre	of	African	rhinos	
during	colonial	times	was	so	dire	that	they	became	extinct	in	many	of	their	traditional	range	
states.	In	East	Africa,	black	rhinos	were	considered	vermin	under	game	control	acts,	and	open	
hunting	season	was	declared	in	pursuit	of	land	clearance	(Msimang	2012:	19).	There	were	
limited	conservation	measures	in	place,	the	valuation	of	wildlife	as	a	natural	heritage	
worthwhile	protecting	was	in	its	infancy	and	no	common	sense	prevailed	when	it	came	to	
limiting	hunting	(Chapter	4	explains	how	excessive	hunting	eventually	led	to	early	
conservation	initiatives).	
	
The	aim	of	this	sub-section	was	to	show	that	hunting	met	much	of	the	global	demand	for	
rhino	horn	in	the	colonial	period.	Rhino	hunting	constituted	however	not	only	a	method	of	
attaining	rhino	horn,	hunters	also	started	to	value	the	act	of	rhino	hunting,	trophies	and	horn	
collectables.	Rhino	hunts	and	the	resultant	trophies	were	economically	lucrative	and	denoted	
symbolic	value,	such	as	masculinity,191	triumph	over	nature	and	colonial	empire	building.	
Rhino	trophy	or	sports	hunting	represented	the	high-end	spectrum	of	the	consumer	market	at	
the	time.	
	
	
3.5	The	cultural	legacy	of	the	jambiya	and	its	symbolic	value	in	Yemen	
	
The	1970s	oil	boom	in	the	Middle	East	led	to	an	enormous	increase	in	per	capita	income	in	
North	Yemen,	affording	upward	social	mobility	and	disposable	income	to	a	new	generation	of	
Yemeni	citizens.	Leading	up	to	the	boom	years,	only	a	few	Yemeni	men	of	high	social	status	
could	afford	the	elaboratively-carved	jambiya,	a	traditional	ceremonial	dagger	of	which	the	
																																																						
190	Zanzibar,	Mombasa,	Mafia,	Bagamoyo,	Pemba	and	Dar	es	Salaam	were	major	Indian	Ocean	harbours	servicing	
both	European	and	Asian	markets	throughout	the	colonial	period.	While	undertaking	research	in	the	Zanzibar	
archives,	Esmond	Martin	found	that	Zanzibari	merchants	imported	several	tons	of	rhino	horn	from	the	Tanzanian	
mainland	annually	during	the	1800s	(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	91).	
	
191	While	the	huntress	plays	an	important	role	in	ancient	myths,	the	rise	of	the	female	trophy	hunter	is	a	recent	
phenomenon.		
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hilt	is	carved	out	of	rhino	horn	(see	Figure	6).	With	its	origins	dating	back	several	thousand	
years,	the	jambiya	plays	a	crucial	role	in	Yemeni	culture.	While	there	are	no	rhinos	in	North	
Yemen,	rhino	horn	has	been	used	in	the	Middle	Eastern	country	for	more	than	one	thousand	
years	(Varisco	1989a:	215).	Historically,	particular	types	of	jambiyas	and	the	way	it	was	worn	
signalled	a	man’s	status	in	society.	Those	who	could	not	claim	tribal	origins	or	were	of	low	
social	status	were	not	allowed	to	wear	jambiyas	(Martin/Vigne/Allan	1997:	2).	After	the	
revolution	in	1962,	jambiyas	became	less	intertwined	with	declaring	one’s	status.	However,	
they	remained	a	symbol	of	Yemeni	identity,	an	expression	of	self-identification	with	the	
dominant	tribal	culture	and	the	new	emerging	nationalism	(Varisco	1989a:	216).	Most	adult	
men	were	wearing	jambiyas	for	symbolic	rather	than	functional	purposes	during	the	oil	boom.	
The	dagger	signifies	that	a	man	is	capable	of	defending	himself	and	his	tribe	(which	happens	
seldom),	and	plays	a	central	role	of	the	bar’a	dance	performed	at	important	tribal	and	
national	events.	It	is	also	a	symbol	of	honour	and	a	man’s	word,	which	is	surrendered	during	
mediation	of	tribal	disputes	as	a	bond	to	signal	acceptance	of	the	mediator’s	decision	(Varisco	
1989a:	216).	
	
The	Yemeni	port	of	Aden	was	a	significant	port	of	call	for	Arab	traders	involved	in	the	trade	of	
ivory	and	rhino	horn	from	Africa	to	China	and	India.	Rhino	horn	may	have	entered	local	
Yemeni	markets	even	before	the	Islamic	period	(Varisco	1989a:	op	cit).	What	is	fascinating	
about	the	use	of	rhino	horn	in	North	Yemen	is	the	observation	that	its	high	valuation	is	
directly	linked	to	the	cultural	significance	of	the	jambiya	and	not	to	the	animal	it	derives	from	
(Varisco	1989a:	215).	While	the	rhino	has	no	significance	to	Yemenis,	rhino	horn	was	highly	
valued	for	its	functional	value	as	a	superior	hilt.	Hilts	made	of	rhino	horn	are	more	resistant	to	
wear	and	tear	than	those	made	from	other	materials,	such	as	cow	or	buffalo	horn	(Varisco	
1989b:	46).	Varisco	(1989a:	216)	explains	the	preference	for	rhino	horn	over	other	materials	
as	follows:	
	
“Rhino	horn	is	the	preferred	material	because	it	is	said	to	improve	with	age	and	
handling.	There	is	also	an	aesthetic	interest.	After	a	few	decades	a	rhino	horn	hilt	
becomes	translucent,	a	transformation	that	takes	not	place	with	the	other	materials	
available	to	dagger	makers.	As	it	ages	the	hilt	may	also	take	on	a	yellowish	hue	
resembling	the	highly	pized	amber	used	in	Yemeni	jewellery.	In	a	mature	hilt,	after	60	
–	100	years,	individual	hair	lines	may	be	discerned	more	distinctly.”	
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Unlike	jambiyas	made	of	other	materials,	the	value	of	rhino	horn	daggers	increases	with	age.	
Jambiyas	that	belonged	to	kings,	tribal	elders	and	political	leaders	are	the	most	highly	valued	
and	famous	daggers.	Moreover,	while	all	Yemeni	men	could	afford	to	wear	jambiyas	after	the	
oil	boom,	the	best	daggers	were	ornate	and	overlaid	with	gold	and	silver,	signalling	a	man’s	
high	social	status	and	wealth	(Varisco	1989b:	46).		
	
Figure	6:	A	traditional	jambiya	with	hilt	carved	out	of	rhino	horn	
	
Source:	Oriental	Arms192	
	
Market	exchanges	involving	rhino	horn	were	legal	until	the	late	1970s.	Martin	(1982:	92–93)	
found	that	rhino	horn	sold	for	32	US	$	per	kg	at	auctions	in	East	Africa	in	1969.	By	1978,	the	
world	market	price	for	rhino	horn	had	increased	to	US	$	300	per	kg.	The	rhino	horn	trade	
expert	argues	convincingly	that	the	price	inflation	was	not	only	linked	to	the	increased	
demand	in	Yemen	but	also	to	changes	in	the	structure	and	composition	of	the	world	market	
(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	93).	At	the	source	(predominantly	in	Kenya	at	the	time),	Africans	
entered	the	trophies	market	and	broke	the	monopoly	of	the	Gujarati	dealers,	thereby	
introducing	competition.	Moreover,	national	authorities	in	several	African	range	states	sold	
their	stockpiles	of	ivory	and	rhino	horn	at	auctions.	Protectionist	policies	were	implemented,	
																																																						
192	The	photo	depicts	a	late	19th-century	jambiya	from	Oman.	The	grip	is	carved	out	of	rhino	horn,	mounted	with	
filigree	gold	and	silver	mounts	and	adorned	with	silver	nails	on	the	front	and	pommel	side.	Image	available	at	
http://oriental-arms.com/item.php?id=5248	(accessed	20	August	2015).	
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which	disadvantaged	Indian	traders	and	displaced	the	monopolistic	market	structures.	As	the	
prices	began	to	increase	at	the	source	in	East	Africa,	buyers	from	Singapore,	Macau,	Hong	
Kong,	Japan,	Taiwan,	South	Korea	and	later	North	Yemen	had	to	raise	their	offing,	too	
(Martin/Martin/Amin	1982:	93).		
	
According	to	official	statistics,	North	Yemen	imported	an	average	of	2	878	kg	of	rhino	horn	
each	year	between	1969	and	1977,	amounting	to	an	average	production	of	approximately	8	
750	rhino	horn	daggers	per	annum	(Martin/Vigne/Allan	1997:	9).	The	wholesale	price	of	rhino	
horn	surged	during	the	1970s	and	1980s	in	Yemen,	reaching	$	680	per	kg	in	1987.	The	Yemeni	
currency	was	declining	at	the	time,	rendering	jambiya	more	expensive	in	real	terms.	Rhino	
horn	imports	started	to	drop	due	to	the	dual	effects	of	decreasing	rhino	numbers	in	Africa	and	
the	expansion	of	East	Asian	interests	in	the	horn	trade.	East	Asians	were	able	to	offer	double	
the	price	due	to	the	strength	of	Asian	currencies	at	the	time	(Martin/Vigne/Allan	1997:	17).	As	
a	result,	a	new	rhino	horn	dagger	cost	at	least	$	1	500	whereas	several	high-end	specimens	
were	valued	at	several	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Dollars	in	the	1980s	(Varisco	1989a:	op	cit).	
Many	daggers	were	locked	away	and	safeguarded	due	to	their	growing	investment	value.	The	
price	of	jambiyas	continued	to	surge	after	the	government	banned	the	import,	export	and	use	
of	rhino	horn	in	1987.	Up	to	this	point,	jambiya	artisans	collected	and	sold	rhino	horn	shavings	
to	the	Chinese	market	(Varisco	1989b).	After	the	Marxist	government	had	been	ousted	in	
South	Yemen	in	1990,	North	and	South	Yemen	became	one	country.	The	Marxist	government	
in	the	South	had	previously	banned	its	citizens	from	carrying	weapons,	including	the	jambiya.	
While	the	unification	of	the	two	nations	did	not	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	demand	for	rhino	
horn	daggers	in	the	southern	regions,	the	culture	of	wearing	jambiyas	in	the	northern	parts	of	
Yemen	remains	(Vigne/Martin	2008:	45).	Rhino	horn	is	still	smuggled	into	the	country	but	at	
much-reduced	levels	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014)	as	Yemeni	buyers	are	unable	to	compete	
with	the	high	prices	offered	on	Asian	markets.	Varisco	(1989a:	217)	warned	in	the	late	1980s	
that	while	the	demand	might	be	waning,	a	rhino	horn	dagger	presented	an	investment	
opportunity	in	an	economy	with	high	inflation	and	few	safe	investments.	Jambiyas	have	
become	generational	heirlooms,	passed	on	from	father	to	son.	The	son	of	a	sheikh,	for	
example,	inherited	a	jambiya	which	was	valued	at	more	than	two	million	Dollars	in	2009.193		
																																																						
193	Daniel	Martin	Varisco	referred	me	to	this	press	clipping,	which	was	translated	from	Arab	into	English.	
Available	at:	http://marebpress.net/mobile/articles.php?id=5305&lng=arabic	(accessed	12	July	2015)	
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Irrespective	of	whether	rhino	horn	is	processed	into	daggers	or	not,	the	investment	value	of	
rhino	horn	is	a	serious	matter	in	light	of	dwindling	rhino	numbers	and	will	be	further	
discussed	in	the	next	and	final	section	of	this	chapter.	
	
	
3.7	Current	rhino	horn	use,	consumer	profiles	and	product	differentiation	
	
A	lengthy	process	of	sacralisation	has	led	to	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	“sacred	object	
with	powerful	detoxifying	qualities”	(Focus	group	with	consumers,	2013).	The	valuation	of	
rhino	horn	is	thus	closely	intertwined	with	cultural	beliefs	that	confer	a	range	of	functional	
and	symbolic	properties	upon	the	coveted	animal	part.	Its	transcendental	value	has	been	
transferred	and	reiterated	via	a	global	history	of	belief.	While	a	minority	of	current	consumers	
impute	rhino	horn	with	supernatural	or	mythical	properties,	key	consumer	groups	have	
accepted	and	assimilated	the	sacred	value	of	rhino	horn.	While	the	scarcity	of	rhinos	has	
contributed	to	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn,	its	historical	use	was	associated	with	political,	
economic	and	military	elites,	as	well	as	royals	across	the	globe	who	could	afford	to	pay	the	
high	price.	In	times	of	limited	supply	(see	early	sections),	the	price	of	rhino	horn	would	surge	
to	new	heights,	never	recovering	to	its	more	affordable	previous	price.	Similar	to	the	market	
for	ivory	(see	for	example:	Gao/Clark	2014;	Lemieux/Clarke	2009;	Harvey	2015),	rhino	horn	is	
a	differentiated	product	with	a	heterogeneous	consumer	profile.	The	following	section	
provides	an	overview	of	findings	gathered	during	fieldwork	in	southern	Africa	and	
southeastern	Asia,	as	well	as	insights	synthesized	from	scholarly	and	policy	literatures.		A	
functional	typology	is	presented	with	the	proviso	that	some	consumers	may	use	rhino	horn	
for	several	purposes	at	the	same	time,	or	horn	use	may	change	over	time,	for	example:	rhino	
horn	may	be	gifted	to	a	person	who	then	uses	ground	up	rhino	horn	for	health	reasons.		
	
	
3.7.1	Rhino	horn	as	an	investment	and	money	laundering	tool	
	
Both	legal	and	criminal	actors	are	using	rhino	horn	as	an	investment	tool.	The	earlier	section	
on	the	use	of	rhino	horn	in	Yemeni	jambiyas	referred	to	the	investment	value	of	rhino	horn	
daggers.	Investment	ventures	into	rhino	horn	daggers	or	objets	d’art	made	from	rhino	horn	
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(such	as	libation	cups)	present	one	end	of	the	investment	scale	of	rhino	horn.	Rhino	horn	
daggers	are	often	family	heirlooms,	passed	on	from	father	to	son.	This	processed	form	of	
rhino	horn	only	re-enters	circulation	once	the	dagger	is	either	stolen	or	legally	sold.	Similar	to	
Arab	investors	buying	jambiyas	as	growing	assets,	Asian	business	entrepreneurs	are	likewise	
picking	up	objets	d’art	such	as	the	often-ornately	carved	libation	cups	(see	Figure	5),	vases	or	
other	artistic	creations.	Karl	Amman	and	his	team	(2015b)	identified	factories	in	Hanoi	that	
were	producing	religious	artefacts	and	symbols	such	as	prayer	bangles,	bracelets	and	Buddha	
beads.	Sales	of	these	religious	objects	were	targeted	at	visiting	Chinese	tourists.			
	
While	some	buyers	are	legitimate	art	collectors	and	lovers,	others	are	driven	by	less	cultural	
and	more	economic	principles.	The	mathematics	is	simple:	As	the	live	rhino	numbers	grow	
fewer,	the	investment	value	of	rhino	horn	and	horn	products	grows	markedly.	Since	the	2008	
global	financial	meltdown,	stock	market	or	conventional	financial	investments	have	become	a	
less	desirable	investment	option.	Rhino	horn	is	deemed	a	safe	investment	option	in	times	of	
financial	uncertainty:	Whereas	share	prices	may	drop,	the	value	of	rhino	horn	is	believed	to	
be	increasing	and	foolproof	from	financial	market	crashes.	According	to	an	Asian	wildlife	
trafficking	intermediary	(Interview,	2013):“It’s	like	paying	with	a	credit	card.”	Says	a	smuggler	
(Interview	with	intermediary	2,	2013):	
	
“The	auctions	are	only	in	Asia	and	at	these	auctions,	some	of	them	buy	the	horns	and	
take	them	into	the	house	and	put	them	on	a	mantelpiece	and	then	they	make	it	very	
very	secure	and	then	leave	it	there.	And	then	he	knows	that's	the	money	that	I	have	
got	here.”		
	
Some	of	these	transactions	occur	in	the	legal	realm	at	world-renowned	auction	houses	with	
the	correct	paperwork	and	required	CITES	permits.	However,	other	transactions	involve	
fraudulent	activities	such	as	the	processing	of	freshly	harvested	rhino	horn	into	“pre-
Convention”	libation	cups	using	innovative	aging	techniques	(the	section	on	fake	rhino	horn	
provides	more	detail).	A	police	investigator	explains	(Interview,	2013):		
	
“If	you	look	at	the	economics	of	Vietnam,	they	were	very	poor.	So	when	the	
Vietnamese	came	to	South	Africa,	and	you	can	see	how	it	started	escalating	in	2002,	
2003,	they	were	buying	up	rhino	horn	cheaply.	So	similar	to	what	was	happening	in	
the	USA	and	Australia	and	within	Europe,	rhino	horn	started	to	sell	on	auctions	as	pre-
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convention	rhino	horn,	as	libation	cups	or	they	change	it	into	libation	cups.	With	that	
you	also	have	seen	the	Big	5	hunters	in	the	USA,	they	started	to	sell	off	their	trophies.	
And	who's	the	buyers	of	the	trophies?	In	Operation	Crash,	that	they	did	this	last	year,	
you	started	seeing	them	buying	up	the	trophies	and	they	went	to	Vietnam.	But	only	
the	horn.	In	South	Africa,	a	similar	process	started	happening.	The	people	that	had	
started	trading	in	rhino	horn	approached	these	markets	and	said:	‘I	want	to	make	
more	money.’	So	all	these	guys	that	had	access	to	the	Vietnamese	started	to	buy	all	
these	rhino	horns	from	the	private	stockpiles.”	194	
	
The	police	investigator	also	touches	on	the	diversion	of	legal	rhino	hunting	trophies	into	the	
illegal	market.	Essentially,	the	legitimate	owners	channel	their	legally	acquired	and	certified	
rhino	horns	–	the	horns	minus	the	rest	of	the	trophy	–	into	illegal	market	flows.	This	form	of	
laundering	involves	a	conversion	from	a	symbolic	valuation	of	rhino	horn	to	an	economic	
valuation,	driven	by	profit-seeking	behaviour.	Whereas	the	rhino	trophy	may	have	been	
valued	as	a	memento	of	a	hunting	safari	in	the	past	(see	earlier	section	on	hunting	tales),	
rhino	horns	are	transformed	into	investment	tools,	of	which	the	re-sell	value	is	likely	to	
exceed	the	cost	of	the	original	trophy	hunt.	
	
In	other	instances,	rhino	horn	remains	undifferentiated	(unprocessed)	in	bank	vaults,	strong	
rooms	or	safe	locations	at	the	source	in	rhino	range	states	or	the	horn	is	transferred	to	similar	
‘safe’	locations	elsewhere	(predominantly	in	Asia).	While	current	streams	of	literature	refer	to	
the	“Asian	market”	as	the	main	consumer	group	of	rhino	horn,	rhino	horn	investors	come	
from	different	cultural	and	national	backgrounds.	South	African	law	enforcers	believe	that	
rogue	wildlife	professionals	(rhino	horn	“producers”)	present	a	portion	of	this	consumer	
group	(Interviews,	2013).	Upon	“harvesting”	rhino	horn	(dehorning)	rhinos,	wildlife	
professionals	(including	private	rhino	owners)	and	their	local	buyers	store	the	unprocessed	
horn	in	a	safe	location.195	While	private	rhino	owners	are	allowed	to	retain	rhino	horn	when	in	
possession	of	the	required	paperwork	–	the	so-called	Threatened	or	Protected	Species	(TOPS)	
																																																						
194	The	U.S.	Fish	and	Wildlife	Service	is	leading	an	on-going	investigation	entitled	“Operation	Crash”,	which	
tackles	illegal	trafficking	of	rhino	horn	in	the	United	States.	Several	antique	dealers	and	illegal	horn	buyers	have	
been	arrested	(U.S.	Fish	and	Wildlife	Service	2014).	The	South	African	investigator	refers	to	hunting	trophies	
getting	exported	to	Vietnam;	however,	many	horns	also	went	to	China.	
	
195	Because	rhino	horn	is	a	natural	material,	weevils,	mites	and	decomposition	may	affect	stockpiles.	Zimbabwe’s	
5-tonne	stockpile	of	rhino	horn	has	reportedly	been	affected	by	weevil	damage	(Eyewitness	News	2014).		
Arsenic,	diesel	and	other	chemicals	are	used	to	preserve	rhino	horn	(Interviews	with	park	authorities	and	private	
rhino	owners,	2013).	
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regulations,	which	are	discussed	later	–	they	are	not	allowed	to	sell	or	trade	in	rhino	horn	and	
they	are	required	to	register	their	stockpiles.196	As	will	be	shown	in	later	chapters	of	this	
dissertation,	wildlife	actors	have	devised	innovative	strategies	to	bypass	regulations	and	
prohibitions.	A	wildlife	veterinarian	confirmed	the	practice	(Interview,	2013):	“If	you	have	
rhino	horn,	you	put	it	somewhere	safe,	it’s	a	growing	asset.”	These	private-owned	
unregistered	rhino	horns	are	either	kept	in	a	safe	location	(which	comes	with	a	high	risk)	197	or	
laundered	into	illegal	market	flows	at	intervals.	Noteworthy	of	this	type	of	use	is	that	it	is	non-
consumptive;	in	other	words,	rhino	horn	can	be	repurposed	for	other	uses	further	down	the	
line	and	re-enter	flows	(circulation).	
	
Criminal	networks	are	using	rhino	horn	and	other	wildlife	contraband	as	a	form	of	criminal	
currency	or	an	instrument	to	launder	ill-gotten	fortunes.	The	dwindling	live	rhino	numbers	
and	the	possible	extinction	of	the	species	form	part	of	the	economic	valuation	of	rhino	horn	
for	such	criminal	networks	whom	themselves	are	actively	contributing	to	the	demise	of	the	
rhino.	Such	actors	are	speculating	on	the	possible	extinction	of	rhinos.198	An	Asian	
intermediary	explains	the	investment	horizon	as	follows:	
	
“When	you	buy	rhino	horn,	you	put	it	in	the	safe.	After	ten	years,	you	take	out	the	
same	horn,	you	going	to	have	a	big	investment.	It	is	different	from	money.	If	you	buy	R	
500	000	of	rhino	horn,	then	after	ten	years	it	is	worth	R1	million.	You	put	the	same	
money	into	the	bank	and	maybe	it’s	going	to	be	worth	R600	000	after	ten	years.”		
	
Rhino	horn	is	also	used	as	a	currency	in	criminal	business	transactions:	illegal	hunters,	for	
example,	use	rhino	horn	to	buy	hunting	rifles	and	weapons.		
	
																																																						
196	National	governments	of	rhino	range	states,	as	well	as	zoo	and	safari	parks	across	the	world,	are	also	
stockpiling	rhino	horn	albeit	legally.	These	actors	have	multiple	reasons	for	maintaining	national	stockpiles,	
ranging	from	maintaining	a	genetic	database	to	keeping	their	options	open	for	the	possibility	of	a	regulated	legal	
trade	in	rhino	horn	in	the	future.	
	
197	Thefts	and	armed	robberies	have	occurred	at	several	private	and	public	stockpiles	in	South	Africa.	In	one	
incident,	66	rhino	horns	were	stolen	a	few	days	before	nature	conservation	officials	were	due	to	register	the	
horns.	
	
198	Two	independent	informants	in	South	Africa	claimed	that	Asian	nationals	had	approached	them	to	find	out	
whether	they	would	be	in	a	position	to	locate	and	kill	all	remaining	rhinos	in	South	Africa.	While	the	supposed	hit	
appears	far-fetched,	interviews	with	criminal	actors	reiterated	the	investment	value	of	rhino	horn.		
	
	 161	
3.7.2	Rhino	horn	as	a	status	symbol	
	
The	earlier	section	on	jambiyas	made	reference	to	the	largely	symbolic	use	of	rhino	horn	
daggers	to	denote	social	strata	and	wealth	in	Yemeni	society.	Milliken	and	Shaw	(2012)	note	a	
similar	pattern	in	Vietnam	and	China,	where	economic	affluence	and	upward	social	mobility	
have	led	to	an	increased	demand	for	rhino	horn	products	over	the	past	decade.	Rhino	horn	is	
used	in	the	treatment	of	cancer	(discussed	below),	as	a	general	health	tonic,	as	a	hangover	
cure	and	status	symbol.	The	latter	three	uses	are	frequently	intertwined	as	wealthy	
individuals	show	off	their	status	and	wealth	by	consuming	rhino	horn	as	a	health	tonic	and	
hangover	cure.	Consumption	of	rhino	horn	in	this	instance	is	linked	to	‘face	consumption’.199	
This	type	of	consumption	holds	significant	cultural	value	to	certain	strata	of	Asian	society,	
which	engage	in	acts	of	conspicuous	consumption	in	order	“to	enhance,	maintain	or	save	
face”	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	135).	According	to	a	study	on	the	consumption	of	wild	animal	
products	in	Vietnam	(Drury	2011:	247),	the	popularity	of	such	products	is	linked	to	their	
function	as	a	medium	“to	communicate	prestige	and	obtain	social	leverage.”	Drury	(2011:	
254)	alludes	to	the	challenge	community	members	of	collective	societies	may	face	in	not	
conforming	to	social	norms.	The	fear	of	loosing	face	holds	sway	in	Asian	societies,	where	
personal	preferences	may	fall	second	to	those	of	the	group.	This	observation	is	important	
with	regards	to	the	notion	of	contested	illegality,	the	earlier	mentioned	strategy	employed	to	
legitimize	illegal	economic	activities.	Enforcing	new	rules	or	regulations	that	contradict	well-
established	social	norms	and	practices	are	likely	to	achieve	limited	success	(this	is	discussed	in	
more	detail	in	the	concluding	section	of	this	chapter).	
	
Consumers	interviewed	during	fieldwork	in	Vietnam	and	Hong	Kong	confirmed	these	
observations	and	the	status-elevating	properties	of	rhino	horn.	Several	informants	
(Interviews,	2013)	related	how	rhino	horn	featured	at	exclusive	private	parties	and	in	
executive	clubs.	The	rhino	horn	owner	(existing	research	suggests	that	wealthy	old	men	are	
the	main	consumers,	women	feature	however	in	the	party	context,	too)	supplies	shots	of	
“rhino	wine”,	“rhino	alcohol”	or	“drink	of	the	millionaires”–	a	cocktail	of	ground	up	rhino	horn	
																																																						
199	The	“loss	of	face”	refers	to	getting	embarrassed	in	front	of	one’s	friends	and	peers.	According	to	a	research	
informant	in	Hong	Kong	(Interview	1,	2013):	“If	you	loose	face	once,	it	is	difficult	to	get	it	back	unless	someone	
grants	you	face	-	a	chance	to	regain	your	honour.”	In	keeping	up	with	the	Joneses,	people	have	to	“fight	for	
face”.	
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and	rice	wine	or	distilled	spirits	(see	Figure	7).	While	several	newspaper	articles	suggest	that	
hedonistic	consumers	snort	rhino	horn	up	their	noses	(much	like	cocaine),	data	collection	at	
the	source	and	interviews	with	law	enforcement	agents	failed	to	verify	these	claims.	However,	
rhino	horn	is	used	in	conjunction	with	alcohol	and	other	illicit	drugs.	
	
Figure	7:	Rhino	alcohol	
	
Source:	Photo	taken	by	researcher	in	Hanoi,	Vietnam	
	
The	mixing	of	rhino	horn	with	alcohol	goes	against	the	basic	instructions	of	TCM	doctors	who	
warn	patients	never	to	mix	rhino	horn	with	alcohol	or	saline	solutions	as	it	undermines	the	
efficacy	of	the	medicine	(Interviews	with	TCM	doctors,	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City,	2013).	
Despite	the	warning,	the	unorthodox	application	of	rhino	horn	as	a	detoxification	tonic	and	
after–party	cleanser	appears	to	be	the	most	popular	use	of	rhino	horn	in	Vietnam	(Interview	
with	TRAFFIC	officer,	Hanoi,	2015).	This	echoes	partially	with	findings	of	the	TRAFFIC	study	
(Milliken/Shaw	2012),	which	identified	habitual	middle-aged	users	who	frequently	drink	‘rhino	
wine’	to	counter	the	effects	of	excessive	drinking.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	initial	TRAFFIC	
study,	WWF	engaged	the	services	of	a	Vietnam–based	marketing	company	to	assess	
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consumer	preferences	in	rhino	horn	consumption	in	the	two	major	cities	of	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	
Minh	City	in	Vietnam.	Based	on	a	sample	of	600	people,	the	study	found	that	highly–educated	
wealthy	people	were	the	main	buyers	and	users	of	rhino	horn	for	health	and	status	reasons.	
The	study	also	identified	‘intenders’,	who	currently	lacked	the	financial	means	to	afford	rhino	
horn	but	who	were	intending	to	buy	it	once	they	had	disposable	income	(Ipsos	Marketing	
2013).	A	subsequent	study	found	(PSI/Vietnam	2015:	7):	
	
“Perceived	health	benefits,	including	body	detoxification	and/or	hangover	
management,	were	the	most	common	reason	for	recent	rhino	horn	use.	High-income	
urban	men	are	more	likely	to	use	rhino	horn	if	they	believe	it	can	achieve	short-term	
health	improvements,	increase	socioeconomic	status,	or	strengthen	professional	
relationships.”	
	
An	interesting	sidebar	is	the	use	of	rhino	horn	as	a	gift,	which	may	be	offered	to	political	and	
economic	elites,	or	business	associates.	Due	to	its	sacred	value	within	Asian	communities,	a	
gift	of	rhino	horn	reflects	that	the	gift-giver	holds	the	recipient	in	high	esteem.	The	gift	thus	
fulfils	the	function	of	‘showing	face’,	and	is	interpreted	as	a	token	of	respect	and	admiration.	
While	no	direct	reciprocity	is	expected,	a	gift	of	horn	“may	open	many	doors.”	As	economic	
and	political	elites	tend	to	fall	into	the	age	category	of	middle-aged	to	old,	the	gifting	of	rhino	
horn	signals	the	giver’s	wish	for	the	recipient	to	enjoy	a	long,	healthy	and	prosperous	life	
(Interviews,	2013).	Rhino	horn	also	serves	as	a	catalyst	to	facilitate	deals	between	African	and	
Asian	business	people.	The	rare	body	part	is	used	to	leverage	discounts	or	maintain	
preferential	business	relationships.	Its	function	is	qualitatively	different	from	providing	an	
altruistic	gift	in	that	it	plays	a	facilitative	role	in	economic	exchanges	based	on	an	expectation	
of	reciprocity.	Says	an	intermediary	(Interview,	2013):		
	
“The	Chinese	are	business	–	minded	people,	so	to	attract	you	they	always	come	with	
gifts.	So,	me,	when	I	used	to	go	there,	they	used	to	tell	me	they	are	going	to	give	me	a	
huge	discount,	but	I	must	give	them	rhino	horn.	I	must	bring	them	zebra	skins,	also	
tiger	skins.	‘If	you	have	it,	tell	me	and	I	will	tell	my	agent	in	Africa	to	bring	it	this	side’.	
So	they	are	using	it	as	a	gift.	In	their	country,	it	is	something	that	they	value.	Each	and	
every	one	has	his	own	purpose	in	taking	the	rhino	horn	because	they	giving	it	a	second	
value.”		
	
This	section	focused	on	the	use	of	rhino	horn	as	a	status	symbol.	While	the	status-elevating	
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qualities	constitute	the	‘primary’	use,	secondary	uses	may	entail	health,	entertainment,	
detoxification/hangover	cure	and	gifting.	A	final	observation	relates	to	another	consumer	
group	in	a	different	cultural	and	geographical	context:	When	a	rhino	trophy	is	mounted	on	a	
wall	or	displayed	in	showrooms	at	hunting	conventions,	it	arguably	also	serves	the	purpose	of	
a	status	symbol.	A	hunting	trophy	signals	that	the	owner	is	an	accomplished	trophy	hunter	
who	has	managed	to	bag	one	of	Africa’s	Big	Five.	
	
	
3.7.3	Rhino	horn	as	medicine	
	
The	use	of	rhino	horn	in	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	has	been	described	at	length	in	the	
earlier	sections	of	this	chapter.	The	imputed	alexipharmic	and	antipyretic	properties	of	rhino	
horn	by	way	of	a	global	history	of	cultural	belief	have	contributed	to	its	sacred	value	in	Asian	
communities.	The	use	of	rhino	horn	as	medicine	is	frequently	linked	to	other	types	of	use.	For	
example,	producers	of	rhino	artefacts	sell	shavings	of	rhino	horn	to	the	TCM	market.	The	issue	
of	fake	rhino	horn	is	particularly	widespread	in	this	segment	of	the	rhino	horn	value	chain	as	
processed	(ground	up)	powder	is	usually	sold	to	TCM	consumers,	who	have	little	recourse	to	
quality	control	when	presented	with	an	unidentifiable	powdered	substance	(discussed	in	
detail	in	Chapter	8	on	fake	horn).	
	
Whereas	TCM	doctors	used	to	prescribe	rhino	horn	for	the	purposes	of	lowering	fever	and	
inflammation	(it	is	a	“body	cooler”),	detoxification	and	stabilization	of	the	central	nervous	
system	(Đỗ	Tất	Lợi	1962),	the	healing	repertoire	has	been	extended	to	include	treatment	of	
cancer,	stroke	and	impotence.	The	application	of	rhino	horn	to	treat	this	host	of	‘new’	
diseases	stands	at	loggerheads	with	medical	masterworks	such	as	Professor	Đỗ	Tất	Lợi’s	‘The	
medicinal	plants	and	herbs	of	Vietnam’	or	the	Li	Shizhen’s	Compendium	of	Materia	Medica.	In	
a	written	statement	to	the	CITES	Standing	Committee,	the	president	of	the	American	College	
of	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	(ACTCM)	and	President	of	the	Council	of	Colleges	of	
Acupuncture	and	Oriental	Medicine	(CCAOM),	Lixin	Huang	(2011:	2)	declared:	
	
“According	to	TCM	theories,	rhino	horns	were	used	to	treat	typhoid	fever,	convulsions,	
macula,	carbuncle	and	other	disorders,	which	was	the	traditional	use	over	thousands	
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of	years.	However,	some	individuals	and	organizations	with	little	understanding	of	the	
essence	and	modern	development	of	TCM	misinterpret	and	exaggerate	the	medicinal	
properties	of	rhino	horns.	Such	misinterpretation	shows	little	respect	for	the	TCM	
profession	and	medical	practices,	and	is	harmful	to	rhino	conservation	efforts…[…]…	
While	this	increase	[of	rhino	poaching]	may	be	in	part	attributable	to	traditional	
medicine,	the	overwhelming	demand	derives	from	a	non-traditional	and	unproven	use	
–	as	a	cure	for	cancer.	There	is	no	evidence	that	rhino	horn	is	an	effective	cure	for	
cancer	and	this	is	not	documented	in	TCM	nor	is	it	approved	by	the	clinical	research	in	
traditional	Chinese	medicine.”	
	
Curiously,	the	use	of	rhino	horn	as	an	aphrodisiac	was	a	Western	myth	until	fairly	recent,	and	
there	had	been	no	empirical	or	medical	basis	in	the	ancient	scriptures	for	such	claims.	Since	
the	late	2000s,	the	claim	that	rhino	horn	“renders	men	virile”	has	however	been	used	as	a	
marketing	tool	aimed	at	the	high-end	segment	of	the	consumer	market	(Interview	with	
enforcement	official,	2013).	The	aphrodisiac	use	is	closely	linked	to	middle-aged	and	older	
men’s	appreciation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	status	symbol.	A	consumer	in	Hanoi	(Interview,	2013)	
explained	that	the	ascribed	aphrodisiac	qualities	derived	from	the	animal’s	lengthy	period	of	
copulation	and	the	phallic	features	of	rhino	horn.		
	
Several	rhino	horn	consumers	were	interviewed	who	were	using	rhino	horn	for	the	treatment	
of	various	forms	of	cancer.	These	cancer	patients	consumed	rhino	horn	preparations	(mixed	
with	other	TCM	ingredients)	in	conjunction	with	evidence-based	cancer	treatments.	The	
daughter	of	a	Stage	3	cancer	patient,	for	example,	bought	rhino	horn	regularly	(from	a	wildlife	
crimes	police	investigator)	to	counteract	the	debilitating	effects	of	chemotherapy	her	dad	was	
experiencing	(Interview	with	consumer	5,	2013).	Research	reports	(such	as	the	much–cited	
TRAFFIC	report:	Milliken/Shaw	2012)	refer	to	the	‘cancer	cure	myth’,	which	is	seen	as	the	
catalyst	for	the	surge	in	the	demand	for	rhino	horn	in	Vietnam.	It	is	difficult	to	assess	whether	
a	high-level	politician’s	recovery	from	cancer	after	using	rhino	horn	is	a	sufficient	explanation	
for	the	increased	demand	for	rhino	horn	in	Vietnam	during	the	2000s.	Structural	explanations	
such	as	the	massive	growth	of	wealthy	entrepreneurs	with	disposable	income,	the	sacral	
valuation,	the	high	price	and	linked	investment	value	of	rhino	horn	seem	to	be	the	main	
drivers	of	demand	in	Asia.	However,	dissecting	the	‘cancer	cure	myth’	sheds	a	light	regarding	
the	implicit	disconnect	between	legal	rules,	social	norms	and	cultural	practices	when	it	comes	
to	the	consumption	of	endangered	wildlife	products.	
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Several	TCM	doctors	and	cancer	patients	(Interviews,	2013)	made	reference	to	the	miraculous	
recovery	from	prostate	cancer	of	a	former	Vietnamese	president	after	consuming	rhino	horn.	
When	the	former	president	fell	ill,	he	sought	medical	attention	in	Singapore	in	2004	(Winnick	
2007;	Aggler	2008).200	He	reportedly	used	rhino	horn	in	conjunction	with	modern	cancer	
treatments	(Interview	with	an	oncologist,	2013).	It	remains	unclear	whether	state-of-the-art	
cancer	treatments	or	rhino	horn	led	to	remission	at	the	time.201	Without	the	president’s	
confirmation	or	denial,	it	is	also	uncertain	whether	he	indeed	used	rhino	horn.	Irrespective	of	
the	president’s	circumstances,	many	cancer	patients	use	a	combination	of	modern	and	
traditional	methods.	According	to	one	doctor	(Interview,	Hanoi,	2013):	
	
“For	those	with	cancer,	or	even	for	the	patient	with	very	advanced	stage	of	the	cancer,	
besides	western	method,	they	want	to	get	some	traditional	medicine	to	treat	
themselves	and	in	fact	this	one	is	very	common	in	Vietnam.	In	my	experiences	there	
are	many,	many	cancer	patients	that	is	on	western	medicines	and	they	use	herbal	
medicine,	they	use	traditional	medicine	to	treat	themselves.	We	understand,	we	know	
this.	But	at	the	moment	there	are	no	evidence	to	confirm	that	traditional	or	something	
like	this	in	Vietnam	can	cure	the	cancer	and	can	cure	the	patients.	For	example,	after	
chemotherapy	or	after	radiation	therapy,	they	go	to	the	traditional	medicine	hospital	
and	they	get	medication	over	there,	traditional	medicine	over	there.	In	principle,	you	
know,	traditional	medicine	is	ok,	because	according	to	our	traditional	medicine	and	
some	medication	like	this	can	help.	For	example,	improving	the	immune	system	or	
make	the	patient	eat	better	or	fuel	appetite,	but	actually	at	the	moment	we	do	not	
have	any	study	to	analyse	the	benefit	of	traditional	medicine	to	the	cancer	patient	
who	have	got	western	medicine.	At	the	moment,	we	don’t	have	any	evaluation	about	
this.	But	very	common	after	treatment	here	the	patient	go	to	the	traditional	medicine	
hospital	for	further	treatment,	for	supplementary	treatment	over	there.	I	know	this.”	
	
The	reliance	on	alternative	strategies	regarding	the	treatment	of	cancer	is	not	something	
exceptional	or	specific	to	the	Vietnamese	case.	Cancer	patients	from	around	the	world	use	
traditional	and	alternative	treatments	against	cancer.	One	doctor	provided	an	insightful	
assessment	of	how	the	cancer	cure	‘myth’	may	have	spread	(Interview	with	oncologist,	Ho	Chi	
Minh	City,	2013):	
																																																						
200	A	confidential	cable	leaked	via	Wikileaks	(Aggler	2008)	suggested	that	President	Nguyen	Minh	Triet’s	prostate	
cancer	reappeared	in	2008,	leading	to	US	concerns	that	the	economic	reformer	and	anti-corruption	leader	would	
step	down.	The	disease	had	gone	into	remission	by	the	time	he	was	initially	selected	as	the	country’s	president	in	
2006.	He	served	a	full	five-year	term,	only	stepping	down	in	2011.	
		
201	See	also	Ham	Hoai	Nhan	(2013)	
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“You	know,	many	patients	for	example	here,	after	radiation	treatment	and	even	after	
chemotherapy,	the	tumour	or	the	melanoma	will	disappear,	thirty	percent,	eighty	
percent,	but	at	the	time	of	discharge	there	will	still	remain	a	small	tumour	here,	very	
small,	smaller	than	before.	But	the	tumour	remains	on	site,	something	like	this.	And	
then	the	patient	goes	to	the	traditional	medicine	hospital	for	their	supplementary	
treatment	from	the	traditional	medicine	and	after	a	couple	of	months,	three	months	
later,	the	tumour	disappears	completely,	and	many	patients	believe	that	in	this	case	
western	medicine	does	not	work	very	well,	because	at	the	end	of	the	treatment	the	
tumour	is	still	on	site.	But	when	they	get	traditional	medicine	the	tumour	disappears	
completely.	They	strongly	believe	that	traditional	medicine	could	make	healthy,	could	
kill	the	tumour,	you	know,	in	the	thinking,	in	the	mind	of	many,	many	cancer	patients	
think	like	this.	But	actually,	basically,	and	we	understand,	in	this	case	the	benefit	
comes	from	western	medicine	because	you	know,	after	radiation	and	chemotherapy	
the	tumour	cell	will	be	cured	but	not	immediately	at	the	same	time.”		
	
Political	elites	are	revered	and	respected	in	Vietnam.	The	suggestion	that	the	president	was	
healed	through	the	consumption	of	rhino	horn	may	well	have	led	to	the	dissemination	of	the	
‘cancer	cure	myth’.	The	same	oncologist	related	how	the	majority	of	his	patients	were	seeking	
rhino	horn	TCM	as	a	secondary	treatment,	often	falling	victim	to	fraudsters	(see	the	chapter	
on	fake	rhino	horn).	Beyond	the	narrative	about	the	former	president’s	recovery	from	cancer,	
research	informants	spoke	about	the	link	between	rhino	horn	and	political	elites.	One	
informant	provided	interesting	insight	into	those	links	(Interview,	Vietnam,	2013):		
“You	know,	buying	or	selling	rhino	is	illegal	in	Vietnam,	but	actually	there	are	some	
very	VIP	who	got	cancer	and	they	also	want	to	buy	rhino,	or	even	for	the	Communist	
Party.	I	think	they	have	rhino.	These	rhinos	will	be	used	for	VIP,	when	they	got	a	
disease	or	something	like	this. Yeah,	they	have	live	rhinos.	And	if	somebody	gets	a	
disease	for	example,	diabetics	or	cancer,	they	want	to	use	rhino	horn	and	they	will	get	
approval	from	the	Communist	Party	and	they	can	use	rhino.	But	it’s	not	official.	In	
principle	according	to	Vietnamese	law,	rhino	is	illegal.” 
 
The	link	of	rhino	horn	consumption	to	political	elites	has	direct	implications	regarding	legality	
and	legitimacy,	and	the	proffered	notion	of	‘contested	illegality’.	If	political	elites	who	are	
responsible	for	the	enactment	and	enforcement	of	illegality	are	complicit	themselves	in	the	
trade	and	consumption	of	rhino	horn,	then	the	ban	overtly	looses	social	and	political	
legitimacy.	If	political	leaders	fail	to	lead	by	example,	can	we	expect	others	to	follow	the	
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rules?	A	researcher	for	a	Hanoi-based	NGO	explains	(Interview,	2013):	“For	people	in	Vietnam,	
illegality	is	of	little	relevance	as	there	is	little	control.	Everything	in	Vietnam	is	a	negotiating	
process.”	The	heterogeneous	composition	of	rhino	horn	TCM	users	and	the	massive	amount	
of	fake	rhino	horn	medicines	in	circulation	render	it	difficult	to	assess	the	size	of	the	market.	
Consumers	come	from	different	socio-economic	strata.		Especially	when	it	comes	to	the	
dreaded	disease	of	cancer,	family	members	are	willing	to	spend	their	last	Vietnamese	Dong	in	
order	to	lengthen	the	lives	of	their	loved	ones.	Interestingly,	TCM	consumers	pay	between	
$25	000	to	$45	000	per	kilogram	of	rhino	horn	(Interviews	with	consumers	and	traders,	2013)	
whereas	other	consumer	groups	pay	a	higher	price	ranging	from	$	65	000	to	$	100	000	per	kg	
(Interviews	with	consumers	and	traders,	2013;	feedback	from	Karl	Amman,	2015).	
	
3.8	Concluding	remarks:	Sacred	value	and	contested	illegality	
	
Cultural	beliefs	led	to	the	sacralization	of	rhino	horn	in	Asian	communities;	however,	the	rhino	
itself	is	not	imbued	with	sacred	value.	The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	in	consumer	markets	tends	
to	trump	conservation	and	anti–poaching	initiatives	in	places	geographically	far	removed	from	
the	market.	The	sanctity	of	ancient	beliefs	and	socially	accepted	norms	not	only	supersedes	
rhino	conservation	initiatives	but	also	international	trade	bans	and	domestic	rules.	The	history	
of	the	cultural	use	of	rhino	horn	was	discussed	in	this	chapter	with	the	objective	of	
highlighting	the	difficulties	associated	with	attempts	to	reverse	social	norms	that	are	
supported	by	cultural	beliefs.	While	few	consumers	uphold	the	quasi-mythical	valuation	of	
rhino	horn	as	a	miracle	cure	for	a	bouquet	of	ailments,	its	transcendental	and	sacred	value	
remains,	and	explains,	in	addition	to	the	increasing	rarity	of	the	species,	the	high	price	of	
rhino	horn.	The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	an	investment	tool	and	status	symbol	by	actors	
outside	Asia	also	reifies	its	high	price.	Moreover,	the	complicity	of	the	elite	(e.g.	political	elites	
and	the	police)	in	the	illegal	trade,	distribution	and	consumption	undermine	the	credibility	of	
the	comparably	new	trade	ban.	In	collective	societies	where	the	elite	holds	considerable	sway,	
members	of	society	are	likely	to	emulate	the	behaviour	of	heroes,	business	elites	and	
respected	leaders.	With	regards	to	resolving	the	coordination	problem	of	value	(an	essential	
condition	for	markets	to	emerge),	it	is	evident	that	rhino	horn	is	highly	valued	and	coveted	in	
consumer	markets.	The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	sacred	good	provides	consumers	with	an	
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exit	from	possible	societal	sanctions	that	usually	obtain	from	breaking	the	law.	Not	only	is	the	
consumption	of	rhino	horn	socially	legitimate	and	culturally	accepted	but	important	role-
models	supply	and	consume	rhino	horn	too.	Consumers	are	crucial	actors	needed	to	
guarantee	the	continuity	of	illegal	rhino	horn	flows.	In	this	instance,	consumers	do	not	accept	
the	trade	ban	and	legitimize	illegal	economic	activities	in	reference	to	ancient	cultural	beliefs	
and	socially	accepted	practices	thus	reiterating	the	notion	of	contested	illegality.	This	chapter	
also	shows	the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality	where	legal	and	illegal	uses	are	hard	to	
distinguish,	and	both	criminal	actors	and	upstanding	citizens	of	society	partake	in	illegal	
market	processes.	Critical	to	the	analysis	is	the	recognition	that	trophy	hunters	and	art	
collectors	likewise	constitute	important	consumer	groups.	The	current	uses	of	rhino	horn	are	
not	‘new	uses’	but	lean	on	ancient	practices	including	the	use	of	rhino	horn	as	status	symbols,	
objets	d’art	and	gifting,	as	well	as	for	health	and	medicinal	purposes.	The	inclusion	of	rhino	
horn	as	a	cancer	cure	and	aphrodisiac	is	a	clever	marketing	ploy	intended	to	grow	the	market.		
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Chapter	4:	Rhino	protection:	Parks,	private	land	and	conservation	
paradigms	
	
“In	the	African	version	of	wildlife	conservation	history,	the	experience	has	
been	that	game	reserves	are	white	inventions	which	elevate	wildlife	above	
humanity	and	which	have	served	as	instruments	of	dispossession	and	
subjugation.	No	Africans	became	partners	in	the	conservationist	enterprise:	
either	their	presence	was	suffered	as	squatters	or	‘courageous	and	loyal	native	
rangers’,	or	they	were	cast	in	the	role	of	‘evil,	cruel	poachers’	who	were	able	to	
stave	off	wage	labour	by	living	off	the	land	(Carruthers	1995:	101).”	
	
	
4.1	Introduction	
	
The	aim	of	the	previous	chapter	was	to	provide	a	history	of	the	demand	for	rhino	horn,	its	
valuation	as	a	sacred	good	in	Asian	markets	and	current	consumption	patterns.	While	climate	
change	and	human	expansion	impact	the	chances	of	rhino	survival	in	the	wild,	the	rapacious	
demand	for	rhino	horn	may	lead	to	the	pachyderm’s	extinction	in	the	near	future.	Although	
non-lethal	methods	of	dehorning	exist,	illegal	hunters	kill	and	dehorn	rhinos	in	order	to	get	to	
the	highly-coveted	rhino	horn.	Conservators	and	regulators	have	devised	conservation	
measures	to	protect	the	rhino	and	disrupt	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn.	This	chapter	starts	with	
reasons	why	the	millennial	generation	may	want	to	continue	with	rhino	protection	in	spite	of	
myriad	challenges	affecting	conservation	objectives.	It	then	continues	with	an	assessment	of	
protective	and	conservation	regimes,	including	colonial	conservation	regulations,	the	
proclamation	of	game	reserves	and	national	parks,	the	conservation	of	rhinos	on	private	land,	
as	well	as	the	creation	of	transfrontier	parks.	Arguably,	the	establishment	and	expansion	of	
conservation	areas	have	led	to	structural	conditions	that	facilitate	rather	than	fight	rhino	
poaching.	It	will	be	argued	that	the	underpinning	conservation	paradigms	have	led	to	a	
situation	of	historical	lock-in,	which	impedes	harmonious	relationships	between	communities	
living	in	or	close	to	conservation	areas	and	wildlife.	In	fact,	relationships	tend	to	be	
conceptualized	in	terms	of	human-wildlife	conflict	–	a	largely	antagonistic	relationship.	The	
privatization	and	commodification	of	rhinos	have	further	entrenched	conflict-laden	social	
relations	between	regulators,	local	African	people	and	the	predominantly	white	landowners.		
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4.2	Why	should	rhinos	be	protected?	
	
A	variety	of	actors	attributes	rhinos	with	intrinsic	and/or	instrumental	value.	The	former	
relates	to	the	contention	that	the	wild	animal	has	a	value	in	its	own	right	(an	end	in	itself)	
while	the	latter	relates	to	the	functional	use	of	rhinos	(means	to	an	end).	While	a	discussion	of	
animal	ethics	is	beyond	the	remit	of	this	dissertation,	it	suffices	to	mention	that	the	
instrumental	value	of	rhinos	is	likely	to	be	of	greater	interest	to	regulators.	The	instrumental	
value	appeals	to	regulators,	who	tend	to	respond	to	the	vagaries	of	cost	and	benefit	
calculations	when	considering	new	regulations	aimed	at	disrupting	illegal	markets.	Justus	and	
colleagues	(2009:	187)	define	entities	as	instrumentally	valuable	“to	the	extent	they	are	or	will	
be	considered	valuable	by	valuers,	such	as	humans	and	perhaps	other	cognitive	complex	
organisms”.	One	of	the	instrumental	values	of	rhinos	is	that	within	its	immediate	environment	
the	rhino	has	some	important	functions:	The	white	rhino	provides	“grazing	lawns”	for	smaller	
herbivores	(its	wide	mouth	and	lips	have	lawnmower-like	qualities)	and	all	rhino	species	
(including	the	3	Asian	sub-species)	assist	in	spreading	the	seeds	and	seedlings	of	many	plants	
(Africa	Geographic	2012a).	A	recent	academic	paper	suggests	that	the	rhino,	like	the	elephant	
or	wolf,	might	be	a	might	be	a	keystone	species	(Cromsigt/te	Beest	2014).	A	South	African	
conservator	explains	the	significance	of	keystone	species	as	follows	(Interview	with	
Conservator	5,	2013):		
	
“The	rhino	is	a	keystone	species,	and	we	are	custodians	of	our	biodiversity.	We	are	
inextricably	linked.	If	the	honeybee	goes,	we	are	gone	as	a	species.	So	we	use	the	
rhino	as	a	symbol	of	the	bigger	picture.”		
In	the	context	of	the	Kruger	National	Park,	the	rhino	may	have	an	impact	on	the	structure	and	
composition	of	the	savannah	grasslands	(Cromsigt/te	Beest	2014).	Its	demise	may	thus	affect	
the	chances	for	survival	of	other	species	of	fauna	and	flora.	Cromsigt	and	te	Beest	(2014:	566)	
found:		
“[O]ur	results	highlight	that	the	current	rhino	poaching	crisis	may	not	only	affect	the	
species,	but	also	threaten	the	potential	key	role	of	this	mega	herbivore	as	a	driver	of	
savannah	functioning.”				
If	the	rhino	were	to	go	extinct	in	its	home	range,	its	disappearance	would	not	only	have	an	
emotional	impact	on	rhino	admirers	but	is	also	likely	to	affect	the	local	ecosystem	and	
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biodiversity.		
The	previous	chapter	gave	an	overview	of	the	global	system	of	belief	leading	to	the	sacral	
valuation	of	rhinos	and	rhino	horns.	While	the	animal	rights	movement	focuses	on	the	
intrinsic	value	of	animals,	cultural	beliefs	in	southern	Africa	likewise	appreciate	the	animal	per	
se	as	a	cultural	and	spiritual	sentient	being,	worthy	of	reverence	and	protection	(see	section	
on	the	San	and	Shona	tribes	in	southern	Africa	in	Chapter	3).	Jones	(1999:	298)	provides	an	
example:		
“Like	many	Westerners	from	developed	countries,	many	rural	Africans	value	wildlife	
for	its	existence	and	wish	their	children	and	grandchildren	to	be	able	to	enjoy	seeing	
wild	animals.”	
	
The	rhino	belongs	to	a	group	of	animal	species	identified	as	charismatic	megafauna.	Animals	
like	the	elephant	or	rhino	invoke	empathy,	personification	and	anthropomorphism	amongst	
people.	Such	sentiments	may	lead	to	material	assistance	and	donations	for	conservation	
initiatives.	Moreover,	the	rhino	is	one	of	the	main	tourist	attractions	in	game	parks.	While	
trophy	hunting	is	the	subject	of	normative	and	moral	contestation	in	modern	narratives,	for	
the	sake	of	completeness,	the	role	of	the	rhino	in	Big	Five	trophy	hunting	safaris	is	also	
acknowledged.	In	fact,	one	objective	of	early	protection	regimes	was	the	conservation	of	
wildlife	for	the	purposes	of	sports	hunting,	a	past	time	reserved	for	the	upper	strata	of	
colonial	society	in	southern	Africa.	The	remainder	of	the	chapter	touches	on	the	specific	
motivations	of	why	actors	choose	to	protect	the	rhino.		
	
	
4.3	Colonial	conservation	measures	in	South	Africa	
	
After	Jan	van	Riebeeck	and	the	Dutch	East	India	Company	arrived	at	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope	in	
1652,	the	lives	and	fortunes	of	indigenous202	and	local	people	and	wild	animals	changed	
forever.	In	the	process	of	colonization,	Africans	lost	property	and	hunting	rights,	and	systemic	
exploitation	was	instituted	first	by	colonial	rulers,	and	subsequently	reinforced	during	the	
																																																						
202	The	term	“indigenous”	people	is	used	to	depict	First	Nations	people	in	southern	Africa	(the	San	people	–	
compare	with	Chapter	3)	whereas	“local”	people	refer	to	other	African	communities,	who	settled	in	southern	
Africa.		
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apartheid	regime.	The	scales	tipped	towards	overexploitation	of	the	still	abundant	wildlife	
shortly	after	the	European	colonizers	arrived.	The	first	colonial	administrator	Jan	van	Riebeeck	
decreed	the	first	poaching	law	a	mere	five	years	after	landing	at	the	Cape.	He	declared	wild	
animals	as	res	nullius.	According	to	this	legal	principle,	whoever	captured	or	killed	a	wild	
animal,	owned	it	(Couzens	2003:	4).	The	early	colonial	settlers	survived	through	hunting,	
which	served	the	purpose	of	land	clearance,	income	generation	and	provision	of	meat	to	
avoid	slaughtering	the	settlers’	livestock.	Settlers	often	employed	the	services	of	local	people	
on	whose	hunting	skills	they	came	to	rely	(Beinart	2003:	31;	Carruthers	1993:	6).	
	
In	1822,	Lord	Charles	Somerset	passed	the	first	piece	of	British	colonial	legislation	that	dealt	
with	the	protection	of	wildlife.203	Of	particular	significance	was	the	delineation	of	who	was	
allowed	to	hunt	and	who	was	proscribed	from	doing	so.	One	of	the	proclamations	declared	
specifically:	“[I]t	is	found	that	many	idle	and	disorderly	persons,	of	inferior	classes	of	life,	who	
ought	to	be	dependent	upon	their	industry,	waste	and	misspend	their	time	destroying	game	
(quoted	in:	Couzens	2003:	66	).”	Mimicking	British	anti-poaching	laws,	the	colonial	rulers	
asserted	hunting	rights	for	the	British	ruling	classes.	These	rights	affected	not	only	the	African	
communities	but	also	the	Afrikaners	who	commenced	the	Great	Trek	to	escape	British	rule	
and	founded	the	Boer	republics	during	the	19th	century.	Upon	settling	in	the	Transvaal,204	the	
Voortrekker	community	depended	on	“indiscriminate	hunting”.	Local	Africans	and	the	
Afrikaners	collaborated	in	killing,	trading	and	clearing	of	wildlife	until	it	became	a	rare	
resource	(Carruthers	1993:	12).		
	
In	1846,	the	first	piece	of	conservation	legislation	was	passed	in	the	Transvaal.	The	law	was	
ostensibly	designed	to	prevent	wastage;	in	other	words,	hunters	were	asked	to	“kill	only	what	
they	needed”	–	the	amount	remained	undefined	–	(Couzens	2003:	66).	Towards	the	end	of	
the	19th	century,	as	the	herds	of	wildlife	had	been	severely	diminished,	the	Afrikaners	
excluded	indigenous	populations	from	the	hunting	of	free-ranging	wildlife	by	way	of	
																																																						
203	Somerset	proclaimed,	amongst	others,	a	“close	season”	of	5	months	(no	hunting	was	allowed	during	those	
five	months;	the	hippopotamus,	elephant	and	bontebok	were	declared	royal	game	(a	special	hunting	permit	was	
required);	a	license	was	required	for	hunting	and	slaves	were	not	permitted	to	hunt	(Couzens	2003:	66).	
	
204	The	Transvaal	was	one	of	the	two	Boer	republics	(the	other	was	the	Orange	Free	State),	which	were	both	
integrated	into	the	Union	of	South	Africa	in	1910.	In	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	vast	swathes	of	the	Transvaal	
province	form	part	of	the	Gauteng	province.	
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conservation	regulations.	As	the	white	Afrikaners	started	to	assert	land	and	farming	rights,	
hunting	and	land	rights	became	intertwined.	205		Wildlife	had	the	legal	status	of	res	nullius;	
hence,	private	landowners	strictly	enforced	trespassing	regulations	to	halt	Africans	and	poor	
whites	from	hunting	on	their	land	(Carruthers	1993:	13).	Enclosure	and	boundary	demarcation	
of	land	further	disowned	local	people.	The	Fencing	Acts	of	1883	and	1910	afforded	
landowners	another	layer	of	protection	and	control	over	the	land	and	its	productive	capacity.	
These	laws	led	to	the	further	disempowerment	of	African	people,	forever	changing	the	social	
relations	of	rural	dwellers.	In	particular,	the	1887	Squatters	Law	and	the	Native	Land	Act	of	
1913206	laid	the	foundations	of	apartheid	segregation	and	birthed	new	legal	designations	of	
trespass,	poaching	and	squatting	(Meskell	2012:	16–17).	While	one	might	think	that	these	
conservation	regulations	sought	to	protect	wildlife,	in	reality,	they	can	only	be	understood	in	
the	context	of	colonial	exploitation	of	African	people.	
	
Despite	the	restricted	access	to	firearms,	hunting	dogs,	as	well	as	the	withdrawal	of	hunting	
and	landownership	rights,	African	people	received	the	blame	for	the	annihilation	of	wildlife	in	
the	Transvaal.	With	historical	hindsight,	a	confluence	of	destructive	forces	such	as	agricultural	
transformation,	modernization	and	industrialization	seem	to	have	played	their	role	while	the	
hunting	by	the	landowners	was	equally	devastating	on	wildlife	numbers	(Carruthers	1993:	13).	
Another	significant	aim	of	the	early	hunting	laws	was	the	creation	of	an	indigenous	workforce	
that	was	reliant	on	income	from	wages	for	their	livelihoods.	Many	Africans	had	maintained	
their	economic	independence	from	European	settlers	by	hunting	and	trading	wildlife	and	
carrying	on	with	their	pastoralist	and	agricultural	life-styles.	Through	the	hunting	ban	and	
																																																						
205	Land	ownership	and	hunting	rights	became	contested	issues	with	the	arrival	of	the	colonial	settlers.	Local	
communities	such	as	the	Tsongas	living	in	the	northeastern	parts	of	the	country	(in	the	modern	Kruger	National	
Park	and	Limpopo	Province)	had	a	different	perception	of	private	ownership	of	property.	Chiefs	allocated	land	to	
any	person	wanting	to	live	in	the	chiefdom,	subject	to	that	person	abiding	by	the	rules	of	the	tribe.	People	were	
free	to	choose	where	to	reside,	but	they	had	to	ask	for	permission	from	the	chief	when	they	wanted	to	move	to	
another	chiefdom.	According	to	this	understanding,	the	land	was	never	private	property;	however,	membership	
of	the	tribe	ensured	access	to	land	and	land	use	rights	(Nefale	2002:	19).	People	could	not	be	evicted	from	their	
place	of	residence	unless	they	had	committed	a	serious	offence	or	violated	a	rule	set	by	the	Chief	or	his	
headmen	(Nefale	2002:	12).	This	notion	of	communal	landownership	stood	in	stark	contrast	to	the	colonial	
approach	that	promoted	land	appropriation	and	private	ownership	rights.	In	some	cases,	chiefs	had	made	land	
‘voluntarily’	available	to	the	white	settlers;	they	had,	of	course,	their	conception	of	land	ownership	in	mind.	
Meanwhile,	the	new	colonial	landowners	were	at	liberty	to	evict	people	of	their	land	with	the	full	backing	of	the	
law	(Nefale	2002:	12).		
	
206	Africans	were	prohibited	from	buying	or	leasing	property	outside	areas	demarcated	as	African	reserves.	
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other	colonial	measures,	the	colonial	‘masters’	had	created	a	workforce	consisting	of	
individuals	who	were	no	longer	self–sufficient	and	depended	on	income	from	working	in	
mines	and	other	industrial	endeavours	(Carruthers	1993:	13).	
	
While	the	early	wildlife	protection	measures	served	the	colonial	objectives,	later	measures	
were	driven	by	the	desire	to	preserve	wildlife	for	sports	hunting.	At	the	turn	of	the	19th	
century,	game	reserves	were	designed	to	provide	“free	from	all	human	interference,	a	
sanctuary	in	which	certain	species	of	wildlife	could	prosper”	(Carruthers	1993:	13).	The	early	
game	reserves	of	Transvaal,	for	example,	were	to	be	located	on	land	considered	barren,	
disease–ridden	and	worthless	to	mining	interests.	Eventually	these	“state	game	farming	
enterprises”	were	to	be	opened	to	sportsmen,	who	would	pay	the	state	for	hunting	privileges	
(Carruthers	1993:	14).	While	the	land	devoted	to	game	reserves	was	uninteresting	to	other	
industries,	national	and	provincial	parks	were	established	on	sought-after	real	estate.	These	
parks	entail	“the	utilization	of	an	area	through	active	management	for	the	benefit	of	the	
ecosystem	and	visitors”.	Thus,	game	reserves	and	national	parks	had	different	aims	and	legal	
foundations.	While	game	reserves	could	be	established	and	abolished	by	proclamation,	
national	parks	were	legally	secure	and	economically	viable	(Carruthers	1993:	13).	Indigenous	
and	local	African	property	and	hunting	rights,	and	ancestral	burial	grounds	(which	are	
significant	cultural	sites)	were	not	considered	when	reserves	and	parks	were	proclaimed.207		
	
A	well-known	example	relates	to	the	Kruger	National	Park,	which	was	a	game	reserve	before	
it	became	the	signature	national	park	of	South	Africa.	The	first	Warden	of	the	Sabi	Game	
Reserve	was	of	the	belief	that	people	and	game	reserves	were	a	lethal	combination.	
Influenced	by	his	European	heritage,	James	Stevenson–Hamilton	had	Africans	evicted	from	
the	land	located	in	the	modern	KNP.	His	actions	earned	him	the	name	Skukuza	(he	who	
sweeps	clean)208	among	the	local	Shangaan	community	(Carruthers	1995:	92).	In	official	
narratives,	the	first	warden	was	lauded	for	“saving”	the	African	“wilderness”.	African	historical	
narratives	were	silenced	in	the	process	of	creating	these	parks	and	reserves	(Meskell	2012:	
																																																						
207	More	than	half	of	the	area	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	is	subject	to	land	claims	by	local	claimants	in	post-
apartheid	South	Africa.	
	
208	Skukuza	is	the	name	of	the	main	administrative	rest–camp	in	the	present-day	Kruger	National	Park.	
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63).	Oral	histories	of	the	Shangaan	people	and	archaeological	sites	document	that	several	
thousand	indigenous	people	were	living	in	the	area	of	the	modern	KNP	more	than	2000	years	
before	the	European	settlers	arrived.	These	tribes	were	scattered	in	numerous	settlements.	
There	were	no	boundaries	with	Mozambique,	Swaziland	or	Zimbabwe	and	people	moved	
freely	amongst	chiefdoms	unless	there	was	strife	(Meskell	2012;	Nefale	2002).	
	
As	the	reserves	were	extended	in	size,	the	colonial	authorities	soon	realized	that	the	vast	
game	reserves	could	not	be	run	like	“a	medieval	European	deer	preserve”	(Carruthers	1993:	
14).	They	required	African	labour	and	funding	to	run	the	reserves.	Consequently,	the	policy	
was	reversed,	and	so-called	black	‘tenants’	had	to	pay	rent	through	labour	or	cash	(Carruthers	
1993:	14).	In	exchange	for	an	obligatory	period	of	three	months	of	labour,	tenants	were	
allowed	to	conduct	agricultural	and	pastoralist	activities	provided	these	did	not	contravene	
conservation	regulations.	White	game	rangers	had	the	task	of	overseeing	the	labourers,	
thereby	asserting	another	layer	of	control	(Carruthers	1993:	15).	After	the	establishment	of	
the	Union	of	South	Africa,209	the	policy	on	game	reserves	was	revisited.	The	land	was	needed	
for	African	and	white	agricultural	expansion,	and	to	satisfy	the	growing	demands	for	mining	
explorations	and	industrial	development.	Before	the	proclamation	of	the	KNP	in	1926,	a	large	
area	along	the	modern	western	boundary	of	the	KNP	was	excised	from	the	Sabi	Game	Reserve	
and	declared	an	‘African	reserve’.210		The	last	forceful	removal	from	the	KNP	involved	the	
Makuleke	people	who	had	been	living	between	the	Levhubu	and	Limpopo	rivers	in	the	Pafuri	
area.	Their	communal	land	was	incorporated	into	the	KNP	in	1969	(Carruthers	1995:	99)	and	
became	subject	to	a	successful	land	claim	in	post–apartheid	South	Africa.		
	
Whether	banished	from	the	reserves	and	parks	or	living	on	its	peripheries,	Africans	contested	
the	creation	of	these	conservation	entities	and	associated	measures.	Poaching	of	wildlife	
became	a	means	of	expressing	their	unhappiness	as	much	as	it	became	a	necessity	to	prevent	
death	from	starvation	after	severe	droughts	and	bouts	of	Rinderpest	(Carruthers	1995:	93).	
Interestingly,	the	history	of	cross-border	poaching	expeditions	launched	from	Mozambique	
can	be	traced	back	to	the	early	days	of	the	20th	century:		
																																																						
209	In	1910,	the	four	colonies	were	amalgamated	into	the	Union	of	South	Africa	under	British	dominion.	
	
210	Due	to	their	proximity	to	the	western	boundary	of	the	Kruger	National	Park,	Acornhoek,	and	many	other	
villages	and	townships	have	become	the	springboard	from	where	modern	poaching	expeditions	are	launched.	
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“Poaching	parties	from	Mozambique	were	large,	well	organized	and	accompanied	by	
many	dogs.	They	also	had	firearms,	unlike	Transvaal	Africans	who	were	not	permitted	
to	bear	arms,	and	the	African	staff	of	the	game	reserve,	carrying	only	assegais,	was	
powerless	against	them	(Carruthers	1995:	93).”		
	
From	the	1930s	onwards	the	dominant	policy	of	national	parks	and	reserves	was	to	preserve	
the	“wilderness”	without	human	habitation.	Underpinning	this	endeavour	was	the	mythical	
ideal	of	untamed	wild	Africa	based	on	fictions	of	terra	nullius	(empty	lands)	prior	to	the	
European	colonial	arrivals.	Essentially	the	combined	notions	of	terra	nullius	and	res	nullius	
(wildlife	could	not	be	owned)	created	an	oppositional	binary	of	nature	versus	(African)	
culture.	Colonial	regulators	stamped	local	people	and	their	cultural	heritage	as	intrusive	and	
destructive	and	opted	to	preserve	what	was	left	of	‘wild	Africa’	without	indigenous	influences	
(Meskell	2012:	117).	To	suit	the	ideal	of	an	untouched,	pristine	wilderness,	millennia	of	
African	history	were	wiped	clear	(Meskell	2012:	18).	A	case	in	point	is	the	neglect	of	
archaeological	records	(especially	in	Kruger	National	Park)	that	show	that	these	so–called	
‘wilderness’	areas	had	been	inhabited	by	African	mining	and	trading	communities	(Cock/Fig	
2000:	133;	Meskell	2012).	In	the	process	of	fencing	in	“fortress	reserves”,	an	irreconcilable	
distance	was	created	between	nature	and	(African)	culture.	As	Meskell	(2012:	18–19)	
observes:		
	
“The	monolithic	desire	to	save	wildlife,	regardless	of	the	harm	that	effort	might	cause	
living	communities,	has	led	conservationists	to	idealize	national	parks	as	the	ultimate	
moral	good	while	eschewing	the	immorality	of	destroying	human	lifeways	(…)	
Connections	to	historic	or	ancestral	sites	and	ongoing	traditions	are	attenuated	and	
cultural	and	natural	heritages	remain	oppositional.”	
	
Africans	were	moved	to	rural	areas	on	the	periphery	of	parks,	which	were	overcrowded	and	
devoid	of	opportunities	for	social	mobility.	With	the	advent	of	the	formalized	system	of	
apartheid	in	1948,	African	people	experienced	“double	exclusion”	from	national	parks.	They	
were	denied	visitor’s	access	to	the	parks	and	systematically	excluded	from	the	governance	of	
parks	(Cock/Fig	2000:	132).211	Parks	such	as	the	KNP	came	to	represent	another	mechanism	of	
																																																						
211	Until	the	1980s	black	visitors	to	the	Kruger	National	Park	could	only	overnight	at	the	rudimentarily	equipped	
Balule	tented	camp.	Economic	deprivation	through	apartheid	restricted	access	further	as	few	Africans	had	access	
to	cars	and	dispensable	income	to	afford	vacations	(Cock/Fig	2000:	132).	
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apartheid	rule.	The	apartheid	regime	actively	promoted	the	view	that	Afrikaners	had	set	up	
national	parks	and	the	black	population	came	to	perceive	parks	as	“manifestations	of	
apartheid”.	The	terrible	irony	between	Africans	having	to	move	to	so-called	homelands	while	
animals	were	protected	on	their	former	land	is	striking.	The	governing	board	of	the	KNP	did	
little	to	elevate	the	situation,	instead	minutes	of	meetings	reflect	that	Africans	were	labelled	
as	“cannibals”,	“bloodthirsty	barbarians”	and	“poachers	undoubtedly	the	most	bloodthirsty,	
cruellest	and	most	ruthless	of	the	earth’s	inhabitants”	(cited	by:	Carruthers	1995:	100).	In	
attrition,	the	KNP	also	served	as	a	springboard	for	military	operations	of	the	apartheid	regime,	
including	the	training	of	South	African	Defence	Force	(SADF)	soldiers,	the	covert	supply	of	
military	support	and	supplies	to	Resistência	Nacional	Moçambicana	(RENAMO)	in	
Mozambique	and	the	launch	of	a	chemical	weapons	attack	against	Frente	de	Libertação	de	
Moçambique	(FRELIMO),	also	in	Mozambique	(Cock/Fig	2000:	132).	Moreover,	both	the	KNP	
and	Ndumo	Game	Reserve	were	considered	strategic	buffer	zones	preventing	the	entry	of	
undocumented	migrants	and	guerrilla	fighters.	Two	military	units	were	based	in	the	KNP:	One	
dealt	with	the	protection	of	wildlife,	the	other	with	the	detection	and	arrest	of	undocumented	
migrants	from	Mozambique	(MacKenzie	1998).	The	apartheid	regime	used	so-called	
conservation	areas	thus	not	only	for	conservation	but	also	for	military	purposes.	Perhaps	not	
surprising,	many	of	the	former	apartheid	military	counter-insurgency	operatives	have	found	a	
new	home	in	anti-poaching	units	in	the	new	South	Africa,	creating	further	distance	between	
local	black	communities	and	conservation.		
	
The	early	history	of	nature	conservation	in	South	Africa	is	thus	deeply	intertwined	with	the	
colonial	project	and	the	systematic	exploitation	of	African	people,	leading	to	land	
expropriation,	the	loss	of	hunting	rights	and	forced	local	people	into	exploitative	labour	
relationships	with	colonial	settlers.		The	connection	of	conservation,	parks	and	wild	animals	
with	structural	violence	experienced	by	local	people	renders	wildlife	conservation	a	highly	
contentious	issue,	which	requires	more	than	a	tacit	acknowledgment	that	wrongs	were	
committed.	The	following	sections	highlight	how	consecutive	and	parallels	conservation	
regimes	followed	a	similar	pathway,	further	alienating	and	side-lining	local	people.	
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4.4	Private	rhinos:	The	commodification	and	privatization	of	the	rhino	
	
This	section	provides	a	brief	background	to	the	emergence	of	private	ownership	of	rhinos	and	
the	wildlife	ranching	industry	in	South	Africa,	Zimbabwe	and	Namibia212	in	the	1960s.	Wildlife	
numbers	had	been	greatly	decimated	outside	designated	conservation	areas	in	South	Africa	
by	the	1950s.	Farmers	perceived	of	wild	animals213	as	vermin,	and	they	appeared	to	pose	a	
significant	threat	to	domestic	livestock	by	competing	for	water	and	grazing	while	supposedly	
carrying	deadly	diseases.	The	underlying	mantra	of	“you	can’t	farm	in	a	zoo”	led	to	the	
conversion	of	large	tracts	of	semi-arid	savannah	into	agricultural	land	during	the	1800s	and	
early	1900s.	Individual	as	well	as	public	land	use	decisions	were	largely	motivated	by	short–
term	economic	planning	and	led	to	a	preference	for	land	use	practices	that	yielded	tradable,	
consumable	and	profitable	commodities	(Krug	2001:	5).	The	apparent	advantages	of	these	
conventional	forms	of	agricultural	production	were	further	reinforced	by	generous	state	
subsidies	provided	to	white	landowners	in	South	Africa	and	Namibia	(which	was	administered	
																																																						
212	Namibia	is	the	second	largest	rhino	range	state	in	Africa.	As	of	31	December	2012,	the	African	Rhino	Specialist	
Group	recorded	2	274	rhinos,	of	which	524	were	southern	white	rhinos	and	1	750	were	black	rhinos	(CITES	
Secretariat	2013).	While	I	was	conducting	fieldwork	in	2012	and	2013,	only	isolated	poaching	incidents	had	
occurred	in	Namibia	since	the	late	1980s.	A	total	of	6	(known)	rhinos	were	poached	between	2006	and	2012.	In	
light	of	the	poaching	crisis	happening	in	neighbouring	South	Africa,	the	question	arose	why	Namibia	was	being	
spared	from	rhino	poaching.	Experts	surmised	that	this	was	linked	to	rhinos	being	scattered	across	dry,	arid	and	
far-flung	regions	of	Namibia,	the	existence	of	a	successful	community	conservancy	programme	and	lack	of	
support	infrastructure	for	criminal	networks.	Unfortunately,	the	status	quo	has	changed:	In	2014,	24	black	rhinos	
were	poached,	and	a	consignment	of	14	rhino	horns	was	intercepted.	A	further	81	rhinos	were	poached	in	the	
arid	country	in	2015.		Namibia	gained	its	independence	from	South	Africa	in	1990.	Since	gaining	independence,	
the	Namibian	government	developed	new	conservation	institutions	and	laws.	These	new	initiatives	include	the	
famous	programme	of	community	conservancies,	for	which	reformed	poachers	are	recruited	as	rhino	guardians.	
The	community	conservancy	programme	incorporates	community	beneficiation	and	close	cooperation	with	
chiefs,	headmen/women	and	neighbouring	farmers.	Namibian	conservators	developed	the	novel	and	somewhat	
contested	method	of	dehorning	rhinos	as	a	conservation	method	in	the	1980s.	In	light	of	the	poaching	incidents	
during	2014,	the	Namibian	government	announced	its	plan	to	dehorn	all	rhinos	in	national	parks	and	private	
conservancies	during	2015	(Njini	13	October	2014).	Interviews	with	rogue	wildlife	professionals	and	convicted	
poachers	in	South	Africa	indicated	that	illegal	hunting	and	dehorning	was	also	taking	place	in	Namibia,	involving	
both	Namibian	and	South	African	wildlife	professionals	(Interviews,	2013).	
	
213	A	legal	and	semantic	difference	applies	to	the	terms	‘wild	animals’,	‘wildlife’	and	‘game’.	The	terms	are	often	
used	interchangeably	without	regard	to	the	nuanced	meanings.	The	term	‘wildlife’	is	used	for	indigenous	animals	
while	‘game’	is	used	for	animals	that	are	hunted	for	amusement	or	in	a	‘fair	chase’	(Carruthers	2008:	162).	
According	to	South	African	common	law,	wild	animals	(ferae	bestiae)	are:	“[T]hose	animals	that	exist	in	a	wild	
state	anywhere	in	the	world.	These	animals	are	wild	by	nature	and	include	not	only	those	animals	that	are	
savage	by	nature	but	also	those	of	a	more	wild	and	timid	nature	and	cannot	be	classified	as	domestic	animals”	
(LAWSA	2014b).	‘Ordinary	game’	and	‘protected	wild	animals’	are	sub–categories	of	‘wild	animals’,	which	affects	
property	rights	and	liability	for	their	behaviour	(LAWSA	2014a).	
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by	South	Africa)	after	the	ascendancy	of	the	National	Party	to	power	and	the	rise	of	the	
apartheid	regime	in	the	late	1940s	(compare	with	Table	5).		
	
	
 
Table	5:	The	changing	political	ecology	of	wildlife	
Phase Economic	and	political	events Wildlife	conservation	and	utilization 
Pre-industrial	economy Low	human	populations • Use	limited	by	ability	or	costs	of	harvesting	
• Institutions	aimed	at	sharing	spoils	of	the	hunt 
Frontier	economy Industrial	revolution	 	
European	colonial	expansion 
• Costs	of	harvesting	greatly	reduced	by	technology	
• Technology	and	globalization	increase	market	access	
• Few	rules	or	norms	to	control	use 
Wildlife	is	nationalized Agricultural	expansion	after	World	War	II	
Urbanization	of	Western	society • Control	of	wildlife	centralized	in	the	state	• Commercial	use	greatly	restricted 
Sustainable	use	approach Land	reform	in	postcolonial	societies	
Emergence	of	transfrontier	conservation	areas	
	
Land	reform	and	etransfrontier	
conservation		
• Use	of	wildlife	devolved	to	landholders	(and	later,	communities)	
• Commercial	uses	encouraged	
 
 
	
Source:		adapted	from	Child	(2012:	2)		
	
Commencing	in	the	1960s,	a	number	of	parallel	processes	resulted	in	what	some	have	termed	
“a	conservation	revolution	in	South	Africa”(Bothma/Rooyen/Rooyen	2004:	840).		The	
development	of	wildlife	ranching	contributed	to	the	commodification	and	privatization	of	
wildlife	in	general,	and	the	rhino	in	specific;	further	entrenching	property	rights	of	the	white	
elite	while	depriving	black	communities	of	the	same.	The	parallel	processes	include	scientific,	
environmental,	institutional,	legal	and	broader	socio-political	and	structural	processes,	which	
led	to	public	officials,	corporations	and	private	individuals	recognizing	the	economic	value	of	
wild	animals	through	consumptive	and	non-consumptive	forms	of	wildlife	ranching.	
Essentially	these	processes	created	a	formal	and	legal	market	for	live	rhinos	and	rhino	
products	on	the	supply	side	while	also	producing	a	growing	pool	of	disenfranchised	black	rural	
communities	with	limited	means	to	generate	income.	Rhinos	(and	other	wild	animals)	did	not	
only	assist	in	filling	depleted	state	coffers	through	the	sale	of	live	animals	to	conservation	
organizations	and	private	investors,	but	they	also	presented	a	lucrative	return	on	investments	
as	immediate	profit–generating	assets	to	economic	elites	(Interview	with	wildlife	professional,	
2013).	In	pre-Convention	times,	the	legal	market	in	rhino	horn	involved	the	trade	of	live	
rhinos,	rhino	horns	and	the	hunting	of	rhinos	for	sports	trophies.	As	will	be	shown	in	later	
sections,	the	early	years	provided	the	foundations	for	certain	criminal	activities	to	flourish	and	
for	gray	channels	to	develop	into	fully-fledged	illegal	supply	chains.		
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The	institutional	recognition	of	wildlife	ranching	as	a	legitimate	agricultural	activity	required	
both	the	national	government	and	provincial	public	servants	to	overcome	bureaucratic	inertia	
and	path	dependency,	which	also	affected	the	apartheid	bureaucracy.	Bureaucrats	in	the	
national	Ministry	of	Agriculture	had	rigid	ideas	as	to	what	constituted	“agriculture”	and	as	a	
result,	there	was	limited	support	for	the	inclusion	of	wildlife	ranching	as	a	viable	land	use	
option	in	the	1960s.	Moreover,	the	Department	of	Veterinary	Affairs	considered	wild	animals	
as	a	threat	to	domestic	animals	due	to	the	potential	for	transmission	of	diseases.	Scientific	
interest	in	game	ranching	had	emerged	in	the	former	Rhodesia	(Zimbabwe)	and	elsewhere	in	
Africa	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s.	Possibly	inspired	through	the	diffusion	of	regional	
and	international	trends,	the	then	Transvaal	Directorate	of	Nature	Conservation214	took	the	
lead	and	commissioned	several	scientific	studies	to	research	the	viability	and	sustainability	of	
game	ranching	on	private	land	in	the	early	1960s.	Without	going	into	the	finer	details	of	the	
various	studies,215	scientists	commented	on	the	unsuitability	of	high-intensity	farming	
practices	on	marginal	farmland.	While	game	ranching	was	neither	touted	as	the	silver	bullet	
to	future	food	production	in	Africa,	the	sustainability	of	the	agricultural	sector	nor	as	a	wildlife	
conservation	approach,	it	was	perceived	to	offer	viable	alternatives	to	failing	farming	
enterprises	(Carruthers	2008:	168).	There	was	mounting	scientific	agreement	that	“killing	
wildlife	commercially	was	ecologically	acceptable	(even	desirable)”	(ibid).	The	practice	of	
culling	and	selling	wildlife	was	already	being	implemented	in	South	African	national	parks	such	
as	the	KNP,	where	wildlife	managers	assessed	and	determined	the	“carrying	capacity”	of	the	
ecosystem,	and	“excess”	numbers	were	cropped	to	achieve	“acceptable”	numbers	of	wildlife	
(Carruthers	2008:	168).	On	a	regional	level,	many	conservators	were	moving	from	the	
preservationist	conservation	paradigm	to	the	sustainable	use	paradigm,	which	proffered	the	
new	mantra	of	‘use	it	or	lose	it’	(Child	2012:	2)	or	in	modern	South	African	parlance	‘if	it	pays	
it	stays’	(Interviews,	2013).	Technological	innovations	such	as	aerial	censuses	to	count	wildlife	
																																																						
214	From	1910	to	1994,	the	South	African	province	of	Transvaal	was	located	north	of	the	Vaal	River	and	its	capital	
was	Pretoria.		After	the	first	democratic	elections	in	1994,	the	country	was	divided	into	nine	9	provinces,	and	the	
Transvaal	province	ceased	to	exist.	
	
215	Scientists,	for	example,	pointed	to	the	suitability	of	wild	animals	(especially	ungulates)	to	grow	in	great	
numbers	on	arid	and	semi–arid	land,	which	otherwise	lay	barren	or	had	become	ecologically	and	financially	
unprofitable,	or	where	livestock	had	been	affected	by	deadly	diseases	such	as	the	highly	contagious	herbivore	
disease	Rinderpest	or	by	the	Tsetse	fly	(carrier	of	the	sleeping	sickness).	Wild	animals	were	immune	to	many	
diseases	afflicting	domestic	livestock	while	also	well–suited	for	providing	animal	protein	for	the	growing	
population	numbers	in	South	Africa	(Carruthers	2008:	167–168).	
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by	fixed-wing	aircraft	or	helicopters	and	the	development	of	sedative	darting	technologies	
and	opioid	tranquilizers,	as	well	as	game	capture	and	translocations	methods	further	assisted	
the	advancement	of	wildlife	management,	which	evolved	in	conjunction	with	biological	and	
ecological	studies	into	a	fully–fledged	field	of	scientific	inquiry,	conservation	approach	and	
industry	(Carruthers	2008:	168).	Central	to	understanding	what	the	privatization	and	
commodification	of	wildlife	meant	to	local	communities	is	an	appreciation	of	the	resultant	
marginalization	and	criminalization	of	these	communities,	which	the	following	sections	
highlight.	
	
	
4.4.1	Private	ownership	rights	
	
The	institutional	turn	eventually	happened	in	the	1970s	when	both	the	agricultural	and	nature	
conservation	bureaucracies	began	to	appreciate	the	profitability	of	the	sector.	However,	the	
issue	of	propriety	had	to	be	resolved	first.	It	was	already	mentioned	above	that	wild	animals	
are	considered	res	nullius	under	South	African	common	law,	meaning	that	nobody	owns	
them.216	Until	the	1960s,	two	conditions	had	to	be	met	for	ownership	of	a	res	nullius	to	be	
recognized:	“[T]he	occupier	must	take	control	of	the	object	(occupatio),	with	the	intention	of	
becoming	the	owner	(animus	possidendi).”	(Glazewski	2000:	op	cit).217	The	principle	of	res	
nullius	had	provided	the	backbone	of	expropriation	of	indigenously	owned	land	and	wildlife	
during	colonial	times.	As	an	indirect	beneficiary218	of	the	sale	of	licenses	for	the	hunting	of	
wild	animals	(van	Hoven	2015:	272),	the	state	had	little	incentive	to	convert	wild	animals	into	
private	property	at	first.	
			
																																																						
216	Wild	animals	fall	into	the	category	of	res	intra	commercium	(objects	that	can	be	owned)	as	opposed	to	things	
incapable	of	private	ownership,	which	is	connected	to	the	principle	of	res	extra	commercium	(such	as	the	sea	and	
seashore)	(Glazewski	2000:	426).	
	
217	Because	wild	animals	tend	to	roam	or	migrate	freely	across	the	land,	it	proved	difficult	to	determine	the	
extent	of	physical	control	necessary	to	establish	legal	ownership	of	wild	animals.	Another	question	related	to	the	
specific	point	at	which	an	established	owner	of	a	wild	animal	loses	ownership	should	it	escape	or	stray	
(Glazewski	2000:	427).	
	
218	Provincial	authorities	handle	hunting	permits.	
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However,	while	the	principle	of	res	nullius	applied	to	wild	animals,	private	landowners	
showed	limited	interest	in	preserving	wildlife	with	no	tangible	economic	benefits	accruing	
other	than	the	intrinsic,	aesthetic	and	symbolic	value	of	wildlife.	Ironically,	the	legal	principle	
that	had	served	indigenous	expropriation	and	white	appropriation	of	land	and	wildlife	during	
the	colonial	period	failed	to	protect	sufficiently	the	interests	of	the	emerging	game	ranching	
industry.	As	a	result,	there	were	about	ten	privately-owned	game	ranches	in	South	Africa	by	
the	1960s	(Bothma/Suich/Spenceley	2012:	147)	while	wildlife	was	almost	exclusively	
conserved	on	state–owned	land.	It	is	particularly	noteworthy	that	it	was	the	state	that	
provided	the	impetus	to	stimulate	privatization	of	conservation.	At	the	time	conservation	
agencies	pursued	the	ambitious	conservation	objective	of	reinstating	species	that	had	gone	
locally	extinct,	to	their	historical	range	by	way	of	newly	developed	translocation	methods.	The	
range	expansion	project	extended	beyond	public	parks	and	conservation	areas.	Especially	the	
former	Natal	Parks	Board	(now	Ezemvelo	KZN	Wildlife)	subsidized	the	procurement	of	wild	
animals	by	providing	them	free	of	charge	or	below	market	value	to	private	individuals	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s	(discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter).	This	would	not	only	provide	
species	teetering	on	the	brink	of	extinction	with	a	fighting	chance	at	survival	and	recovery,	but	
it	would	also	increase	the	total	area	available	to	conservation	and	create	buffer	zones	
adjacent	to	state-owned	conservation	land	(Interviews	with	conservators	10	&	11,	2013).	The	
Transvaal	Directorate	of	Nature	Conservation	again	took	up	a	leadership	role	by	introducing	
the	‘certificate	of	adequate	enclosure’	in	1968,	which	was	subsequently	rolled	out	to	the	
other	provinces.	This	certificate	exempted	landowners	from	regulations	applicable	to	hunting	
seasons	and	bag	limits,	meaning	that	wild	animals	thus	could	be	hunted	all	year	round.	
Landowners	were	invited	to	apply	for	the	certificate	if	they	could	demonstrate	adequate	
game-proof	fencing	(Reilly	2014).219	Upon	provision	of	proof	of	adequate	enclosure,	game	
ranchers	could	also	apply	for	government	subsidies	in	times	of	drought	or	other	natural	
disasters	(van	Hoven	2015:	106).		In	essence,	game	farmers	were	granted	ownership	of	
wildlife	and	the	right	to	derive	income	from	consumptive	utilization,	such	as	the	killing	of	wild	
animals	for	profit	(Lindsey/Roulet/Romañach	2007:	463).	Beyond	fencing	in	wild	animals	and	
claiming	ownership	rights	both	over	land	and	wild	animals,	this	move	further	cemented	the	
																																																						
219	A	multi-strand	nine-foot	fence	designed	to	keep	wild	animals	inside	the	game	ranch	constituted	the	minimum	
standard	of	adequate	enclosure	(Reilly	2014).	
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alienation	and	deprivation	of	rural,	local	communities	from	access	to	land	and	resources.	
Once	these	property	and	ownership	rights	had	been	asserted,	subsistence	hunting	on	game	
farms	was	inevitably	branded	as	poaching	and	accessing	private	land	for	the	purposes	of	
seeking	grazing,	water	or	medicinal	plants	was	deemed	as	the	criminal	offence	of	
‘trespassing’.	The	apartheid	regime	employed	this	category	of	crime	to	prevent	black	South	
Africans	from	moving	around	freely	in	demarcated	“whites-only”	areas,	which	included	parks,	
private	land	and	towns.	Moreover,	the	physical	demarcation	between	land	for	wild	animals	
and	human	beings	entrenched	notions	of	fortress	conversation	(seemingly	at	loggerheads	
with	sustainable	use	approach	professed	by	game	farmers),	which	stress	the	incompatibility	
of	humans	and	wild	animals	living	in	harmony.	According	to	this	paradigm,	wild	animals	and	
humans	should	be	kept	apart	as	to	minimize	human-wildlife	conflict.	Dangerous	wild	animals	
were	to	be	contained	within	game	fences,	which	effectively	demarcated	‘no-go	areas’	for	local	
communities.	If	a	farmer	were	to	find	an	unknown	black	person	‘trespassing’	on	the	land,	
there	was	the	danger	of	getting	shot	on	sight	(Interviews,	2013).	The	waiver	of	the	res	nullius	
principle	entrenched	by	the	new	regulation	also	strengthened	the	relationship	between	the	
apartheid	state	and	the	white	farming	community,	one	of	its	main	powerbases	and	further	
contributed	to	social	re-ordering	and	engineering	of	rural	apartheid	South	Africa.	
		
Game	ranching	derives	income	from	consumptive	(hunting	and	meat	production)	and	non–
consumptive	use	of	wildlife	(eco-tourism	and	sale	of	live	animals	at	auctions).	In	the	
aftermath	of	severe	droughts,	the	outbreak	of	Rinderpest	and	the	linked	decline	of	the	price	
of	meat	in	the	1960s,	as	well	as	the	changing	property	rights,	livestock	farmers	started	to	
migrate	to	game	ranching	or	‘mixed’	farming.	The	cultural	significance	of	hunting	amongst	
Afrikaners220	further	assisted	the	conversion	from	traditional	farming	methods	to	game	
ranching.	The	commercial	trophy	hunting	industry	took	off	in	the	1960s	as	hunters	started	to	
pay	to	stalk	wild	animals	(Scriven/Eloff	2003:	246).	The	new	brand	of	game	ranchers	soon	
realized	the	economic	value	of	carrying	trophy	animals	on	their	land.	High-value	species	such	
as	elephants,	lions,	buffalos	and	leopards	(together	with	the	rhino,	these	five	species	are	
																																																						
220	Du	Toit	(2011:	11)	explains	the	cultural	significance	of	hunting	as	follows:	“The	culture	of	the	Boer	is	to	hunt	
and	from	there	are	the	well-known	words,	“Die	Boer	en	sy	Roer”	(The	farmer	and	his	rifle	(sic)).	Hunting	for	food	
can	never	be	classified	as	a	sport	since	this	constitutes	a	cultural	action	rather	than	a	sport.”	
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known	by	the	hunting	marketing	brand	‘Big	Five’)	can	be	hunted	across	southern	Africa.221	
Hunting	of	black	and	white	rhinos	is,	however,	only	permitted	with	the	required	paperwork	in	
Namibia	and	South	Africa	(Lindsey/Roulet/Romañach	2007:	457).	Since	then	trophy	hunting	
has	become	a	major	income	generator	on	game	ranches	(see	Table	6).222	After	the	end	of	the	
apartheid	regime,	the	industry	experienced	a	major	growth	spurt,223	which	is	partially	linked	
to	the	lifting	of	the	economic	sanctions	by	the	international	community	and	the	depreciating	
value	of	the	South	African	currency	over	the	past	decade.	Moreover,	white	farmers	regarded	
game	reserves	as	secure	investments	that	might	be	spared	from	land	claims224	and	labour	
unrest	(Interviews	with	journalist	1,	2013;	rhino	owner	3,	2013).	In	2013,	hunting	tourists	
spent	an	estimated	1.072	billion	South	African	Rand	(approximately	80	million	€)	on	7	638	
hunts	(Professional	Hunters'	Association	of	South	Africa	9	December	2014).	Trophy	hunting	
proponents	assert	that	the	profit	margins	of	trophy	hunting	outperform	other	types	of	wildlife	
use	(Bothma/Suich/Spenceley	2012:	154);	however,	such	claims	have	been	questioned	(see	
for	example:	Joubert	2015).	While	the	hunting	fraternity	makes	claims	to	beneficiation	of	
rural	communities	living	near	hunting	reserves	through	the	provision	of	jobs	and	meat	
(Interview	with	professional	hunting	representative,	2013),	there	is	little	evidence	of	equitable	
income	distribution.	In	addition,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	some	of	the	(mostly	illegal)	
hunting	profits	never	reach	South	African	shores.	This	lack	of	equitable	income	distribution	is	
linked,	amongst	others,	to	the	lack	of	wildlife	legislation	enforcing	community	involvement,	
communal	ownership	of	wildlife	or	skills	transfer	allowing	communities	to	run	their	own	
hunting	operations	or	negotiate	fair	terms	with	operators	and	hunting	outfits	(Lindsey	2008:	
45).		
																																																						
221	Trophy	hunting	is	banned	in	Botswana	and	Swaziland.	
	
222	Despite	the	growth	and	influence	of	the	animal	rights	movement	and	the	anti-hunting	lobby	in	the	northern	
hemisphere,	there	was	little	debate	about	the	ethics	of	hunting	in	South	Africa	in	the	early	years	of	the	game	
ranching	industry.	This	shortcoming	may	be	linked	to	the	country’s	pariah	status	and	isolation	from	the	
international	community	while	the	apartheid	regime	was	in	power,	as	well	as	the	cultural	importance	attached	
to	hunting	(which	is	not	specific	to	the	Afrikaner	people	only).	
	
223	Many	international	trophy	hunters	were	unperturbed	by	the	politics	of	the	apartheid	regime	and	had	already	
moved	their	business	south	once	Kenya,	the	former	top	hunting	safari	destination	banned	all	hunting	to	save	its	
wildlife	from	extinction	in	1977.	
	
224	The	issue	of	land	restitution	to	its	former	owners	(who	had	been	disowned	during	colonial	and	apartheid	
times)	is	a	contested	issue	and	provides	for	on-going	conflicts	in	post-apartheid	South	Africa.	According	to	
interviews	with	white	farmers,	investing	in	game	reserves	was	deemed	preferable	over	traditional	agricultural	
ventures	because	local	people	“would	not	want	to	farm	or	live	amongst	wild	animals”.	Moreover,	wild	animals	
(the	main	assets	beyond	the	land	itself)	could	be	moved	or	sold	(Interview	with	rhino	owner	7,	2013).	
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Moreover,	where	community	beneficiation	is	affected,	conflicts	have	arisen	over	who	is	in	
charge	of	equitable	income	distribution	to	members	or	who	negotiates	on	behalf	of	the	
community	(see	also:	Kahler/Gore	2012).	The	local	political	elite	in	the	form	of	traditional	
leaders	or	chiefs	tends	to	act	as	negotiators	between	outside	parties	and	the	community	in	
rural	southern	Africa,	and	“if	you	are	on	the	wrong	side	of	the	chief,	then	you	will	see	no	
money	or	benefits”	(Focus	group	with	community	members,	2013).	
	
Table	6:	Annual	income	of	the	South	African	wildlife	industry	in	2011	
Sector	 Value	(ZAR)	 Value	(€)	 Percentage	
Recreational	hunting	industry		 3,100,000,000		 283,300,000	 66	
Translocation	(capture)	 750,000,000	 68,542,600	 16	
Trophy	hunting	industry		 510,000,000	 46,609,000	 11	
Taxidermy		 200,000,000		 18,278,000	 4	
Live	animal	sales	(auctions)		 94,000,000	 8,590,670	 2	
Meat	production		 42,000,000		 3,838,390	 1	
Total	 4,696,000,000		 429,168,000	 100	
	
Source:	adapted	from	du	Toit/van	Schalkwyk	(2011:	11)	
	
Wildlife	had	been	imbued	with	monetary	value	or	commodified	in	Marxian	terms,	and	by	
1987,	the	Department	of	Agricultural	Development	recognized	game	ranching	as	a	fully-
fledged	agricultural	activity.	So-called	‘shareblocking’	legislation	(the	1988	amendment	to	the	
Share	Block	Control	Act	of	1980)	allowed	for	the	joint	acquisition	of	agricultural	land	for	the	
purposes	of	converting	it	into	private	conservation	areas.	A	group	of	people	could	buy	blocks	
of	shares	in	a	company	that	effectively	owned	all	movable	and	immovable	assets	on	a	piece	of	
agricultural	land	(Hearne/McKenzie	2000:	427).	This	led	to	new	opportunities	for	city	dwellers	
to	own	their	own	piece	of	land	‘out	in	the	bush’	and	more	business	people	became	‘weekend	
farmers’.	So–called	‘cheque	booking	farming’	involved	wealthy	executives	“shielding	taxable	
income	from	bonuses	and	share	options	by	investing	in	farms”	(Lester	2014).	This	move	also	
strengthened	the	conservation-business	nexus	in	as	far	as	game	farms	became	increasingly	
managed	as	businesses.	As	will	be	shown	in	later	chapters	of	this	dissertation,	the	smart	
partnership	between	some	rogue	wildlife	professionals	and	business	entrepreneurs	led	to	the	
establishment	of	front	companies	and	legitimate	companies,	through	which	trophies	could	be	
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exported	abroad.	While	conservation	objectives	were	a	drawing	card	for	many	game	farmers,	
the	business	of	game	farming	had	to	be	profitable	to	be	sustainable	and	to	interest	potential	
investors.	
	
The	limits	of	the	common	law	position	that	wild	animals	could	not	be	owned	remained	
unsatisfactory	to	investors,	especially	since	the	wildlife	and	hunting	industries	had	grown	
tremendously	since	the	1970s.	White	rhinos,	for	example,	were	selling	for	an	average	price	of	
R	34	713	(about	7000	German	Mark	at	the	time)	at	game	auctions	in	1989.	Unless	game	
(rhino)	ownership	became	legally	protected,	wild	animals	in	general	and	rhinos	in	specific	
posed	a	financial	liability	to	owners	(South	African	Law	Commission	1990:	5)	and	thus	the	
state	intervened	again.	The	South	African	Law	Commission	tackled	the	issue	in	1989.	Its	
recommendations	led	to	the	Game	Theft	Act	105	of	1991	(Glazewski	2000:	428),	which	still	
applies	today.	The	objective	of	the	Act	is	to	protect	the	landowner’s	rights	of	ownership	of	
game	when	the	game	escapes	or	is	lured	away	from	the	landowner’s	“sufficiently	enclosed”	
land	(Glazewski	2000:	ibid).	It	is	rather	curious	that	the	corollary	does	not	apply	to	wild	
animals	that	cross	from	national	parks	to	private,	communal	or	provincial	reserves	in	South	
Africa.	Upon	leaving	the	confines	of	national	parks,	wild	animals	revert	to	the	status	of	res	
nullius,	and	not	res	publicae	(resources	owned	by	the	state)	or	res	communis	(resources	
owned	in	common).	The	categories	of	res	publicae	(wild	animals	in	US	national	parks	are	
categorized	as	res	publicae)	and	res	communis	place	restrictions	on	the	rule	of	capture	and	
reserve	certain	proprietary	rights	to	the	state	or	community	rather	than	to	individuals	
(Wodarski	2014).	While	South	African	biodiversity	and	conservation	legislation	protects	
ownership	rights	of	the	private	commercial	game	ranching	industry,	it	fails	to	deal	with	the	
acquisition,	retention	and	loss	of	wild	animals	that	occur	or	escape	from	public	wildlife	
conservation	areas	and	national	parks	(Hopkinson/van	Staden/Ridl	2008:	484).	This	omission	
has	led	to	heated	debates	amongst	opposing	camps	in	the	trophy	hunting	debate,225	
especially	since	some	national	parks	have	dropped	their	boundary	fences	with	privately-
owned	game	reserves	that	allow	trophy	hunting.	Wild	animals	deriving	from	public	parks	
																																																						
225	The	morality	of	sports	or	trophy	hunting	is	subject	to	many	normative,	moral	and	ethical	debates,	ranging	
from	contested	issues	pertaining	to	the	killing	of	animals	for	pleasure,	trophies	or	sport,	and	extending	through	
to	broader	existential	discussions	on	whether	animals	as	sentient	beings	should	enjoy	the	same	inalienable	rights	
as	human	beings.		
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might	thus	be	hunted	for	profit	on	private	land	(see	Box	1).	Some	conservators	consider	the	
state’s	dropping	of	fences	as	an	incentive	for	private	operators	to	carry	on	with	their	private	
conservation	endeavours226	while	also	increasing	the	total	surface	area	available	to	
conservation	(Interviews	2013).	There	have	been	instances	where	hunting	operators	have	
“removed”	game	fences	between	national	parks	and	adjacent	game	reserves	by	throwing	
battery	acid	on	boundary	fences	(Interview	with	conservator	13,	2013;	investigative	journalist	
1,	2012;	investigative	journalist	3,	2013;	own	observation	at	boundary	fences).	The	acid	
speeds	up	corrosion	allowing	big	animals	such	as	rhinos	or	elephants	to	break	through	the	
fence	and	migrate	to	the	other	side	of	the	game	fence.	There	have	also	been	occasions	where	
hunting	operators	lured	wild	animals	(e.g.	lions)	from	national	parks	by	hanging	bait	on	
boundary	fences.	While	private	ownership	rights	of	wild	animals	are	protected	on	private	
land,	the	same	ownership	privileges	do	not	accrue	to	the	public	(state).	Trespassing	and	
hunting	are	forbidden	in	national	parks;	however,	the	state	has	no	recourse	to	claiming	
ownership	over	wild	animals	that	have	escaped	from	its	conservation	areas.	The	strange	
disconnect	between	the	hunting	ban	in	national	parks	and	commercial	trophy	hunting	on	
adjacent	private	land	is	discussed	in	Box	1	below.	Suffice	to	mention	here	that	these	muddled	
hunting	and	property	rights	have	led	to	confusion	and	unhappiness	amongst	local	
communities.	Whereas	members	of	their	communities	are	branded	as	“poachers”	when	
hunting	on	private	or	public	land,	wealthy	hunters	are	allowed	to	hunt	wild	animals	against	a	
price	tag	on	private	land	where	the	provenance	of	such	wild	animals	is	not	clear.	
	
																																																						
226	Wild	animals	are	thus	considered	a	‘gift’	or	incentive	to	carry	on	conserving	the	same.	
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Box	1:	White	hunter	versus	black	poacher?	
	
The	Associated	Private	Nature	Reserves	(APNR)	is	an	association	of	privately	owned	game	
reserves	bordering	on	the	Kruger	National	Park.	South	Africa’s	national	parks	authority	
SANParks	agreed	to	drop	Kruger’s	western	boundary	fences	with	adjacent	private	game	
reserves	in	1993,	which	adds	approximately	200	000	hectares	of	conservation	area	to	the	
so–called	Greater	Kruger	National	Park.	The	dropped	fences	allow	for	the	free	movement	
of	wild	animals	in	the	enlarged	conservation	area	while	also	creating	a	buffer	zone	
between	the	national	park,	private	conservancies	and	surrounding	land.	The	hunting	of	
wild	animals	is	not	allowed	in	national	parks	such	as	the	KNP	whereas	the	internal	
constitutions	of	individual	private	game	reserves	determine	what	forms	of	sustainable	use	
are	permissible	in	their	conservation	areas.	The	APNR	allows	commercial	hunting	within	its	
protected	area.	Hunting	permits	are	allocated	through	a	consultative	process,	which	
involves	the	KNP	and	the	Limpopo	Department	of	Economic	Development,	Environment	
and	Tourism	(LEDET)	(AfricaHunting.com	2010).	David	Mabunda,	the	former	chief	
executive	of	SANParks,	declared	that	the	parks	authority	was	not	opposed	to	hunting	in	
buffer	areas	provided	“it	is	done	transparently	and	according	to	the	management	plan	and	
protocols	agreed	to	between	adjoining	landowners	and	SANParks”(Kruger	National	Park	
2009).	According	to	animal	rights	activists	(Interviews,	2013),	the	incompatible	animal	use	
philosophies	of	national	parks	and	game	reserves	constitute	a	potential	conflict	of	interest	
as	“natural	heritage	is	sold	for	profit	to	trophy	hunters	with	limited	benefit	to	the	state	or	
community”.	According	to	Animal	Rights	Africa	(2009:	22),	“[r]hinoceroses	living	in	the	
Kruger	National	Park	are	moving	across	unfenced	boundaries	on	the	Park’s	western	border	
into	the	Associated	Private	Nature	Reserves	(APNR)	and	on	the	Park’s	[E]astern	border	into	
Mozambique	where	they	can	be	privately	sold	to	foreign	trophy	hunters	for	exorbitant	
sums.”	Two	APNR	members	were	amongst	the	first	private	operators	to	obtain	white	
rhinos	from	the	Natal	Parks	Board	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	(Buijs	1987:	1–2).	Unlike	many	
other	private	recipients	of	white	rhinos	(see	later	in	this	chapter),	these	two	operators	
could	account	for	the	fate	of	their	white	rhinos,	which	included	trophy	hunting	of	rhino	
bulls	(Buijs	1987:	29).	While	there	is	only	anecdotal	evidence	that	‘Kruger’	rhinos	may	have	
been	hunted	in	game	reserves	adjacent	to	the	KNP	(their	provenance	is	difficult	to	
establish	as	white	rhinos	across	South	Africa	are	descended	from	the	same	genetic	pool	in	
KwaZulu–Natal),	trophy	hunting	of	rhinos	continues	to	constitute	a	form	of	revenue	to	
some	APNR	reserves	(see	for	example:	Borchert	27	February	2013).	This	muddled	state	of	
affairs	raises	questions	of	why	trophy	hunters	should	be	allowed	to	(potentially)	hunt	
Kruger	rhinos	legally	with	limited	direct	benefits	accruing	to	state	coffers	while	rhino	
poaching	is	an	on-going	concern	in	the	KNP.		Moreover,	this	points	to	a	very	fine	line	
between	‘legal’	trophy	hunting	and	‘illegal’	poaching	and	the	polar	dichotomy	of	‘black	
poacher’	versus	‘white	hunter’	(for	an	excellent	analysis	of	this	dichotomy	and	the	
associated	master	narrative	see	also:	Steinhart	2006).	Essentially,	the	law	sanctions	the	
former	in	exchange	for	money	while	the	latter	commits	a	criminal	act	and	hence	is	
penalized	by	the	law.	According	to	a	professional	hunter	(Interview	with	professional	
hunter	1,	2013),	hunting	and	poaching	differ	in	three	significant	points.	A	hunter	is	highly	
skilled,	strives	to	achieve	a	one-shot	kill	(a	so-called	heart-lung	shot)	and	the	motivation	for	
the	hunt	is	different	to	that	of	a	poacher.	As	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	7,	this	distinction	
may	be	academic;	in	practice,	the	significant	difference	(as	per	those	noted	by	the	
professional	hunter)	relates	to	the	motivation	of	the	hunter	versus	that	of	the	poacher.	
Many	so-called	poachers	are	equally	highly-skilled	aiming	for	a	one-shot	kill	as	not	attract	
the	attention	of	rangers	and	other	security	personnel.	The	distinction	thus	relates	to	how	
the	two	are	legally	defined.	
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4.4.2	Large-scale	conversion	to	game	ranching	in	the	1990s	
	
Some	structural	changes	further	influenced	the	conversion	of	agricultural	land	into	game	
ranches	in	the	1990s.	Commercial	farmers	had	been	one	of	the	social	bases	of	the	National	
Party’s	rise	to	power	in	1948.	The	apartheid	government	ran	the	agricultural	sector	through	
control	boards	and	cooperatives;	commercial	farmers	were	supported	through	subsidies,	
grants,	transport	concessions,	favourable	credit	facilities,	marketing	boards	and	cheap	labour	
(South	African	History	Online	2014).227	Over	the	course	of	the	1980s,	there	was	a	gradual	
weakening	of	the	political	and	economic	power	of	commercial	farmers	within	the	political	
economy	of	South	Africa,	climaxing	with	the	removal	of	the	National	Party	from	power	after	
the	first	democratic	elections	held	in	1994	(Greenberg	2013:	1).	
	
In	the	post–apartheid	era,	commercial	farmers	were	faced	with	multi–layered	challenges,	
including	amongst	others,	the	continued	deregulation	of	the	agricultural	sector	(in	line	with	
the	World	Trade	Organization’s	(WTO)	policy	on	trade	liberalization);	the	loss	of	political	
leverage	(the	farming	lobby	held	about	one-third	of	the	parliamentary	seats	during	the	height	
of	the	apartheid	regime);	the	introduction	of	new	labour	legislation	in	post-apartheid	South	
Africa	(introducing	minimum	wages	for	farm	workers);	the	impact	of	HIV/Aids	and	malaria	on	
the	productivity	of	farm	labourers;	stock	theft,	livestock	diseases,	bush	encroachment	and	
climate	change,	as	well	as	land	claims	for	illegal	land	appropriation	during	the	colonial	and	
apartheid	regimes	(Absa	2003:	1–8;	Carruthers	2008).	The	conversion	to	game	ranching	was	
appealing:	not	only	had	the	monetary	value	of	wild	animals	increased	dramatically	but	game	
ranching	is	less	dependent	on	unskilled	labour	(Smith/Wilson	2002:	11)	and	favourable	
weather	conditions	while	ostensibly	pursuing	the	lofty	goal	of	achieving	a	‘sustainable	living	
planet’	through	growing	wildlife	numbers	(Absa	2003:	8).	Moreover,	game	ranches	were	seen	
as	an	investment	safe	from	land	claims	after	1994.	The	government	had	undertaken	to	
preserve	public	and	private	conservation	areas	as	to	ensure	that	the	total	area	available	for	
conservation	would	not	decrease	(Interview	with	game	farmers	8	&	9,	2015).			
	
																																																						
227	The	apartheid	regime	introduced	a	dual	farming	system	in	rural	areas,	commercial	farming	by	white	farmers	
and	communal	farming	in	African	reserves.	Agricultural	production	was	supposedly	based	on	“pre-colonial	
forms”	of	farming	in	the	reserves,	“meant	to	perpetuate	the	myth	of	the	continuity	of	rural	life	while	in	reality	
denying	African	the	means	to	sustain	themselves	off	the	land”	(South	African	History	Online	2014).	
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The	confluence	of	these	processes	has	led	to	healthy	growth	of	game	farms	and	reserves:	In	
the	early	1960s,	there	were	approximately	500,000	wild	animals	in	the	whole	of	South	Africa	
(van	Hoven	2015:	104),	including	an	estimated	840	white	rhinos	(Collins,	Alan/Fraser,	
Gavin/Snowball,	Jen	2013:	2).228	By	2015,	there	were	11	600	registered	game	farms	in	South	
Africa	holding	some	21	million	hectares	of	land	(van	Hoven	2015:	101)	and	between	16	to	20	
million	wild	animals	(Reilly	2014).	Meanwhile,	the	total	size	of	private	rhino	reserves	in	South	
Africa	stretches	over	an	area	of	about	two	million	hectares	incorporating	about	380	separate	
properties,	similar	in	size	to	the	Kruger	National	Park	(KNP).	By	December	2014,	27	%	(or	
about	5000	animals)	of	the	national	population	of	white	rhinos	and	20	%	(or	450	animals)	of	
black	rhinos	were	protected	on	private	land	in	South	Africa.		
	
Beyond	the	need	for	the	provision	of	support	services	and	goods	(such	as	game-proof	fencing,	
off-street	vehicles	and	ranching	infrastructure),	wildlife	ranching	led	to	the	creation	of	new	
semi-skilled	and	skilled	job	categories	such	as	wildlife	veterinarians,	game	managers	and	
consultants,	and	to	the	growth	of	the	taxidermy,	game	capture	and	translocation	industries,	
as	well	as	supplementary	feed	manufacturers	and	suppliers	(du	Toit/van	Schalkwyk	2011;	van	
Hoven	2015:	102).	The	claim	that	the	wildlife	ranching	employs	three	times	more	staff	than	
livestock	farms	(Dry	2011;	Langholz/Kerley	2006)	deserves	critical	examination.	While	some	
game	reserves	and	farms	continued	to	employ	farm	workers	and	their	extended	families	(who	
had	been	living,	working	and	farming	on	the	land),	the	services	of	trackers,	guides,	drivers,	
cleaning	and	catering	staff	were	needed	on	game	farms	(Hearne/McKenzie	2000:	426).	
Instead	of	re-skilling	or	providing	training	courses	to	resident	farm	workers,	labour	was	often	
sought	in	nearby	cities	and	town	(Helliker	2013:	17).	The	conversion	of	farmland	to	game	
ranches	thus	affected	hundreds	of	black	farm	workers	and	dwellers,229	whose	services	were	
no	longer	required	on	game	ranches.	Similar	to	what	played	out	upon	the	promulgation	of	
national	parks	and	game	reserves,	many	black	farmworkers	were	either	paid	off,	retrenched	
																																																						
228	There	are	conflicting	number	estimates.	Wildlife	counts	were	less	reliable	in	the	absence	of	modern	census	
technologies	now	available	to	wildlife	professionals.	The	choice	was	made	to	go	with	the	numbers	supplied	by	
the	Natal	Parks	Board	and	Dr	Ian	Player,	who	were	working	intimately	with	rhinos	at	the	time.		
	
229	The	displacement	of	black	farmers	was	part	of	the	colonial	project	in	South	Africa.	As	white	settlers	
appropriated	land,	hut	taxes	were	imposed,	and	economic	pressure	increased,	many	people	living	on	farms	
became	farm	workers,	or	they	entered	into	contractual	arrangements	with	white	farmers	to	retain	access	to	land	
(Hall	2003:	2).	
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and/or	(and	continue	to	be)	evicted	from	privately	owned	game	ranches	and	reserves.230	
These	practices	were	particularly	pronounced	before	the	end	of	apartheid	when	farm	workers	
enjoyed	no	legal	protection	from	their	employers.	With	the	advent	of	democracy	and	the	end	
of	white	minority	rule,	the	fortunes	of	farm	workers	have	changed	on	paper	but	few	know	
their	rights	and	continue	to	be	vulnerable	to	eviction	and	exploitative	labour	conditions	
(Berger	2011;	Human	Rights	Watch	2011).	Beyond	the	setting	up	phase,	game	ranches	are	less	
‘hard’	labour-intensive	(Smith/Wilson	2002:	11)	and	farm	workers	and	dwellers,	and	their	
livestock	were	expelled	or	denied	access	under	the	guise	of	“people,	livestock	and	wildlife	are	
a	lethal	combination”	(Interviews	with	game	ranchers	and	convicted	poachers,	2013).	Lester	
(2014)	puts	this	further	into	perspective	by	referring	to	the	large	percentage	of	foreign	
ownership	of	game	reserves:		
	
“Game	farming	used	to	be	largely	confined	to	the	Lowveld	and	northern	parts	of	RSA.	
Then	we	got	to	the	new	South	Africa	and	we	came	up	with	the	wonderful	idea	that	
game	farms	bring	tourists,	foreign	currency,	jobs	and	a	whole	lot	more	to	the	new	RSA.	
And,	yes,	some	operators	have	made	a	huge	contribution.	But	let’s	be	honest,	many	
game	farms	are	paying	lip	service	to	the	true	meaning	of	sustainable	development.	
Any	old	dunny	with	foreign	currency	can	swan	into	RSA	and	buy	up	what	was	a	
farming	concern,	sell	off	the	livestock,	pay	off	the	workers	and	turn	the	land	into	a	
personal	private	zoo.	Then	find	a	nice	African	name	and	call	it	a	‘conservatory’.”	
	
The	tolerance	of	the	South	African	state	for	absentee	and	foreign	landownership	further	
exacerbates	the	‘land	question’,231	and	the	racially	skewed	landownership	patterns.		There	
																																																						
230	In	a	study	undertaken	on	behalf	of	the	Wilderness	Foundation	(a	private	foundation	started	by	the	late	Dr	Ian	
Player),	the	authors	found	“no	evidence	of	farm	workers	being	laid	off	in	the	establishment	of	the	PGRs”	
(Langholz/Kerley	2006:	10).	The	workers	either	found	employment	with	the	private	game	reserve	(PGR)	or	
moved	with	their	original	employers.	Approximately	52%	of	the	original	farm	workers	had	remained	in	the	
employment	of	the	PGR.	Langholz	and	Kerley’s	survey	data	derived	from	completed	questionnaires	provided	by	
ten	of	thirteen	Indalo	(Eastern	Cape	Association	of	Private	Game	Reserves)	members	in	2006.	The	study	also	
found	that	the	average	annual	salary	of	fulltime	employees	had	increased	4.8	fold,	which	is	attributed	to	the	high	
salaries	paid	to	senior	staff.	Interestingly,	a	report	by	a	local	NGO	provides	data	that	contradicts	the	study,	
documenting	evictions	and	cases	where	the	farm	workers’	socioeconomic	rights	were	eroded	by	not	allowing	
them	to	keep	livestock,	grow	vegetables,	or	denied	them	access	to	the	land	(Naidoo	2005:	28–30).	There	is	scant	
empirical	evidence	on	the	fortunes	of	farm	workers	in	private	game	reserves	from	other	sources.	Advocacy	
campaigns	and	reports	by	unions	and	others	have	also	been	less	positive	in	their	appraisal	(Lester	2014;	Wisborg	
et	al.	2013;	Parliamentary	Monitoring	Group	2011).	Sentiments	of	dissent	and	unhappiness	were	also	echoed	in	
interviews	and	focus	groups	undertaken	with	rural	communities	and	convicted	poachers	(some	of	whom	had	
been	farm	workers	or	their	next-of-kin	were).	
	
231	The	‘land	issue’	of	resolving	the	dispossession	and	expropriation	of	black-owned	land	during	the	colonial	and	
apartheid	regimes	remains	one	of	the	most	important	issues	within	the	public	and	political	discourse	in	South	
Africa.	
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has	been	substantial	foreign	investment	in	some	reserves	–	such	as	Richard	Branson’s	private	
lodge	in	the	western	Sabi	Sands	game	reserve		(he	is	one	of	many	international	investors	of	
the	game	reserve	adjacent	to	the	KNP)	or	‘Dubai	World’,	the	investment	arm	of	the	United	
Arab	Emirates’	government	that	acquired	majority	shares	in	the	Shamwari	Game	Reserve	in	
the	Eastern	Cape	(Helliker	2013:	16).	Moreover,	the	creation	of	amalgamated	and	corporate-
owned	game	reserves	has	changed	the	land	structure	towards	larger	tracts	of	land,	which	
contradicts	the	South	African	government’s	land	reform	policy	of	promoting	smaller	farming	
units	(Wisborg	et	al.	2013:	59–60).	
	
There	is	a	growing	rift	between	the	state	(who	effectively	allowed	private	ownership	of	
wildlife	for	the	purposes	of	wildlife	conservation)	and	members	of	the	game	ranching	
fraternity	who	have	branched	out	into	‘less	conservation-orientated	endeavours’.	This	new	
school	of	game	ranchers	has	introduced	exotic	(non-indigenous)	species,	such	as	fallow	deer	
from	western	Eurasia,	Russian	wild	boar,	roan	antelope	from	West	Africa	and	sable	antelope	
from	Zambia.	There	also	has	been	a	focus	on	breeding	trophy	specimens	and	the	birth	of	an	
entire	industry	based	on	phenotypic	colour	variations	within	a	species.	These	practices	
concern	conservators	as	the	selection	of	certain	traits	departs	from	the	notion	of	natural	
selection	and	free-ranging	wild	populations	(Reilly	2014).	The	objective	of	phenotypic	
breeding	is	the	diversification	and	expansion	of	available	trophy	animals	(Interview	with	
wildlife	vet	2	and	farm	manager	1,	2013).		The	promulgation	of	the	earlier	mentioned	
Threatened	or	Protected	Species	(TOPS)	regulations	(discussed	in	Chapter	5	and	below)	were	
partially	triggered	by	the	injudicious	movement	and	introduction	of	non-indigenous	wild	
animals	–	which	is	also	relevant	to	the	rhino	issue	as	the	TOPS	regulations	stipulate	that	the	
rhino	should	not	be	moved	to	areas	that	fall	outside	its	historical	range.		
	
Essentially,	the	processes	described	above	led	to	the	social	re-ordering	of	rural	South	Africa,	
imbued	wildlife	with	economic	value,	encouraged	the	privatization	of	and	the	buy-in	of	
corporations	into	‘conservation’	initiatives,	further	alienating	local	communities	from	land	and	
wildlife	and	providing	the	ideal	conditions	for	poaching	to	flourish	(such	as	impoverishment;	
loss	of	agency,	land	and	hunting	rights;	unhappiness	with	the	rules).	It	also	led	to	the	
interdependence	of	state	and	private	conservation	initiatives	and	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	
lucrative	wildlife	industry.	The	privileged	position	of	obtaining	highly	subsidized	wildlife	from	
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the	state,	assurance	of	private	ownership	of	the	same	and	the	political	leverage	of	the	farming	
community	during	apartheid	led	to	some	wildlife	ranchers	feeling	underappreciated	in	the	
new	dispensation	(Interviews,	2013).	The	increased	regulation	of	the	private	sector	(such	as	
the	TOPS	regulations)	and	the	perceived	threat	of	dispossession	of	land	and	wildlife	have	led	
to	growing	resentment	amongst	wildlife	farmers	and	landowners.	In	some	instances,	these	
feelings	of	resentment	and	the	perceived	unfairness	of	the	rules	have	provided	fodder	to	
bend	the	rules,	exploit	legal	loopholes	or	engage	in	illegal	activities	(which	will	be	discussed	in	
Chapter	6).	In	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	the	hunting	and	wildlife	industries	are	almost	
exclusively	made	up	of	a	homogenous	group	of	white	economic	elites.	Attempts	to	obtain	
statistics	on	the	level	of	transformation	within	the	wildlife	and	hunting	sectors	were	
unsuccessful	from	important	gatekeepers	(e.g.	how	many	black	professional	hunters	are	
there?	How	many	black-owned	rhino	farms	and	reserves	are	there?).	A	well-known	exception	
is	South	Africa’s	current	deputy-president	Cyril	Ramaphosa	who	is	a	famous	wildlife	breeder	
and	who	came	in	for	critique	after	he	bid	on	a	$2	million	buffalo	during	a	wildlife	auction	
(Findlay	[SAPA-AP]	2014).	
	
4.4.3	Privatization	of	the	rhino	
	
While	the	privatization	of	rhinos	has	been	portrayed	as	an	unqualified	conservation	success	
story	(‘t	Sas-Rolfes	2012;	Bothma/Suich/Spenceley	2012),	the	darker	side	is	often	disregarded.	
By	virtue	of	the	apartheid	race	laws,	black	people	were	legally	excluded	from	owning	land	and	
wild	animals	until	the	end	of	the	colonial	apartheid	regime	in	1994.	The	privatization	of	
wildlife	inclusive	of	rhinos	contributed	to	an	even	greater	distance	between	local	people,	wild	
animals	and	conservation	endeavours.	Beyond	the	systematic	exclusion	of	black	people,	rhino	
conservation	on	private	land	was	fraught	with	notions	of	privilege	and	entitlement	by	rhino	
breeders	and	conservators.	The	private	landowners’	need	to	generate	profits	to	run	game	
farms	and	reserves	provided	the	point	of	entry	for	illegal	economic	action,	the	exploitation	of	
legislative	and	regulatory	loopholes.	This	critical	assessment	constitutes	a	departure	from	the	
grand	narrative	of	the	uncritical	rhino	conservation	success	story	in	South	Africa	and	is	further	
unpacked	in	the	following	section.	
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The	rhino	indeed	takes	centre	stage	in	the	privatization	and	commodification	of	wildlife	in	
South	Africa,	enriching	landowners	and	farmers	with	little	benefit	to	local,	rural	communities.	
The	number	of	white	rhinos	in	the	Hluhluwe-iMfolozi	Park	in	KwaZulu-Natal	had	been	reduced	
to	about	50	to	70	animals	in	the	early	20th	century	(Interview	with	Ian	Player	by	Jeff	Barbee,	
2013)	and	had	gone	locally	extinct	elsewhere	in	South	Africa.	Through	successful	breeding	and	
conservation	programmes	within	the	park,	white	rhino	numbers	had	increased	by	the	1960s.	
In	fact,	rhino	numbers	started	exceeding	the	carrying	capacity	of	the	park,	and	there	were	
fears	that	an	outbreak	of	disease	could	revoke	the	recovery	of	the	white	rhino.	It	was	at	this	
point	that	the	Natal	Parks	Board232	commenced	“Operation	Rhino”,	which	over	the	course	of	
the	1960s	and	early	1970s	saw	more	than	1,200	white	rhinos	relocated	from	the	iMfolozi	
Game	Reserve	to	the	KNP,	private	game	reserves,	as	well	as	zoos	and	safari	parks	abroad.	
New	immobilization	and	translocation	methods	greatly	assisted	this	project	(Emslie	et	al.	
2009:	22).	The	Natal	Parks	Board	had	envisaged	that	the	provision	of	white	rhinos	at	low	cost	
to	private	landowners	would	render	them	effective	custodians	of	rhinos.		The	first	white	
rhinos	were	thus	sold	to	private	landowners	at	highly	subsidized	prices	and	possibly	below	
market	value	in	1963.		The	market	value	was	unknown	at	this	point	as	the	rhino	had	not	been	
economically	valued	in	South	Africa	(unlike	in	consumer	markets	in	the	Arab	peninsula	and	
Asia).	A	former	official	of	the	then	Natal	Parks	Board	pointed	out	that	the	state	had	to	
persuade	some	game	farmers	to	take	on	rhinos	as	they	were	by	no	means	coveted	wild	
animals	in	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	(Interview	with	conservator	10,	2013).	The	former	parks	
official	recounted	the	story	of	trying	to	sell	rhinos	to	an	unwilling	buyer	(Interview	with	
conservator	10,	2013):		
	
“I	said	to	him:	‘Look	we’ve	got	a	surplus	of	white	rhino	and	it’s	quite	embarrassing	
because	they	are	exceeding	the	carrying	capacity	and	we’ve	been	warned	that	certain	
impoverishment	of	the	ecology	would	take	place	unless	we	moved	them.’		So	the	
thought	of	culling	the	rhinos	so	soon	after	we’d	saved	them	wasn’t	very	palatable.		He	
said:	‘Well,	look	there’s	nothing	I	can	do	with	the	rhino.	If	you	ask	me,	I’m	not	
interested	in	one.’	Then	I	said:	‘Look	we	take	over	R200	each	to	deliver	it.’	And	he	said:	
‘I’m	sorry	I’ll	have	to	put	up	fences.’	And	we	said:	‘	You	know	they	are	so	big	and	
wieldy.’	To	that	he	says:	‘Once	they	break	through	the	fence,	they	can	cause	enormous	
trouble	for	my	neighbors.’…”			
																																																						
232	The	former	province	of	Natal	is	known	as	KwaZulu-Natal	since	the	end	of	apartheid,	and	its	parks	authority	is	
Ezemvelo	KZN	Wildlife,	the	former	Natal	Parks	Board.	
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According	to	rhino	owners	(Interviews,	2013),	the	start-up	costs	of	establishing	a	game	
reserve	with	big	animals	like	rhinos,	elephants,	hippos	or	buffaloes	were	higher	than	standard	
game	reserves	due	to	the	higher	cost	attached	to	procurement,	translocation	and	
management	of	big	animals.	The	reluctance	of	law-abiding	game	farmers	to	keep	rhinos	in	the	
1970s	was	also	linked	to	the	blanket	ban	on	the	trade	of	live	rhinos	and	their	products	
imposed	by	CITES	in	1977,	showcasing	how	the	treaty	was	counterproductive	to	conservation	
initiatives	in	the	early	years.	As	a	consequence	of	the	trade	ban,	rhino	trophies	could	not	be	
exported	to	international	destinations.	While	there	was	a	growing	local	hunting	industry	(e.g.	
cultural	hunting	of	the	Afrikaners),	local	hunters	preferred	to	hunt	for	food	or	as	an	
expression	of	cultural	values	(du	Toit/van	Schalkwyk	2011).		South	Africa	allowed	the	export	
of	hunting	trophies	of	white	rhinos	from	1979	onwards	again.	As	a	result	of	the	high	cost	
attached	to	keeping	rhinos	and	low	returns	on	investments	(initially),	rhino	ranching	became	
largely	an	economic	activity	for	the	wealthy	elite	or	for	ranchers	who	could	gain	the	
confidence	of	foreign	and	local	investors	or	trophy	hunters.	Once	the	profitability	of	the	rhino	
as	a	trophy	animal	became	known,	the	Natal	Parks	Board	struggled	to	meet	the	demand	for	
rhinos	(Interview	with	conservator	10,	2013)	and	a	waiting	list	had	to	be	instituted.	Despite	
tripling	the	list	price	for	rhinos,	the	demand	for	rhinos	outstripped	the	supply.	Following	in	the	
footsteps	of	a	private	individual	who	auctioned	off	his	rhinos,	the	Natal	Parks	Board	held	its	
first	auction	in	1986.	The	six	rhinos	on	auction	achieved	more	than	double	the	list	price.	In	
light	of	the	success	and	in	response	to	the	Buijs	report	(discussed	below),	parks	authorities	
started	to	back	the	auction	system	(‘t	Sas–Rolfes	2011:	4).		
			
By	the	mid–1980s,	the	Natal	Parks	Board	grew	concerned	over	the	lack	of	growth	of	rhino	
numbers	on	private	land,	and	this	eventually	led	to	an	investigation	by	Daan	Buijs	in	1987.	The	
so-called	Buijs	report	traced	and	recorded	the	histories	of	all	translocations	of	white	rhinos	
from	Natal	Game	Reserves,	Bophuthatswana	Parks233	and	private	sales.	Of	the	1,291	white	
rhinos	translocated	to	private	land	between	1961	and	1987,	there	was	an	unexplained	loss	of	
510	white	rhinos	on	private	land.	While	there	were	deaths	during	and	after	translocation,	the	
annual	growth	rate	should	have	been	around	6%.	Buijs	(1987:	2)	remarked:		
	
																																																						
233	Bophuthatswana	was	a	homeland	in	the	northwestern	region	of	South	Africa	during	the	apartheid	regime.	
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“This	data	shows	an	unexpected	decrease	of	510	rhinos	and	the	loss	of	all	rhino	on	45	
ranches	(includes	unknown	destinies)	to	which	rhino	have	been	delivered.	The	fate	of	
the	rhino	of	21	of	the	ranches	could	not	be	established	and	of	the	other	24	all	the	
rhinos	were	shot,	lost	or	sold	(not	always	known	to	whom).”	
	
While	some	founder	populations	were	deemed	too	small	for	breeding	purposes,	the	habitat	
unsuitable	for	rhino	survival	or	single	adult	male	populations	leading	to	no	or	little	
procreation,	Buijs’	report	points	to	the	economic	valuation	of	the	rhino	as	a	trophy	animal	as	
a	cause	for	concern	(Buijs	1987:	10–11).	As	‘t	Sas–Rolfes	(2011:	3)	explains:		
	 	
“In	1982,	the	Natal	Parks	Board	list	price	for	a	live	white	rhino	was	1,000	South	African	
Rand	(R).	That	same	year,	the	average	trophy	price	was	R	6,000.	Any	private	
landowner	receiving	a	live	rhino	had	a	very	strong	incentive	to	sell	it	as	a	trophy	as	
quickly	as	possible	to	pocket	a	600	percent	profit.	The	alternative	was	allowing	it	to	
roam	on	his	property	where	there	was	a	risk	of	losing	it	to	a	poacher	or	neighbour.”	
	
The	value	of	a	white	rhino	trophy	had	surged	to	R	35,	000	(about	17	000	German	Mark)	while	
the	state	carried	on	selling	live	rhinos	at	highly	subsidized	prices	when	Buijs	was	conducting	
his	research	in	1987.	Due	to	the	steady	decline	of	the	South	African	Rand	and	the	advantages	
of	obtaining	foreign	currency,	the	value	of	the	rhino	trophy	was	further	enhanced	(Buijs	1987:	
11).	Moreover,	trophy	hunting	of	rhinos	elsewhere	in	southern	Africa	was	affected	by	intra-
and	interstate	conflicts	and	diminished	numbers	of	rhinos	available	for	trophy	hunting	due	to	
widespread	illegal	hunting.	Foreign	trophy	hunters	were	increasingly	drawn	to	South	Africa.	A	
drawing	card	appears	to	have	been	the	well-known	hospitality	of	South	Africans,	which	seems	
to	have	extended	to	obliging	trophy	hunters	by	allowing	‘unconventional’	hunting	safaris	to	
take	place.234	In	some	instances,	rhino	owners	flouted	basic	principles	of	ethical	hunting,	such	
as	the	tacit	‘gentlemen’s	agreement’	of	not	hunting	breeding	rhino	cows,	rhino	cows	and	their	
calves	or	young	bulls	(Buijs	1987:	8–12).	Others	simply	bought	the	rhino	from	the	state	and	
had	trophy	hunters	shoot	it	soon	thereafter.	This	practice	continues	into	the	present	and	is	
known	as	‘put	and	take’:	“…buy	rhino,	kill	it,	replace	it,	kill	it…”	(Interview	with	provincial	
government	official	1,	2013),	discussed	further	in	Chapter	6.	
	
																																																						
234	Buijs	(1987:	8)	describes	one	such	incident	where	an	American	trophy	hunter	shot	a	rhino	cow,	and	his	son	
shot	her	calf.		
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Buijs	(1987:	14–31)	provides	a	detailed	breakdown	of	recipients	of	public	rhinos	by	name,	the	
location	of	the	reserves	or	farms	and	the	reasons	given	for	the	lack	of	growth	of	rhino	
populations.	It	is	curious	that	some	of	the	same	family	names	and	game	reserves	are	linked	to	
irregular	or	illegal	hunting	operations	close	to	thirty	years	later.	What	also	stands	out	in	the	
Buijs	report	is	the	sense	of	entitlement	expressed	by	some	rhino	owners,	a	sentiment	that	
came	up	during	interviews	conducted	with	wildlife	professionals	in	2013.	Says	Buijs	(Buijs	
1987:	11):	
“Many	landowners	have	allowed	all	their	adult	males	to	be	shot	by	trophy	hunters,	
and	in	many	instances	have	also	provided	breeding	females	for	hunting.	This	has	been	
in	many	cases	justified	by	the	view	that	they	would	be	allocated	more	rhino	by	the	
Natal	Parks	Board.	In	some	instances,	safari	operators	in	Natal	maintained	it	was	the	
Province’s	obligation	that	they	should	be	provided	with	more	rhino	for	hunting.”	
	
As	a	result	of	the	Buijs	report,	the	Natal	Parks	Board	revised	its	allocation	policies	and	started	
selling	its	rhinos	at	market-related	prices	from	1989	onwards	(Emslie/Brooks	1999:	18).	
Conservation	economist	‘t	Sas–Rolfes	(2011:	4)	argues	that	with	the	introduction	of	the	
auction	system,	the	pricing	for	live	rhinos	approached	realistic	market	values.	The	Board’s	
auction	achieved	an	average	price	of	ZAR	49,	000	per	rhino	in	1989,	a	tenfold	increase	of	the	
list	price	of	1986.	Meanwhile,	trophy	hunters	were	willing	to	part	with	between	ZAR	80,	000	
to	more	than	ZAR	90,	000	per	rhino	trophy	in	the	late	80s	and	early	90s	(‘t	Sas–Rolfes	2011:	
4).	While	there	were	incentives	to	breed	rhinos	in	light	of	the	massive	price	increase	of	live	
rhinos,	the	return	on	investments	to	avail	rhinos	for	trophy	hunting	remained	equally	
appealing.		
	
Animal	rights	group	picked	up	on	the	issue	of	the	“missing	rhinos”	to	campaign	for	a	hunting	
and	trade	ban	to	be	imposed	upon	South	Africa	at	CITES	CoP	meetings	in	the	1990s	(Buijs	
1998:	4).	However,	subsequent	surveys	and	assessments	(Adcock/Emslie	1994;	Emslie/Brooks	
1999;	Buijs/Anderson	1989;	Buijs	1987;	Buijs	1998;	Buijs/Papenfus	1996;	Buijs	2002;	
Castley/Hall–Martin	2003;	Hall–Martin	et	al.	2008;	Emslie	2008)	revealed	realistic	growth	
patterns	of	rhino	populations	and	further	regulatory	restrictions	were	thwarted;	in	fact,	the	
white	rhino	was	down-listed	to	Appendix	II	of	CITES	in	1994,	which	allowed	trophy	hunting	
and	the	sale	of	live	animals	(Leader-Williams	et	al.	2005:	4).	The	1994	decision	served	
conservation	initiatives	on	private	land,	allowing	wealthy	landowners	and	hunters	to	derive	
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benefit	from	rhinos.	Meanwhile,	local	communities	remained	marginalized	and	excluded	from	
direct	beneficiation.		
	
Scientists	have	calculated	an	annual	rhino	population	growth	rate	of	6,9	%	for	private	and	
state-owned	rhinos	in	South	Africa	between	1991	and	2010	(Emslie/Milliken/Talukdar	2013:	
4).	The	average	population	growth	rate	of	rhinos	in	captive	breeding	or	intensive	farming	
operations	is	lower	than	that	of	rhinos	kept	in	the	‘wild’;	and	hence,	a	growth	rate	of	5	%	to	6	
%	was	deemed	as	realistic	on	private	land	(Interviews	with	conservators	and	rhino	scientist	9,	
2013).	Moreover,	the	annual	hunting	rates	of	approximately	10,5%	on	private	land	before	
1988	decreased	rapidly.	By	1994,	the	rate	had	dropped	to	3%	(Adcock/Emslie	1994:	1).		
	
	
4.4.4	The	sale	of	live	rhinos	as	a	fundraising	strategy	for	national	parks	
	
The	surveys	conducted	by	Buijs	and	others	are	useful	tools	to	highlight	some	of	the	strengths	
and	weaknesses	of	rhino	conservation	on	private	land.	After	the	unsubsidized	valuation	of	
rhinos	at	public	auctions,	the	rhino	(and	other	wild	animals)	became	major	sources	of	income	
for	parks	authorities.	National	and	provincial	parks	authorities	have	been	dealing	with	
decreasing	budget	allocations	from	the	national	government	(Interviews	with	parks	officials	
2013),	diminished	or	insufficient	revenue	streams	from	other	sources	of	income	including	
tourism	revenues,	subscriptions	and	foreign	donations	(James	et	al,	2000	quoted	in:		Krug	
2001:	10),	as	well	as	other	forms	of	sustainable	use	(Interviews	with	government	officials	and	
conservators,	2013).235		
	
From	the	mid-90s,	rhino	breeding	intensified	and	rhino	populations	grew	both	on	private	and	
public	land.	Park	managers	had	introduced	351	white	rhinos	to	the	Kruger	National	Park	
(KNP),	South	Africa’s	largest	conservation	area	between	1960	and	1972.	The	KNP	rapidly	
became	the	world’s	leading	conservator	of	white	rhinos	and	from	the	mid–1980s	onwards,	
Kruger	rhinos	were	donated	to	other	conservation	areas	and	zoological	gardens.	As	of	the	late	
																																																						
235	The	management	authority	of	the	KNP	had	‘surplus’	wild	animals	including	elephants,	buffaloes	and	hippos	
culled,	slaughtered	and	processed	into	tinned	food	at	an	abattoir	near	Skukuza	between	the	1960s	and	1990s.	
The	abattoir	was	later	closed	down	due	to	successful	campaigning	by	animal	welfare	organizations.	
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1990s,	“a	large	fraction”	of	white	rhinos	were	sold	to	generate	conservation	revenue	
(Ferreira/Botha/Emmet	2012:	5).	Scientists	determine	the	“take	off”	or	“management	
removals”	of	rhinos	per	annum	(Ferreira	2013b:	3).	The	figure	is	linked	to	a	number	of	
variables	such	as	gender,	age,	social	behaviour	and	breeding	success	of	individual	animals	
(Interview	with	KNP	official,	2013).	The	sale	of	live	animals	to	private	operators	and	overseas	
destinations	is	but	one	of	the	strategies	employed	to	make	state-run	parks	profitable,	and	is	
justified	in	terms	of	the	pursuit	of		“purist	biodiversity	conservation	objectives”,	whereby	the	
rhino	is	reintroduced	to	its	historical	ranges	on	private	land	(Ferreira	2013b:	3).	Following	the	
advent	of	democracy	in	1994,	the	former	national	parks	board	morphed	into	the	para-statal	
South	African	National	Parks	(SANParks)	and	actively	sought	private-public	partnerships236	in	
light	of	the	augmented	financing	requirements	for	the	growing	numbers	of	national	parks,	
state-run	game	and	nature	reserves	and	associated	cost	considerations	such	as	community	
resettlement	and	beneficiation.	While	the	privatization	programme	was	aimed	at	generating	
supplementary	financing	and	filling	the	gaps	of	shortfalls	in	public	conservation	spending,	the	
parks	authority	nonetheless	continued	to	sell	wild	animals	as	a	fundraising	strategy	–	initially,	
these	funds	were	used	to	fund	land	acquisition	to	extend	parks	(Ramutsindela	2006:	86).237	
According	to	the	official	narrative,	the	sale	of	live	rhinos	has	been	used	to	fund	anti-poaching	
operations	since	rhino	poaching	escalated	in	public	parks	(Interview	with	KNP	official,	2013).	
However,	these	funds	are	not	ring-fenced	for	rhino	protection	only.	In	response	to	a	
parliamentary	question,	the	Minister	of	Environmental	Affairs,	Edna	Molewa	explained	that	
the	income	generated	from	the	sale	of	animals	accumulates	in	a	special	fund	called	the	‘Park	
Development	Fund’.	SANParks	uses	the	fund	for	“acquisition	of	land	for	inclusion	into	national	
																																																						
236	The	privatization	drive	of	conservation	areas	in	South	Africa	falls	under	the	ambit	of	the	post–apartheid	
neoliberal	macroeconomic	policy	entitled	Growth,	Employment	and	Redistribution	(GEAR),	which	is	geared	
towards	the	privatization	of	state	assets	(Ramutsindela	2006:	90).	Banks,	telecommunications	companies,	
American	foundations	and	international	and	national	charitable	organizations,	for	example,	are	involved	in	
public-private	partnerships	with	SANParks.	The	SANParks	restructuring	and	privatization	programme	in	Kruger	
National	Park	is	known	as	‘Operation	Prevail’	–	a	rather	interesting	choice	of	name	considering	the	history	of	the	
park.	Private	operators	have	been	granted	20-year	concession	contracts	to	upgrade	existing	lodges	or	develop	
new	ones	(Meskell	2012:	180).			
	
237	Several	interview	partners	shared	that	the	revenue	of	rhino	sales	was	used	to	balance	SANParks’	overdraft	
facilities	and	to	finance	bonuses	of	senior	staff.	SANParks	officials	were	not	at	liberty	to	comment	on	this;	
however,	the	national	parks	authority	attempted	to	use	a	gagging	order	to	plug	a	possible	leak	about	bonuses	
awarded	to	its	fundraising	manager.	Investigative	journalists	found	that	the	SANParks	employee	tasked	with	
raising	money	against	rhino	poaching	had	received	hefty	bonus	payments	in	addition	to	his	basic	monthly	salary	
(Legal	Brief	2014).		
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parks,	research	projects	in	the	biophysical	and	social	sciences	relevant	to	national	parks,	
scientific	reports	and	community	beneficiation	projects”	(Molewa	2014).	Parliamentary	
representatives	of	the	main	opposition	party	in	the	South	African	National	Assembly,	the	
Democratic	Alliance	(DA)	also	requested	information	regarding	the	number	of	white	and	black	
rhinos	sold	and	the	respective	buyers	since	2007.	While	the	former	Minister	of	Water	and	
Environmental	Affairs	(Sonjica	2010)	provided	a	detailed	list	of	rhino	buyers	(many	of	whom	
were	implicated	in	illegal	hunting)	in	2010,	the	response	in	2014	was	thin	on	the	details	
stating	“names	cannot	be	published	due	to	exposure	and	security	risks”	(Molewa	2014).		
	
No	gender	differentiation	is	made	in	the	average	prices	cited	in	Table	7;	however,	rhino	cows	
are	more	expensive	than	rhino	bulls.	Two	characteristics	specific	to	rhino	cows	explain	the	
price	differentials:	the	horns	of	female	rhinos	tend	to	be	longer	than	those	of	males	(they	
fight	less),	and	the	buyer	may	“buy	two	for	the	price	of	one”	–	so-called	cow-calf	
combinations	–	should	the	rhino	cow	be	pregnant	or	have	a	young	calf	(Interview	with	
SANParks	official,	2013).		
	
Table	7:	SANParks'	rhino	sales,	2007–2014238	
	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011–2014	
White	rhinos	 87	 91	 252	 138	 	
Black	rhinos	 0	 0	 0	 0	 	
Species	undisclosed	 	 	 	 	 354239	
Average	price	per	rhino/	ZAR	 176	969	 252	341	 207	660	 207	080	 228	984	
Average	price	per	rhino	/	€	 18	355	 20	978	 17	816	 21	369	 19	172	
Total	income	in	ZAR240	 15	396	280	 22	963	000	 52	330	300	 28	577	071	 81	060	538	
Total	income	in	€241	 1	597	124	 1	908	305	 4	489	578	 2	948	948	 6	787	009	
Source:	Extracted	from	responses	to	parliamentary	questions	(Sonjica	2010;	Molewa	2014)	
																																																						
238	The	pricing	excludes	Value	Added	Tax	(VAT).	
	
239	In	response	to	a	parliamentary	question	by	DA	representative	Gareth	Morgan,	Minister	Molewa	stated	that	
108	rhinos	were	allocated	for	potential	sales	in	2011	(Molewa	2011).	SANParks’	annual	reports	for	2011	to	2014	
provide	no	further	details	on	rhino	sales;	however,	the	overall	income	from	wildlife	sales	is	listed	(compare	with	
Table	8).	
	
240	Numbers	have	been	rounded	up	or	down	to	the	next	decimal.	
	
241	The	average	annual	Rand/Euro	exchange	was	used.		
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While	verifying	the	data,	it	was	noted	that	the	rhino	sales	numbers	for	2007	and	2008	did	not	
synchronize	with	data	collected	from	the	2008	survey	of	white	rhinos	on	private	land	in	South	
Africa.242	While	the	number	differentials	appear	cosmetic	and	could	be	attributed	to	either	
party	attaching	a	number	of	rhinos	to	the	wrong	year,	it	points	to	the	larger	problem	of	
accessing	credible	data.	Conflicting	data	on	rhino	sales,	poaching	incidents	and	rhino	census	
numbers	have	become	a	contentious	issue	in	current	debates	on	rhino	conservation	and	
scupper	attempts	to	derive	credible	rhino	contingency	plans.243	
	
The	table	also	fails	to	disclose	the	total	number	of	buyers	(the	number	and	names	of	buyers	
were	only	supplied	in	2010),244	which	is	relevant	if	conservation	objectives	were	to	reign	
supreme	in	making	sales	decisions.	While	some	interview	partners	claimed	that	the	private	
sector	was	no	longer	interested	in	buying	rhinos	due	to	the	rising	costs	of	securing	them,	and	
the	risk	of	poaching,	the	data	suggests	otherwise.	Moreover,	the	average	price	per	rhino	has	
remained	at	constant	levels	at	government	auctions	(there	is	a	considerable	price	variance	at	
private	auctions,	discussed	below).	According	to	economist	Flippie	Cloete	(cited	by	Stoddard	6	
October	2014),	the	average	price	of	rhinos	sold	on	auction	increased	by	a	mere	54	%	between	
1991	and	2013,	whereas	Cape	buffalo	prices	leapt	nearly	five-fold	over	the	same	period.	It	
																																																						
242	The	authors	of	the	report	stated	that	81	instead	of	87	white	rhinos	were	sold	in	2007,	and	96	instead	of	the	91	
sold	in	2008	(Hall–Martin	et	al.	2008:	12).	
	
243	Throughout	the	process	of	data	collection,	I	was	presented	with	conflicting	datasets,	cherry-picked	data	and	
one-sided	narratives.	I	chose	to	point	out	the	conflicting	data	in	this	instance,	as	it	demonstrates	the	difficult	task	
of	sorting	through	verifiable	and	credible	data.	In	this	case,	it	is	the	statement	of	the	Minister	backed	by	
protected	data	–	usually	only	available	to	selected	state	bureaucrats	–	against	data	provided	to	scientists	who	
undertook	the	survey	for	the	WWF-African	Rhino	Programme.	
	
244	The	2010	sale	of	98	white	rhinos	to	John	Hume,	the	owner	of	the	biggest	privately	owned	herd	of	rhinos,	led	
to	concerns	amongst	some	conservators	whether	it	was	perhaps	safer	to	spread	the	risk	of	poaching	and	disease	
amongst	a	greater	number	of	private	individuals	than	a	select	few	(Sonjica	2010,	Interviews,	2013).	In	2008,	
SANParks	suspended	the	sale	of	200	rhinos	to	the	rhino	farmer	after	ten	of	72	rhinos	translocated	to	his	farming	
operation	in	the	Northwest	Province	had	died	(Momberg	2009).	The	SANParks’	habitat	assessment	deemed	the	
farm	in	the	Northwestern	Province	as	unsuitable	habitat,	and	the	translocation	had	happened	“the	wrong	time	
of	year”.	The	deal	was	amended	after	Hume	agreed	to	translocate	the	rhinos	to	his	former	reserve	near	the	KNP.	
The	game	reserve	Mauricedale	had	been	put	on	the	market	at	the	time	of	fieldwork	in	2013.	By	then,	Hume	had	
translocated	the	majority	of	his	herd	of	rhinos	to	his	captive	breeding	facility	in	the	Northwest	Province.	In	2014,	
Hume’s	herd	of	more	than	1000	rhinos	was	affected	by	an	outbreak	of	the	bacterial	disease	Histotoxic	Clostridial	
toxaemia	at	the	Northwest	farm.	About	30	rhinos	died	during	the	outbreak,	which	was	attributed	to	above-
average	rainfall	following	a	period	of	drought.	Several	other	rhino	fatalities	linked	to	the	bacterial	disease	were	
later	reported	from	other	regions	of	South	Africa.	The	rhino	breeder	financed	research	and	development	of	a	
Clostridial	vaccine	for	rhinos	(Game	Warden	2014),	which	has	been	made	available	to	fellow	rhino	breeders	in	
South	Africa	and	abroad	(personal	communication	with	Dr	Michelle	Otto,	2016).	
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appears	bizarre	that	the	sale	trends	of	live	rhinos	would	not	follow	the	same	trajectory	as	
those	of	the	Cape	buffalo	and	other	wild	animals.	A	rhino	owner’s	return	on	investment	pales	
in	comparison	unless	she	offers	trophy	hunts	in	lieu	of	the	sale	of	live	animals.	Thus,	the	
breeding	of	wild	rhinos	and	their	sale	remains	largely	a	function	of	the	state;	however,	the	
supply	of	new	animals	to	the	private	sector	is	under	threat	because	the	illegal	hunting	of	
rhinos	on	public	land	has	reduced	the	total	number	of	rhino	available	for	donations	and	sale	
(Interviews,	2013	and	2014).	The	interdependent	relationship	between	trophy	hunting	(legal	
sector)	and	poaching	(illegal	flows)	is	noticeable	in	this	instance.	
	
Despite	the	threat,	the	sale	of	rhinos	remains	a	major	source	of	income	for	SANParks.	More	
than	half	of	the	park	authority’s	revenue	from	the	sale	of	wild	animals	(see	Table	8)	emanated	
from	the	sale	of	rhinos	in	spite	of	the	“escalating	rhino	poaching	crisis”	(Interview	with	parks	
official,	2013).		Ezemvelo	KZN	Wildlife,	the	parks	authority	responsible	for	managing	protected	
areas	in	the	province	of	KwaZulu-Natal,	also	lists	the	sale	of	white	rhino	as	its	biggest	
contributor	at	live	and	catalogue	game	auctions,	accounting	for	74.9%	of	total	turnover	from	
2008	to	July	2011	(Friedmann	et	al.	2011:	2).	In	2013,	forty	white	rhinos	were	sold	for	close	to	
10	million	Rand	at	Ezemvelo’s	annual	game	auction	in	Durban	(Mngoma	16	May	2013).	One	
year	later,	26	white	rhinos	were	sold	for	11	million	Rand	at	the	2014	game	auction	in	
KwaZulu-Natal.	One	buyer	parted	with	a	record	sum	of	850	000	Rand	(approximately	60	660	
€)	for	a	cow-calf	combination	(Bentley	29	September	2014).	
	
In	2013,	SANParks	officials	noted	“a	spike	in	the	market	of	guys	buying	big”.	Such	private	
operators	either	have	immense	farming	operations	or	are	backed	by	corporate	interests	
(Interviews,	2013).	While	Pelham	Jones	of	the	Private	Rhino	Owners	Association	(PROA)	
estimated	a	potential	loss	of	400	000	hectares	of	rhino	habitat	due	to	an	estimated	40	
reserves	selling	their	rhinos	(Jones	2014),	big	rhino	farmers	and	corporate	conservation	
ventures	are	filling	the	gap.		Although	the	continued	sale	of	rhinos	to	private	operators	is	
touted	as	an	insurance	policy	for	the	survival	of	the	rhino	(Interview	with	SANParks	official,	
2013),	inadequate	attention	is	paid	to	the	buyer’s	profile	and	the	viability	of	their	rhino	
breeding	and	farming	operations.	Despite	Buijs’	call	on	parks	authorities	to	institute	these	due	
diligence	and	background	checks	on	rhino	buyers	more	than	three	decades	ago,	rhinos	
continued	to	be	sold	to	the	highest	bidder	up	until	recently.	The	former	Minister	of	Water	and	
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Environmental	Affairs	acknowledged	in	response	to	a	parliamentary	question	that	SANParks	
put	no	restrictions	on	the	sale	contracts	relating	to	“hunting	and	for	any	activity	beyond	the	
sale”	(Sonjica	2010).	
	
Table	8:	SANParks'	revenue	from	the	total	sale	of	wildlife	versus	live	rhino	sales	(2011-2014)	
	 Revenue	in	ZAR	 Revenue	in	€245	
2011246	 30	000	000		 3	140	516	
2012		 43	310	139	 4	248	299	
2013	 22	701	052.49	 2	105	694	
2014	 38	236	982	 2	881	620	
Total	wildlife	sales	(2011–2014)	 134	248	173.49		 12	376	129	
Total	rhino	sales	(2011–2014)	 81	060	538	 6	787	009	
Sale	of	other	wild	animals	(2011–2014)	 53	187	635	 5	589	120	
	
Source:	South	African	National	Parks	(2010/	2011:	12);	South	African	National	Parks	(2011/2012:	12);	South	
African	National	Parks	(2012/2013:	10);	South	African	National	Parks	(2013/2014:	17)	
	
Once	the	rhino	leaves	the	national	parks,	it	becomes	the	responsibility	of	provincial	
authorities.	In	fact,	unless	a	potential	rhino	buyer	has	been	formally	charged	with	a	criminal	
offence,	rhinos	could	be	(and	were)	sold	to	known	rogue	wildlife	professionals	and	rhino	
owners	implicated	in	illegal	hunting	and	pseudo-hunting	–	a	number	of	the	rhino	buyers	on	
Sonjica’s	list	have	been	charged	with	illegal	hunting,	racketeering	and	related	offences	in	the	
interim	(Sonjica	2010).247	A	KNP	official	explains	the	dilemma	(Interview	with	KNP	official	6,	
2013):		
	
																																																						
245	The	annual	average	exchange	rate	of	South	African	Rand	to	Euro	provided	by	oanda	(www.oanda.com)	was	
employed	to	convert	the	sales	numbers	into	Euro.	Amounts	are	rounded	up	to	the	next	decimal.	
	
246	The	authors	of	the	SANParks	annual	report	for	2010/2011	(South	African	National	Parks	2011/2012:	13)	
provide	an	approximate	amount	for	the	sale	of	wild	animals,	stating	“the	total	income	generated	for	the	2010/11	
financial	year	exceeded	R30	million	exclusive	of	VAT.”	
	
247	While	security	concerns	might	be	a	legitimate	reason	not	to	disclose	names	of	rhino	buyers,	the	2010	
disclosure	revealed	‘creative’	practices,	such	as	wildlife	veterinarians	and	game	capturers	buying	rhinos	on	behalf	
of	others	(e.g.	Dr	Karel	Toet	bought	rhinos	for	Dawie	Groenewald,	who	has	been	charged	with	more	than	1,800	
crimes	involving	the	illegal	trade	in	rhino	horn).	
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“We	decided	to	do	pre-tender	qualifications	because	at	our	auctions	we	have	very	
little	control	over	who	you	sell	it	[the	rhino]	to.	So	when	you	put	it	out	on	an	advert	
and	people	bid,	and	then	you	look	at	the	best	prices,	and	we	allocate	accordingly.	And	
then	we	have	a	habitat	form	that	we	send	out	and	a	questionnaire.	So	we	do	try	and	
act	responsibly	with	whom	we	sell	to;	but	obviously	it’s	a	little	bit	more	complex	than	
that,	because	whoever	buys	it	from	us	doesn’t	necessarily	keep	it,	he	might	sell	it	on.	
You	know.	So	we’re	actually	dependent	on	the	provincial	permits	systems	to	be	
functional	and	I	don’t	think	that’s	the	case.	So	that’s	why	we	put	extra	steps	in	place	to	
try	and	mitigate	that.	Like	that	questionnaire	and	if	somebody	wants	to	buy	more	than	
20	rhinos	he	needs	to	indicate	what	he	wants	to	do	with	them	and	where	they	will	be	
held	and	you	know	if	it’s	free	range	or	intensive	and	all	of	those	types	of	things...[…]…	
Well,	at	one	stage,	we	had	a	sort	of	approach	that	if	the	person	hasn’t	been	formerly	
charged	we	can’t	really	not	supply	to	them,	if	they’ve	got	a	legal	permit	and	they’ve	
actually	got	everything.	But	we’ve	actually	tightened	that	up	now.	If	people	are	being	
investigated,	we	will	try	and	not	to	sell	to	them	directly.	Unfortunately	people	are	
clever	and	they	know	ways	of	getting	around	things.”	
	
The	disconnect	between	rhino	conservation	objectives,	transparent	administrative	procedures	
and	due	diligence	checks	came	under	the	spotlight	in	August	2014.	At	the	time,	the	Minister	
of	Environmental	Affairs	made	an	announcement	that	up	to	500	rhinos	would	be	translocated	
to	other	national	parks,	private	game	reserves	and	foreign	locations	as	part	of	the	integrated	
rhino	conservation	strategy.	In	an	exposé	and	a	complaint	to	South	Africa’s	public	protector	
shortly	after	the	announcement,	wildlife	activists	revealed	that	260	rhinos	had	already	been	
sold	to	three	hunting	outfits	in	the	Northern	Cape	(Thomson	16	August	2014;	MacLeod	9	
September	2014).	At	least	one	of	the	three	outfits	had	links	to	pseudo-	and	illegal	hunting	
syndicates	(Thomson	16	August	2014,	independently	confirmed	by	an	organized	crime	
investigator,	2015)	and	a	possible	conflict	of	interest	was	noted	as	one	SANParks	board	
member	had	interests	in	one	of	the	hunting	farms	in	the	past	(Thomson	16	August	2014).	
Subsequent	to	the	exposé,	SANParks	cancelled	the	sales	contracts;	the	deposits	were	
returned	to	the	outfitters,	and	an	official	was	suspended	pending	the	outcome	of	arbitration	
proceedings.	It	was	alleged	that	the	official	had	signed	off	on	the	deals	without	the	board’s	
approval,	which	he,	in	turn,	denied	(Reinstein	21	August	2014).	While	the	Public	Finance	
Management	Act	1	of	1999	permits	the	disposal	of	moveable	state	assets	“at	market	related	
value	or	by	tender	or	auction”	(quoted	by:	Thomson	16	August	2014)	and	security	
considerations	might	legitimize	the	move	away	from	auctions;	however,	private	direct	sales	
and	cached	tender	procedures	impede	public	and	media	scrutiny	of	the	sale	of	valuable	
species	of	South	Africa’s	natural	heritage	to	private	and	public	entities	in	South	Africa	and	
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abroad.	Beyond	withdrawing	rhino	sales	from	the	public	realm	and	scrutiny,	the	sales	prices	
are	open	to	price	fixing,	manipulation	and	corrupt	activities.	The	260	rhinos	allegedly	were	to	
be	sold	for	60	million	Rand	(approximately	4	213	900	€),	equating	to	an	average	price	of	230	
700	Rand	per	rhino	(approximately	16	200	€)	(Thomson	16	August	2014).	Rhino	sales	have	
been	achieving	higher	prices	at	private	game	auctions	(compare	with	Table	9)	and	the	average	
price	of	white	rhinos	at	the	Ezemvelo	KZN	Wildlife	public	auction	was	approximately	423	100	
Rand	per	animal	(approximately	29	600	€)	in	2014	(Bentley	29	September	2014).	The	private	
sales	of	rhinos,	the	swapping	of	rhinos	for	other	wild	animals	or	far	more	nefarious	activities	
including	the	swapping	of	rhino	horn	for	live	rhinos	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	After	
the	botched	rhino	sales,	a	SANParks	spokesperson	released	a	set	of	criteria248	that	SANParks	
employed	to	determine	whether	rhinos	would	be	translocated	to	potential	buyers.	It	remains	
unclear	whether	these	criteria	are	considered	when	sales	contracts	are	initially	signed.	
	
What	is	particularly	interesting	about	most	public	and	private	auctions	of	rhinos	is	that	the	
animals	are	described	in	terms	of	“length	of	horn	in	inches”	(Interviews,	2013).	In	that	vein,	it	
is	curious	that	the	Vleissentraal	auctioneers	describe	one	of	the	rhino	cows	on	auction	as	
“pregnant	of	a	33	“	[inch]	bull”	(see	Table	9),	which,	in	this	case,	refers	to	the	length	of	the	
bull’s	horn.	The	peculiar	description	supports	the	notion	that	the	price	of	a	rhino	is	
determined	in	terms	of	the	length	of	its	horns	(or	potential	length	of	the	progeny’s	horn)	
rather	than	gender,	fecundity	or	age.	Interviews	with	wildlife	professionals,	park	officials	and	
rhino	farmers	(Interviews,	2013)	confirmed	the	rather	precarious	relationship	that	emerged	
between	the	state	and	private	operators.	Says	one	wildlife	professional	(Interview,	2013):	
	
“So	what	a	lot	of	people	miss	is	not	only	the	entitlement	that	the	farmer	feels	and	that	
he	is	truly	entitled	to.	He	just	bought	this	[rhino].	Most	of	them	come	from	the	parks.	
And	they	bought	them,	either	by	inch	or	horn	but	they	bought	them	–	not	one	but	
hundreds.	The	last	auction	it	was	100	inches	out	of	Hluhluwe.249	So	you	are	talking	
about	200	rhinos	per	year	at	least.	They	were	coming	out	in	numbers,	as	fast	as	our	
trucks	could	move	them.	We	were	driving	rhino,	you	know.	Before	the	ban,	I	was	
																																																						
248	The	translocation	criteria	include	the	historical	range	of	habitats,	suitable	habitat	present,	welfare	
considerations	such	as	sufficient	space	for	social	interactions,	safety	and	security	of	rhinos,	the	management	
experience	of	managers	and/or	rhinos,	the	legal	histories	of	managers	and	owners	and	logistical	challenges	
(Reinstein	21	August	2014).	
	
249	Hluhluwe	iMfolozi	Park	is	a	public	nature	reserve	in	South	Africa.	The	Park	was	mentioned	earlier	in	
connection	with	“Operation	Rhino”,	the	successful	rhino	expansion	programme	of	the	former	Natal	Parks	Board.	
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probably	doing	about	300	per	year.	We	were	really	moving	rhino	around.	There	was	a	
very	healthy	industry	associated	with	it.	They	used	to	be	a	market,	now	it’s	only	in	
Namibia.”	
	
	
Table	9:	Price	of	rhinos	at	Vleissentraal	private	auctions	in	South	Africa	in	2014	
	 Price	per	rhino	in	
Rand	(March	’14)	
	
Price	in	€250	 Price	per	rhino	in	
Rand	(May	2014)	
Price	in	€	
White	rhino	bull	 225	000	 15	454	 310	000	 21	721	
White	rhino	cow	
and	calf		
530	000	 36	404	 750	000	 52	550	
White	rhino	
heifer	(pregnant	
of	33”	bull)	
600	000	 41	212	 /	 /	
White	rhino	cow	 540	000	 37	091	 450	000	 31	530	
White	rhino	
heifer	
380	000	 26	101	 /	 /	
	
Source:	extracted	from	Vleissentraal	(2014);	Thomson	(16	August	2014);	MacLeod	(9	September	2014)	
	
	
Beyond	the	sale	of	rhinos	to	local	operators,	rhinos	are	also	sold	to	safari	parks	and	zoological	
gardens	elsewhere	in	the	world.	The	sale	of	live	animals	and	their	translocation	to	foreign	
destinations	constitutes	a	legal	flow	of	rhinos	and	their	horn,	permitted	by	the	CITES	
regulatory	framework.	This	legal	flow	came	under	the	spotlight	after	live	rhinos	were	sold	to	
rhino	horn	consumer	countries,	including	Vietnam	and	China.	According	to	the	Department	of	
Water	and	Environmental	Affairs,	a	total	of	101	rhinos	were	exported	from	South	Africa	
between	1	January	2007	and	20	April	2012.	30	rhinos	of	the	101	rhinos	obtained	permit	
endorsements	at	O	R	Tambo	International	Airport,	South	Africa’s	major	international	airport.	
																																																						
250	The	price	in	€	was	determined	via	the	historical	exchange	converter	on	www.oanda.com.	The	amounts	are	
rounded	off	to	the	next	decimal.	
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The	Northwest	Provincial	Authority251	had	initially	approved	the	permit	applications	of	the	
rhinos;	however,	none	of	the	permit	applications	stated	the	name	of	the	rhino	exporter	
(originator)	or	the	final	recipient	in	the	importing	countries	in	Asia.	In	some	cases,	the	address	
of	the	importer	was	given	(Molewa	2012b).		Private	operators	including	game	capture	and	
translocation	companies	were	involved	in	the	sale	of	rhinos	to	Asian	countries.		A	SANParks	
official	(Interview	with	Conservator	12,	2013)	said:		
	
“From	ourselves,	there	was	not	directly	any	export	to	China.	It	was	taken	to	Australia,	
to	America,	and	that	was	through	the	International	Rhino	Foundation,	which	was	a	
major	zoo.	You	had	to	go	and	inspect	the	zoos	in	the	whole	International	Rhino	
Foundation	so	those	were	above	board.	Animals	that	were	bought	from	us,	we	won’t	
be	able	to	say	what	went	where	because	like	I	say	if	they’ve	got	destinations	that	
we’ve	got	on	our	permit	system,	from	there	they	could	have	gone	anywhere	they	
could	have	been	loaded	straight	onto	the	plane	or	maybe	hunted,	we	won’t	know.”	
	
In	response	to	a	parliamentary	question	regarding	the	export	of	a	further	seven	white	rhinos	
to	Vietnam	in	2012	(Vietnam	had	been	identified	as	a	major	consumer	country	by	then),	the	
DEA	advised	that	the	CITES	management	and	scientific	authority	in	Vietnam	had	confirmed	
that	the	animals	would	be	used	for	zoological	purposes	only.	Moreover,	the	recipient	was	
“suitably	equipped	to	house	and	care	for	the	animals”	(Molewa	2012a).252	At	the	time	of	the	
parliamentary	question,	the	DEA	was	in	the	process	of	formalizing	an	additional	requirement,	
which	has	since	then	been	implemented.	In	line	with	the	CITES	Conference	Resolution	11.20	
(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	44),	the	recipient	captive	facility	is	required	to	be	an	institutional	
member	of	the	World	Association	of	Zoos	and	Aquaria	(WAZA)	and	the	receiving	country	
should	possess	adequate	legislation	to	ensure	that	the	live	animals	are	only	used	for	the	
purposes	indicated	on	the	CITES	export	and	import	permits	to	prevent	unauthorized	use	
(Interview	with	government	official	3,	2013).	While	it	is	a	matter	of	conjecture	what	happened	
to	the	rhinos	that	went	to	China,	Vietnam,	Turkmenistan,	Japan	and	Myanmar	–	there	is	
anecdotal	evidence	that	some	rhinos	were	sent	to	state-run	captive	breeding	facilities	in	
China,	where	the	horn	was	harvested	for	scientific	purposes	(Interviews,	2013).		
																																																						
251	Officials	in	the	employ	of	the	permitting	authority	of	the	Northwest	Province	have	been	linked	to	permit	fraud	
and	attending	‘pseudo’	hunts	involving	Vietnamese	hunters	without	investigating	why	so-called	professional	
hunters	were	unable	to	shoot	the	target	of	their	trophy	hunts	themselves	(see	Chapter	6).		
	
252	Attempts	were	made	to	establish	details	of	the	fate	of	those	seven	rhinos	while	on	fieldwork	in	Vietnam.	
Apparently	five	of	the	original	rhinos	had	survived	and	were	living	in	a	safari	park	near	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	
(Interviews,	2013).		
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The	privatization	of	wildlife	put	further	distance	between	local	communities,	landowners	and	
wildlife,	creating	community	perceptions	that	wildlife	conservation	trumped	concerns	over	
social	and	economic	development.	The	colonial	and	apartheid	land	grabs	contributed	to	a	
growing	pool	of	potential	would-be	poachers	and	sympathy	on	the	part	of	the	community	
who	see	poaching	as	a	form	of	defiance	and	rebellion	against	unfair	and	systemic	exclusion.	
The	nature	conservation	bureaucracy	followed	the	path	laid	out	by	the	colonial	rulers	in	
separating	local	people	from	wildlife.	Like	the	colonial	poaching	regulations,	apartheid	
conservation	measures	can	only	be	understood	in	the	context	of	broader	political,	economic	
and	social	macro-structures	aimed	systemic	oppression	of	black	people.	Conservation	
measures	and	regulations	served	to	entrench	white	minority	rule.	This	section	also	touched	
on	conservation	in	the	post-colonial	context,	pointing	to	the	growing	nexus	between	
conservation	and	private	business	interests.	The	following	section	examines	the	rise	of	
neoliberal	conservation	initiatives.	
	
	
4.5	The	ascendancy	of	neoliberal	conservation?		
	
The	first	section	of	this	chapter	touched	on	the	loss	of	land	and	hunting	rights	in	South	Africa	
during	the	colonial	period,	which	was	replicated	across	geographies	in	southern	Africa	
including	South	Africa’s	neighbour	Mozambique.	‘Fortress	conservation’	served	the	political	
elite	during	the	colonial	period,	as	it	brought	large	areas	of	land	into	direct	control	of	the	state	
and	led	to	the	eviction	of	African	people.	The	myth	of	wild	Africa,	endless	‘empty	land’	and	an	
African	‘Garden	of	Eden’	informed	this	anachronistic	Weltbild.	This	conservation	paradigm	
prevailed	into	the	1960s	and	1970s	with	the	next	generation	of	political	elites	in	southern	
Africa	(most	of	southern	Africa	was	still	under	colonial	leadership)	continuing	to	uphold	the	
principles	of	segregation	and	protectionism.	This	involved	further	demarcation	of	“designated	
wild	places	and	species”	protected	from	“human	predation	at	a	time	when	human	activity	
was	becoming	more	extensive	and	pervasive”	(Murphree	2013:	XV).	The	1980s	and	1990s	saw	
the	ascendancy	of	the	sustainable	use	paradigm.	Conservation	organizations	and	NGOs	
started	to	develop	programmes	that	promoted	local	participation	in	and	beneficiation	from	
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conservation,	such	as	the	Communal	Areas	Management	Programme	for	Indigenous	
Resources	(CAMPFIRE)	programme.253		
	
Couched	in	the	discourse	of	social	development	and	sustainable	use,	the	tide	has	turned	in	
favour	of	‘fortress	conservation’,	as	transfrontier	conservation	follows	the	trajectory	of	
colonial	conservation	policy	making.	The	significant	‘innovation’	of	the	old	paradigm	is	the	
increasing	privatization	of	conservation	management	and	areas,	as	well	as	the	weighty	role	of	
non–state	actors,	such	as	conservation	NGOs	and	corporations.	The	underlying	conservation	
philosophy	straddles	the	nature	and	culture	dichotomy.	The	discourse	of	‘othering’	of	
indigenous	and	local	communities	is	still	employed.	Such	communities	are	either	perceived	as	
“traditional,	living	in	harmony	with	nature	and	displaying	conserving	behaviour”	or	as	
“modernized	and	destroying	it”(Duffy	2001:	7).	Turned	on	its	head,	the	proclamation	of	huge	
tracts	of	land	as	transnational	conservation	areas	has	serious	economic,	social	and	cultural	
consequences	for	people	living	inside	or	on	the	edge	of	these	new	megaparks.	Although	
claiming	to	the	contrary,	such	parks	encroach	upon	the	livelihoods	and	cultural	goods	of	local	
people.		These	transnational	megaparks	are	designated	as	a	“global	environmental	good”,	
which	has	led	to	prescriptions	of	what	is	deemed	“appropriate	and	inappropriate	resource	
use”(Duffy	2001:	7).	Communities	living	in	areas	designated	or	proclaimed	as	conservation	
areas	are	increasingly	‘asked’	to	relocate	because	of	inappropriate	resource	use,	sometimes	
on	a	voluntary	basis,	and	sometimes	on	a	less	voluntary	basis.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
253	The	quoted	author	Marshall	Murphree	was	one	of	the	initiators	of	CAMPFIRE,	a	Zimbabwean	community-
based	natural	resource	management	programme.	CAMPFIRE	has	been	used	as	a	blueprint	for	similar	projects	in	
southern	Africa	such	as	the	community	conservancies	in	Namibia	and	Mozambique.	Community–Based	Natural	
Resource	Management	(CBNRM)	was	popular	with	donors	in	the	1990s	due	to	its	supposed	benefits	of	
combining	ecological	sensitivity	with	rural	poverty	alleviation,	achieved	through	economic	expansion	and	
institutional	growth.	Perhaps	the	most	damning	critique	of	communal	common	property	proprietorship	sees	
CBNRM	programmes	as	“creatures	of	a	common	colonial	heritage	of	land	and	resource	expropriation”,	where	
“the	postcolonial	state	finds	itself	perpetuating	a	legal	defence	of	illicitly	obtained	private	rights	of	the	landed	
elite	(Wilson	2005:	150).”	
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4.5.1	Case	study:	The	creation	of	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Park	
	
Chapter	7	deals	with	rhino	poaching	in	the	Kruger	National	Park,	a	phenomenon	closely	
associated	with	the	history	of	the	park	and	the	creation	of	a	new	transfrontier	park.		
The	formation	of	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Park	(GLTP)	serves	as	a	case	study	to	
demonstrate	the	problematic	assumptions	of	the	‘new’	neoliberal	conservation	approach.	The	
Kruger	National	Park,	together	with	the	Limpopo	National	Park	(hereafter	LNP)	and	the	
Gonarezhou	National	Park	in	Zimbabwe	form	part	of	a	transnational	conservation	area	or	
peace	park254	called	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Park	(hereafter	GLTP),	which	was	
formally	launched	in	November	2001.255	The	wealthy	South	African	cigarette	tycoon	Anton	
Rupert256	drove	the	initiative,	supported	by	Prince	Bernhard	from	the	Netherlands	and	former	
South	African	president	Nelson	Mandela.	Rupert	created	the	NGO	Peace	Parks	Foundation	
(PPF),	which	has	become	the	lobbying	vehicle	for	developing	peace	parks	initiatives	across	
southern	Africa.	The	PPF	was	instrumental	in	coordinating	the	institutional	and	administrative	
structures	of	the	GLTP	with	South	African	government	stakeholders	such	as	the	Department	
of	Environmental	Affairs	and	Tourism	(DEAT)	and	the	South	African	National	Parks	authority	
(SANParks),257	and	obtaining	financial	support	from	the	World	Bank	and	international	donor	
																																																						
254	The	concept	of	peace	parks	derives	from	the	perception	that	the	amalgamation	of	national	parks	in	separate	
states	but	adjacent	to	one	another	was	symbolic	of	peace.	The	contention	is	that	‘artificial’	political	borders	are	
replaced	with	‘natural’	borders.	The	origin	of	the	concept	is	traced	back	to	the	first	“peace	park”	along	the	
Canadian	and	US	border,	the	Waterton/Glacier	International	Peace	Park,	which	was	established	in	1932	
(Ramutsindela	2007:	29–30).	
	
255	The	conservation	area	spans	a	territory	of	37	572	km2	across	the	three	countries.	The	NGO	Peace	Parks	
Foundation	(PPF),	the	main	driving	force	behind	transfrontier	conservation	in	southern	Africa	is	planning	the	
expansion	of	the	conservation	area	into	“the	world’s	greatest	animal	kingdom”,	spanning	an	area	of	almost	100	
000	km2.	This	undertaking	would	see	Banhine	and	Zinave	National	Parks,	the	Massingir	and	Corumana	areas	and	
interlinking	regions	in	Mozambique,	as	well	as	several	privately-	and	state-owned	conservation	areas	in	South	
Africa	and	Zimbabwe,	integrated	into	the	transfrontier	peace	park	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	2014a).	
	
256	Spierenburg	and	Wels	(2010)	shine	a	light	on	the	darker	side	of	the	business	and	nature	conservation	nexus	in	
southern	Africa	in	a	paper	entitled	“Conservative	Philanthropists,	Royalty	and	Business	Elites	in	Nature	
Conservation	in	Southern	Africa”.	The	main	argument	is	that	Rupert	and	his	associate	Prince	Bernhard	from	the	
Netherlands	saw	in	transfrontier	conservation	an	opportunity	to	fix	their	tarnished	reputations.	Rupert,	who	had	
been	a	member	of	the	Afrikaner	secret	grouping	“Broederbond”,	had	actively	supported	the	apartheid	regime	
while	Prince	Bernhard	had	been	embroiled	in	a	bribery	scandal.	
	
257	Wolmer	(2003:	269)	argues	that	the	South	African	National	Parks	Board	went	with	the	idea	of	establishing	the	
GLTP	for	a	number	of	reasons.	These	included	legitimizing	its	existence	by	adopting	“a	potential	cause	celebré”	
(the	apartheid	era	National	Parks	Board	had	been	an	all-white	ensemble	of	conservators,	some	of	whom	had	
links	to	the	apartheid	security	apparatus).	Conservators	were	apparently	also	worried	about	increasing	numbers	
of	war-displaced	people	moving	into	the	border	areas,	so	the	creation	of	a	transfrontier	park	would	create	a	
buffer	zone.	At	the	time,	the	KNP	was	also	dealing	with	elephant	population	numbers	that	exceeded	its	carrying	
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agencies.	The	GLTP	has	been	portrayed	as	an	“unequal	partnership”	between	South	Africa	as	
the	regional	economic	and	political	powerhouse,	and	Mozambique	and	Zimbabwe,	which	
were	both	dealing	with	domestic	issues	(Lunstrum	2013;	Ramutsindela	2007;	Wolmer	
2005).258	The	South	African	government,	its	private	partners	and	international	financiers	took	
the	lead	in	developing	the	peace	parks	initiative,	which	gained	traction	in	Mozambican	
government	circles	in	the	late	1990s.	The	implementation	appeared	to	require	minimal	
investment	by	the	Mozambican	state,259	while	supposedly	beneficial	to	the	country	as	a	
whole.	International	donors	were	going	to	shoulder	the	cost	of	setting	up	institutional	and	
regulatory	frameworks,	the	controversial	resettlement	of	communities,	as	well	as	the	start-up	
costs	of	the	Park.	
	
There	was	also	the	promise	of	economic	and	social	development	of	rural	communities	living	
within	and	on	the	peripheries	of	the	Park.	During	the	initial	negotiations,	an	inclusive	
approach	to	nature	conservation	was	professed.	Project	partners	were	tasked	with	seeking	
social	legitimacy	of	the	Park	by	offering	benefits	to	residents	inside	and	on	the	edge	of	the	
Park	(Spierenburg	2011:	83).	The	transfrontier	conservation	area	was	going	to	‘pay	for	itself’	
through	international	donor	monies,	opportunities	for	private	investments,	eco–tourism	
initiatives	and	community-based	natural	resource	management.	A	pivotal	aspect	of	the	LNP	
was	the	re-introduction	of	wildlife	from	the	KNP,	which	was	going	to	be	protected	and	
conserved	through	the	creation	of	a	ranger	force	and	by	investing	the	community	in	the	good	
fortunes	of	the	Park.	The	PPF	had	mobilized	a	great	deal	of	international	and	national	(South	
African)	funding.	Donor	funding	seldom	comes	without	strings	attached	and	in	the	case	of	the	
																																																																																																																																																																											
capacity.	Conservators	had	instituted	elephant	culling	which	had	led	to	vociferous	international	campaigning	by	
animal	rights	groups.	It	was	hoped	that	dropping	the	fences	would	encourage	elephant	migration,	and	more	than	
1	100	Kruger	elephants	were	earmarked	for	the	new	conservation	area	(Magome/Murombedzi	2012:	124).	
	
258	One	school	of	thought	has	referred	to	the	process	that	led	to	the	creation	of	the	GLTP	as	“Krugerization”	
whereby	“political	and	economic	interests	that	are	historically	embedded	in	the	Kruger	National	Park	are	being	
extended	beyond	the	borders	of	South	Africa,	still	serving	a	privileged	group	at	the	expense	of	mostly	black	
people”(Ramutsindela	2007:	2–3).	Ramutsindela	(2007:	2)	acknowledges	the	prominent	role	of	Afrikaners	in	the	
creation	of	the	GLTP	but	points	to	the	heterogeneity	of	the	Afrikaners	in	South	Africa,	as	well	as	the	international	
origins	of	the	notion	of	peace	parks.	He	provides	a	nuanced	analysis	of	transfrontier	conservation	areas	in	Africa	
in	his	book	“Conservation	in	Africa:	At	the	Confluence	of	Capital,	Politics	and	Nature”.	Ramutsindela	and	other	
scholars	(Büscher	2010;	Büscher/Davidov	2013;	Büscher/Dressler	2012;	Büscher/Dressler/Fletcher	2014;	McFee	
1999)	explore	the	role	of	capital	and	privatization	in	conservation.	
	
259	Consultation	with	the	communities	affected	by	the	creation	of	the	Park	was	one	of	the	key	responsibilities	of	
the	Mozambican	government.	
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GTFP,	both	the	donors	and	the	PPF	determined	important	aspects	of	the	final	physical	
contours	and	operational	aspects	of	the	conservation	area.	South	Africa	through	its	DEAT	and	
the	PPF	negotiated	the	terms	and	conditions	leading	to	the	establishment	of	the	Limpopo	
National	Park	and	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Park.	These	differed	vastly	from	the	
initially	agreed	to	establishment	of	a	multi-use	conservation	area	“that	would	allow	human	
habitation	and	sustainable	use	of	resources”	(Lunstrum	2013:	4).	SANParks	was	not	willing	to	
consider	the	relocation	of	wild	animals	into	a	hunting	area,	which	was	the	official	status	of	the	
Coutada	16	260	at	the	time.	The	parks	authority	was	only	going	to	sign	off	the	deal	if	the	new	
conservation	area	guaranteed	maximum	protection	(Milgroom/Spierenburg	2008:	438).	
	
When	the	LPN	was	proclaimed	as	a	total	protection	zone	in	2001,	there	was	no	wildlife	in	the	
area	of	the	former	Coutada	16;	however,	27	000	people	were	residing	in	the	area.	These	
village	communities261	had	been	affected	by	displacement	during	the	colonial	period	and	the	
civil	war.	They	had	returned,	rebuilt	and	reconstructed	their	lives	and	livelihoods	after	the	end	
of	the	civil	war	(Lunstrum	2010:	139).	In	a	perhaps	ironic	twist	of	fate,	some	7,000	villagers	
have	to	relocate	‘to	make	space	for	wild	animals’	that	were	no	longer	living	in	the	area	
whereas	the	villagers	were	(Interviews,	2012	and	2013).	In	preparation	for	the	proclamation	
of	the	Park,	the	land	use	rights	of	the	former	hunting	reserve	Coutada	16	were	changed.	In	
Mozambique,	the	state	has	the	prerogative	to	change	unilaterally	land	use	rights	if	it	serves	
the	public	interest	(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels	2006:	94).	In	this	instance,	Coutada	16	was	
changed	from	a	multi-use	conservation	area	to	a	“total	protection	zone”.	According	to	the	
Mozambican	Land	Act	of	1997,	no	economic	activity,	resource	use	or	occupation	is	allowed	in	
“total	protection	zones”	(Tanner	2002:	36–37).	The	legal	drafters	behind	the	Land	Act	had	not	
considered	tenure	rights	of	communities	living	in	areas	that	were	subsequently	declared	total	
protection	zones	(Norfolk	2004:	13)	and	as	a	result	residents	of	the	LNP	found	themselves	in	a	
state	of	legal	ambiguity	as	their	tenure	rights	remained	undefined	(Witter	2013:	407).	Experts	
on	behalf	of	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID)	and	the	Peace	
																																																						
260	The	Coutada	16	had	been	a	hunting	reserve	during	the	colonial	period	and	became	a	hideout	for	Renamo	
fighters	during	the	civil	war.	Weapon	caches	remained	concealed	in	the	area	long	after	the	war	had	ended.		
Some	of	these	weapons	have	found	their	way	back	into	circulation	as	hunting	rifles	of	poachers.	The	reserve	had	
been	depleted	of	wildlife,	serving	as	one	of	the	few	available	food	sources	during	and	after	the	civil	war.	
	
261	While	the	term	“communities”	is	used	throughout	this	dissertation,	the	term	is	used	with	caution,	as	
communities	are	by	no	means	a	homogenous	group	of	people.	
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Parks	Foundation	(PPF)	drew	up	a	land	use	plan	and	a	study	on	tourism	development,	which	
earmarked	the	areas	adjacent	to	the	Shingwedzi	River	as	offering	the	best	opportunities	for	
developing	viable	populations	of	wildlife	while	equally	attractive	to	the	international	tourist	
market	(Milgroom/Spierenburg	2008:	3).	The	experts	also	declared	that	the	area	would	be	
more	appealing	to	private	tourist	operators	if	the	villages	were	removed	(Spierenburg	2011:	
94).	As	a	consequence,	people	living	in	eight	villages	along	the	Shingwedzi	River	inside	the	
park	were	told	that	they	had	to	move	to	areas	outside	the	park.	A	dispute	ensued	between	
the	Mozambican	Ministry	of	Tourism	and	the	concerned	villagers	over	whether	they	
‘belonged’	to	the	Park	and	what	their	rights	were	(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels	2006:	94).	
The	state	won	the	dispute	and	as	a	consequence	of	the	changed	conservation	status	of	the	
area,	some	7,000	villagers	would	have	to	relocate	“to	make	space	for	wild	animals”	that	were	
to	be	reintroduced	from	the	KNP.	The	oddity	of	moving	people	to	accommodate	wild	animals	
led	affected	communities	to	believe	that	the	state’s	priorities	were	skewed	in	favour	of	wild	
animals	and	their	benefactors	(SANParks)	from	South	Africa	(Interviews,	2012	and	2013).	
Negative	sentiments	towards	Kruger	and	its	abundant	populations	of	wild	animals	started	to	
arise	then,	providing	ample	motivations	to	poach	wild	animals	in	years	to	come.	As	will	be	
shown	in	Chapter	7,	these	motivations	are	not	only	based	on	economic	needs	and	
impoverishment	but	also	on	environmental	justice	principles	(poaching	as	an	act	of	defiance).	
	
The	German	Development	Bank262	stipulated	that	all	relocations	would	have	to	happen	on	a	
voluntary	basis	(Milgroom/Spierenburg	2008:	3).	Unlike	in	colonial	times	where	relocation	
was	forced	from	the	barrel	of	a	gun,	communities	were	incentivized,	and	the	narrative	of	
‘voluntary’	resettlement	or	‘choice’	was	employed	(Witter	2013:	407).	In	other	words,	
villagers	were	supposedly	given	agency	to	decide	whether	to	stay	or	go.	It	is	a	matter	of	
conjecture	whether	choosing	to	move	out	of	the	park	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	human-
wildlife	conflict263	and	economic	marginalization	(Lunstrum	2013;	Witter	2013,	Focus	group	
with	villagers	resettled	from	LPN	in	2013),	constitutes	‘voluntary	resettlement’	or	a	last	resort	
																																																						
262		As	one	of	the	main	funders	behind	the	establishment	of	the	peace	park,	the	German	Bank	also	carried	the	
cost	of	resettling	the	villagers.	
	
263	Witter	(2013)	provides	a	detailed	account	of	how	the	re-introduction	of	elephants	in	particular,	and	other	
dangerous	wildlife	including	rhinos	and	lions,	to	the	LNP	has	caused	major	disruptions	and	damage	to	
communities	remaining	inside	the	park,	and	affected	their	livelihoods.		
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to	escape	the	“diminished	access	to	cultural	and	environmental	sources”	(Witter	2013:	407).	A	
focus	group	with	recently	resettled	villagers	(from	the	Park	to	Massingir)	suggested	the	
heterogeneous	composition	of	villages	and	varying	levels	of	acceptance	of	the	relocation.	
While	the	objective	of	the	focus	group	was	to	collect	data	on	rhino	poaching	and	its	impact	at	
the	community	level,	the	conversation	ended	up	returning	to	the	issue	of	relocation	several	
times.	One	villager	explains	(Focus	group	in	Massingir,	2013):	
	
	“We	were	happy	where	we	came	from.	There’s	no	peace	here.	They	can	give	you	a	
house	and	the	next	day	they	can	remove	you	and	give	it	to	someone	else,	maybe	they	
will	sort	that	problem	out	now.		The	young	ones	go	to	school,	but	it	is	far.	We	don’t	
have	a	school	here,	and	the	youth	are	struggling	to	get	jobs	in	this	village.	We	have	not	
talked	about	what	we	want	as	a	community.”			
	
Schmidt-Soltau	and	Brockington	(2007:	2196)	make	a	convincing	argument	that	voluntary	
resettlements	are	unlikely	in	the	poorer	parts	of	the	world,	given	the	lack	of	international	(and	
often	of	national)	policies	guiding	so–called	voluntary	resettlement	and	divergent	
understandings	of	determining	volition.	The	World	Bank	(2001)	published	a	policy	for	
involuntary	resettlements	in	2001	entitled	‘Operational	Manual	OP	4.12’,	which	has	become	
the	international	standard	to	adjudicate	the	suitability	of	resettlement	schemes.	In	light	of	
being	recognized	as	an	international	standard,	this	policy	on	involuntary	resettlements264	was	
employed	to	guide	voluntary	resettlements	from	the	LNP	(Milgroom/Spierenburg	2008:	437).	
The	Project	Implementation	Unit	(PIU)	in	charge	of	establishing	the	LNP	set	up	a	Consultation	
Committee	on	Resettlement	(CCR),	which	included	representatives	of	all	the	villages	that	were	
to	be	resettled,	and	development	NGOs	operating	in	the	Park.	Initially,	elected	community	
authorities	within	each	village	were	hoping	to	codetermine	the	land	use	rights	and	contours	
of	the	final	Park.	However,	once	the	Park	had	been	declared,	their	role	had	been	reduced	to	
negotiating	compensation	for	the	anticipated	resettlement	of	village	residents	
(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels	2006:	94)	
	
Community	beneficiation	and	projects	were	important	elements	to	be	considered	in	the	
creation	of	the	conservation	area.	Communities	receive	a	20%	share	in	the	revenue	
																																																						
264	The	policy	stipulates	that	involuntary	resettlement	should	be	avoided,	and	if	unavoidable,	then	it	should	uplift	
the	affected	people’s	lives.	
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generation	of	the	Park.265	Such	revenues	are	supposed	to	benefit	the	community	as	a	whole;	
however,	the	distribution	and	investment	of	such	funds	is	not	without	its	own	
complications.266		Mangome	and	Murombedzi	(2012:	124)	point	out	that	a	critical	mass	of	
‘bodies	in	beds’	is	required	to	achieve	“significant	job	opportunities	and	viable	multiplier	
effects”.	Suffice	to	mention	here	that	there	has	been	no	tourist	boom	in	the	LNP	as	yet,	and	
rhino	poaching	and	the	stigmatization	of	local	communities	as	rhino	poachers	is	unlikely	to	
alleviate	the	situation.	Milgroom	and	Spierenburg	(2008:	437),	for	example,	found	that	most	
residents	of	the	LNP	“began	to	feel	the	effects	of	economic	displacement	soon	after	the	park	
was	established	in	2001,	through	the	application	of	new	park	regulations	prohibiting	hunting	
and	restricting	extraction	of	forest	products	for	commercial	purposes”.	Food	security	was	
greatly	diminished	as	cultivation	inside	the	Park	is	forbidden	unless	the	area	was	used	for	
farming	prior	to	the	declaration	of	the	Park.267	Access	to	emergency	pastures	for	cattle	in	the	
Park	was	forbidden	during	times	of	drought.	Moreover,	the	reintroduction	of	predators	
affected	both	crops	and	cattle,	aggravating	human-wildlife	conflict	(Spierenburg	quoted	by:	
Arets	et	al.	2011:	58).		
	
While	many	community	members	were	no	longer	able	to	eke	out	a	living	and	had	to	find	
alternate	forms	of	income,	the	majority	of	villagers	chose	to	remain	within	the	Limpopo	
National	Park	after	its	initial	inception.	This	choice	signals	the	preference	of	village	
communities	to	stay	in	the	Park	and	continue	with	their	lives	and	livelihoods	uninterrupted.	
Due	to	the	diminished	income	opportunities	and	increasing	pressure	(‘carrot	and	stick’),	
villagers	have	started	to	accept	the	relocation	packages.	Although	couched	in	the	narrative	of	
‘voluntary	resettlement’	and	‘improved	livelihoods’,	many	villagers	feel	forced	to	move	
(Interview	with	academic	2	and	3,	2012;	focus	group	with	resettled	villagers,	2013).	The	
resettlement	of	communities,	as	well	as	those	who	chose	to	stay	inside	the	Park,	has	led	to	
																																																						
265	Since	2006,	the	LNP	has	handed	an	amount	of	€	174	410	to	communities,	which	they	have	invested	in	the	
construction	of	a	craft	centre,	the	rehabilitation	of	classrooms,	the	creation	of	potable	water	supply	systems	and	
a	livestock	association	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	2014d).	
	
266	A	body	of	literature	speaks	to	this	issue	but	it	is	beyond	the	focus	of	this	dissertation	(for	example:	Fall	2002;	
Singh,	S.	2008).	
	
267	Soil	fertility	and	harvest	yields	decrease	through	continued	use	of	the	same	piece	of	land.	It	also	leads	to	land	
degeneration	and	massive	erosion,	which	carries	severe	environmental	impacts.	Essentially,	this	restricted	form	
of	land	use	is	not	only	contributing	to	less	food	security	but	also	to	the	environmental	degradation	of	the	land.	
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diminished	income	streams	and	changing	social	relations.	While	the	resettlement	policy	was	
supposed	to	enable	community	empowerment	and	social	development,	the	transition	process	
has	been	less	than	smooth,	and	the	resettlement	from	acceptance	to	relocation	has	been	
slow.	Instead	of	being	in	charge	of	their	livelihoods,	the	new	status	quo	has	deprived	
communities	of	agency	as	regards	to	choosing	where	to	live268	and	how	to	provide	for	their	
livelihoods.		
	
Possibly	the	single	most	problematic	aspect	of	the	creation	of	both	the	LNP	and	GLTP	lies	in	
the	approach	taken	to	people	who	were	living	within	the	boundaries	of	the	designated	park	in	
Mozambique.	The	chosen	route	is	not	dissimilar	to	the	colonial	approaches	described	in	the	
earlier	section.	Instead	of	building	harmonious	and	beneficial	relationships	between	local	
village	communities	and	wildlife	(as	suggested	by	the	oxymoron	‘peace	park’),	the	creation	of	
the	LNP	has	led	to	human-wildlife	conflict,	impoverishment,	as	well	as	widespread	contempt	
for	conservation	initiatives	and	the	‘Big	Brother’	next	door	–	the	management,	rangers	and	
environmental	crime	investigators	of	the	KNP	(Interviews	with	convicted	poachers,	2013).	A	
significant	oversight	was	the	inadequate	consultation	with	communities	directly	affected	by	
the	creation	of	the	new	park.	In	essence,	further	marginalization	of	in	situ	communities	(which	
are	not	homogeneous	entities)	and	individuals	could	have	been	mitigated.	The	establishment	
of	the	park	has	led	to	a	growing	pool	of	unhappy	village	communities.	In	light	of	the	above,	it	
is	not	surprising	that	many	rhino	poachers	originate	from	displaced	and	marginalized	village	
and/or	rural	communities	(Interviews	with	organized	crime,	environmental	crime	
investigators	and	poachers,	2013	and	2014).	
	
An	important	element	linked	to	the	establishment	of	the	GLTP	was	the	removal	of	the	
physical	boundaries	between	the	participating	countries.	The	abolishment	of	artificially	drawn	
borders	of	the	colonial	period	(which	were	physically	reinforced	when	the	postcolonial	
																																																						
268	At	the	time	of	writing,	120	families	had	been	relocated	to	Banga	village	near	the	Massingir	dam.	While	there	
are	kinship	ties	to	people	already	living	south	of	the	Massingir	dam,	not	all	residents	were	happy	with	the	new	
arrivals.	More	people	lead	to	more	competition	on	already	scarce	resources	and	jobs	in	the	area.	Moreover,	the	
resettled	villagers	are	perceived	to	receive	an	unfair	advantage	as	they	receive	housing,	services	and	
compensation	from	the	Park	(Focus	group	with	villagers;	Interviews;	2013).	It	needs	to	be	noted	that	benefits	are	
supposed	to	accrue	to	communities	living	inside	and	on	the	periphery	of	the	Park	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	
2014c),	signalling	incongruence	between	community	perceptions	and	negotiated	outcomes.		By	March	2016,	the	
remaining	families	of	the	former	300-family	strong	Massingir	Velho	–	a	village	about	10	km	from	the	Kruger	
boundary	–	were	moved	about	75	km	from	the	border	(enca	reporter	2016).	
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Mozambican	government	supported	South	African	liberation	movements	during	the	final	
years	of	the	apartheid	regime)	rendered	the	concept	of	transfrontier	parks	appealing	to	many.	
It	was	hoped	that	the	so-called	‘peace	park’	would	reconcile	the	former	apartheid	pariah	state	
with	its	southern	African	neighbours,	open	up	historical	animal	migration	routes	and	realize	
conservation	and	social	development	objectives.	While	border	fences	between	the	KNP	and	
LNP	were	partially	taken	down	(see	Figure	8),	other	fences	went	up	to	demarcate	the	
boundaries	of	the	conservation	area	with	surrounding	communal	land	(Dzingirai	et	al.	2013:	
107).		
	
From	2001	to	2008,	close	to	5000	wild	animals	(including	12	white	rhinos)	were	translocated	
from	the	KNP	to	the	LNP	to	develop	the	new	conservation	area	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	
2014b).	One-third	(57	km)	of	the	old	boundary	fence	has	been	dropped	since	the	inception	of	
the	TFCA.	The	remainder	of	the	fence	was	left	intact	due	to	safety	and	security	concerns.269	
The	sections	of	dropped	fence	are	mostly	located	in	the	far	north	of	the	KNP	(with	a	
corresponding	low	density	of	villagers	and	rhinos)	and	12	km	of	fence	were	dropped	in	the	
middle	section	between	the	parks.	According	to	the	PPF,	the	fence270	was	left	in	tact	“for	the	
peace	of	mind	of	communities	resident	in	the	LNP,	especially	the	ones	with	cattle”	(Wray	
2014).	The	dropping	of	the	fence	affected	the	communities	living	in	the	Park	as	they	had	to	
deal	with	unwanted	visits	from	wild	animals	that	did	not	only	constitute	a	danger	to	their	lives	
but	also	destroyed	their	crops	and	attacked	their	cattle.	There	was	also	the	danger	of	the	
communication	of	zoonotic	diseases	such	as	anthrax,	which	afflicts	buffalo	in	the	KNP	at	
regular	intervals	(Interview	with	wildlife	veterinarian	3,	2013).	
	
According	to	the	official	narrative,	the	partial	removal	of	the	fence	did	not	only	serve	a	
symbolic	function	of	creating	a	peace	park	but	also	the	purpose	of	encouraging	the	natural	
migration	of	wild	animals	to	the	new	conservation	area.	In	light	of	rhino	poaching,	the	
																																																						
269	Several	smuggling	corridors	are	located	along	the	350	km	long	border	between	the	KNP	and	Mozambique.	
Cross–border	crime	includes	the	smuggling	of	undocumented	migrants,	stolen	motor	vehicles,	drugs,	cigarettes	
and	counterfeit	goods,	as	well	as	the	trafficking	of	endangered	species	(which	goes	beyond	rhino	horn).	
	
270	In	his	doctoral	dissertation,	Kloppers	(2005)	provides	a	fascinating	analysis	of	social	structures	within	the	
borderlands	between	Mozambique	and	South	Africa.	The	fence	(physical	boundary)	plays	an	important	role	in	his	
analysis	of	whether	physical	boundaries	become	entrenched	in	formerly	homogenous	societies	living	in	the	
borderlands.	
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dropping	of	the	boundary	fence	has	become	a	controversial	talking	point	amongst	
conservators,	law	enforcers	and	animal	activists,	some	of	whom	moot	the	renewed	erection	
of	a	high-security	fence	as	a	strategy	to	fight	rhino	poaching	(Interviews,	2013).	
	
Figure	8:	The	border	fence	between	the	Kruger	National	Park,	South	Africa	&	Mozambique	
	
Source:	Author’s	own	photo	taken	in	a	southern	section	of	Kruger	National	Park	
	
The	re-erection	of	the	boundary	fence	may	not	only	signal	a	physical	but	also	symbolic	defeat	
of	the	“borderless”	peace	parks	project,	which	had	been	envisaged	as	the	panacea	to	post–
war	reconciliation,	wildlife	conservation	and	community	development	in	southern	Africa.	
Büscher	and	Ramutsindela	(2016:	1)	observe	that	key	actors	within	transfrontier	conservation	
have	been	responding	to	the	poaching	crisis	“with	increasing	desperation”	to	safeguard	the	
peace	parks	project	and,	of	course,	the	rhinos.		
	
The	privatization	and	acquisition	of	former	communal	land	along	the	eastern	boundary	by	
multinational	corporations	and	South	African	companies	in	partnership	with	influential	and	
often	high-ranking	government	officials	from	Maputo	is	not	unproblematic.	Rhino	poachers	
use	some	concessions	as	a	springboard	for	poaching	expeditions	into	the	KNP.	This	has	led	to	
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joint	anti-poaching	partnerships	between	Kruger	and	the	foreign-owned	concessions.	While	
not	the	immediate	focus	of	this	dissertation,	it	needs	to	be	pointed	out	that	the	establishment	
of	these	concessions	from	the	late	1990s	onwards	has	led	to	yet	another	round	of	
displacements,	evictions	of	locals	either	living	or	utilizing	the	land	for	commercial	purposes	in	
these	areas.	Some	locals	are	(more	or	less)	gainfully	employed	on	the	concessions	in	job	
categories	other	than	anti-poaching	(for	example	as	construction,	plantation	or	as	farm	
labourers).	There	are	several	hunting	concessions	that	offer	‘Big	Five’	hunts	along	the	eastern	
boundary,271	which	has	led	to	outcries	from	environmental	activists	and	media	that	“wild	
animals	belonging	to	the	KNP	(and	the	South	African	people)	are	appropriated	by	greedy	
concessionaires	in	Mozambique”	(Interview	with	animal	rights	activist	1,	2012).	The	
reputation	of	the	concessionaires	suffered	a	further	blow	after	a	safari	outfit	was	caught	
luring	lions	with	bait	mounted	on	the	boundary	fence	(which	had	been	cut)	out	of	the	KNP	for	
“canned	hunting”	(Interview	with	conservators,	2013).272.	More	recently,	the	multinational	
sugar	corporation	Tongaat	Hulett	has	come	under	fire	after	four	Kruger	elephants	were	killed	
and	slaughtered	near	its	Xinavane	sugar	processing	mill	in	November	2014	(Bloch	13	
November	2014).273	According	to	anti-poaching	and	intelligence	officers	operating	in	the	area	
(Interviews,	2013),	the	sugar	plantation	and	two	other	concessions	were	insufficiently	
guarded.274	Due	to	their	strategic	position	adjacent	to	the	southern	sections	of	the	KNP	(which	
are	high	rhino-density	areas)	and	the	lacking	security	detail,	these	concessions	had	become	
ideal	launching	pads	for	rhino	poaching	and	smuggling	between	the	KNP	and	Mozambique.275	
																																																						
271	There	are	several	privately	owned	reserves	along	the	western	boundary	of	the	KNP	in	South	Africa,	which	also	
offer	trophy	hunting	including	Big	Five	hunts.	Like	their	Mozambican	counterparts,	these	reserves	have	been	on	
the	receiving	end	of	massive	criticism.	
	
272	Canned	hunting	refers	to	a	trophy	hunt	where	the	animal	is	kept	in	a	confined	space.	This	practice	minimizes	
the	chances	of	a	‘fair	chase’	while	increasing	the	success	rate	of	the	hunter	bagging	a	kill.	
	
273	Tongaat	Hulett	acquired	the	14,000	hectares	Massitonto	concession	in	1998.	The	concession	borders	the	KNP	
and	Magude	village,	where	several	notorious	gangs	of	poachers	originate.	The	corporation	owns	close	to	90	%	of	
the	company	operating	the	mill	while	the	remaining	shares	accrue	to	the	Mozambican	government	(MacLeod	7	
November	2014).	
	
274	Investigative	journalist	Fiona	MacLeod	reported	that	there	had	been	a	rapprochement	between	KNP	officials	
and	the	sugar	corporation	in	2014.	While	KNP	field	rangers	had	provided	training	to	staff	members	on	the	
plantation,	“their	suggestions	on	how	to	improve	anti-poaching	interventions	at	Massitonto	were	not	
implemented	with	the	necessary	sense	of	urgency”	(MacLeod	7	November	2014).	
	
275	In	the	past,	anti-poaching	trackers	discovered	spoor	of	Kruger	rhinos	that	had	crossed	into	the	sugar	
plantations.	Unsuccessful	attempts	were	made	to	get	the	rhinos	repatriated	to	the	KNP,	the	dehorned	carcasses	
were	later	found	in	neighbouring	concessions	(Interviews,	2013)	
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The	commercial	interests	of	Mozambican	government	officials	in	these	concessions	not	only	
suggests	a	conflict	of	interest	as	regards	the	transfer	of	communal	land	into	state	and	private	
ownership	but	already	scarce	state	resources	have	been	promised	to	protect	and	secure	these	
concessions.276		
	
The	central	role	of	the	PPF	during	the	inception	period	of	the	GLTP	has	carried	through	to	the	
present.	The	conservation	NGO	has	taken	on	a	leading	role	in	the	day-to-day	management	of	
the	Park.	According	to	its	website	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	2014e),	Mozambique	“requested	
Peace	Parks	Foundation’s	assistance	in	overseeing	its	development	as	a	Southern	African	
Development	Community	approved	project”.	The	‘request	for	assistance’	includes	two	
technical	advisors,	one	in	charge	of	wildlife	conservation	and	anti–poaching	operations;	the	
other	is	responsible	for	project	management	of	community	initiatives	and	development	of	
park	infrastructures	(Interviews	with	PPF,	2012,	2013	and	2014).	The	Mozambican	
government	appoints	the	park	warden.	The	funding	for	the	development	of	park	
infrastructures,	community	upliftment	projects,	and	conservation	and	anti–poaching	
initiatives	is	channelled	through	and	disbursed	by	the	PPF,	indicating	the	powerful	role	of	the	
NGO.	
	
	
4.6	Concluding	remarks	
	
The	objective	of	this	chapter	was	to	demonstrate	the	path	dependency	displayed	by	
consecutive	conservation	regulators	and	the	effect	this	has	had	on	conservation-orientated	
initiatives.	Wildlife	protection	was	closely	linked	to	colonial	dispossession,	subjugation,	
exploitation	and	loss	of	hunting	rights	of	local	communities.	The	privatization	of	farmland	and	
wildlife	further	exacerbated	the	alienation	and	marginalization	of	local	communities.	
Underpinning	these	conservation	regimes	are	archaic	and	elitist	preservation	and	
conservation	paradigms	that	discount	the	potential	for	harmonious	relationships	between	
																																																																																																																																																																											
	
276	Fiona	MacLeod	(7	November	2014)	reported	that	Tongaat	Hulett	had	requested	assistance	from	the	
Mozambican	government,	who	in	turn	had	undertaken	to	assign	20	anti-poaching	professionals	to	the	
concession.	
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local	communities	and	wildlife.	Instead	of	including	local	communities	in	parks	and	
conservation,	wildlife	conservation	continues	as	a	state	and	private	sector-driven	enterprise.	
Parks	and	game	reserves	continue	to	present	manifestations	of	colonial	dispossession	and	
apartheid	segregation.	More	than	twenty	years	after	the	end	of	apartheid,	conservation	areas	
are	still	seen	as	symbols	of	white	elite	interests	and	wealth,	inaccessible	to	the	poor	majority.	
These	problematic	conservation	approaches	and	paradigms	have	led	to	a	historical	lock-in,	
where	romantic	and	utopian	notions	of	‘Africa’s	Wild	Eden’	continue	to	undermine	support	
and	buy-in	of	local	communities	in	wildlife	conservation.	The	question	arising	here	is:	What	
are	we	trying	to	protect?	Without	the	broad-based	support	of	local	communities,	illegal	
wildlife	markets	will	continue	to	flourish.	As	long	as	communities	are	excluded	from	the	
benefits	of	wildlife	and	parks,	a	dead	rhino	will	be	valued	higher	than	a	live	one.	In	light	of	the	
systemic	exploitation	of	local	communities	during	the	colonial	and	apartheid	periods,	as	well	
as	economic	deprivation	brought	on	through	neoliberal	conservation	regimes	nowadays,	it	is	
not	surprising	that	many	poachers	originate	from	these	communities.	While	a	typical	narrative	
portrays	rhino	poachers	as	seeking	to	fill	cooking	pots	and	pocket	books	(Kahler/Gore	2012),	
this	chapter	showed	why	poaching	could	also	be	construed	as	an	expression	of	dissent	and	
unhappiness	with	the	system,	the	rule-makers	and	the	rules.	
	
This	chapter	also	described	how	rhino	horn	supplies	were	established	through	the	economic	
valuation	of	rhinos.	Two	waves	of	economic	valuation	occurred	in	South	Africa.	The	first	
valuation	involved	the	hunting	of	rhinos	during	the	colonial	period	while	the	second	valuation	
relates	to	the	valuation	of	the	rhino	as	a	trophy	animal	and	a	tradable	live	animal	from	the	
1960s	and	1970s	onwards.	To	parks	authorities	in	South	Africa,	the	sale	of	live	rhinos	
constitutes	a	much-needed	cash	injection.		The	economic	valuation	has	created	a	muddled	
relationship	between	the	public	and	private	sector,	where	economic	necessity	and	bottom-
lines	are	pitted	against	ethical	considerations,	due	diligence,	and	conservation	objectives.	The	
section	also	began	to	sketch	the	outlines	of	the	gray	area	between	legality	and	illegality	on	
the	one	hand;	and	legitimacy	and	illegitimacy	of	the	market	exchange	and	rules	governing	it,	
on	the	other.		
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Chapter	5:	The	international	political	protection	regime:	The	road	to	
extinction	is	paved	with	good	intentions	
	
“And	I	dream	of	the	vast	deserts,	the	forests,	and	all	of	the	wilderness	on	our	
continent;	wild	places	that	we	should	protect	as	a	precious	heritage	for	our	children	
and	for	our	children’s	children.	We	must	never	forget	that	it	is	our	duty	to	protect	this	
environment	(Mandela	2013	).“	
	
5.1	Introduction	
	
Taken	at	face	value,	the	protective	and	conservation	measures	employed	to	safeguard	the	
rhino	would	suggest	that	the	animal	should	be	one	of	the	best-protected	and	cared	for	
creatures	in	South	Africa.	The	South	African	military,	a	multitude	of	private	security	
companies,	public	and	private	intelligence	operatives,	law	enforcement	agencies	and	
hundreds	of	NGOs	have	stepped	up	protective	measures	to	‘save’	the	rhino.	In	spite	of	all	the	
‘do-gooders’,	financial	donations	and	the	securitization	of	what	used	to	be	seen	as	a	
conservation	issue,	rhino	deaths	have	escalated	over	the	past	decade.	The	rhino	protection	
and	poaching	economies	have	become	the	daily	bread	and	butter	of	many	actors,	with	the	
boundaries	becoming	somewhat	blurred.	This	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	key	political	
actors,	their	agendas,	and	measures	associated	with	rhino	protection	and	conservation.		
	
The	notion	of	contested	illegality	is	of	pivotal	importance	to	this	chapter,	as	it	constitutes	the	
primary	legitimation	device	employed	by	various	actors	along	the	illegal	supply	chain	in	
defence	of	their	illegal	economic	activities.	Contestation	of	the	illegality	is	intricately	linked	to	
acceptance	and	social	legitimacy	of	the	law.	Chapter	4	sketched	the	historic	alienation	of	rural	
people	living	in	and	adjacent	to	parks	and	showed	why	they	do	not	regard	the	rules	as	
legitimate	or	applicable	to	them.		The	trade	ban	of	rhino	horn	originates	in	a	multinational	
environmental	treaty,	which	offers	interesting	insights	as	to	how	international	bans	are	
implemented	at	the	local	level	and	why	it	might	be	difficult	to	garner	buy-in	of	such	bans	
when	they	are	imposed	“from	the	outside	world”.	While	the	focus	is	on	actors	and	
relationships	linked	to	the	illegalization	of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn	and	protection	of	rhinos,	
many	of	the	same	actors	are	relevant	to	the	structure	and	functioning	of	the	illegal	supply	
chain	and	will	also	be	of	importance	in	the	final	two	chapters	of	the	dissertation.	Chapter	4	
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highlighted	problematic	conservation	paradigms	and	their	conversion	into	policy	approaches	
and	how	this	affected	local	communities.	Similar	to	the	failings	of	the	conservation	paradigms	
and	approaches	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	this	chapter	argues	that	the	international	political	
protection	regime	undermines	rather	than	facilitates	rhino	protection.	CITES	proceeds	on	the	
assumption	that	trade	bans	are	appropriate	measures	to	deal	with	transnational	wildlife	
trafficking.	
	
	
5.2	The	international	regulatory	backdrop:	CITES	
	
The	United	Nations	Convention	on	International	Trade	in	Endangered	Species	of	Wild	Fauna	
and	Flora	(CITES)	provides	the	international	regulatory	framework	for	international	trade	in	
endangered	plant	and	animal	species.	Its	stated	aim	is	to	ensure	that	international	trade	in	
specimens	of	wild	animals	and	plants	does	not	threaten	the	survival	of	the	species	in	the	wild,	
and	it	accords	degrees	of	protection	to	more	than	35	000	species	of	animals	and	plants	(CITES	
2014c).	In	short,	the	illegalization	of	the	trade	in	rhinos	and	rhino	products	is	intricately	linked	
to	this	multilateral	environmental	treaty,	conversion	of	its	determinations	into	domestic	
legislation	and	implementation	thereof.	Seen	as	the	‘Magna	Carta’	of	wildlife	by	some	(Layne	
1973:	99),	others	regard	the	CITES	approach	to	conservation	as	fundamentally	flawed	(for	
alternative	perspectives	see:	Hutton/Dickson	2000a).	As	most	of	the	planet’s	remaining	
biodiversity	is	located	in	the	Global	South	and	northern	countries	are	seen	as	particularly	
concerned	about	the	potential	loss	of	biodiversity,	the	Convention	has	become	a	platform	for	
North-South	conflict	(Hutton/Dickson	2000b:	XV),	and	its	legitimacy	has	suffered	as	a	
consequence.		As	shown	in	the	previous	chapter,	different	paradigms,	and	conceptions	of	
nature,	preservation	and	conservation277	determine	the	trajectory	and	path	dependency	of	
regulatory	frameworks.	Powerful	alliances	between	state	and	non-state	actors	have	had	a	
lasting	influence	on	the	cornerstones	of	this	convention.	
	
																																																						
277	The	preservationist	paradigm	refers	to	a	fortress-like	approach	to	nature,	which	minimizes	human	influence	
in	order	to	maintain	“pristine	wilderness”.	The	approach	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	conservation	paradigm,	
which	allows	for	humans	and	nature	to	share	a	common	space	and	coexist	(Freitag	2012).	
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The	CITES	was	originally	signed	in	Washington	in	1973	and	entered	force	in	1975.	Earlier	
regulatory	attempts	to	deal	with	the	international	problem	of	unsustainable	exploitation	of	
wildlife	were	unsuccessful	because	the	former	colonial	powers	struggled	to	reach	consensus	
and	broad	ratification	of	various	instruments	(Sand	1997:	19).	According	to	an	academic	
specializing	in	environmental	law	(Interview	with	Academic	1,	2013),	the	early	attempts	at	
regulating	different	species	of	fauna	and	flora	laid	the	foundations	for	individual	species	
protection	and	the	system	of	negative	listing:		
	
“In	the	1880s,	1890s,	you	started	to	get	the	first	protection	and	conservation	laws.	
This	wasn’t	the	same	as	it	is	today.	Shooting	was	for	the	elite,	and	they	wanted	to	be	
the	only	ones	to	shoot.	I	suppose	that	view	still	exists	today.	The	poacher’s	philosophy	
being	used	today	came	from	that	period.	If	you	look	at	the	1900	London	Convention	
for	Birds	Useful	for	Agriculture	and	the	1902	Paris	Convention,	they	both	take	the	
approach	of	categorizing	species,	and	so	when	we	look	at	the	final	Convention,	it	has	
two	lists.	It	creates	lists	of	birds	that	are	useful	and	birds	that	are	noxious,	poisonous,	
toxic	–	to	be	disposed	of	on	sight.	The	birds	that	were	considered	useful	were	the	ones	
that	ate	insects.	The	ones	considered	noxious,	where	those	that	ate	seeds.	So	for	
example,	the	bearded	vulture	is	on	the	noxious	list,	and	today	they	are	rare.	These	
Conventions	were	taking	the	approach	of	saying	these	species	will	be	protected	and	
those	not.	In	many	ways,	that	is	still	with	us.	It	went	through	a	few	incarnations	but	
when	you	look	at	it	today,	we	are	still	categorizing	certain	species	deserving	of	
protection.	Most	of	the	conventions	do.	You	are	dividing	animals	and	plants	instead	of	
taking	the	broad	approach	of	protecting	habitats,	the	ecosystems.”	
	
The	above–mentioned	system	of	negative	lists	(CITES	calls	them	‘Appendices’)	provided	the	
first	bone	of	contention	during	the	drafting	process	of	CITES.	The	IUCN	had	suggested	that	
wildlife	trade	should	be	controlled	or	banned	on	the	basis	of	global	lists	of	threatened	species	
to	be	drawn	and	updated	upon	advice	by	an	international	committee	of	experts.	A	coalition	of	
countries	from	the	Global	South	was	in	favour	of	range	states	determining	their	lists	of	
tradable	species.	The	US	supported	the	bid	thereby	paving	the	way	for	the	Washington	
Conference,	which	led	to	the	creation	of	CITES	(Sand	1997:	20).	The	core	approach	of	CITES	is	
to	subject	all	wildlife	imports	to	mandatory	licensing	with	permits	issued	by	the	exporting	
countries	on	the	basis	of	an	agreed	negative	listing	(Sand	1997:	20).	Twenty-one	states	signed	
the	Convention	initially,	which	had	placed	1100	species	on	the	appendices	(see	below).	The	
underlying	philosophy	was	that	international	cooperation	would	prevent	international	trade	
causing	species	extinction,	as	stated	in	the	preamble	of	the	Convention	(CITES	1973):	
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“International	cooperation	is	essential	for	the	protection	of	certain	species	of	wild	fauna	and	
flora	against	over-exploitation	through	international	trade”.		
	
In	essence,	CITES	accords	protection	to	about	35	000	animal	and	plant	species,	which	are	
included	in	the	three	Appendices.	Species	are	considered	for	inclusion	in	or	deletion	from	the	
Appendices	at	the	Conference	of	Parties	(CoP),	held	every	three	years.	Appendix	I	provides	a	
list	of	species	threatened	with	extinction	and	thus	commercial	trade	in	wild-caught	specimens	
of	these	species	is	illegal	(CITES	2002).278	The	Scientific	Authority	(a	further	requirement	of	
CITES)279	of	the	exporting	country	must	issue	a	non-detriment	finding,	assuring	that	such	
export	would	not	adversely	affect	the	wild	population.	Any	form	of	trade	in	these	species	
requires	export	and	import	permits.	The	Management	Authority	of	the	exporting	state	is	
expected	to	check	that	an	import	permit	has	been	secured	and	that	the	importing	state	is	
capable	of	providing	adequate	care	for	the	specimen	(CITES	1973).		
	
Species	listed	under	Appendix	II	are	not	necessarily	threatened	with	extinction	but	may	
become	threatened	unless	trade	is	subject	to	strict	regulation	to	prevent	extinction	in	the	
wild.	International	trade	may	be	authorized	by	the	presentation	and	granting	of	an	export	
permit	or	re-export	certificate.	No	import	permit	is	necessary	although	some	countries	may	
require	import	permits	in	terms	of	their	own	stricter	domestic	measures.	The	exporting	state	
has	to	issue	a	non-detriment	finding	and	export	permit.	Appendix	III	relates	to	species,	which	
were	listed	after	one	state	party	asked	other	state	parties	for	assistance	in	controlling	trade	in	
a	specific	species.	These	species	are	not	necessarily	threatened	with	extinction	globally.	Trade	
is	only	authorized	by	way	of	an	appropriate	export	permit	and	a	certificate	of	origin	(CITES	
1973).		Table	10	summarizes	the	conditions	of	trade	in	relation	to	the	different	CITES	
categories	of	protection.	CITES	allows	for	some	room	to	manoeuver	when	it	comes	to	the	
listing	of	cases	where	the	conservation	status	of	a	species	differs	across	its	range.	So–called	
‘split	listing’	refers	to	cases	“where	different	populations	or	sub-species	are	in	different	
																																																						
278	The	trade	of	captive-bred	animals	or	cultivated	plants	of	Appendix	I	species	are	considered	Appendix	II	
specimens	with	the	concomitant	requirements	(CITES	2002).	In	other	words,	so-called	Appendix	I	species	can	be	
traded	if	they	do	not	derive	from	wild	populations.	
	
279	According	to	Article	IX,	signatories	have	to	designate	one	of	or	more	Management	Authorities	in	charge	of	
administering	the	licensing	system,	and	one	or	more	Scientific	Authorities	to	advise	CITES	on	the	effects	of	
international	trade	on	CITES-listed	species	(CITES	1973).	
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Appendices	and	where	a	population	(or	sub-species)	may	be	listed	and	another	may	not”	
(Willock	2004:	15).	Rhinos	are	an	example	of	such	a	split-listing,	as	white	rhinos	in	South	
Africa	and	Swaziland	were	moved	to	Appendix	II	(more	details	will	be	provided	later	in	this	
chapter).	
 
Table	10:	Conditions	of	trade	under	the	Appendices	I,	II	and	III	of	CITES	
	
Appendix	 Permit	conditions	 Export	Permit	
required?	
Re–export	
certificate	required?	
Import	permit	
required?	
Non–detriment	
finding	required?	
I	 Not	for	commercial	
trade;	trade	not	
detrimental	to	the	
species;	trade	is	
legal;	avoids	cruel	or	
injurious	shipping	of	
live	specimens	
Yes	(granted	only	if	
import	permit	
already	in	hand)	
Yes	(granted	only	if	
in	accordance	with	
CITES	and	there	is	a	
valid	import	permit)	
Yes	 Yes	
II	 Trade	not	
detrimental	to	the	
species;	Trade	is	
legal;	avoids	cruel	or	
injurious	shipping	of	
live	specimens	
Yes	 Yes	(granted	only	in	
accordance	with	
CITES)	
No	(unless	required	
under	national	law)	
Yes	
III	
(if	trade	originates	
with	listing	party)	
Trade	is	legal	and	
avoids	cruel	or	
injurious	shipping	of	
live	specimens	
Yes	 Not	applicable	 No	(unless	required	
under	national	law)	
No	
III	
(if	trade	does	not	
originate	with	listing	
party)	
Trade	is	legal	and	
avoids	cruel	or	
injurious	shipping	of	
live	specimens	
No	(certificate	of	
origin	only)	
No	(certificate	of	
origin	only)	
No	(unless	required	
under	national	law)	
No	
	
Source:		adapted	from:	Clarke	(2004:	11)	
	
Despite	the	noble	intentions,	the	initial	signatories	of	the	Convention	had	little	information	on	
the	scale	of	the	problem	and	how	to	operate	trade	controls	(Huxley	2000:	8).	Oryx	(cited	by:	
Huxley	2000:)	observed,	“…when	CITES	was	originally	set	up	and	signed,	few	administrators	
realized	that	more	than	a	handful	of	species	were	involved”.	In	addition,	few	countries	had	
experience	in	handling	trade	controls	of	the	type	set	out	in	the	CITES.	The	lack	of	
understanding	of	how	to	operate	the	system	of	trade	regulations	has	persisted	over	the	years,	
and	continues	to	pose	problems	at	the	Conferences	of	Parties	(CoPs).	During	the	early	years,	it	
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was	realized	that	the	treaty	needed	a	great	deal	of	interpretation	and	fine-tuning	if	it	were	to	
work	effectively.	Moreover,	a	central	issue	was	the	criteria	to	be	used	for	including	species	in	
the	Appendices.	The	Washington	Conference	had	neglected	to	establish	such	criteria.	It	was	
only	at	the	first	Conference	of	the	Parties	in	1976	that	explicit	criteria	were	formulated.	
However,	many	states	were	not	happy	with	the	criteria,	and	they	remain	a	contested	issue	in	
the	present	context	(Huxley,	2000:	8).	
	
Although	CITES	is	supposed	to	be	legally	binding,	it	is	the	prerogative	of	individual	states	to	
domesticate	and	implement	wildlife	trade	regulations	at	the	local	level.	As	is	the	case	with	
most	other	international	conventions,	there	is	little	recourse	to	dealing	with	infractions	or	
non-compliance	by	way	of	international	enforcement.	Infractions	may	include	negligence	with	
regards	to	the	issuing	of	permits,	excessive	trade,	lax	enforcement	or	failure	to	produce	
annual	reports.	When	informed	of	an	infraction,	the	Secretariat	is	required	to	notify	all	other	
State	Parties.	The	offending	party	is	given	time	to	respond	to	the	allegations	and	may	be	
provided	with	technical	assistance	to	prevent	further	infractions	(CITES	1973).280	There	are	
180	parties	to	CITES	as	of	November	2014,	including	all	the	rhino	range,	transfer	and	
consumer	countries.281	South	Africa	ratified	the	Convention	on	15	July	1975,	rendering	it	one	
of	the	Convention’s	earliest	signatories.	As	the	Convention	enters	its	forty-first	year	of	coming	
into	force,	the	political,	social,	economic	and	environmental	dimensions	of	the	modern	world	
have	changed	since	its	inception.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	apartheid	regime	gave	CITES	the	
stamp	of	approval.	Moreover,	some	consumer	countries	such	as	Cambodia,	Laos,	Myanmar,	
Taiwan,	Vietnam	and	Yemen	only	joined	CITES	more	than	20	years	after	the	Convention	
entered	into	force,	allowing	a	massive	window	for	uncontrolled	international	trade	in	wildlife	
in	the	interim	period	(see	Table	11).	As	of	2015,	the	remaining	African	rhino	range	states	are	
Botswana,	Kenya,	Malawi,	Namibia,	South	Africa,	Swaziland,	Tanzania,	Uganda,	Zambia,	and	
Zimbabwe.	The	following	sections	will	discuss	the	Convention’s	limited	success	in	curbing	
																																																						
280	The	Secretariat	may	also	rule	that	all	permits	are	to	be	confirmed	by	the	Secretariat,	it	may	suspend	
cooperation,	issue	a	formal	warning,	visit	the	country	to	verify	capacity	or	recommend	the	suspension	of	CITES-
related	trade,	which	will	only	be	resumed	once	corrective	measures	have	been	implemented	by	the	offending	
Party	(CITES	1973).	
	
281	Southern	Sudan,	the	newest	state	is	the	only	country	in	Africa	not	to	have	joined	CITES.	Angola	acceded	on	
31	December	2013	(CITES	2014b).		
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exploitative	wildlife	trade,	lack	of	acceptance	and	legitimacy	and	how	this	may	have	affected	
illegal	market	flows.	
	
	
While	civil	society	organizations	might	lobby	government	regarding	the	ratification	and	
implementation	of	specific	international	conventions	(such	as	the	Rome	Statute),	
governments	do	not	usually	consult	affected	constituents	on	the	virtues	and	failings	of	
becoming	a	party	to	an	international	treaty.	As	a	consequence,	local	constituents	may	regard	
international	conventions	as	‘alien	implants’	which	lack	legitimacy	and	acceptance	at	the	local	
level.	According	to	a	former	government	official,	international	instruments	are	routinely	
signed	off	in	southern	Africa,	often	contingent	on	whether	there	are	perceived	benefits	to	the	
signatory,	or	because	other	states	or	institutions	apply	some	form	of	the	‘carrot	and	stick’	
principle	to	garner	broad-based	ascension	or	ratification.	In	some	instances,	such	
international	instruments	travel	no	further	than	the	initial	signature	(Interview	with	
government	official	6,	2013).	In	light	of	the	many	conventions	and	initiatives	in	circulation,	it	is	
perhaps	not	surprising	that	politicians	have	to	prioritize	amongst	a	vast	pool	of	options.	
Domestification	of	CITES	has	been	riddled	with	problems	and	shortcomings,	which	relate	to	
the	contents	and	objectives	of	the	Convention,	enforcement	mechanisms	and	its	legitimacy	at	
the	local	level,	particularly	in	the	Global	South.	
	
Table	11:	When	did	rhino	range,	transit	and	consumer	states	join	CITES?	
Name	of	country	 Relevance	to	rhinos	 Date	1	 Date	2	
Angola	 FR	&	T	 02/10/2013	(A)	 31/12/2013	
Botswana	 R	&	T	 14/11/1977	(A)	 12/02/1978	
Cambodia	 FR	&	T	&	C	 04/07/1997	(R)	 02/10/1997	
China	 FR	&	T	&	C	 08/01/1981	(A)	 08/04/1981	
Czech	Republic	 T	&	C	 14/04/1993	(S)	 01/01/1993	
DR	Congo	 FR	&	T	 20/07/1976	(A)	 18/10/1976	
Ethiopia	 FR	&	T	 05/04/1989	(A)	 04/07/1989	
Germany	 T	 22/03/1976	(R)	 20/06/1976	
India	 R	&	T		 20/07/1976	(R)		 18/10/1976	
Indonesia	 R	&	T	 28/12/1976	(A)	 28/03/1979	
Ireland	 T	 08/01/2002	(R)	 08/04/2002	
Japan	 C	 06/08/1980	(Ac)	 04/11/1980	
Kenya	 R	&	T	 13/12/1978	(R)	 13/03/1979	
Laos	 T	&	C	 01/03/2004	(A)	 30/05/2004	
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Lesotho	 T	 01/10/2003	(R)	 30/12/2003	
Malawi	 R		 05/02/1982	(A)	 06/05/1982	
Malaysia	 R	&	T	 20/10/1977	(A)	 18/01/1978	
Mozambique	 FR	&	T	 25/03/1981	(A)	 23/06/1981	
Myanmar	 R	&	T	&	C	 13/06/1997	(A)	 11/09/1997	
Namibia	 R	&	T	 18/12/1990	(A)	 18/03/1991	
Nepal	 R	&	T	 18/06/1975	(A)	 16/09/1975	
Netherlands	 T	 19/04/1984	(R)	 18/07/1984	
Nigeria	 T	 09/05/1974	(R)	 01/07/1975	
Pakistan	 R		 20/04/1976	(A)	 19/07/1976	
Poland	 T	 12/12/1989	(R)	 12/03/1990	
Qatar	 T	&	C	 08/05/2001	(A)	 12/03/1990	
Singapore	 T	 30/11/1986	(A)	 28/02/1987	
South	Africa	 R	 15/07/1975	(R)	 13/10/1975	
Swaziland	 R	&	T	 26/02/1997	(A)	 27/05/1997	
Tanzania	 R	&	T	 29/11/1979	(R)	 27/02/1980	
Thailand	 T	&	C	 21/01/1983	(R)	 21/04/1983	
Uganda	 R		 18/07/1991	(A)	 16/10/1991	
United	Arab	Emirates	 T	&	C	 08/02/1990	(A)	 09/05/1990	
United	Kingdom	 T	 02/08/1976	(R)	 31/10/1976	
United	States		 T		 14/01/1974	(R)	 01/07/1975	
Vietnam	 FR	&	T	&	C	 20/01/1994	(A)	 20/04/1994	
Yemen	 C	 05/05/1997	(A)	 03/08/1997	
Zambia	 R	&	T	 24/11/1980	(A)	 22/02/1981	
Zimbabwe	 R	&	T	 19/05/1981	(A)	 17/08/1981	
	
Source:	extracted	from	CITES	(2014b)282	
	
	
Date	1:	 	(A)	Accession	 	 Date	2:	Date	of	entry	into	force				 	 Relevance	to	rhinos:	
	 	(Ap)	Approval	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (R)	Range	State	
	 	(C)	Continuation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (FR)	Former	Range	State	
	 	(R)	Ratification	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (T)	Transit	State	
	 	(S)	Succession	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (C)	Consumer	State	
	
	
Chapter	3	dealt	with	the	long	history	of	rhino	horn	demand.	The	total	number	of	rhinos	in	the	
1970s	and	1980s	best	demonstrates	the	gravity	of	the	situation	in	Africa	at	the	time.	The	IUCN	
estimated	that	8,458	white	and	black	rhinos	survived	by	1990	(Cumming/du	Toit/Stuart	1990:	
																																																						
282	Rhino	horns	originating	from	thefts	out	of	museums	and	private	collections	in	countries	outside	the	
traditional	range	states	were	not	included	in	this	table.	The	categorization	of	countries	is	based	on	current	data	
collected	by	the	author.	
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10).	It	is	thus	not	surprising	that	CITES	has	engaged	with	the	rhino	issue	since	its	early	days.	
When	CITES	entered	into	force	in	1975,	rhinos	and	their	products	were	among	the	first	
species	to	be	placed	in	Appendices	I	and	II.	All	rhino	species	were	placed	in	Appendix	I	in	
1977,	effectively	banning	international	trade	except	under	exceptional	circumstances	
(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	44).	Despite	the	trade	ban,	the	number	of	black	rhinos	continued	to	
plummet,	and	rhinos	became	locally	extinct	in	at	least	18	range	states	in	Africa	over	the	next	
two	decades	(Leader-Williams	2003:	92).	The	failure	of	the	Appendix	I	listing	prompted	
further	action.	Resolution	3.11	of	1981	called	on	states	that	were	not	parties	to	CITES	(Taiwan	
and	Yemen	were	major	consumer	nations	and	not	parties	to	CITES	at	the	time)	to	take	
preventative	measures	to	curb	illegal	trade.	Moreover,	the	Resolution	called	for	a	moratorium	
on	the	sale	of	all	government	and	para-statal	stocks	of	rhino	horn	as	well	as	the	mandatory	
annual	reporting	of	horn	assets	to	the	Convention	(IUCN	2000:	47).	The	passive	opposition	of	
consumer	countries	(by	initially	not	joining	CITES)	constitutes	a	significant	hurdle	to	
legitimizing	and	implementing	the	trade	ban.	Essentially,	the	trade	and	consumption	of	rhino	
horn	were	legal	until	consumer	countries	ascended	to	or	ratified	CITES,	and	domesticated	
local	prohibition.		
	
At	the	6th	Conference	of	Parties	in	Ottawa,	Canada,	it	was	noted	that	the	black	rhino	
continued	to	“decline	catastrophically”	(Wijnsteker	2003:	198)	and	thus	Resolution	6.10	of	
1987	called	for	immediate,	drastic	and	even	stricter	measures	to	be	taken	to	stop	the	illegal	
cross-border	trade	in	rhino	horn.	All	domestic	and	international	trade	was	prohibited	with	the	
exception	of	the	movement	of	non-commercial	hunting	trophies	that	needed	requisite	CITES	
documentation.	Moreover,	governments	were	again	urged	to	destroy	all	government	and	
para-statal	stocks	of	rhino	horn	(in	return	they	would	be	compensated	with	external	aid	to	
assist	in	rhino	conservation	–	ostensibly	these	funds	would	be	made	available	by	member	
states	from	the	Global	North).	Law	enforcement	agencies	were	instructed	to	be	particularly	
alert	to	the	trafficking	of	rhino	horn.	Parties	were	asked	to	increase	penalties	for	individual	
and	corporate	offenders	involved	in	cross-border	poaching	and	trafficking	of	horn.	Those	
countries	that	ignored	the	earlier	resolution	were	supposed	to	be	pressurized	by	way	of	
economic,	political	and	diplomatic	sanctions	(Leader-Williams	2003:	92–94).	Although	the	
resolution	chartered	new	territory	by	going	beyond	the	remit	of	trade	regulations,	the	success	
was	again	limited.	Many	states	did	not	destroy	their	rhino	horn	stockpiles	nor	was	the	
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promised	compensation	to	promote	the	destruction	of	stockpiles	forthcoming	(IUCN	2000:	
47).	In	addition,	several	key	consumer	nations283	failed	to	implement	domestic	laws	to	curb	
the	illegal	trade	(Leader-Williams	2003:	94).	It	bears	mentioning	that	South	Africa	allowed	the	
export	of	white	rhino	trophies	since	1979	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	44).	South	Africa	was	subject	
to	international	sanctions	due	to	her	racist	apartheid	regime	during	the	first	20	years	of	CITES.	
Since	the	advent	of	democracy	in	1994,	the	South	African	wildlife	hunting	industry	has	
experienced	a	massive	boom	and	became	a	top	destination	for	‘Big	Five’	hunting	(Interview	
with	Journalist	1),284	including	the	rhino	(see	also	Chapter	4).	
	
Over	the	course	of	the	next	five	years,	the	governments	of	South	Africa,	Namibia	and	
Zimbabwe	began	to	express	their	disenchantment	with	the	international	ban	on	the	trade	in	
rhino	products,	and	proposals	for	a	controlled	legal	trade	were	made.	All	three	countries	held	
considerable	stocks	of	horn	attained	through	the	collection	of	horn	from	natural	mortalities	
and	confiscations,	and	in	the	case	of	Namibia	and	Zimbabwe	through	dehorning	of	animals,	
undertaken	as	a	protective	measure	(Leader-Williams	2003:	94).	For	all	intents	and	purposes,	
this	constitutes	the	first	contestation	of	illegality	(against	the	CITES	trade	ban)	with	regards	to	
the	trade	in	rhino	horn.	In	other	words,	the	disillusionment	of	the	three	southern	African	
countries	constitutes	a	form	of	contested	illegality	at	the	macro	level,	which	was	going	to	
influence	future	policy	directions	on	the	matter.	Proposals	to	down-list	rhinos	from	Appendix	I	
to	Appendix	II	were	rejected	at	the	CoPs	in	1992	and	1994.285	The	9th	CoP	in	Fort	Lauderdale	
had	taken	place	only	six	months	after	the	election	of	the	first	democratic	government	in	South	
Africa	in	1994.	South	Africa’s	quest	for	a	controlled	trade	continued	and	in	recognition	of	the	
country’s	success	in	rhino	conservation	and	management,	the	populations	of	white	rhino	
were	moved	to	Appendix	II	in	1994.	An	annotation	confined	the	permissible	trade	to	live	
rhinos	to	“acceptable	and	appropriate	destinations	and	hunting	trophies	only”(CITES	1994).	
																																																						
283	China,	South	Korea,	Taiwan	and	Yemen	
	
284	Originally	the	term	‘Big	Five’	was	a	hunting	term,	which	has	been	adopted	into	common	parlance.	The	‘Big	
Five’	refer	to	five	of	Africa’s	great	wild	animals:	the	African	lion,	African	elephant,	Cape	buffalo,	African	leopard	
and	the	white	or	black	rhino.	
	
285	Outside	the	confines	of	CITES,	the	US	threatened	China,	South	Korea,	Taiwan	and	Yemen	with	the	suspension	
of	any	wildlife	and	fisheries	trade	under	the	Pelly	Amendment	(US	domestic	legislation	governing	wildlife	and	
fisheries	trade).	The	countries	leapt	into	action	by	passing	some	domestic	laws	and	intensifying	efforts	to	curb	
illicit	trade	(Leader-Williams	2003:	94).	
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Swaziland’s	white	rhino	population	was	also	granted	Appendix	II	status	in	2004,	tied	to	a	
partial	annotation	for	live	sales	and	hunting	trophies	only	and	subject	to	quotas	set	as	
percentages	of	the	total	rhino	numbers	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	44).	At	the	same	Conference	of	
Parties,	Resolution	9.14	was	passed,	which	repealed	the	earlier	two	resolutions.	The	
resolution	urged,	amongst	others,	those	parties	with	legal	stocks	to	identify,	mark,	register	
and	secure	all	such	stock	and	to	implement	adequate	legislation	including	domestic	trade	
restrictions.286		South	Africa	again	pushed	for	a	controlled	trade	of	both	white	and	black	rhino	
species	at	the	next	Conference	of	Parties	in	1997.	By	that	stage,	South	Africa	was	conserving	
some	70	%	to	80	%	of	the	world’s	rhinos	(Leader-Williams	2003:	96).	The	country	also	
proposed	to	change	the	Appendix	II	annotation	to	allow	for	trade	in	rhino	parts	and	
derivatives	(as	opposed	to	the	1994	listing	which	only	allowed	trade	in	live	rhinos	and	hunting	
trophies).	State	officials	expressed	concern	about	the	incentives	for	rhino	conservation,	
especially	for	private	rhino	owners,	who	conserved	some	15	%	of	South	Africa’s	rhinos	at	the	
time.	The	proposal	was	rejected,	as	the	European	Union	(EU)	and	the	United	States	(US)	did	
not	support	the	proposal	(the	EU	holds	considerable	sway	at	CITES	as	its	member	countries	
tend	to	vote	as	a	block).	While	the	EU	deemed	the	proposal	premature	as	no	adequate	trade	
control	mechanisms	had	been	put	in	place,	the	US	indicated	that	the	amendment	would	
undermine	progress	to	curb	the	demand	for	rhino	horn	in	consumer	nations	(Department	of	
Environmental	Affairs	2012).		
	
After	the	1997	rejection	at	CITES	and	in	light	of	its	acceptance	into	regional	bodies,	South	
Africa	got	increasingly	involved	with	relevant	Southern	African	Development	Community	
(SADC)	initiatives.287	A	SADC	CoP	preparatory	meeting	ahead	of	the	Conference	of	Parties	in	
2000	recommended	that	a	comprehensive	trade	system	be	developed	before	a	proposal	was	
submitted	at	the	CoP	(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	2012).	Namibia	and	South	Africa	
were	granted	an	annual	export	quota	of	five	hunting	trophies	of	adult	male	black	rhinos	at	the	
13th	Conference	of	Parties	in	2004	(CITES	2004).	Says	a	South	African	expert	(Interview	with	
Conservator	7):		
																																																						
286	Reeves	(2002:	189–200)	provides	a	fascinating	account	of	the	political	manoeuvring	behind	the	scenes	at	
CITES	in	the	run	up	to	the	CoPs	in	1992	and	1994.	
	
287	South	Africa	joined	SADC	after	the	apartheid	system	was	abolished	in	1994.	
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“In	’97	we	asked	again	for	trade	and	lost	with	one	or	two	votes,	then	we	left	it	and	
concentrated	on	our	elephants.	From	2000,	elephants	were	key	at	CoP	12	and	13,	and	
after	CoP	14	we	could	trade	in	ivory,	and	then	at	CoP	15	we	didn't	take	any	proposals	
because	Tanzania	and	Zambia	took	their	ivory	proposals,	so	it’s	not	that	South	Africa	
never	asked	for	trade	in	rhino	horn	before.”	
	
The	frequency	of	rhino	poaching	increased	during	the	2000s	(later	chapters	will	argue	that	the	
actual	number	of	illegal	rhino	horns	entering	the	market	increased	marginally	as	horn	supplies	
derived	from	other	sources)	and	South	Africa	put	the	trade	proposal	on	the	backburner	until	
CoP	16	held	in	Bangkok,	Thailand	in	2013.	At	the	occasion,	Edna	Molewa,	the	South	African	
Minister	of	Environmental	Affairs	announced	that	South	Africa	was	considering	proposals	to	
seek	legalization	of	trade	in	rhino	horn	at	the	CoP	17	to	be	held	in	South	Africa	in	2016.	
Molewa	(quoted	in:	Smith	2013)	explained	the	position:		
	
"Our	rhinos	are	killed	every	day	and	the	numbers	are	going	up.	The	reality	is	that	we	
have	done	all	in	our	power	and	doing	the	same	thing	every	day	isn't	working.	We	do	
think	that	we	need	to	address	this	issue	of	trade	in	a	controlled	manner	so	that	we	can	
at	least	begin	to	push	down	this	pressure."		
	
The	rhino	issue	at	CITES	cannot	be	separated	from	parallel	processes	and	debates	happing	at	
CITES	because	they	illustrate	the	polarization	at	CITES.	The	north-south	divide288	and	the	
perceived	politicization	of	CITES	became	increasingly	evident	when	the	African	elephant	was	
‘uplisted’	(moved	from	Appendix	II	to	Appendix	I)	and	the	trade	ban	of	ivory	products	entered	
into	force	in	1989.	The	proposal	for	the	complete	ban	was	based	on	recommendations	from	
the	CITES	Elephant	Working	Group	and	a	study	undertaken	by	the	specially	convened	Ivory	
Trade	Review	Group.	The	group	found	that	neither	the	quota	management	system	nor	any	of	
the	earlier	CITES	resolutions	had	stemmed	the	tide	against	illegal	poaching	of	elephants	and	
trade	in	ivory	(‘t	Sas-Rolfes	2000:	75).	In	the	run-up	to	the	ban,	Western	conservation	NGOs	
had	campaigned	in	favour	of	prohibition.	The	CITES	proposal	was	adopted	despite	objections	
from	9	southern	African	elephant	range	states,	and	Japan	and	China.	Back	then	the	population	
of	elephants	was	considered	stable	or	rising	in	Botswana	and	Zimbabwe.	In	some	range	
																																																						
288	The	term	is	used	with	reservation	as	some	states	in	the	Global	South	(notably	Kenya)	have	aligned	themselves	
with	the	anti-sustainable	use	faction,	which	is	largely	linked	to	countries	and	conservation	NGOs	in	the	Global	
North.	
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states,	notably	Kenya	and	Zimbabwe,	expanding	elephant	populations	were	destroying	the	
farming	operations	of	rural	farmers	(‘t	Sas-Rolfes	2000:	77).	Zimbabwe	became	particularly	
vocal	after	several	attempts	to	down-list	elephants	were	rejected	at	subsequent	CoPs	despite	
the	growth	of	its	herds	and	competent	conservation	management	principles	being	applied.	
Matters	climaxed	when	a	group	of	southern	African	countries	threatened	to	withdraw	from	
CITES	at	the	8th	Conference	of	Parties	held	in	Kyoto.	The	southern	African	faction	felt	that	
CITES	listings	were	increasingly	used	for	political	purposes,	and	listing	decisions	were	not	
based	on	sound	scientific	data.289			
	
The	disputed	elephant	listing	triggered	a	larger	debate	over	which	conservation	paradigms	the	
CITES	regime	should	employ:	the	sustainable	use	paradigm	was	pitted	against	the	
preservation	paradigm	(Mofson	2000:	111).	The	southern	African	faction	advocated	the	
sustainable	use	of	wildlife	as	a	conservation	tool.	By	way	of	background:	It	is	important	to	
note	that	CITES	tends	to	focus	on	the	global	level	of	imperilment	of	a	species	when	
determining	its	listing.	In	essence:	regardless	of	its	status	in	individual	range	states,	if	a	
species	is	deemed	as	endangered	at	the	global	level,	then	its	trade	may	be	banned.	Through	
this	approach,	CITES	treats	natural	resources	within	individual	countries	as	part	of	the	global	
commons	(Castley/Hall–Martin	2003:	129).		When	it	comes	to	shouldering	the	costs	of	
conservation	of	listed	species	in	individual	countries,	no	state	carries	the	financial	
responsibility	for	the	costs	(financial,	administrative	and	human	resources)	it	may	be	placing	
on	another	state	(Martin	2000:	131).	In	other	words,	the	range	states	themselves	have	to	
carry	the	costs	attached	to	the	listing	and	attempts	at	de–listing	of	a	species.290	The	listing	
process	has	been	subject	to	scathing	criticism	by	countries	affected	by	listing	decisions.	
Western	experts,	scientists	and	lobbyists	are	seen	as	the	main	catalysts	behind	the	listing	of	
threatened	species.	Broad	consultation	with	communities	that	are	affected	by	such	listings	is	
perceived	to	be	lacking	(Interviews	with	Conservator	3	&	4,	2013).	With	every	additional	
																																																						
289	In	response	to	the	contested	elephant	issue,	Zimbabwe	and	its	partners	from	the	Southern	African	Centre	for	
Ivory	Marketing	(SACIM)	submitted	a	proposal	to	list	the	northern	Atlantic	herring	in	Appendix	I.	The	herring	was	
chosen	because	it	was	an	important	commercial	commodity	for	many	European	countries,	just	as	the	elephant	
was	for	many	African	range	states.	The	proposal	was	withdrawn	due	to	weak	supporting	data	(Mofson	2000:	
110).	
	
290	Mozambique’s	experience	with	attempts	at	getting	crocodiles	delisted	is	instructive.	The	southern	African	
nation	was	required	to	spend	a	great	deal	of	money	to	prove	that	a	species	locally	considered	a	pest	was	not	
endangered	in	order	to	trade	crocodile	skins	from	abundant	populations	(Huxley	2000:	9).	
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listing	or	annotation,	the	Convention	becomes	more	complex,	difficult	and	expensive	to	
operate		–	and	not	only	to	countries	located	in	the	Global	South	(Huxley	2000:	9).	Moreover,	
while	an	objective	scientific	assessment	might	treat	all	species	threatened	by	exploitative	
trade	with	equal	seriousness,	in	practice	not	all	species	are	treated	the	same.	Due	to	cultural,	
political,	economic	and	aesthetic	reasons,	some	species	have	been	afforded	greater	
importance.	CITES	appears	to	privilege	animals	over	plants,	and	certain	species	that	have	
been	dubbed	“charismatic	megafauna”(Dickson	2003:	24).	The	rhino	falls	into	this	category	
(elephants	and	tigers	are	other	dominant	representatives	of	this	type	of	animal).	While	the	
appropriation	of	charismatic	megafauna	may	be	legitimate	for	the	attainment	of	
conservationist	objectives,	conservation	NGOs	have	been	using	the	convention	as	fund-raising	
tool.	The	typical	trajectory	would	incorporate	the	declaration	of	a	crisis,	the	mounting	of	a	
campaign	coupled	with	fund	raising	to	“save”	the	species.	The	process	culminates	with	the	
species	getting	listed	on	Appendix	I,	and	the	NGOs’	coffers	filled	with	donor	monies	(Huxley	
2000:	10).	
	
In	addition,	the	conservation	ideology	underpinning	the	CITES	regime	in	its	early	days	
excluded	the	possibility	that	trade	may	hold	benefits	for	species,	ecosystems	or	people	
(Martin	2000:	129).	While	trade	might	be	the	principal	threat	to	the	survival	of	species,	trade	
regulations	may	be	inappropriate	in	dealing	with	threats	such	as	human	encroachment,	
climate	change	or	organized	crime.	It	was	assumed	that	trade	regulation	constituted	the	most	
effective	way	of	achieving	conservationist	goals	(Dickson	2003:	26).	Moreover,	listings	do	not	
only	affect	the	wild	fauna	and	flora	that	CITES	seeks	to	protect	but	also	the	people	that	live	in	
close	proximity	to	them.	These	rural	people	often	eke	out	a	living	from	harvesting	or	trading	
in	wild	animals	or	plants.	From	one	day	to	the	next,	a	former	harvester	may	be	labelled	a	
poacher	or	criminal.	As	a	consequence,	there	were	calls	that	CITES	should	consider	the	plight	
of	rural	people	when	passing	measures	that	affect	their	livelihood	(Dickson	2003:	23).	
	
In	1992,	CITES	recognized	with	Resolution	8.3	that	the	majority	of	species	it	sought	to	protect	
were	located	in	the	Global	South.	It	also	acknowledged	that	the	sustainable	use	of	wild	fauna	
and	flora,	irrespective	of	being	consumptive	or	non-consumptive,	provided	an	economically	
viable	option	(CITES	1992).	Moreover,	it	was	accepted	that	unless	conservation	programmes	
took	into	account	the	needs	of	local	people,	and	provided	incentives	for	sustainable	use	of	
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wild	fauna	and	flora,	conversion	to	alternate	forms	of	land	use	might	occur	(Wijnsteker	2003:	
59).	To	this	day,	the	issue	of	sustainable	use	constitutes	a	highly	contentious	issue	at	CITES	
CoPs.	There	is	a	significant	lobby	within	the	environmental	movement	(predominantly	located	
in	the	Global	North	with	strategic	partners	and	offices	located	around	the	globe)	that	is	
vehemently	opposed	to	any	trade	in	animal	species,	particularly	when	it	is	premised	on	the	
killing	of	these	animals	(Dickson	2003:	24).	This	lobby	holds	considerable	sway	at	CITES,	
directly	and	indirectly	affecting	regulations	that	lead	to	restrictions	on	trade	in	wildlife.	Some	
southern	countries	object	to	the	strong	influence	of	animal	rights	and	conservation	NGOs	at	
CITES,	portraying	the	anti-use	stance	as	“an	illegitimate	imposition	of	specific	moral	values	on	
the	wider	conservation	community”	especially	since	the	sustainable	use	of	wildlife	is	seen	as	a	
means	to	uplift	rural	communities	(Dickson	2003:	24–25).	Despite	the	apparent	conflict	
between	conservation	principles	as	envisaged	in	the	original	convention	and	notions	of	
sustainable	use	and	development,	CITES	has	acknowledged	developmental	concerns	of	the	
custodians	of	most	of	the	remaining	biodiversity	in	the	Global	South	in	its	strategic	plan	of	
2000:		
	
“The	Strategic	Plan	confirms	the	recognition	by	the	parties	that	sustainable	trade	in	
wild	fauna	and	flora	can	make	a	major	contribution	to	securing	the	broader	and	not	
incompatible	objectives	of	sustainable	development	and	biodiversity	conversation	
(CITES	Secretariat	quoted	in:	Dickson	2003:	25).”	
	
What	has	been	deemed	a	“somewhat	opaque	endorsement	of	the	relevance	of	sustainable	
development”	(Dickson	2003:	25)	cleared	the	path	for	countries	of	the	Global	South	to	insist	
that	developmental	concerns	should	be	considered	in	future	formulations	of	wildlife	policies.	
At	the	16th	CoP,	CITES	extended	the	validity	of	the	Strategic	Vision	and	Action	Plan	to	2020.	In	
a	significant	move	to	broaden	its	repertoire,	appeal	and	impact,	CITES	approved	a	new	
framework	for	future	policy	development.	The	framework	incorporates	new	goals	and	
objectives.	The	international	body	aspires	to	contribute	to	the	attainment	of	the	UN	
Millennium	Development	Goals	relevant	to	CITES,	the	‘Strategic	Plan	for	Biodiversity	2011–
2020’,	the	Aichi	Biodiversity	Targets	and	to	the	implementation	of	relevant	outcomes	of	the	
United	Nations	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development	of	2012.	And	most	significantly,	the	
new	framework	proclaims	to	consider	“cultural,	social	and	economic	factors	at	play	in	
producer	and	consumer	countries”,	promote	“transparency	and	wider	involvement	of	civil	
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society	in	the	development	of	conservation	policies	and	practices”	and	ensure	“that	a	
coherent	and	internationally	agreed	approach	based	on	scientific	evidence	is	taken	to	address	
any	species	of	wild	fauna	and	flora	subject	to	unsustainable	international	trade”	(CITES	2013a:	
2).	The	suggested	institutional	change	is	reflected	in	the	new	CITES	vision	statement:	
	
“Conserve	biodiversity	and	contribute	to	its	sustainable	use	by	ensuring	that	no	
species	of	wild	fauna	or	flora	becomes	or	remains	subject	to	unsustainable	
exploitation	through	international	trade,	thereby	contributing	to	the	significant	
reduction	of	the	rate	of	biodiversity	loss	and	making	a	significant	contribution	towards	
achieving	the	relevant	Aichi	Biodiversity	Targets.”	(CITES	2013a:	2)		
	
	
Whether	the	chosen	path	will	cause	more	division	amongst	parties	at	CITES	or	assist	CITES	in	
regaining	credibility	and	legitimacy	amongst	disgruntled	parties	is	a	matter	of	future	analysis.	
However,	data	collected	prior	and	during	the	course	of	this	project	revealed	sentiments	that	
reflected	negatively	on	CITES,	the	Appendices	and	the	perceived	influence	of	Western	
conservation	NGOs	and	the	animal	rights	movement	whereas	local	(African)	environmental	
justice	movements	had	no	or	little	representation	at	CoPs.	Falling	short	of	calling	CITES	a	neo–
colonial	institution,	government	officials	from	the	SADC	region	interviewed	for	a	project	on	
organized	crime	trends	in	southern	Africa	portrayed	CITES	as	an	instrument	that	was	
developed	and	sponsored	by	countries	of	the	Global	North.	It	is	seen	to	reflect	Western	
conservation	philosophies	and	animal	rights	ethics	while	paying	“little	concern	to	the	plight	of	
African	rural	people	and	their	developmental	concerns”	(Institute	for	Security	Studies	2009–
2010).	Officials	also	pointed	to	the	uncontrolled	“slaughter	of	wild	animals”	during	the	
colonial	period,	questioning	why	the	northern	relatives	of	those	colonial	hunters	should	have	
any	say	in	African	conservation	matters.	The	question	arose	of	why	Africans	should	preserve	
Western-style	safari	parks	filled	with	wild	animals	when	European	countries	had	failed	so	
dismally	in	conserving	their	own	wilderness	areas.	While	the	northern	lobby	was	quick	to	
criticize	and	determine	the	way	forward,	they	failed	to	“put	their	money	where	there	mouth	
is”	in	terms	of	paying	compensation	and	implementation	of	rules	(Interviews,	2013).	The	
perception	that	northern	countries	hold	sway	at	CITES	is	supported	by	voting	patterns	at	CoPs	
(EU	member	states	usually	vote	as	a	block).	During	interviews	for	the	current	project,	
conservators	and	private	rhino	owners	shared	these	sentiments.	A	South	African	law	
enforcement	official	said	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	3):		
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“It	is	crazy	that	these	old	colonial	institutions	are	still	in	place.	CITES	decides	how	much	
and	what	we	can	sell.	We	stock	about	90%	of	the	world’s	rhinos.	So	who	are	they	to	
prescribe	to	us?	I	mean	we	are	in	a	controlled	area,	where	we	manage	stock.	We	know	
what	we	are	doing	and	we	are	trying	to	protect	them	for	our	children.”	
	
	
The	significance	of	perceptions	like	the	one	expressed	in	the	citation	above,	is	how	they	affect	
the	diffusion	and	acceptance	of	CITES	at	the	local	level.	As	will	be	shown	in	subsequent	
sections	and	chapters,	local	regulations	such	as	the	Threatened	of	Protected	Species	(TOPS)	
regulations	and	the	moratorium	on	the	domestic	trade	in	rhino	horn	lack	support	and	
legitimacy	amongst	key	constituencies	in	South	Africa.	In	essence,	the	perceived	unfairness	of	
CITES	as	an	international	instrument	that	impacts	national	trade	aspirations	also	affects	the	
legitimacy	of	domestic	laws,	ordinances	and	regulations	in	South	Africa	and	other	range,	
transfer	and	consumer	countries.	The	politicization	and	influence	of	northern	countries	at	
CITES	explains	in	part	why	representatives	of	countries	in	the	Global	South	muster	limited	
political	will	to	implement	CITES	decisions	and	regulations.	Moreover,	the	normative	agenda	
of	CITES	emulates	the	earlier	discussed	conservation	paradigms,	which	tend	to	emphasize	the	
irreconcilability	between	local	people,	conservation	and	wild	animals.	In	light	of	the	
controversy	surrounding	CITES,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	international	political	protection	
regime	has	had	limited	success	in	disrupting	transnational	flows	of	rhino	horn.	
	
	
5.3	The	international	response		
	
The	previous	section	alluded	to	the	perception	of	unfairness	when	it	comes	to	listing	decisions	
(illegalization)	and	shouldering	the	cost	implications	of	such	listings.	This	section	provides	a	
brief	overview	of	the	role	of	the	international	community	in	rhino	protection	in	the	form	of	
political	responses	and	their	impact.	An	important	aspect	of	the	international	response	relates	
to	the	legislative	and	enforcement	efforts	in	transit	and	consumer	countries.	Reprimands	and	
the	threat	of	sanctions	on	part	of	CITES,	as	well	as	pressure	by	the	US	(the	Pelly	Amendment),	
led	to	limited	action	by	the	major	rhino	horn	consumer	countries	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	
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China291,	South	Korea292,	Taiwan293	and	Yemen294	joined	CITES	(see	Table	11)	and	passed	
sufficient	domestic	legislation	(at	the	time)	to	avert	sanctions	and	a	fall	out	with	the	CITES	
Standing	Committee.		
	
South	Africa	is	currently	the	principal	supplier	of	illegal	rhino	horn	through	poaching	and	
pseudo–hunting;	however,	organized	crime	networks	have	engaged	in	frauds,	burglaries	and	
robberies	across	the	world.	As	will	be	shown	in	later	chapters,	the	illicit	supply	chain	of	rhino	
horn	involves	nationalities	from	across	the	globe.295	Sellar	(2014a)	argues	that	while	South	
Africa	has	been	pulling	its	weight	in	curbing	poaching	and	illegal	trade,	transit	and	consumer	
countries	have	been	lagging	far	behind.	Interviews	with	law	enforcer	and	conservators	echo	
Sellar’s	sentiments	on	the	disconnect	between	the	international	ban	as	envisaged	by	CITES,	
and	practical	support	for	its	implementation	in	transit	and	consumer	countries.	Sellar	who	
headed	the	CITES	law	enforcement	arm	comments	on	the	lacklustre	follow	up	to	CITES	
																																																						
291	China	joined	CITES	in	1981.	The	country	was	the	world’s	largest	exporter	of	patent	medicines	containing	rhino	
horn	and	agreed	to	ban	all	exports	in	1992.	Chinese	officials	were	not	in	favour	of	banning	domestic	trade	at	the	
time,	claiming	that	rhino	horn	stock	had	been	bought	prior	to	China	joining	CITES.	As	pressure	was	mounting,	the	
Chinese	State	Council	banned	with	immediate	effect	the	manufacture	of	all	medicines	containing	rhino	horn	and	
tiger	bones,	and	all	domestic	and	international	trade	in	rhino	horn,	tiger	parts	and	derivatives.	Moreover,	it	
became	mandatory	to	register	all	rhino	and	tiger	stocks,	and	rhino	horn	was	taken	off	the	official	pharmacopeia	
in	1993	(Reeve	2006:	191).		
	
292	The	Republic	of	Korea	avoided	certification	by	the	US	upon	passing	domestic	legislation	and	implementing	
effective	measures	to	curb	the	sale	of	rhino	horn.	The	Korean	government	passed	a	decree	in	1993	that	
rendered	the	sale	or	display	of	rhino	horn	a	punishable	offence	of	up	to	6-month	imprisonment	and	a	fine	of	US	
$	1250	(which	translated	to	1	million	US	$	in	2006)	(Reeve	2006:	190–191).	
	
293	Taiwan	became	the	largest	importer	of	African	and	Asian	rhino	horn	in	the	mid-1980s.	A	ban	on	the	import	of	
rhino	horn	was	instituted	in	1985,	but	it	lacked	implementation	and	enforcement.	Despite	the	adoption	of	the	
Wildlife	Conservation	Act	in	1989,	which	had	banned	the	sale	and	display	of	rhino	horn	without	a	special	permit	
in	1989,	rhino	horn	remained	openly	on	sale.	Due	to	increasing	international	pressure	and	NGO	campaigns,	the	
government	announced	a	full	ban,	the	imposition	of	fines,	and	enforcement	of	the	Wildlife	Conservation	Act	in	
1992.	The	US	nonetheless	imposed	sanctions,	which	were	only	lifted	in	1997,	once	the	Wildlife	Conservation	Act	
complied	with	CITES	guidelines	and	a	special	investigative	unit	had	been	set	up	(Reeve	2006:	194–196).	
	
294	Yemen	only	joined	CITES	in	1997,	but	the	Ministry	of	Supply	and	Trade	issued	a	decree	prohibiting	trade	in	
rhino	horn	that	had	not	been	processed	into	jambiya	handles	by	1992.	Traders	had	two	months	to	register	stock	
of	raw	rhino	horn	and	another	month	to	have	it	marked	before	all	unmarked	stock	was	to	be	confiscated	(Reeve	
2006:	191).	
	
295	Beyond	the	South	African	rhino	harvesting	and	smuggling	networks,	Mozambicans,	Zimbabwean,	Congolese,	
Namibian	and	Swaziland	nationals	have	been	linked	to	rhino	poaching	while	Vietnamese,	Laotian,	Thai,	Chinese,	
Mozambicans	and	others	are	smuggling	and	trafficking	rhino	horn.	Thai,	Vietnamese,	Polish,	Czech	and	US	
nationals	were	involved	in	fraudulent	hunting	expeditions,	and	international	organized	crime	networks	such	as	
the	infamous	Irish	Rover	gang	have	ransacked	private	collections,	museums	and	galleries.	
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Rhinoceros	Enforcement	Task	Force meetings.	The	CITES	Secretariat	convenes	such	meetings	
at	regular	intervals	with	the	objective	of	bringing	together	law	enforcement	officials	from	
rhino	range,	transit	and	consumer	countries	for	the	purpose	of	sharing	intelligence	and	
designing	response	strategies.	Pursuant	to	CoP	16,	the	Secretariat	arranged	a	CITES	
Rhinoceros	Enforcement	Task	Force	meeting	in	the	Kenyan	capital	of	Nairobi	in	October	2013.	
Representatives	of	wildlife	enforcement	networks	and	law	enforcement	personnel	from	21	
countries296	attended	the	meeting	(CITES	2013b).	Such	meetings	help	to	highlight	complex	
diversity	as	to	“experience,	authority,	skills	and	resources”	of	law	enforcement	officials	across	
the	world	(Sellar	2014b).	One	of	the	outcomes	of	the	meeting	in	Kenya	was	the	decision	to	
create	a	directory	of	national	focal	points.	The	resultant	list	would	provide	the	contact	details	
of	individuals	tasked	with	coordinating	the	investigation	of	rhino	crimes	in	countries	across	
the	world	(Sellar	2014a).	Countries	were	given	four	months	(until	28	February	2014)	to	
provide	the	contact	details	of	their	national	focal	points	to	the	CITES	Secretariat	for	
dissemination	to	relevant	law	enforcement	bodies	and	wildlife	enforcement	networks	
(WENs).	By	August	2014,	reminders	had	to	be	sent	as	only	China	and	Greece	had	heeded	the	
request.	Nine	states	had	designated	and	communicated	their	national	focal	points	upon	
publication	of	the	national	focal	points	in	October	2014.	Two	of	the	nine	states	that	complied	
were	not	members	of	the	task	force	(Greece	and	Japan).	Essentially,	14	states	deemed	as	
rhino	supply,	transit	or	consumer	countries	failed	to	comply	with	a	simple	directive,	including	
Vietnam	which	is	a	major	transit	and	consumer	country	of	rhino	horn	(CITES	2014a).	Sellar’s	
comments	(2014a)	on	this	state	of	affairs	are	poignant:	
“There	must	have	been	times,	probably	many	times	in	recent	years,	when	
enforcement	officers	in	South	Africa	have	felt	they	are	engaged	in	a	lone	battle.	At	
least	they	can	now	take	comfort	from	the	fact	that	there	are	8	countries	out	there	
ready	to	back	them	up.	Only	eight?	Yes,	South	Africa’s	focal	point’s	details	are	in	the	
directory	so	it	has	to	be	subtracted.	In	the	race	to	catch	up	with	criminals,	our	feet	are	
not	even	on	the	starting	blocks	yet.”	
Not	surprising,	members	of	the	international	law	enforcement	community	have	expressed	
their	disenchantment	with	the	‘soft’	approach	of	the	CITES	regulatory	framework.	Sellar	
																																																						
296	In	addition	to	several	regional	wildlife	and	law	enforcement	networks,	Botswana,	Cambodia,	China,	the	Czech	
Republic,	Indonesia,	Kenya,	the	Lao's	People	Democratic	Republic,	Malawi,	Malaysia,	Mozambique,	Namibia,	
Nepal,	the	Philippines,	Poland,	South	Africa,	Thailand,	Uganda,	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	
Ireland,	the	United	States	of	America,	Vietnam	and	Zambia	were	represented	at	the	meeting	(CITES	2013b).	
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(2014c:	7)	argues,	this	time	on	behalf	of	the	Global	Initiative	against	Transnational	Organized	
Crime:	 
	
“Although	Parties	are	legally	bound	to	penalize	violations	of	CITES,	the	Convention	was	
drafted	in	1973	and,	hence,	its	wording	does	not	reflect	the	existing	significant	and	
serious	levels	of	sophisticated	and	organized	trafficking.	It	is	acceptable,	for	instance,	
for	Parties	to	respond	to	violations	by	way	of	administrative,	as	opposed	to	criminal,	
penalties.”	
	
According	to	the	law	enforcement	professional,	the	international	community	should	deal	with	
“environmental	organized	crime”	in	terms	of	the	United	Nations	Convention	against	
Transnational	Organized	Crime	and	requisite	domestic	laws	that	deal	with	organized	crime,	
racketeering	or	conspiracy.	The	international	law	enforcement	community	has	put	measures	
into	place	to	deal	with	wildlife	trafficking	(such	as	the	International	Consortium	on	Combating	
Wildlife	Crime	(ICCWC)297	and	the	INTERPOL	Wildlife	Crime	Working	Group);298	wildlife	crime	
is	nonetheless	considered	the	“Cinderella	of	crimes”	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	8).299	And	in	
spite	of	being	branded	a	“priority	crime”	by	regional	organizations	such	as	the	Southern	
African	Regional	Police	Chiefs	Cooperating	Organisation	(SARPCCO)300	and	dedicated	wildlife	
crime	law	enforcement	regional	networks	such	as	the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	
Wildlife	Enforcement	Network	(ASEAN-WEN)301	and	the	Lusaka	Agreement	Task	Force	
																																																						
297	The	International	Consortium	on	Combating	Wildlife	Crime	is	an	initiative	started	by	the	CITES	Secretariat,	
INTERPOL,	the	United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	(UNODC),	the	World	Bank	and	the	World	Customs	
Organization	(WCO)	to	bolster	international	cooperation	regarding	the	combating	of	wildlife	and	forest	crime.	
	
298	There	are	numerous	other	international,	regional	and	sub-regional	initiatives	with	the	objective	of	tackling	
illegal	wildlife	trade.	It	is	beyond	the	remit	of	the	dissertation	to	mention	them	all.	A	few	initiatives	were	chosen	
to	illustrate	my	argument.	This	choice	should	not	detract	from	the	significance	and	impact	of	other	initiatives.	
	
299	Wildlife	crime	is	perceived	as	a	‘soft’	crime	amongst	many	actors	in	the	law	enforcement	community	and	
beyond.	Interviews	with	law	enforcement	officials	working	in	the	field	of	wildlife	crime	investigations	revealed	
that	they	had	to	deal	with	the	perception	that	wildlife	crimes	were	less	serious	crimes.		
	
300	Formally	established	in	1996,	the	Southern	African	Police	Chiefs	Cooperating	Organization	(SARPCCO)	is	a	
regional	organization	of	Chiefs	of	Police	for	SADC	member	states.	The	15	SADC	member	states	are	also	SARPCCO	
member	states	(SARPCCO	2014).		
	
301	The	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations’	Wildlife	Enforcement	Network	(ASEAN-WEN)	is	a	regional	
intergovernmental	law	enforcement	network	designed	to	combat	wildlife	trafficking	in	Southeast	Asia.	Brunei,	
Cambodia,	Indonesia,	Laos,	Malaysia,	Myanmar,	the	Philippines,	Singapore,	Vietnam	and	Thailand	are	member	
countries	(ASEAN–WEN	2014).	
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(LATF)302,	investigation	of	wildlife	crime	carries	less	prestige	and	status,	and	is	even	perceived	
as	a	‘career	sideliner’	in	the	southern	African	context	(Interviews	with	regional	law	
enforcement	officials,	2012	and	2013).	While	ranked	as	the	4th	most	lucrative	illegal	market	in	
the	world,303	law	enforcement	officers	seconded	to	wildlife	investigations	are	perceived	to	
draw	the	shorter	straw	in	comparison	to	getting	called	up	to	international,	regional	desks	or	
units	that	deal	with	drug	markets,	human	and	gun	trafficking,	or	other	“hard	crimes”	that	
have	“human”	victims	(forgetting	that	there	have	been	dozens	of	human	victims	–	poaching	
suspects	and	rangers	who	have	been	killed	in	the	wildlife	‘wars’	in	southern	Africa).	According	
to	this	cognitive	framing,	wildlife	crime	is	perceived	as	a	victimless	(and	hence	lesser)	crime	
because	it	does	not	cause	direct	harm	to	humans.	The	framing	omits	that	poaching	and	illegal	
harvesting	of	wildlife	harms	a	public	good.304	Due	to	the	involvement	of	transnational	
organized	crime	networks	in	wildlife	trafficking	with	links	to	“other	hard	crimes”	this	
perception	is	starting	to	change,	as	well	as	the	high	death	rate	of	poaching	suspects	and	
rangers	killed	in	conservation	areas	(Interview	with	law	enforcers	2,	8,	10;	2013).		
	
It	is	beyond	the	focus	of	this	dissertation	to	provide	an	overview	of	all	the	initiatives	and	
campaigns	occurring	at	the	international	level.	Suffice	to	point	out	that	the	international	
community	is	going	through	the	motions	of	setting	up	institutional,	regulatory	and	law	
enforcement	initiatives	to	deal	with	wildlife	crimes	in	general,	and	some	initiatives	that	are	
directed	towards	disrupting	the	market.	Whether	these	measures	accrue	to	noticeable	
																																																						
302	The	Lusaka	Agreement	Task	Force	is	the	enforcement	arm	of	the	‘Lusaka	Agreement	on	Co–operative	
Enforcement	Operations	Directed	at	Illegal	Trade	in	Wild	Fauna	and	Flora’.	The	agreement	followed	working	
group	meetings	between	eight	southern	and	eastern	African	countries,	CITES,	Interpol,	the	US	Fish	&	Wildlife	
Service	and	lawyers	of	the	Foundation	for	International	Environment	Law	Development	and	formal	inter–
governmental	negotiations	under	the	auspices	of	the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	(UNEP).	The	
agreement	has	been	categorized	as	a	UN	treaty	(Environment)	and	entered	force	in	1996.	There	are	currently	
seven	parties	to	the	agreement:	the	Republic	of	Congo	(Brazzaville),	Kenya,	Lesotho,	Liberia,	Tanzania,	Uganda	
and	Zambia.	Ethiopia,	South	Africa	and	Swaziland	are	signatories	(Lusaka	Agreement	on	Co–operative	
Enforcement	Operations	Directed	at	Illegal	Trade	in	Wild	Fauna	and	Flora	2014).	
	
303	Research	reports	often	cite	an	annual	turnover	of	8	to	10	billion	US	$	in	illegal	wildlife	markets,	a	figure	
extrapolated	from	a	2003	media	report	(Colombo	6	September	2003)	and	interviews	with	the	US	conservation	
NGO	Coalition	against	Wildlife	Trafficking	(CAWT)	by	Jeremy	Harken	for	a	report	commissioned	by	the	US	
research	and	advocacy	organization	Global	Financial	Integrity	(Harken	2011:	11).	While	the	figure	appears	to	
have	no	scientific	base	–	and	admittedly,	illegal	markets	are	notoriously	difficult	to	quantify	and	the	annual	
turnover	is	more	than	likely	much	higher	than	the	cited	figure.	Harken’s	estimation	has	been	used	widely	to	
underline	the	importance	and	serious	‘threat	level’	of	wildlife	crime.	
	
304	Based	on	discussions	and	comments	made	at	a	workshop	of	the	‘illegal	markets’	research	group	at	the	MPIfG.	
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changes	to	actors	on	the	ground	–	such	as	rangers	and	anti-poaching	personnel	–	is	subject	of	
Chapter	7.	The	following	sections	examine	the	domestic	responses	in	Vietnam	and	South	
Africa.	The	two	countries	were	chosen	due	to	their	important	roles	in	illegal	market	
structures.	Other	state	responses	such	as	those	of	China	and	Mozambique	are	considered	in	
context-specific	sections	of	the	dissertation.	
	
	
5.3.1	The	Vietnamese	response	
	
Vietnam	flew	under	the	radar	despite	being	a	transit	and	consumer	country	in	the	early	years	
of	CITES	(Interviews	in	Vietnam,	2013)	and	lacked	adequate	legislation	until	TRAFFIC,	
conservation	NGOs	and	the	CITES	Secretariat	identified	the	southeastern	Asian	nation	as	a	
major	consumer	country	(see	for	example:	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	CITES	Secretariat	2013;	
Nowell	2012b).	In	January	2013,	the	Prime	Minister	of	Vietnam	issued	Decision	11	on	the	
prohibition	of	the	export,	import,	selling	and	buying	of	specimens	of	some	wild	animal	species	
listed	under	the	Appendices	of	CITES.	This	decision	effectively	bans	all	domestic	sales	of	
African	rhino	horn	in	Vietnam.	An	exception	excludes	“imports	for	the	purpose	of	diplomacy,	
scientific	research,	biodiversity	conservation,	display	at	zoos,	exhibitions,	non-profit	circus	
performances,	law	enforcement	and	exchange	of	specimens	amongst	CITES	management	
authorities	of	member	countries	are	still	allowed”	(Vietnam	2013).	The	exceptions	relating	to	
the	imports	of	rhino	horn	for	the	purposes	of	diplomacy	and	law	enforcement	are	rather	
curious	(some	research	informants	believed	this	to	be	a	deliberate	loophole),	as	data	
collected	for	this	project	implicates	both	diplomats	and	law	enforcement	officials	in	the	
smuggling	and	trading	of	rhino	horn.	While	Hong	Kong	has	returned	confiscated	rhino	horn	to	
South	Africa	for	the	purpose	of	criminal	prosecutions	(Interview	with	law	enforcement	officer	
1,	Hong	Kong;	Interview	with	government	official	3,	South	Africa),	a	reverse	routing	of	
‘confiscated’	rhino	horn	in	the	opposite	direction	of	the	chain	of	evidence	(to	Vietnam)	seems	
odd.	Taken	at	face	value,	this	decision	appears	to	legitimize	the	illegal	activities	of	state–
sanctioned	actors	who	have	been	associated	with	the	illegal	supply	chain.	Despite	these	
specified	exemptions,	Vietnam	confirmed	to	the	CITES	rhinoceroses	working	group	in	July	
2014	that	no	permit	had	been	issued	for	ivory	or	rhino	horn	since	the	effective	date	of	the	
Decision	on	24	January	2013	(CITES	Rhinoceros	Working	Group	2014:	5).		
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Vietnam	also	banned	“non-commercial	import	of	hunting	trophies”	unless	cooperation	
agreements	had	been	signed	between	the	Vietnam	CITES	management	authority	and	the	
CITES	management	authority	in	the	exporting	country	(Vietnam	2013:	1).	At	the	time	of	
writing,	Vietnamese	hunters	were	still	banned	from	hunting	in	South	Africa	as	the	Vietnamese	
authorities	had	made	no	further	progress	in	ensuring	that	the	hunting	trophies	stayed	with	
the	original	trophy	hunter	(Interview	with	government	official	3,	South	Africa).	This	loophole	
relates	to	the	lack	of	regulations	and	enforcement	pertaining	to	what	happens	to	hunting	
trophies	once	they	have	reached	Vietnamese	shores.	While	rhino	trophy	hunters	are	not	
allowed	to	sell	their	trophies,	there	are	no	regulations	preventing	the	owners	from	donating	
or	gifting	them.	In	fact,	Vietnam’s	national	civil	law	permits	the	trophy	owner	to	decide	how	
to	use	their	trophies.	Because	hunting	trophies	are	categorized	as	personal	effects	in	the	
Southeast	Asian	country,	authorities	said	they	found	it	difficult	to	control	and	monitor	them.	
In	addition,	there	are	no	punitive	measures	or	permit	regulations	should	the	trophy	owner	
decide	to	cut	up	the	horn(s)	or	dispose	of	the	trophy	without	prior	authorization	(CITES	
Secretariat	2013:	7–8).305		Vietnam	was	on	the	receiving	end	of	a	great	deal	of	criticism	at	CoP	
16.	Vietnamese	government	officials	denied	the	huge	role	their	country	played	in	the	illegal	
supply	chain	of	rhino	horn	and	pointed	their	fingers	at	their	neighbour,	suggesting	that	
Vietnam	served	as	a	transit	and	processing	hub	for	rhino	horn	en	route	to	China	(CITES	
Secretariat	2013,	Interview	with	government	official	6,	Vietnam).		
	
The	tide	seems	to	have	turned:	A	progress	report	made	to	the	CITES	Secretariat	(Vietnam	
CITES	Management	Authority	31	January	2014)	on	Vietnam’s	compliance	with	decisions	taken	
at	CoP	16	at	the	end	of	January	2014	states	that	the	country’s	CITES	management	authority	
had	developed	additional	enforcement	mechanisms	to	protect	“precious,	rare	and	
endangered	species”	with	a	specific	focus	on	rhino,	elephant	and	pangolin	products	from	
Africa.	The	management	authority	is	also	in	the	process	of	developing	a	circular	on	the	
management	of	hunting	trophies.	The	circular	is	aimed	at	monitoring	the	alteration	of	
imported	hunting	trophies.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	circular	had	not	been	published.	In	
																																																						
305	In	its	September	2012	report	to	the	CITES	Secretariat,	Vietnam	indicated	that	many	hunters	cut	up	their	
hunting	trophies	(the	horns)	and	gifted	pieces	of	rhino	horn	to	friends	and	family.	When	the	Management	
Authority	in	Vietnam	undertook	“random	checks”	of	hunting	trophies,	only	7	out	of	40	trophies	were	found	in	an	
unadulterated	form	while	11	hunters	could	not	be	contacted	(CITES	Secretariat	2013:	23).			
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February	2014,	the	prime	minister	of	Vietnam	issued	an	additional	directive	“On	
strengthening	the	direction	and	implementation	of	measures	for	controlling	and	protecting	
endangered,	rare	and	precious	wild	animals”.	The	directive	provides	a	mandate	to	relevant	
ministries	to	tackle	wildlife	crime.	The	CITES	rhinoceros	working	group	interpreted	Vietnam’s	
recent	actions	as	a	demonstration	of	political	will	to	tackle	the	illegal	wildlife	trade	(CITES	
Rhinoceros	Working	Group	2014:	5).	
	
	
	
5.3.2	The	South	African	response	
The	previous	chapter	dealt	with	historical	aspects	of	nature	and	rhino	conservation	in	South	
Africa,	this	section	examines	the	status	quo.	The	apartheid	regime’s	endorsement	of	CITES	did	
not	impact	the	legitimacy	of	the	multilateral	treaty	amongst	the	first	generation	of	nature	
conservation	bureaucrats	in	the	new	South	Africa.306	Upon	election	of	the	first	democratic	
government	in	1994,	a	new	Constitution	cleared	the	way	for	transformation	of	laws,	policies	
and	the	apartheid	bureaucracy.	Environmental	rights,	sustainable	development	and	use	of	
natural	resources	became	enshrined	in	the	new	Constitution.	Thus,	Section	24	of	the	
Constitution	(Republic	of	South	Africa	1996:	6)	reads:		
	 “24.	Everyone	has	the	right	-	
(a)	to	an	environment	that	is	not	harmful	to	their	health	or	well-being;	and	
(b)	to	have	the	environment	protected,	for	the	benefit	of	present	and	future	
generations,	through	reasonable	legislative	and	other	measures	that	-	
(i)	prevent	pollution	and	ecological	degradation;	
(ii)	promote	conservation;	and	
(iii)	secure	ecologically	sustainable	development	and	use	of	natural	resources	while	
promoting	justifiable	economic	and	social	development	(author’s	emphasis).”307	
The	protection	of	the	environment		–	and	by	the	extension,	the	rhino	–	is	thus	considered	and	
guaranteed	by	the	highest	law	of	the	land.	In	the	immediate	period	following	the	end	of	
apartheid,	several	significant	events	impacted	the	state	of	nature	conservation,	known	as	
environmental	affairs	under	the	new	dispensation.	On	the	eve	of	the	first	democratic	
																																																						
306	Some	bureaucrats	of	the	‘old	apartheid’	regime’s	Department	of	Nature	Conservation	survived	the	regime	
change,	and	were	co-opted	by	the	new	government.	This	step	assisted	the	post-apartheid	government	in	
utilizing	institutional	memory	while	also	moving	forward	with	new	policy	directives	(Interview	with	government	
official	3,	2013).	
	
307	It	is	important	to	note	that	constitutional	interpretation	must	take	cognizance	of	international	law.	
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elections,	the	former	four	provinces	and	homelands	(known	as	Bantustans	in	apartheid	lingo)	
were	subdivided	into	nine	provinces.	Says	a	government	official	(Interview	with	government	
official	3,	2013):		
“Although	the	Department	was	the	focal	point	for	CITES	and	because	there	were	only	
four	provinces	in	the	old	days,	the	four	directors	were	at	the	forefront.	But	then	from	
1994,	the	role	of	the	Department	started	increasing.	Now	there	were	suddenly	nine	
and	not	four	provinces,	there	was	a	lot	more	coordination	to	get	uniform	systems	and	
training	of	the	new	officials.”	
The	new	Constitution	opened	the	floor	for	the	clearing	of	an	arsenal	of	draconian	apartheid	
laws	and	institutions	relating	to	all	sectors	of	public	and	private	life.	Concurrently,	the	wildlife	
ranching,	safari	and	game	industries	experienced	massive	growth	as	the	end	of	apartheid	had	
opened	up	previously	untapped	international	markets	of	hunters	and	tourists,	who	had	
boycotted	the	country	previously.	The	1990s	also	saw	some	‘dirty	tricks’	of	the	apartheid	
regime	exposed.	The	“Kumleben	Commission	of	Inquiry	into	the	Alleged	Smuggling	and	Trade	
in	Ivory	and	Rhinoceros	Horn	in	South	Africa”	(Kumleben	1996)	in	1996	and	the	Truth	and	
Reconciliation	Commission	(Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	1998)	culminating	in	the	
publication	of	its	final	report	in	1998,	revealed	an	underground	network	of	corrupt	apartheid	
politicians	and	military	intelligence	personnel	running	sanction–busting	trade	of	natural	
resources	including	ivory	and	rhino	horn	in	Angola,	Namibia	(formerly	known	as	Southwest	
Africa)	and	Mozambique.		The	new	environmental	affairs	bureaucracy	transformed	with	many	
former	public	servants	from	the	old	regime	opting	out	by	accepting	retrenchment	packages,	
early	retirement	or	job	opportunities	in	the	private	sector.	Beyond	the	institutional	and	
staffing	changes	in	the	Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	(its	name	and	scope	of	work	
went	through	several	changes	in	the	new	South	Africa),	the	criminal	justice,	security,	law	
enforcement	and	defence	sectors	equally	were	transformed.	Of	importance	here	is	the	
movement	of	apartheid	control	agents	(soldiers,	police	officers,	intelligence	and	the	upper	
echelons	of	the	relevant	bureaucracies)	into	the	private	sector.	It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	
that	many	of	the	‘apartheid	dogs	of	war’	would	have	ended	up	in	the	private	security	industry,	
specifically	in	the	anti–poaching	and	wildlife	protection	sectors.	A	few	of	these	former	control	
agents	have	joined	poaching	groups.	One	of	the	most	notorious	poachers	in	KwaZulu–Natal	
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(KZN),	for	example,	was	trained	by	the	apartheid	regime	to	fight	in	the	bush	war	in	southern	
Angola	and	against	MK	operatives	in	KZN	(Interview	with	anti–poaching	official	1,	2013).308	
While	the	apartheid	regime	endorsed	the	notion	of	sustainable	use,	the	new	democratic	
dispensation	has	put	a	greater	emphasis	on	sustainable	use	linked	to	community	
empowerment	and	social	development	as	envisaged	by	the	Constitution.	The	basic	tenet	of	
the	sustainable	use	approach	is	“if	it	pays	it	stays”	and	in	its	pure	form	every	part	of	the	
animal	is	used	“from	tip	to	toe”	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	2,	2013).	South	Africa	is	a	
member	of	the	Group	of	Like-Minded	Megadiverse	Countries	(LMMC),309	a	group	of	18	
countries	that	harbour	close	to	70%	of	the	world’s	biodiversity	and	share	common	interests	in	
conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	biological	diversity.	After	Brazil	and	Indonesia,	South	
Africa	ranks	third	in	biological	diversity	worldwide	(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	
2014c).	Beyond	the	rhino,	there	are	many	other	plant	and	animal	species	teetering	on	the	
brink	of	extinction	lacking	celebrity	status	or	public	support,310	also	in	need	of	material	
assistance	from	government,	the	private	sector	and	conservation	NGOs	(Baillie/Butcher	
2012).	The	South	African	government	finds	itself	in	a	quandary,	when	it	comes	to	assessing	
which	species	are	worthy	of	protection.	Currently	all	disposable	conservation	funds	are	
channelled	into	rhino	and	to	a	lesser	degree,	elephant	protection,	security	and	conservation.	
The	single	species	focus	and	devotion	of	administrative,	law	enforcement	and	financial	
resources	come	at	a	loss	to	other	animal	and	plant	species	equally	or	more	threatened	with	
extinction	(Interview	with	government	official	1,	2013).311	
																																																						
308	Umkhonto	we	Sizwe	(MK)	–	Zulu	for	‘Spear	of	the	Nation’	–	was	the	armed	wing	of	the	African	National	
Congress	(ANC)	during	the	liberation	struggle	in	South	Africa.	
	
309	The	following	countries	are	members	of	LMMC:	Bolivia,	Brazil,	China,	Colombia,	Costa	Rica,	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo,	Ecuador,	Guatemala,	India,	Indonesia,	Kenya,	Madagascar,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	Peru,	
Philippines,	South	Africa,	and	Venezuela.	Together	they	hold	10%	of	the	global	surface	(Department	of	
Environmental	Affairs	2014c).	
	
310	Many	of	the	species	on	the	IUCN	Red	List	of	critically	endangered	species,	as	well	as	thousands	of	other	
species	of	varying	levels	of	imperilment,	provide	no	direct	economic	benefit	to	people,	and	little	is	known	
whether	or	how	their	demise	would	affect	society.	These	often	less	charismatic	plants	and	animals	appear	to	
have	little	value	to	society	other	than	representing	“cultural	or	existence	value”;	in	other	words,	“their	value	to	
humanity	is	unknown	or	tangential	at	best”	(Baillie/Butcher	2012:	16).		
	
311	This	approach	stands	at	loggerheads	with	the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity,	which	professes	a	
conservation	of	habitat	approach.	
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In	August	2014,	the	South	African	cabinet	adopted	a	new	integrated	strategic	management	
plan	for	rhinos.	This	plan	demonstrates	the	paradigm	shift	from	a	pure	conservation	ethos	to	
an	essentially	multi-layered	approach	that	attempts	to	subsume	rhino	conservation,	rhino	
management,	rhino	security	and	sustainable	use	under	one	banner.	The	immediacy	of	curbing	
illegal	poaching	of	rhinos	in	protected	areas	through	security	measures	is	given	prominence,	
signalling	the	increasing	securitization	of	rhino	conservation.	According	to	the	plan	
(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	2014a),	the	following	“integrated	interventions”	will	be	
adopted:	
“Compulsory	interventions	include	pro-active	anti-poaching	initiatives,	the	
implementation	and	improvement	of	actionable	intelligence	as	well	as	the	
introduction	of	responsive	legislation	and	policy	amendments	to	address	rhino	
poaching.		Other	interventions	include	continued	efforts	to	increase	rhino	numbers	
through,	for	example,	translocation	to	low	risk	areas,	range-	and	population	
expansion.	New	interventions	include	steps	to	disrupt	crime	syndicates.	These	will	be	
implemented	by	our	Security	Cluster.	Long-term	sustainable	solutions,	to	ensure	the	
future	survival	of	this	key	species,	include	the	creation	of	economic	alternatives	for	
communities	taking	into	account	the	government’s	sustainable	utilisation	policy.”	
In	pursuit	of	the	stated	long-term	objective	of	sustainable	use,	South	Africa	continues	to	
campaign	for	the	legalization	of	trade	in	rhino	horn	at	the	international	level.	Key	to	garnering	
international	support	is	“putting	South	Africa’s	house	in	order”	(Interview	with	government	
official	3,	2013).	Although	perceptions	and	the	legitimacy	of	CITES	range	from	tacit	acceptance	
to	silent	rebellion	on	the	ground,	the	relevant	South	African	government	institution,	the	
Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	(hereafter	DEA)	has	put	measures	into	place	to	comply	
with	international	standards	as	envisaged	by	CITES,	and	to	respond	to	calls	from	civil	society	
to	address	the	rhino	issue.312	Upon	receipt	of	a	written	caution	from	the	57th	Standing	
Committee	meeting	of	CITES	about	the	lack	of	compliance	with	the	National	Legislation	
Project,313	the	Department	changed	gears	and	the	CITES	regulations	were	published	in	March	
																																																						
312	A	South	African	civil	society	group	called	Afriforum	has	threatened	to	take	the	South	African	government	to	
court	for	its	failure	to	roll	out	appropriate	measures	to	protect	the	rhino	(personal	communication,	2014).	
	
313	CITES	initiated	the	so–called	National	Legislation	Project	in	1992,	with	the	objective	of	reviewing	and	
evaluating	national	legislations	of	CITES	member	states,	and	bringing	them	into	line	with	CITES	requirements.	
Countries	were	listed	in	three	categories	dependent	on	their	level	of	compliance.	Category	1	signified	full	
compliance,	Category	2	partial	compliance	and	countries	listed	in	Category	3	failed	to	meet	the	requirements	for	
implementation	of	CITES	(Vasquez	2003:	64–65).		South	Africa	had	been	placed	in	Category	2	until	the	
promulgation	of	the	CITES	regulations	in	2010.	The	country	is	now	fully	compliant	(Interview	with	Government	
Official	3).	
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2010	(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	2010).	Domesticating	the	CITES	requirements	had	
been	put	on	the	backburner	in	lieu	of	the	need	to	draft	new	comprehensive	legislation,	
culminating	with	the	enactment	of	the	National	Environmental	Management	Biodiversity	Act	
(NEMBA)	in	2004,	and	the	promulgation	of	the	Threatened	of	Protected	Species	regulations	
(TOPS)	in	2008.	The	TOPS	regulations	list	prohibited	activities	involving	listed	species	and	they	
regulate	hunting	and	compulsory	registration	requirements.	While	these	regulations	comply	
with	the	legislative	requirements	set	out	by	the	CITES,	implementation	and	diffusion	have	
been	slow	at	the	provincial	level.	There	is	also	limited	congruence	of	the	nine	sets	of	
provincial	environmental	legislation.	Although	the	then	Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	
and	Tourism	(the	department’s	name	at	the	time)	had	consulted	various	stakeholders	and	
local	communities	before	drafting	the	regulations,	the	final	version	and	list	of	protected	
species	were	not	communicated	ahead	of	publication	and	implementation	(Institute	for	
Security	Studies	2009–2010,	Interview	with	conservator	2,	2013).	Similar	to	John	Sellar’s	
critique	regarding	the	adequacy	of	CITES	as	an	instrument	in	the	fight	against	transnational	
organized	crime	(compare	with	the	subsection	on	“The	international	response”),	law	
enforcement	officials	in	South	Africa	have	expressed	contemptuous	sentiments	about	the	
TOPS	regulations.	Says	one	law	enforcement	official	(interview	with	law	enforcer	8,	2013):		
“They	make	regulations.	Who	makes	the	regulations	regarding	environmental	
affairs...the	rhino	regulations?	People	in	environmental	affairs,	ok.	But	they	have	no	
experience	or	knowledge	of	transnational	organized	crime.	They	are	completely	out	of	
their	depth.	And	that’s	not	being	arrogant,	it’s	just	not	their	experience.”		
Moreover,	the	enforcers	of	the	regulations	–	provincial	government	officials	–	had	neither	
been	sufficiently	informed	of	the	new	regulations	nor	were	they	provided	with	adequate	
training	prior	to	the	promulgation	(Interview	with	provincial	government	official,	2013).		
Interviews	held	with	private	rhino	owners,	conservators	and	other	wildlife	professionals	
revealed	widespread	contempt	for	the	TOPS	regulations	but	the	brunt	of	critique	was	directed	
at	the	national	moratorium.	Mr	Marthinus	van	Schalkwyk,	the	former	Minister	of	
Environmental	Affairs	and	Tourism	declared	a	national	moratorium	on	the	sale	of	individual	
rhino	horns	in	2009	(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	and	Tourism	2009)	–	domestic	
trade	of	rhino	horn	had	never	been	banned	and	presented	a	loophole,	which	criminal	actors	
were	readily	abusing.	As	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	6,	a	few	private	rhino	owners	and	wildlife	
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professionals	procured	rhino	horn	under	the	guise	of	domestic	trade	and	sold	it	illegally	to	
Asian	organized	crime	networks.	Beyond	income	generation	through	the	sale	of	live	rhinos,	
tourism	and	trophy	hunting,	the	domestic	trade	in	rhino	horn	provided	an	additional	income	
stream	to	private	rhino	owners.	There	is	however	no	domestic	market	for	rhino	horn	in	South	
Africa,	suggesting	that	sellers	and	buyers	were	either	stockpiling,	or	laundering	horn	into	
illegal	supply	chains.	In	response	to	the	growing	discontent	among	private	rhino	owners,	the	
DEA	agreed	to	conduct	a	feasibility	study	to	probe	whether	national	trade	in	rhino	horn	
should	be	reopened	in	2010.	While	acknowledging	that	the	moratorium	failed	to	reduce	rhino	
poaching,	the	study	recommends	that	the	trade	ban	should	not	be	lifted	as	yet.	The	authors	
(Taylor,	Andrew	et	al.	2014:	10–11)	suggests	the	following	plan	of	action:		
“South	Africa	should	not	lift	the	national	moratorium	at	the	present	time.	However,	it	
should	immediately	start	developing	a	secure	national	electronic	permitting	system	to	
bring	non-compliance	issues	under	control.	This	must	be	linked	to	a	rhino	database	
that	includes	horn	stockpile	and	DNA	profile	information.	Private	rhino	owners	must	
be	incentivised	to	continue	protecting	rhinos	during	this	period.	South	Africa	must	
continue	to	show	that	it	is	complying	with	CITES	Resolution	Conference	9.14	(Rev.	
CoP15)	to	avoid	potential	punitive	measures	from	Parties	and,	if	a	proposal	for	
legalising	international	trade	is	to	be	submitted,	South	Africa	should	be	prepared	
before	the	deadline	for	submissions	for	CoP17	in	2016.”		
In	2012,	a	Limpopo	rhino	breeder	started	to	litigate	against	the	South	African	government	to	
have	the	moratorium	lifted.	John	Hume,	the	world’s	biggest	private	rhino	owner	joined	Johan	
Krüger	in	2015.	The	pair	argues	that	the	government	is	infringing	on	their	constitutional	
rights,	as	the	right	to	sustainable	utilization	is	entrenched	within	the	Constitution	of	South	
Africa	(Krüger/Hume	2015).	The	legal	challenge	to	the	domestic	trade	ban	represents	a	lawful	
expression	of	‘contested	illegality’	against	the	moratorium.	In	this	instance,	the	rhino	breeders	
are	not	using	their	discontent	with	the	moratorium	to	legitimize	illegal	trade	practices	but	
they	contest	the	legality	of	the	trade	ban	on	the	basis	of	the	highest	law	of	the	land.	However,	
it	remains	unclear	who	their	domestic	trade	partners	would	be,	should	they	win	the	court	
case.314	
																																																						
314	High	Court	Judge	Legodi	set	aside	the	moratorium	due	to	insufficient	public	consultation	in	September	2015	
(Legodi	2015).	The	Minister	lodged	a	notice	of	leave	to	appeal	soon	after	the	court’s	decision,	effectively	
suspending	the	judgment	until	the	appeal	is	heard	in	2016.	
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Because	the	TOPS	regulations	apply	to	South	Africa’s	national	jurisdiction	only,	CITES	
processes	are	used	to	deal	with	‘import’	countries	and	trade	that	transcends	her	national	
borders.	The	marriage	between	the	TOPS	regulations	and	CITES	processes	has	been	difficult,	
as	the	channels	of	communication	were	patchy	at	first.	For	example,	provincial	government	
officials	deal	with	national	and	international	hunting	and	trophy	applications	and	permits	
within	their	province,	whereas	national	government	officials	communicate	with	the	CITES	
Secretariat	and	its	various	enforcement	bodies	regarding	international	trade	and	export.	In	
light	of	the	pseudo–hunting	phenomenon	(which	is	discussed	in	Chapter	6),	involving	rhino	
‘hunters’	from	Vietnam	and	other	atypical	countries	of	origin	for	trophy	hunters	(such	as	the	
Czech	Republic	and	Poland),	all	rhino	hunting	applications	have	to	be	forwarded	to	the	
national	department	for	a	recommendation.	This	new	procedure	derives	from	the	practice	of	
illegitimate	hunters	“province–hopping”	in	order	to	shoot	more	than	one	rhino	per	year	
without	detection	by	provincial	permit	officials,	who	have	only	oversight	of	what	happens	on	
their	own	doorstep	(the	permissible	hunting	quota	is	one	rhino	per	hunter	within	a	calendar	
year).	Previously,	provincial	permit	officers	had	no	recourse	to	determining	whether	a	hunter	
had	shot	rhinos	in	any	of	the	other	eight	provinces.	Once	the	national	department	has	made	a	
recommendation,	the	provincial	permit	officer	may	then	issue	or	refuse	a	hunting	permit.	
Although	the	national	department	has	a	centralized	database	in	place,	it	is	not	connected	to	
other	crime	or	biodiversity	management	databases	as	yet.	At	the	time	of	the	interview	in	mid-
2013,	senior	management	had	approved	the	terms	and	conditions	for	the	procurement	of	a	
comprehensive	electronic	database.	However,	the	proper	supply	management	procedures	
and	the	tender	process	had	to	be	followed	and	it	was	unclear	as	of	when	the	database	would	
be	ready	for	use	(Interview	with	government	official	4,	2013).315		
The	TOPS	regulations	and	the	moratorium	lack	legitimacy	and	buy-in	from	wildlife	
professionals	as	well	as	private	landowners,	who	feel	that	they	were	not	sufficiently	consulted	
ahead	of	the	promulgation	while	being	the	ones	most	affected	by	the	new	status	quo.	In	
addition,	many	provincial	governments	lack	the	staffing,	funding	and	expertise	to	implement	
the	complex	new	regulations	(Interview	with	private	rhino	owners;	private	security	actors	and	
																																																						
315	By	2016,	there	had	been	no	progress	regarding	the	centralized	database.	However,	law	enforcement	officials	
were	in	the	process	of	streamlining	permitting	procedures,	which	are	likely	to	be	centralized	and	controlled	
exclusively	by	the	national	department.	
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wildlife	professionals).	The	permitting	system	differs	across	the	nine	provinces	with	varying	
degrees	of	efficiency,	responsiveness	and	accountability.		
	
The	perceived	lack	of	follow-up	consultation	with	relevant	stakeholders	changed	with	the	
appointment	of	the	Rhino	Issue	Manager	(RIM),	Mavuso	Msimang	who	was	assigned	the	task	
of	conducting	a	series	of	stakeholder	engagements	to	address	the	protection	and	sustainable	
conservation	of	the	South	African	rhino	populations	during	2012.	The	so–called	RIM	process	
entailed	16	workshops	held	in	the	South	African	provinces	of	Gauteng,	KwaZulu–Natal	and	the	
Western	Cape.	Ultimately	the	RIM	talks	assisted	the	DEA	in	developing	the	South	African	
position	in	preparation	for	the	CITES	CoP	16	held	in	2013	(Msimang	2012:	7).	Msimang	(2012:	
9)	points	to	the	discrepancy	between	scientific	data	collected	over	years,	and	positions	that	
were	based	on	“sentimental	or	aesthetic	considerations”.	The	distance	between	hard	sciences	
and	emotion	is	one	of	the	key	elements	causing	a	rift	among	different	actors	within	the	rhino	
management,	conservation	and	associated	protection	economies.	The	final	RIM	report	
proposes	a	number	of	measures	to	save	the	rhino,	most	importantly	the	opening	of	
international	trade	in	its	horn:	
	
“The	absence	of	a	single	strategy	to	quell	and	annul	rhino	poaching	calls	for	the	
judicious	employment	of	several	carefully	thought–out	interventions	in	a	portfolio	
approach.	In	the	immediate	term,	there	can	be	no	substitute	for	heightened	security	
using	the	tried	and	tested	ranger	bolstered	by	the	best	available	technologies.	
Simultaneously,	biological	conservation	measures,	including	range	expansion,	should	
be	investigated	and	implemented.	Finally,	as	long	as	there	is	demand	for	rhino	horn,	
effective	means	of	supplying	it,	must	be	worked	out	that	would	have	the	effect	of	
saving	the	life	of	the	rhino.	These	strategies	must	be	finalized	with	urgency	and	an	
application	made	to	the	Conference	of	Parties	to	legalize	trade	in	rhino	horn	(Msimang	
2012:	10).”	
	
In	the	aftermath	of	the	RIM	talks	an	Inter-Ministerial	Committee316	was	set	up	to	deliberate	
the	possibility	of	a	legal	trade	in	rhino	horn,	supported	by	a	Committee	of	Experts	(CoE).	The	
CoE	commenced	its	work	in	April	2014	(Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	30	June	2014)	
and	provided	its	final	report	to	the	Minister	in	2015.	The	South	African	government	is	
																																																						
316	The	Ministers	of	Environmental	Affairs,	International	Relations	and	Cooperation,	Trade	and	Industry,	Finance,	
Science	and	Technology,	Agriculture,	Forestry	and	Fisheries,	Rural	Development	and	Land	Reform,	Economic	
Development	and	Tourism,	Safety	and	Security,	Justice	and	Correctional	Services	are	represented	in	the	Inter-
Ministerial	Committee.	
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acknowledging	that	protective	measures	are	failing.	Whether	a	reversal	of	the	trade	ban	is	
going	to	save	the	rhino	is	a	highly	contested	issue	in	South	Africa	and	beyond.	Suffice	to	
mention	here	that	champions	of	the	so-called	‘anti-trade’	faction	(which	is	by	no	means	a	
homogenous	group)	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	South	African	government	lacks	the	political	
will	to	save	the	rhino,	and	is	in	the	process	of	signing	off	the	rhino’s	death	warrant	by	even	
entertaining	thoughts	of	reopening	the	trade	(Interviews	with	representatives	of	conservation	
NGOs,	2013,	2014	and	2015).	Other	than	suggesting	supplementary,	somewhat	draconian	
security,	military	and	anti-poaching	measures,	the	anti-trade	faction	offers	no	alternative	
approaches.	Later	chapters	touch	on	military	and	security	measures	employed	to	protect	the	
rhinos.	Suffice	to	mention	here	that	these	rhino	protection	economies	have	become	multi-
million	enterprises	with	the	involvement	of	many	actors	from	the	private	military	and	security	
sectors	in	South	Africa	and	beyond,	the	military-industrial	complex,	wildlife	professionals,	as	
well	as	a	multitude	of	intelligence	operatives.		
	
The	international	regulatory	stipulations	have	been	domesticated;	like	the	international	
convention	they	lack	broad-based	legitimacy	and	support	by	those	most	affected.	In	
conclusion,	it	should	be	noted	that	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn	have	not	been	disrupted	despite	
the	South	African	government’s	multi-level	and	multi-departmental	approach	to	protecting	
the	rhino.		
	
	
5.4	Concluding	remarks	
	
This	chapter	explored	the	international	political	protection	regime	that	led	to	the	illegalization	
of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn.	State	actors	conceived	of	the	multilateral	environmental	treaty	
more	than	forty	years	ago.	In	other	words,	the	illegalization	of	the	trade	in	rhino	horn	
commenced	in	1977.	Prior	to	that,	market	exchanges	involving	rhino	horn	were	either	legal	or	
undetermined.	In	this	instance,	a	community	of	states,	the	CITES	CoP,	determined	the	trade	
ban.	The	ban	itself	is	ambiguous	as	it	only	concerns	international	trade	of	rhino	horn,	leaving	
space	for	illegal	market	actors	to	manoeuver	at	the	domestic	level.	The	power	dynamics	and	
influence	of	northern	countries	and	conservation	NGOs	at	CITES	have	led	to	growing	
disgruntlement	amongst	the	custodians	of	most	of	the	world’s	remaining	biodiversity.	
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Regulators	and	opinion-makers	on	the	supply	side	have	stamped	CITES	as	a	‘neo-colonial’	
institution	while	important	consumer	states	joined	CITES	only	years	after	its	inception.	
Irrespective	of	power	politics	and	the	north-south	divide,	the	diffusion	of	the	trade	ban	was	
going	to	take	time	in	light	of	the	transnational	dimensions	of	rhino	horn	flows.	Ideally,	
illegalization	at	the	national	level	would	encompass	a	protracted	process	of	consultation	with	
affected	constituencies.	Law	enforcement	officials	have	expressed	concerns	of	whether	trade	
bans	appropriate	are	measures	to	disrupt	transnational	organized	crime	networks.	
	
The	chapter	examined	how	South	Africa	and	Vietnam	domesticated	CITES	obligations,	
demonstrating	the	difficulties	of	implementing	international	commitments	that	are	out	of	
touch	with	the	reality	on	the	ground.	While	most	countries	have	illegalized	rhino	horn	trade,	
horn	consumption	continues	to	hover	in	a	gray	zone.	Chapter	3	pointed	to	the	social	
legitimacy	and	cultural	significance	of	rhino	horn	in	key	consumer	nations.	The	sacred	
valuation	of	rhino	horn	in	such	countries	undermines	the	legitimacy	of	the	trade	ban.	This	
state	of	affairs	is	accentuated	by	the	fact	that	public	officials	are	implicated	in	trafficking	and	
distribution	networks,	suggesting	that	the	trade	ban	has	been	ineffective	in	curbing	supply	
and	demand.	
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Chapter	6:	Riding	on	the	edge	of	legality:	Interfaces	between	legal,	
gray	and	illegal	markets	
	
“It	is	one	guy	using	it	as	a	doorstopper;	the	next	guy	puts	it	into	his	safe	with	a	gold	
chain	around	it.	They	want	the	moratorium	to	have	started	the	poaching;	it	makes	
sense	for	their	argument.	They	want	to	blame	something	for	the	right	that	has	been	
taken	away	to	make	money.	They	try	and	say	the	trade	was	going	to	make	us	rich.	
Which	South	African	is	going	to	pay	25,000	Rand	for	one	kg	of	rhino	horn?	So	that	
argument	doesn't	stick	for	me	(Interview	with	law	enforcement	official,	2013).”	
	
	
6.1	Introduction	
	
Chapter	4	provides	an	introduction	to	the	privatization	and	commodification	of	the	rhino	on	
the	supply	side	of	the	market.	This	chapter	continues	with	an	examination	of	rhino	horn	
‘production’317	on	private	land.	This	mode	of	‘production’	constituted	the	principal	source	of	
supply	of	South	African	rhino	horn	between	the	late	1960s	and	late	2000s.	Actors	capitalize	on	
the	liberal	interface	between	legality	and	illegality.	Bolstered	by	sentiments	of	contested	
illegality	and	legality,	these	actors	have	no	qualms	to	exploit	regulatory	loopholes.	Involved	
are	wildlife	professionals318	with	intimate	knowledge	of	the	product	(rhino	horn)	and	of	the	
institutional	and	legislative	framework	governing	the	international	trade	of	rhino	horn.	These	
actors	belong	to	influential	and	transnational	social	networks	with	links	to	political	and	
economic	elites	in	supply,	transit	and	consumer	countries.	Rhino	owners,	professional	
hunters,	wildlife	veterinarians,	corrupt	government	officials,	diplomats	(their	role	is	discussed	
in	Chapter	7	and	8)	and	other	categories	of	wildlife	professionals	are	the	principal	actors	in	
this	market	segment.		
	
Wildlife	professionals	are	also	involved	in	the	illegal	hunting	of	rhinos	on	private	and	public	
hunting	(such	as	chemical	poaching);319	organized	illegal	hunting	(poaching)	is	discussed	in	
																																																						
317	The	term	“production”	refers	to	the	supply	stage	of	the	market	and	is	used	in	reference	to	market	structures	
and	processes	here,	and	not	as	a	normative	claim	regarding	conditions	on	rhino	farms.	
	
318	The	term	“wildlife	professional”	refers	to	any	individual	who	is	involved	in	the	transporting,	translocation,	
well-being,	management,	farming,	breeding,	hunting	and	securing	of	wildlife	on	private	or	public	land	(my	
definition).		
	
319		Wildlife	professionals	use	a	veterinary	anaesthetic	drug	called	M-99	(or	its	generic	formulation)	during	
‘chemical	poaching’	incidents.	Poachers	dart	rhinos	and	dehorn	them	while	they	are	anesthetized	(Hübschle	
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Chapter	7.	This	chapter	draws	on	data	from	several	court	cases,	as	well	as	primary	data	
collected	during	fieldwork.	The	focus	is	on	illegal	hunting	while	also	touching	on	the	practice	
of	unregistered	stockpiling	and	horn	laundering.	
 
	
6.	1	‘Put	and	take’	and	other	hunting	transgressions		
	
The	Buijs	report	(1987)	referred	to	a	practice	known	colloquially	as	‘put	and	take’	(introduced	
in	Chapter	4).	The	term	refers	to	the	hunting	of	a	rhino	shortly	after	delivery	to	a	private	game	
reserve	or	game	farm.		In	other	words,	the	rhino	is	literally	“put”	into	a	hunting	reserve,	only	
to	be	“taken”	out	by	way	of	hunting	shortly	after	its	translocation	to	the	hunting	reserve.	The	
practice	commenced	in	the	1970s	and	carries	on	in	various	permutations	to	this	day.	For	the	
purposes	of	clarity:	trophy	hunting	of	white	rhinos320	bought	from	the	state	is	not	illegal	per	
se;	in	fact,	the	state	acknowledges	the	need	for	economic	incentives	for	“the	continued	
growth	and	expansion	of	the	rhino	populations	and	range	through	the	introduction	of	herds	in	
new	areas”	which	are	“reliant	on	the	private	sector	and	communities	making	their	land	
available	for	the	introduction	of	rhinos	sourced	from	protected	areas	and	privately	owned	
herds”	(Republic	of	South	Africa	2013:	6).	However,	trophy	hunting	that	leads	to	limited	or	no	
population	growth	and	range	expansion	contradicts	and	undermines	the	specified	
conservation	objectives	of	the	state.	According	to	wildlife	professionals	(Interviews,	2013),	
some	hunting	outfitters	would	keep	the	same	number	of	rhinos	in	their	reserves	and	“new	
stock”	would	be	brought	in	for	trophy	hunts.	In	essence,	this	form	of	‘put	and	take’	involves	a	
deadly	game	of	musical	chairs.	One	wildlife	professional	recounted	how	he	and	his	colleagues	
delivered	more	rhinos	to	a	specific	hunting	outfit	in	one	week	than	an	alleged	kingpin	“did	in	
his	whole	time	of	doing	pseudo-hunting”	(Interview,	2013).	While	this	form	of	‘put	and	take’	
was	legal	on	paper	at	the	time,	the	rhino	trophies	emanating	from	many	‘legal	hunts’	were	
																																																																																																																																																																											
2014:	47).	Wildlife	veterinarians	are	usually	complicit	in	such	poaching	incidents,	which	may	also	require	the	
services	of	helicopter	pilots.	Wildlife	investigators	have	dubbed	the	act	as	“chemical	poaching”	due	to	the	use	of	
pharmaceutical	drugs	(“chemicals”).	
	
320	“Operation	Rhino”,	the	Natal	Parks	Board’s	rhino	range	expansion	programme	coincided	with	the	
economization	of	trophy	hunting;	in	other	words,	trophy	hunters	were	willing	to	pay	for	the	stalking	of	animals	
as	of	the	late	1960s.	White	rhinos	became	sought-after	trophy	animals	in	South	Africa.	Black	rhino	numbers,	
meanwhile,	were	too	few	to	offer	trophy	hunting.		
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sold	directly	to	Asian	buyers	or	laundered	into	illegal	flows.	Says	the	same	wildlife	
professional	(Interview,	2013):		
	
“We	were	shooting	the	shit	out	of	them,	probably	100	a	month	but	everything	was	
legal.	You	know	–	that's	the	thing	if	it's	legal,	you	get	permits	for	it	and	you	bought	it,	
why	not?	…	[…]…The	minute,	they	made	it	illegal	–	I'm	not	willing	to	touch	it	if	can't	
get	a	permit.	I	don't	mind	making	a	buck,	but	I	don't	do	illegal	shit	and	go	to	jail.”		
	
Interviews	with	organized	crime	investigators,	former	and	active	conservators	confirmed	the	
high	prevalence	of	the	practice.	Rhino	horns	deriving	from	‘put	and	take’	operations	fed	into	
illegal	horn	flows	from	elsewhere	in	South	Africa	and	surrounding	countries	(including	
Namibia,	Zimbabwe,	and	Mozambique)	en	route	to	consumer	markets.	Once	the	supply	of	
horns	had	ebbed	off	from	sources	north	of	South	Africa,	South	African	wildlife	professionals	
stepped	up	to	meet	the	supply.	It	is	difficult	to	establish	how	many	rhinos	were	hunted	by	
way	of	‘put	and	take’,	as	existing	official	databases	on	the	sale	of	live	rhinos,	hunts,	and	
trophy	exports	only	capture	official	numbers.	One	informant	remarked:		
	
“There’s	a	massive	blank	from	when	fucking	TRAFFIC	stopped	monitoring	stuff	until	
they	realized	there	was	shit.	And	in	that	void	we	have	only	the	farmers	and	the	vets	
that	know	what	we	were	doing.	But	you	can’t	tell	anyone	because	otherwise	they	are	
going	to	put	you	into	jail.	Even	though	everything	you	did	at	the	time	was	legal	and	
now	they	want	to	try	and	fucking	catch	someone.	These	are	guys	that	were	legally	
involved	in	something,	which	is	now	illegal.	How	do	you	want	to	prosecute	them?	
Nobody	is	going	to	admit	to	anything.	They	will	stand	together.”	
	
The	informant	alludes	to	a	social	bond	amongst	wildlife	professionals	who	justify	‘put	and	
take’	and	domestic	trade	of	rhino	horn	as	a	practice	permissible	by	the	law	of	the	land.	There	
is	a	tacit	acknowledgment	that	these	unbridled	economic	activities	may	lack	social	legitimacy	
in	broader	society.	A	wildlife	veterinarian,	for	example,	described	the	hunts	(including	
pseudo-hunting	which	is	discussed	below)	as	“pre-moratorium	legal	(but	unethical)	hunts”	
mainly	involving	“surplus	bulls	in	the	industry”	(Schack	2012:	1).	Empirical	evidence	confirms	
that	bulls	were	the	principal	trophy	animals;	however,	a	few	hunting	outfitters	offer	a	more	
exotic	bouquet	of	hunting	safaris	such	as	hunting	multiple	rhinos	on	one	permit,	hunting	
young	animals,	hunting	of	rhinos	with	restricted	hunting	gear	(including	crossbows	or	bow	
and	arrows),	or	“canned”	Big	Five	hunting	from	helicopters	(Interviews,	2013).		
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The	knowledge	that	some	activities	might	be	construed	as	legal	but	illegitimate	or	unethical	
(the	section	on	‘contested	illegality’	will	discuss	this	in	more	detail)	might	explain	why	the	
sector	continues	to	be	shrouded	in	secrecy.		Consecutive	surveys	of	rhinos	on	private	land	
sketch	a	historical	narrative	(see	also	Chapter	4)	of	how	conservation	authorities	experienced	
difficulties	in	accessing	information	on	the	fate	of	rhinos	bought	from	the	state,	and	their	
progeny	from	the	early	1970s	onwards.	An	author	of	the	latest	survey	on	rhino	numbers	and	
stockpiles	on	private	land,	undertaken	between	2008	and	2011,	remarked	that	the	survey	
obtained	a	response	rate	of	25	%	from	rhino	owners	(Jo	Shaw,	personal	communication,	
2015).	Earlier	surveys	achieved	even	lower	participation	numbers	(Hall–Martin	et	al.	2008).	
The	question	arises	why	the	majority	of	rhino	owners	are	not	willing	to	provide	information	
on	their	rhino	numbers	or	the	size	of	their	rhino	horn	stockpiles.	Naturally,	once	property	
rights	were	conferred	upon	private	individuals,	rhinos	moved	from	the	public	to	the	private	
sphere.	This	new	breed	of	private	rhino	owners	had	become	sole	proprietors	of	rhinos	with	no	
reporting	or	accountability	functions	obtaining	from	the	conversion	of	a	common	good	to	
private	property.	This	state	of	affairs	is	different	to	recent	custodianship	programs,	where	
communities	or	individuals	receive	user	rights	while	rhinos	remain	the	property	of	the	state.	
In	some	instances,	private	sales,	translocations,	the	sale	of	game	reserves	and	farms,	or	the	
creation	of	large	amalgamated	reserves	and	biospheres	led	to	obfuscation	as	to	rhino	
ownership	or	location	(Buijs/Papenfus	1996:	1–2).	This	was	not	necessarily	a	purposeful	
attempt	at	creating	smokescreens.	The	regulatory	framework	governing	movement,	
translocations	and	private	sale	or	barter	trade	of	rhinos	came	only	into	force	when	the	
NEMBA	Act	was	enacted	and	the	TOPS	Regulations	were	promulgated	in	2004	and	2008	
respectively.	Yet	rhino	owners	maintain	that	the	state	should	have	no	business	as	to	keeping	
track	of	the	fate	of	the	founding	populations	and	their	progeny	(Interview	with	rhino	owner	
10,	2013)	because	“what	happens	behind	this	game	fence	is	my	business”	(Presentation	by	
conservator	14,	2015).	This	attitude	precedes	the	period	of	political	transformation	in	South	
Africa	and	uncertainty	about	the	future	of	the	farming	community.	There	were	few	legitimate	
reasons	to	conceal	such	information	in	the	heydays	of	apartheid	unless	there	were	indeed	
illegal,	unethical	or	illegitimate	activities	taking	place.	In	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	the	
white	farming	community	remains	distrustful	of	the	democratically	elected	(mostly	black)	
government.	While	the	white	farming	community	is	by	no	means	a	homogenous	grouping,	its	
strong	political	ties	to	the	apartheid	regime,	economic	privileges	and	support	(such	as	
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subsidies,	marketing	boards	and	property	rights	of	wild	animals)	and	exploitative	labour	
relations	on	some	farms	had	contributed	to	large-scale	social	engineering	in	South	Africa’s	
rural	areas,	and	upheld	the	social	structure	and	economic	powerbase	of	the	apartheid	state	
(see	also	Chapter	4).	This	privileged	state	of	affairs	shifted	to	incorporate	the	interests	of	rural	
(black)	dwellers	and	communities	with	the	changing	of	the	political	guard	in	1994.	
	
Once	NEMBA	and	the	TOPS	regulations	came	into	effect,	wildlife	professionals	reported	that	
upon	applying	for	permits	to	hunt	or	dehorn	rhinos,	or	to	register	rhino	horn	stockpiles,	
poachers	hit	their	reserves	or	organized	gangs	robbed	their	stockpiles	at	gunpoint	(Interview	
with	rhino	owner	1	&	6,	2013).	Rhino	owners	felt	that	full	disclosure	put	them	at	risk	for	
poaching,	farm	attacks	or	theft	from	rhino	horn	stockpiles.		While	such	fears	are	legitimate,	
the	peers	of	rhino	owners	–	such	as	members	of	the	Private	Rhino	Owners	Association	(PROA)	
–	struggle	to	gain	access	to	this	‘privileged’	information	too	(Interviews,	2013).	This	lack	of	
transparency	might	ultimately	derail	the	quest	for	the	legalization	of	the	trade	in	rhino	
horn.321	
	
Dishonesty	or	non-disclosure	is	partially	legitimized	by	pointing	to	“corrupt	permit	officers”	or	
to	other	public	officials	perceived	as	harbouring	connections	to	organized	crime	gangs.322	In	
other	instances,	rogue	farmers	or	wildlife	professionals	instigated	robberies	and	theft	as	
smokescreens	to	cache	illegal	hunting	or	dehorning	of	rhinos	(Interviews	and	focus	groups	
with	law	enforcement	officials,	2013).	Awareness	of	‘foul	apples’	in	the	peer	group,	the	
associated	fear	of	stigma	as	well	as	silent	rebellion	directed	at	public	officials	and	“their	new	
regulations”	also	explain	why	non-disclosure,	obfuscation,	and	secrecy	of	rhino	populations	
and	stockpiles	held	in	private	hand,	continue	to	characterize	the	relationship	of	some	private	
rhino	owners	with	the	state.	This	environment	of	distrust	and	secrecy	has	allowed	rogue	and	
unethical	wildlife	professionals	to	fly	under	the	radar,	who	are	protected	through	a	mutual	
																																																						
321	The	CITES	Secretariat	has	admonished	South	Africa	in	the	past	for	failing	to	furnish	details	on	the	size	of	
private	rhino	horn	stockpiles,	as	well	as	exact	figures	of	rhino	crashes	held	on	private	land.	
	
322	While	racism	and	racial	discrimination	are	still	widespread	across	many	communities	in	post-apartheid	South	
Africa,	the	white	farming	community	is	renowned	for	discriminatory	and	racist	practices	(compare	with	Chapter	
4).	Although	there	have	been	incidences	of	corruption	within	the	law	enforcement	and	nature	conservation	
bureaucracies,	the	assumption	that	all	public	officials	of	the	new	dispensation	are	corrupt	and	corruptible	has	to	
be	read	in	the	context	of	a	white	superiority	complex	supported	by	racist	apartheid	ideologies	of	yesteryear.	
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distrust	by	the	white	farming	community	of	the	new	government,	its	land	reform	programme	
and	broad-based	black	empowerment	policies.	
	
Regardless	of	the	prevailing	secrecy,	‘put	and	take’	of	rhino	bulls	bought	from	the	state	
happened	with	the	indirect	sanctioning	of	the	state	(Interviews,	2013);	park	officials,	for	
example,	knew	that	a	rhino	bull’s	life	expectancy	was	significantly	shortened	when	sold	to	a	
hunting	outfitter	or	a	game	reserve	that	offers	trophy	hunts.	Scientists	argue	that	the	South	
African	national	herd	was	only	able	to	recover	and	increase	to	its	current	size	because	private	
and	communal	farmers	made	farmland	available	for	range	expansion	(Emslie/Brooks	1999:	
33).	The	‘carrying	capacity’	of	national	parks	and	nature	reserves	had	been	reached.	Scientific	
studies	legitimize	the	hunting	of	“surplus	bulls”	or	“problem	bulls”	by	way	of	demonstrating	
an	inherent	male	gender	bias	in	rhino	populations.	The	SADC	Rhino	Management	Group	
(RMG)	found	that	there	was	a	53%	male	sex	ratio	of	black	rhino	at	birth	in	the	southern	
African	region.	Some	black	rhino	populations	have	hence	a	pronounced	male	bias	
(Knight/African	Rhino	Specialist	Group	2013:	2).	A	behavioural	study	of	wild	black	rhino	
populations	in	Namibia	(Berger	1995:	1–2)	suggests	however	that	secondary	sex	ratios323	
favour	female	black	rhinos,	as	male	rhinos	are	more	prone	to	human	predation,	a	finding	
consistent	with	data	from	12	black	rhino	populations	across	Africa.	The	male	bias	appears	to	
be	of	greater	significance	when	it	comes	to	semi-wild	or	captive	bred	rhino	populations.	Few	
rhino	bulls	are	required	to	achieve	ideal	breeding	conditions	and	significant	population	
growth.	A	ranching	manual	suggests	a	ratio	of	2	male	to	4	female	white	rhinos	(du	Toit	1998:	
11).	Breeding	bulls	should	be	replaced	every	six	years	“before	they	start	breeding	with	their	
own	offspring”	while	age	variance,	amongst	other	factors,	can	affect	dominance	patterns	
among	rhino	bulls	which	in	a	worst	case	scenario	can	end	in	the	death	of	male	competitors	
(du	Toit	1998:	29).		
	
Black	rhinos	are	known	as	the	more	aggressive	and	solitary	of	the	rhino	species	thus	“problem	
bulls”	have	been	traditionally	associated	with	the	black	species,	whereas	the	more	numerous	
white	rhinos	tend	to	be	associated	with	the	management	issue	of	“surplus	bulls”.	Both	of	
																																																						
323	The	primary	sex	ratio	refers	to	the	sex	ratio	at	the	time	of	conception	whereas	the	secondary	sex	ratio	is	the	
sex	ratio	at	the	time	of	birth.	
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these	rhino	management	issues	are	conflated	in	public	and	policy	discourse	on	the	matter.	
While	the	one	does	not	preclude	the	other,	they	should	be	seen	as	two	distinct	management	
issues	with	separate	outcomes,	depending	on	the	species,	habitat	and	breeding	format.	
Government	authorities	(the	Namibian	and	South	African	governments)	employ	the	rationale,	
which	legitimizes	the	trophy	hunting	or	sale	of	“problem	bulls”	and	“surplus	bulls”324	at	
intervals	to	maintain	the	health,	longevity	and	social	structure	of	rhino	herds.325	Animal	
activists	have	suggested	that	translocating	“problem	animals”	to	other	locations	could	save	
the	animal’s	life	(Fears	[3	January	2015]	2015).	Such	translocations	come	however	at	a	high	
price.326	Moving	surplus	or	problem	bulls	to	other	rhino	populations	may	be	equally	
problematic	as	these	herds	“do	not	want	additional	males”	(Knight/African	Rhino	Specialist	
Group	2013:	2).	In	light	of	severely	constrained	conservation	budgets,	government	authorities	
cannot	afford	to	translocate	“problem	animals”	(Interviews,	2013).	Meanwhile,	animal	
activists	are	not	fronting	the	money	to	undertake	the	suggested	translocations,	which	involve	
finding	suitable	land,	capture,	translocation	and	on-going	management	and	monitoring	
(Knight/African	Rhino	Specialist	Group	2013:	5).	While	there	are	no	reliable	statistics	about	
the	percentage	of	“problem	bulls”	in	rhino	herds,327	some	conservators	and	animal	activists	
																																																						
324	A	state	witness	called	on	behalf	of	the	State	in	aggravation	of	sentence	during	the	Lemtongthai	trial	(the	
linked	phenomenon	of	pseudo-hunting	is	discussed	in	the	next	section)	conceded	that	the	rhinos	that	were	
hunted	and	killed	during	the	pseudo-hunting	expeditions	had	been	surplus	bulls	“that	were	destined	to	be	shot	
by	trophy	hunters”	(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	12).	The	appellate	judge	ruling	on	behalf	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Appeals	regarded	this	concession	as	a	distinguishing	feature	of	this	case	of	pseudo-hunting	from	“those	of	the	
conventional	type	of	poacher,	namely,	a	person	who	kills	indiscriminately	without	any	pretence	of	legality”	
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	12).		
	
325	The	Namibian	government	is	allowed	to	sell	five	black	rhino	hunts	per	annum.	The	full	quota	has	never	been	
exploited.	In	2013,	the	Dallas	Safari	Club	(DCS)	auctioned	off	a	black	rhino	hunting	permit	on	behalf	of	the	
Namibian	government	for	the	hefty	sum	of	$	350	000.	Animal	activists	have	criticized	the	auction	and	petitioned	
the	United	States	Fish	and	Wildlife	Service	to	prevent	the	import	of	the	hunting	trophy.		
	
326	Conservation	organization	Rhinos	without	Borders	is	planning	to	move	100	white	rhinos	from	South	Africa	to	
Botswana	at	a	cost	of	$	45	000	per	animal	(approximately	40	266	€	per	animal)	(Paul	2014).	The	translocation	of	
desert-adapted	black	rhinos	in	Namibia	costs	an	estimated	$	10	000	per	animal	(approximately	8940	€)	involving	
the	use	of	helicopters	in	remote	areas	(Fears	[3	January	2015]	2015).		
	
327	In	response	to	the	fallout	after	the	DCS	auction	in	the	US,	the	African	Rhino	Specialist	Group	(AfRSG)	provided	
the	falling	data:	
	
“Based	on	extensive	monitoring	of	the	species	in	its	key	range	states	over	an	extended	period	we	know	
that	some	black	rhinos	are	being	killed	in	fights	with	aggressive	bulls	and	that	valuable	breeding	females	
and	their	calves	are	sometimes	killed.	This	is	more	likely	to	be	the	case	when	densities	build	up	relative	
to	carrying	capacity	in	an	area,	and	where	breeding	populations	have	a	markedly	male	biased	
population.	(SADC	RMG	data	shows	that	from	2007-2011	fighting	deaths	were	the	single	greatest	
known	cause	of	known	black	rhino	deaths	in	Namibia	(31%)	with	females	and	sub-adults/calves	making	
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have	questioned	the	perceived	high	incidence	of	“problem	animals”	(Interviews,	2013).	There	
have	been	suggestions	that	the	notion	of	‘problem	bulls’	is	exploited	(personal	
communication	with	conservator,	2014)328	to	sell	“surplus	bulls”	for	profit	to	hunting	
outfitters.	Rhino	breeders	also	use	the	lack	of	breeding	success	as	a	legitimation	device	to	
allow	trophy	hunts	of	non-breeding	rhino	cows	(Interviews,	2013).	
	
While	the	state’s	adoption	of	the	notion	of	“problem	bulls”	and	“surplus	bulls”	is	embedded	in	
scientific	discourse,	criminal	actors	have	abused	the	notion	of	“problem	animals”	to	legitimize	
illegal	hunting	of	rhinos.	The	US	indictment	of	Dawie	Groenewald329	charges	that	the	alleged	
rhino	horn	trafficker	sold	illegal	rhino	hunts	to	American	hunters	at	gun	and	hunting	shows	
(the	next	section	provides	more	details	on	the	Groenewald	gang).	The	owner	of	Out	of	Africa	
Adventurous	Safaris	and	his	US-based	brother	Janneman	Groenewald	claimed	allegedly	that	
particular	rhinos	had	to	be	hunted	because	they	presented	a	“problem”,	were	a	“nuisance”,	a	
“menace”,	“aggressive”	and	“dangerous”	or	“mean”	(The	Grand	Jury	for	the	Middle	District	of	
Alabama	2014:	8–14).	The	Groenewald	brothers	told	their	American	clients	that	because	the	
dead	or	darted	rhinos330	were	“problem”	animals,	their	remains/horns	could	not	be	exported	
as	a	trophy.	In	lieu	of	returning	home	with	the	hunting	trophy,	the	hunters	could	take	
measurements	of	the	rhino	horns.	They	could	also	take	photos	and	videos	of	the	hunt	and	
themselves	posing	with	the	dead	animal.	According	to	the	indictment,	Groenewald	sold	the	
																																																																																																																																																																											
up	26.7%	and	35%	of	all	fighting	deaths	respectively)(Knight/African	Rhino	Specialist	Group	2013:	1).”	
	
328	A	South	African	professional	hunter,	his	US	client	and	conservation	officials	linked	to	the	Namibian	Ministry	of	
the	Environment	and	Tourism	(MET)	were	involved	in	a	black	rhino	bull	trophy	hunt	in	2013,	which	led	to	the	
wrongful	killing	of	the	only	black	rhino	cow	in	Mangetti	National	Park	in	Namibia.	The	quartet	allegedly	thought	
that	they	were	stalking	a	rhino	bull.	The	trophy	hunter	claimed	that	he	shot	the	rhino	cow	after	it	charged	the	
hunting	party.	The	case	has	been	mired	in	controversy	with	anecdotal	evidence	suggesting	foul	play,	bribes	and	
expiration	of	hunting	permits	(personal	communication	with	professional	hunter	and	conservator,	2014).	
	
329	The	alleged	rhino	poaching	kingpin	faces	1736	counts	of	racketeering,	money	laundering,	fraud,	intimidation,	
illegal	hunting	and	dealing	in	rhino	horns	in	South	Africa.	The	provisional	trial	date	was	set	for	August	2015	but	is	
likely	only	to	go	ahead	in	2016	(Rademeyer	2014a).	
	
330	The	South	African	government	has	banned	so-called	‘green	hunts’	or	‘darting	safaris’	while	the	South	African	
Veterinary	Council	has	declared	them	an	“unethical	procedure”	in	2010	(South	African	Veterinary	Council	2010).	
Originally	conceived	as	“a	unique	synergy	between	sports	hunting	and	conservation”	(SouthAfrica.info	2005),	
green	hunts	involve	the	temporary	immobilization	of	wild	animals	for	research	or	management	purposes	(South	
African	Veterinary	Council	2010).	Unscrupulous	wildlife	operators	exploited	green	hunts	by	darting	animals	too	
frequently	without	consideration	for	the	animal’s	well–being	or	the	long-term	effects	of	repeated	anaesthesia	
(Interviews,	2013).				
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rhino	horns	obtained	from	these	hunts	to	criminal	networks	(The	Grand	Jury	for	the	Middle	
District	of	Alabama	2014:	8),	thus	profiting	from	both:	the	illegal	hunts	to	legitimate	trophy	
hunters,	and	the	subsequent	illegal	sale	of	rhino	horns	to	criminal	actors.	The	American	
hunters	were	allegedly	not	told	that	these	hunts	were	not	permitted	(lacked	the	required	
paperwork)	and	were	in	violation	of	South	African	laws.	It	is	nonetheless	rather	surprising	that	
the	hunters	bought	Groenewald’s	fabrications	and	relinquished	the	collection	of	their	hunting	
memorabilia.		
	
‘Put	and	take’	transactions	could	also	involve	the	exchange	of	rhinos	for	other	species	of	
wildlife	or	rhino	horn	without	any	money	exchanging	hands.	A	rhino	breeder	could,	for	
example,	exchange	two	young	rhino	bulls	for	a	fixed	number	of	wild	animals	with	another	
farmer.	The	breeder	could	also	swap	the	same	two	young	rhino	bulls	for	multiple	sets	of	rhino	
horn.	Breeders	were	also	paying	wildlife	professionals	(e.g.	wildlife	veterinarians	or	wildlife	
capturers)	with	unregistered	rhino	horn.331	The	state	would	have	no	record	of	these	
transactions	because	there	were	no	official	paper	trails	nor	was	there	any	exchange	of	money	
per	se.	A	wildlife	professional	explains	(Interview	with	wildlife	professional	2):	
	
“…	in	that	process	there	was	the	deadly	timing	of	other	guys	realizing:	we	can	sell	
these	legally	to	guys	through	hunts.	There	were	several	guys	trying	to	jump	onto	the	
bandwagon.	The	first	guy	to	do	it	properly	was	old	Mr	Smith	and	there	was	a	whole	bunch	
of	others	that	you	haven't	heard	of	because	they	were	the	clever	guys.	The	idiots	got	
caught.	The	guys	that	behave	like	idiots,	they	are	the	ones	that	come	in	with	organized	
crime	connections.	With	the	starting	of	the	pseudo-hunts,	guys	got	a	wobble	that	we	can't	
shoot	rhinos	anymore.	I	think	the	shit	started	at	old	Tim	Barton	near	Steven	van	der	
Merwe.	He	was	also	buying	quite	a	lot	of	stuff	[rhino	horn]	from	Steven.	The	guys	were	
doing	hunts	at	Tim	Barton	and	we	would	drop	off	little	rhinos	–	two	or	three-year-olds.	
They	would	shoot	those	and	leave	with	big	rhino	horns,	which	came	from	Steven.	He	said	
																																																						
331	Wildlife	transporters	and	game	capturers	have	smuggled	rhino	horn	inside	translocation	crates	from	South	
Africa	to	Asian	countries	(Interview	with	rogue	wildlife	professional	2;	law	enforcement	official	2;	rhino	farmer	
12;	2013).	According	to	a	wildlife	professional	(Interview;	2013):	
	
“At	the	same	time	we	were	starting	to	send	all	our	rhino	out	–	shipments	to	China	–	you	know	and	when	
we	were	sending	our	shipments	to	China,	there	were	lots	of	horns	going	with	those	rhinos.	So	each	baby	
rhino	had	a	big	rhino	horn	lying	in	its	crate.	If	anybody	said	anything,	then	this	all	had	just	broken	
off…[…]…	these	were	not	smuggling	networks,	organized	crime	–	these	were	just	guys	that	have	made	
the	connection	and	who	said:	“Let's	do	this	as	well".	In	that	process,	everybody	started	to	realize:	
“Wow,	look	what	we	can	get	for	the	stuff."		
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he	had	so	many	rhinos,	what	is	he	supposed	to	do	with	it.	Then,	when	they	put	the	
moratorium	on,	that's	when	everything	changed.”	332	
	
Regulators	have	tried	to	address	the	practice	of	‘put	and	take’.	Regulation	24	of	the	
Threatened	or	Protected	Species	Regulations	(TOPS)	directs	that	rhinos	may	only	be	hunted	
24	months	after	introduction	into	an	area	to	allow	them	to	establish	a	genetic	line	(Friedmann	
et	al.	2011:	3).	In	practice,	this	regulation	is	difficult	to	enforce	–	and	operators	have	already	
devised	a	mechanism	to	bypass	the	regulation,	the	‘swap	and	take’	method.	In	this	instance,	
the	rhino	owner	swaps	the	newly	acquired	rhino	with	an	extant	rhino	on	the	farm,	which	is	
then	made	available	for	a	trophy	hunt.	Both	‘put	and	take’	and	‘swap	and	take’	are	on	the	
borderlines	of	what	constitutes	legality	and	illegality	and	without	scrutiny,	the	line	is	easily	
crossed.	Moreover,	‘put	and	take’	enabled	other	forms	of	illegal	hunting,	dehorning,	and	horn	
laundering	on	private	land.	
	
	
6.2	Permit	fraud	
	
All	modes	of	horn	‘production’	on	private	land	share	the	commonality	that	perpetrators	
display	detailed	and	extensive	knowledge	of	the	rules	and	how	to	bypass,	flout	or	break	the	
same,	or	exploit	legal	loopholes.	While	wildlife	professionals	and	rhino	owners	tend	to	regard	
the	law	(NEMBA),	the	regulations		(TOPS	regulations)	and	the	moratorium	on	domestic	trade	
as	responsible	for	the	surge	of	poaching,	the	regulatory	framework	did	not	emerge	from	a	
vacuum.	In	fact,	as	documented	in	previous	chapters,	the	first	rules	governing	the	
management	and	specifically	the	hunting	of	wildlife	were	passed	during	colonial	times.	The	
breaking	or	flouting	of	hunting	rules	was	seen	a	gentleman’s	derelict	(unless	it	involved	
indigenous	hunters	or	Afrikaners)	and,	in	some	cases,	it	was	a	rite	of	passage.	A	double	
morality	legitimizes	modern	rule	breaking,	partially	linked	to	a	sense	of	entitlement	and	
privilege,	and	the	earlier	averred	to	‘silent	rebellion’	to	the	new	rule–makers	and	“their	rules”.	
A	wildlife	professional	explains	(Interview,	2013):	
	
																																																						
332	The	names	of	individuals	mentioned	in	the	citation	have	been	changed	to	preserve	the	anonymity	of	
respondents.	
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“The	way	it	used	to	work,	the	law	was	always	there	but	nobody	ever	pushed	it.	Within	
48	hours	of	the	guy	getting	the	horn,	you	had	to	go	to	nature	conservation	and	get	a	
chip	in.	And	then	you	could	apply	for	a	permit	and	sell	it.	As	you	had	a	permit	to	sell	
and	trade,	they	never	kept	track	of	anything.	You	could	sell	without	anyone	noticing	or	
caring.	And	because	it	wasn't	really	checked	on,	if	you	had	a	permit	for	one	horn,	you	
could	use	it	for	weeks	or	months.	So	what	a	lot	of	people	miss	is	not	only	the	
entitlement	that	the	farmer	feels	and	that	he	is	truly	entitled	to.	He	just	bought	this,	
most	of	them	come	from	the	park.”	
	
The	quotation	above	refers	to	the	most	common	form	of	permit	fraud	before	the	
implementation	of	stricter	regulations	and	enforcement	(Interviews	with	law	enforcement	
officials	and	conservators,	2013).	Wildlife	professionals	would	use	the	same	permit	to	shoot	
and	dehorn	multiple	rhinos.	Or,	as	was	the	case	in	some	provinces	–	most	notably	in	the	
northern	Limpopo	Province,	wildlife	professionals	could	use	a		“standing	permit”	for	white	
rhino	hunts	on	certain	properties.	In	other	words,	hunting	outfitters	applied	for	a	blanket	
permit	once	and	after	that	they	hunted	without	further	permits	and	state	supervision	on	
these	properties	until	August	2008	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	38,	Interviews	with	wildlife	
professionals,	2013).		
	
	
6.2.1	The	Groenewald	gang	
	
The	previous	section	referred	to	the	alleged	“rhino	horn	syndicate	kingpin”	Dawie	
Groenewald	and	his	accomplices,	known	as	the	Groenewald	gang	or	the	“Musina	group”.333	
The	rhino	poaching	syndicate	faces	1736	counts	of	racketeering,	money	laundering,	fraud,	
intimidation	and	illegal	hunting	and	dealing	in	rhino	horns	in	South	Africa	(Rademeyer	2012)	
while	the	US	indictment	alleges	that	the	Groenewald	siblings	(see	earlier	section)	sold	illegal	
hunts	to	US	trophy	hunters.	According	to	the	South	African	criminal	indictment	(compare	
with:	National	Prosecuting	Authority	2011),	Groenewald	and	his	accomplices	were	involved	in	
intricate	scams,	ranging	from	false	permit	applications	through	to	illegal	dehorning	of	rhinos	
and	the	laundering	of	unregistered	rhino	horns.	Rhinos	and	rhino	horns	were	acquired	
																																																						
333	Musina	is	a	border	town	in	the	Limpopo	Province.	Dawie	Groenewald’s	farm	called	Prachtig	is	located	near	
Musina	and	most	of	the	South	African	wildlife	professionals	with	direct	links	to	his	criminal	network	live	in	the	
town	or	nearby.		
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through	a	variety	of	gray	and	illegal	channels.	The	court	case	is	likely	to	resume	in	2016	after	
several	postponements	since	the	initial	arrests	of	gang	members	in	2011.334		Amongst	
Groenewald’s	co-accused	are	wildlife	veterinarians,	professional	hunters,	a	pilot,	farm	
labourers	and	two	wives	(his	own	and	the	wife	of	wildlife	veterinarian	Karel	Toet),335	who	
assisted	with	the	permit	applications	and	other	administrative	tasks.		The	Groenewald	gang	
entered	into	business	ventures	with	rhino	farmers	and	wildlife	professionals,	many	of	whom	
were	unaware	that	they	were	breaking	the	law	at	the	time.	What	renders	this	case	interesting	
is	the	demonstrable	interface	between	legality	and	illegality.	The	following	section	provides	a	
few	examples	of	the	Groenewald	gang’s	activities.	
	
Groenewald	hunted	numerous	rhinos	illegally	on	his	farm	Prachtig	in	the	northern	Limpopo	
Province	(the	indictment	alleges	that	he	killed	59	of	his	own	rhinos)	and	procured	live	rhinos	
and	rhino	horns	from	other	rhino	farmers.	It	is	alleged	that	he	dehorned	rhinos	and	sold	at	
least	384	rhino	horns	over	a	four-year	period	(Jooste	2012).	The	role	of	professional	hunter	
Nardus	Rossouw	is	central	to	illegal	and	pseudo-hunts	hunts	(see	also	next	section)	conducted	
on	Prachtig	and	other	hunting	reserves,	as	well	as	obtaining	rhinos	and	horns	on	behalf	of	the	
gang.	Groenewald’s	list	of	rhino	and	rhino	horn	suppliers,	and	service	providers	(game	
capturers,	transporters,	hunters,	butchers,	etc.)	reads	like	a	list	of	the	“who’s	who	in	the	
wildlife	industry	of	South	Africa”	–	including	the	names	of	the	world’s	biggest	rhino	breeder	
John	Hume,	Marnus	Steyl	who	collaborated	with	the	Laotian	Xaysavang	network	(discussed	in	
detail	below)	and	the	Kruger	National	Park	as	supplier	of	live	rhinos	(compare	with:	National	
Prosecuting	Authority	2011).	In	terms	of	the	National	Environmental	Management	of	
Biodiversity	Act	(NEMBA),	separate	permit	applications	have	to	be	tendered	to	dehorn	a	
rhino,	to	transport	rhino	horns,	as	well	as	to	possess	rhino	horn.	According	to	Colonel	Jooste’s	
affidavit	(Jooste	2012:	14),336	the	Groenewald	gang	flouted	these	rules	on	numerous	
																																																						
334	The	court	bid	to	get	the	domestic	moratorium	on	the	trade	in	rhino	horn	lifted	(see	Chapter	5)	led	to	latest	
court	postponement	in	the	Groenewald	case.	Prosecutors	believe	that	the	merits	(or	lack	thereof)	of	that	case	
are	likely	to	impact	the	outcome	of	the	Groenewald	case.	
		
335	While	Sariette	Groenewald	and	Mariza	Toet	were	the	administrators	and	bookkeepers	of	the	gang,	the	fact	
that	they	are	the	wives	of	two	central	players	in	the	network	is	emphasized	here	because	their	family	ties	render	
them	trustworthy,	and	important	assets.		
	
336	Colonel	Johan	Jooste	heads	the	Endangered	Species	Unit	at	the	Directorate	for	Priority	Crime	Investigations	
(DPCI),	South	Africa’s	organized	crime	fighting	unit.		
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occasions.	The	carcasses	of	rhinos	that	were	allegedly	illegally	hunted,	killed	and	dehorned	on	
Prachtig	were	either	sold	to	a	local	butcher,337	buried	or	burnt	(Jooste	2012:	11).		
	
An	innovative	method	involved	the	re-sale	or	trade	exchange	of	dehorned	rhinos.	John	Hume,	
for	example,	accepted	14	dehorned	rhinos	in	respect	of	a	debt	owed	to	him	by	Groenewald	
(Jooste	2012:	76-77).	Karel	Toet,	Groenewald’s	veterinarian,	dehorned	the	rhinos	before	the	
live	but	dehorned	animals	were	sold	to	fellow	rhino	breeders.	He	was	also	in	charge	of	
translocating	and	selling	rhinos	that	had	been	dehorned.	Several	hundred	rhinos	were	
allegedly	dehorned	and	the	resultant	horns	were	laundered	into	legal	or	gray	supply	chains.	
Groenewald	and	Toet	did	not	only	dehorn	rhinos	on	Groenewald’s	farm	Prachtig	but	are	
believed	to	have	offered	dehorning	services	to	fellow	rhino	breeders	across	South	Africa.	
Toet’s	wife	Mariza	and	Groenewald’s	wife	Sariette	applied	and	falsified	permits	for	
translocations	and	dehorning	of	rhinos	(e.g.	using	the	same	micro-chip	numbers	again,	using	
expired	permits	or	swapping	permits).338	Their	roles	in	the	Groenewald	syndicate	should	not	
be	underestimated,	as	they	were	allegedly	responsible	for	multiple	fraudulent	permit	
applications.	These	also	included	applications	for	rhino	translocations	that	never	occurred	
(with	the	objective	of	hiding	illegally	dehorned	rhinos)	through	to	applications	for	
translocations	of	dehorned	rhinos	without	separate	permits	for	‘missing’	rhino	horns,	which	
should	have	been	registered	as	part	of	Groenewald’s	private	stockpile.	The	two	wives	are	
heavily	invested	in	the	business	ventures	of	their	husbands	as	shareholders,	bookkeepers,	and	
administrators.339	Direct	family	ties	to	central	figures	in	the	Groenewald	gang,	as	well	as	the	
women’s	financial	and	criminal	investment	(culpability)	help	to	resolve	the	coordination	
problem	of	security.	Through	the	clever	manipulation	of	paperwork,	the	women	were	
responsible	for	the	safe	and	‘legal’	transfer	of	illegally	obtained	rhino	horn	from	legitimate	
rhino	breeders	and	wildlife	industry	players	to	Asian	markets.	The	adage	of	‘blood	is	thicker	
than	water’	is	of	importance	here.		
	
																																																						
337	39	carcasses	were	sold	to	a	local	butcher	between	2008	and	2010.	
	
338	When	a	rhino	is	dehorned,	the	horn	has	to	be	micro-chipped	and	registered	with	nature	conservation	officials.		
	
339	Sariette	Groenewald,	for	example,	holds	a	50%	stake	in	the	private	company	Catfish	Investments	59.	She	is	
the	only	member	of	the	closed	corporation	Valinor	Trading	142	CC.	The	gang	used	Valinor	for	the	financial	
aspects	of	‘Out	of	Africa	Safaris’	and	Valinor	Trading.	
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In	some	instances,	Groenewald	and	his	colleagues	failed	to	notify	nature	conservation	officials	
before	moving	rhinos	to	other	properties	despite	being	explicitly	ordered	to	do	so,	thus	
bypassing	inspections	that	would	have	identified	fraudulent	permit	applications.	In	another	
incident,	the	Groenewald	gang	allegedly	tried	to	obstruct	the	course	of	justice	by	offering	
bribes	to	an	investigating	officer	to	loose	a	case	docket	regarding	the	unlawful	possession	of	
elephant	tusks.	One	of	Groenewald’s	associates	had	delivered	the	tusks	to	the	Vietnamese	
owner	of	a	warehouse	at	the	China	Mall	in	Johannesburg	(Jooste	2012:	66-67).	When	
fraudulent	permit	applications	failed,	the	gang	would	thus	attempt	to	corrupt	relevant	police	
or	nature	conservation	officials	as	a	contingency	plan	(another	security	precaution	to	resolve	
the	coordination	problem	of	security).	Groenewald	was	arrested	for	an	illegal	leopard	hunt	
and	export	of	the	leopard	trophy	in	the	US	in	2010.	While	under	house	arrest	in	the	US,	he	
allegedly	instructed	fellow	syndicate	member	Tielman	Erasmus	to	stage	a	house	breaking	on	
his	farm.	He	suspected	that	environmental	management	inspectors	would	inspect	the	farm	in	
his	absence	and	find	numerous	dehorned	rhinos	but	no	rhino	horns	(Jooste	2012:	12).	
Groenewald’s	attempt	to	cache	his	illicit	activities	through	staging	a	house	breaking	failed,	
and	forms	part	of	the	state’s	indictment	against	him	and	his	gang.		
	
Groenewald	had	strong	social	networks	with	fellow	members	of	the	wildlife	industry	in	
southern	Africa	and	beyond	(including	the	US)	who	were	willing	to	conduct	business	with	him.	
The	existence	of	social	ties	that	stretched	beyond	his	immediate	social	network	gave	
Groenewald	the	competitive	edge	(compare	with:	Morselli	2001:	228).	Socially	embedded	in	
the	southern	African	wildlife	industry	with	strong	business	connections	to	the	consumer	
market	(Vietnam),	as	well	as	extensive	knowledge	of	the	tricks	of	the	trade,	Groenewald	was	
in	an	excellent	position	to	procure	high	volumes	of	rhino	horn	through	gray	and	illegal	
channels.	Many	horn	procurement	methods	crossed	the	fine	line	between	legality	and	
illegality.	While	fellow	wildlife	industry	players	often	thought	that	they	were	acting	within	the	
ambit	of	the	law	when	transacting	with	the	gang,	Groenewald	and	his	associates	were	fully	
aware	of	the	regulations	and	how	to	bypass	them.	Although	it	was	illegal	to	hunt	and	dehorn	
rhinos	without	the	required	paperwork,	the	gang	managed	to	sell	their	criminal	and	gray	
activities	as	legitimate	business	enterprises.	To	some	business	partners,	trading	rhino	or	rhino	
horns	with	Groenewald	at	the	domestic	level	appeared	to	be	legitimate.	Moreover,	the	
privatization	of	rhinos	and	the	entitlement	to	do	‘as	you	please	with	your	own	property’	
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allowed	many	criminal	and	gray	activities	to	go	undetected	for	several	years.	It	is	particularly	
surprising	that	Groenewald	conducted	business	with	agents	of	the	state	(he	bought	rhinos	
from	the	KNP),	even	after	the	Directorate	for	Priority	Crime	Investigations		(DPCI)	had	
commenced	with	Project	Cruiser,	an	investigation	into	his	fraudulent	and	criminal	operations.	
The	complicity	of	wildlife	professionals	such	as	wildlife	veterinarians,	helicopter	pilots,	
professional	hunters	and	fellow	rhino	breeders	facilitated	the	gang’s	activities.	
	
	
6.2.2	The	pseudo-hunting	phenomenon	
	
Another	creative	way	of	supplying	Asian	consumer	markets	with	‘legally’	attained	rhino	horn	
involved	hunters	originating	from	countries	that	have	no	tradition	or	culture	of	sports	
hunting.	In	continuation	of	colonial	big	game	hunting	and	safaris,	the	majority	of	traditional	
rhino	hunters	herald	from	Europe	and	North	America	(Interview	with	professional	hunter,	
2013;	data	supplied	by	PHASA,	2013).		As	of	the	early	2000s,	a	new	breed	of	hunters	arrived	
on	South	African	shores	(see	Graph	4).	Young	Vietnamese	nationals	with	no	or	a	limited	
(sometimes	falsified)	track	record	of	trophy	hunting	booked	white	rhino	hunts	with	South	
African	outfitters.	In	terms	of	CITES	stipulations	and	domestic	laws	in	South	Africa,	hunters	are	
allowed	to	shoot	one	white	rhino	per	calendar	year	while	the	annual	quota	for	black	rhinos	is	
restricted	to	five	animals.	These	hunting	trophies	may	be	exported	as	hunting	memorabilia	for	
non-commercial	use.	Vietnamese	crime	groups	together	with	their	local	intermediaries	
recruited	Vietnamese	citizens	as	stand-in	trophy	hunters	to	bypass	the	rule	of	‘one	white	
rhino,	per	person,	per	annum’.	Their	role	was	hence	to	pose	as	trophy	hunters	for	the	
purposes	of	compliance	with	permit	regulations	while	a	South	African	professional	hunter	
would	shoot	the	rhino	on	their	behalf.	It	is	mandatory	in	terms	of	South	African	law	that	a	
South	African	professional	hunter	and	an	official	from	nature	conservation	accompany	each	
rhino	hunting	party.	The	professional	hunter	is	only	supposed	to	dispatch	the	so-called	‘kill	
shot’	if	the	hunter	as	per	the	hunting	permit	fails	to	kill	the	rhino	with	his	or	her	first	shot	and	
the	animal	is	wounded.	Known	as	“pseudo-hunting”,	a	law	enforcement	official	explains	the	
phenomenon	as	follows	(Interview;	2013):		
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“When	the	demand	grew,	they	decided:	let's	go	and	hunt	rhinos.		As	a	PH	[professional	
hunter]	and	an	outfitter,	you	need	to	sell	your	hunts	as	a	package.	It	is	a	contract	with	
requirements.	There	is	no	hunting	offered	in	Vietnam.	They	do	not	have	firearms	and	
they	do	not	belong	to	a	hunting	fraternity	and	there	is	no	hunting	fraternity	in	
Vietnam.	So	why	the	hell	would	you	come	to	hunt	a	rhino	all	the	way	from	Vietnam?	
With	all	these	guidelines	that	you	have,	they	are	not	hunters.	I	can	show	you	pictures	
of	people	that	supposedly	go	hunting	in	high	heels.	And	if	you	check	all	these	hunters	
involved	in	these	trophy	hunts,	they	are	between	the	ages	of	26	and	32.		If	you	
compare	that	to	their	income,	then	you	ask	yourself	what	does	it	cost	to	be	a	hunter?	
What	does	it	cost	to	hunt	a	rhino?	They	are	shot	in	less	than	half	an	hour;	they	pay	
cash.	They	pay	for	that	hunt	between	500,000	and	1	million	Rand340	–	only	for	the	
horn.		What	happens	to	those	trophies,	they	supposedly	go	to	the	taxidermist.	And	
then	they	get	lost	in	the	system.	Loads	of	taxidermists	are	complicit.	They	use	the	
system	to	defraud	the	state.	A	hunter	hunts	for	memorabilia.	But	what	do	these	guys	
do?	They	hunt	for	commercial	exploitation,	whether	it	is	for	libation	cup	or	for	status	
in	the	country.	If	they	are	involved	in	pseudo-hunts,	the	farmers	buy	rhinos	at	auctions	
and	in	less	than	48	hours	the	rhino's	shot,	from	auction	to	grave.”		
	
The	CITES	regulations	ban	the	commercial	exploitation	of	rhino	horn;	rhino	trophies	have	
hence	to	be	exported	and	stay	in	tact	(as	opposed	to	the	export	of	the	horns	only,	pieces	of	
horn	or	powdered	horn)	and	they	may	not	be	traded	commercially.		
	
Graph		4:		Nationality	of	hunters	applying	for	white	rhino	hunts	juxtaposed	against	the	
average	price	of	trophy	hunting,	2004-2011	
	
	
Source:	Graph	extracted	from	Milliken	and	Shaw	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	53);	data	compiled	by	Michael	Knight	(No	
hunting	permit	data	was	available	for	2008)	
																																																						
340	This	amounts	to	47	420	€	to	94	950	€.	
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The	only	permissible	use	of	a	rhino	trophy	is	thus	as	hunting	memorabilia	in	the	trophy	
hunter’s	private	collection.	
	
While	rhino	horn	obtained	through	pseudo-hunting	passed	as	a	legal	flow	out	of	South	Africa	
initially,	law	abiding	wildlife	professionals	and	conservation	officials	became	suspicious	once	it	
became	apparent	that	the	young	Southeast	Asian	hunters	were	stand-in’s	to	obtain	rhino	
horn	through	legal	channels	(Interviews,	2013).	The	afore-mentioned	TOPS	regulations	also	
targeted	this	illegal	practice.	The	resilience	and	creativity	of	rhino	traffickers	is	apparent	in	the	
employment	of	new	strategies	to	bypass	regulations	and	the	law	(see	next	section).	
Official	records	show	that	the	exportation	of	‘legally’	attained	rhino	horn	from	South	Africa	to	
Vietnam	was	prevalent	throughout	the	2000s.	The	CITES	Trade	Database	(Graph	5)	provides	a	
register	of	legally	exported	and	imported	rhino	trophies	and	other	rhino	products	(such	as	
rhino	tails	and	genitalia)	from	South	Africa.	Vietnamese	horn	importers	were	using	CITES	
export	permits	to	import	multiple	rhino	horns	on	the	same	single-use	export	permit	to	
Vietnam	until	its	expiration	date	was	reached	after	six	months	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	58).		
	
Graph		5:	South	Africa's	officially	reported	export	data	versus	Vietnam's	officially	reported	
import	data	of	rhino	horn	(2003-2010)	
	
	
Source:	CITES	Annual	Report	Data	provided	in	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	59)	
	
According	to	annual	export	and	import	data	provided	to	CITES,	Vietnam	acknowledged	receipt	
of	about	25	%	of	the	legally	imported	rhino	horn	trophies	between	20003	and	2010.	This	
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discrepancy	suggests	that	approximately	487	of	657		‘legal’	rhino	horns	entered	the	illegal	
market	in	Vietnam	(Milliken/Shaw	2012:	58).	As	recent	as	2012,	South	Africa	reported	the	
export	of	16	rhino	horns	and	13	rhino	trophies	to	the	southeastern	Asian	country.	About	the	
former,	Vietnamese	authorities	confirmed	the	import	of	28	horns	(a	difference	of	12	
additional	rhino	horns)	and	in	reference	to	the	latter,	of	the	13	trophies	only	1	was	registered	
for	importation	upon	arrival	in	Vietnam	(CITES	Trade	Database	2012).	Direct	exports	of	rhino	
trophies	from	South	Africa	to	Vietnam	stopped	entirely	by	2013	(CITES	Trade	Database	2013).	
In	excess	of	400	rhino	trophies	(800	horns)	were	‘legally’	exported	to	Vietnam	from	2003	to	
2012	(Carnie	2013).		
	
	
6.2.3	Thai	sex	workers	as	trophy	hunters	
	
Unlike	the	Vietnamese	pseudo-hunters	who	had	to	be	flown	in	from	their	home	country,	a	
Laotian	wildlife	trafficking	network,	using	a	front	company	called	‘Xaysavang	Trading	Export-
Import’,341	employed	a	clever	cost-saving	measure.	The	Thai	representative	of	Xaysavang	in	
South	Africa	recruited	Thai	sex	workers	who	were	already	based	in	South	Africa	to	accompany	
him	and	his	South	African	intermediaries	to	private	hunting	reserves	and	farms	to	act	as	
stand-ins	for	trophy	hunters.	The	wildlife	traffickers	thus	saved	on	financing	travel	costs	from	
Southeast	Asia	to	South	Africa.	A	local	henchman342	trawled	through	Johannesburg’s	strip	
clubs	and	brothels	in	search	of	Thai	nationals343	with	valid	travel	documents,	which	were	
																																																						
341	Investigative	journalist	Julian	Rademeyer	(2012)	provides	a	detailed	account	of	the	Xaysavang	wildlife	
network	in	his	book	Killing	for	Profit.	Chumlong	Lemtongthai	was	running	the	South	African	operation	of	the	
network	until	his	arrest	in	2011	and	subsequent	conviction	in	2012.	He	was	sentenced	to	40	years	imprisonment,	
which	was	reduced	to	a	30-year	sentence	on	appeal	in	2013	(Tsoka/Levenberg	2013).	The	Supreme	Court	of	
Appeal	heard	the	case	in	2014	and	shortened	Lemtongthai’s	sentence	to	an	effective	13-year	prison	term	and	a	R	
1	million	monetary	fine.	Failing	payment	of	the	fine	would	lead	to	an	effective	period	of	imprisonment	of	18	
years	(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014).	
	
342	Johnny	Olivier	the	local	‘handlanger’	(helper)	of	Chumlong	Lemthongthai	turned	against	the	wildlife	crime	
network	and	became	the	star	state	witness	against	the	Thai	national.	His	police	statement	and	various	interviews	
with	journalists	provided	insight	into	the	inner	workings	of	the	network.	His	motivation	to	turn	against	the	
network	is	discussed	later	in	this	section.	
	
343	Johnny	Olivier	suggested	that	the	Thai	women	might	have	been	trafficked	to	South	Africa	(Olivier	2011:	2).	
Another	criminal	actor	likewise	maintained	that	the	Xaysavang	network	was	also	involved	in	drug	and	human	
trafficking	(Interview	with	smuggling	intermediary,	2013).		
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needed	for	the	application	for	hunting	permits.	The	Xaysavang	wildlife	trafficking	network	had	
initially	extended	its	operations	to	South	Africa	in	a	bid	to	source	lion	bones,	teeth,	and	claws,	
which	were	sold	as	substitutes	for	tiger	bones	in	traditional	Chinese	medicine	preparations.344	
Upon	arrival	in	South	Africa,	the	transnational	coordinator	and	transporter	of	the	network	
Chumlong	Lemthongthai	saw	advertisements	for	Big	Five	hunts	including	rhino	and	informed	
his	boss	of	this	“business	opportunity”.	Keen	to	fund	“any	trade	in	rhino	horn”,	the	Laos-
based	kingpin	Vixay	Keosavang	ordered	Lemthongthai	to	“make	inquiries”	
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	9,	Interviews,	2013).	The	network	first	appeared	on	the	South	
African	police’s	radar	when	five	members	offered	tens	of	thousands	of	Dollars	for	three	rhino	
horns	to	an	undercover	police	officer	in	2008	(Connett	2014).	The	Xaysavang	network’s	
infamous	pseudo-hunting	scheme	commenced	in	late	2010.	Of	significance	was	a	clear	
separation	of	duties.	The	syndicate	sought	out	South	African	wildlife	professionals	and	
conservation	officials	with	a	penchant	for	“dodgy	deals”	that	would	facilitate	their	nefarious	
activities	by	availing	their	services	and	providing	unhindered	passage	of	rhino	horn	out	of	the	
country.	To	the	wildlife	network,	cooperation	with	South	African	wildlife	professionals	
involved	little	effort	and	operational	risk.	However,	the	‘legal’	export	of	hunting	trophies	
involved	comparably	more	administrative	and	organizational	footwork	than	a	poaching	
excursion	into	a	protected	area	would	(Interviews,	2013).		
	
The	local	organizer	of	these	pseudo–hunts	was	a	South	African	game	farmer	and	safari	
operator	who	employed	the	services	of	a	professional	hunter	to	shoot	the	rhinos	on	behalf	of	
the	Thai	pseudo–hunters.	Marnus	Steyl	first	supplied	lion	bones	and	later	progressed	to	
rhinos,	arranging	rhino	hunts,	the	removal	and	weighing	of	the	rhino	horns.	The	live	rhinos	
were	purchased	at	discounted	prices	at	auctions	as	rhino	farmers	were	starting	to	off-load	
rhinos	in	the	face	of	the	escalating	poaching	crisis.	He	would	also	find	farmers	and	outfitters	
																																																						
344	Criminal	syndicates	sell	lion	bone	as	tiger	bone	to	unsuspecting	consumers	in	Southeast	Asia.	Traditionally	
tiger	bone	is	cooked	up	into	a	jelly-like	substance	known	as	‘tiger	cake’	or	imbibed	as	‘tiger	wine’	(Interviews	
with	TCM	practitioners,	Hong	Kong,	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City,	2013).	While	the	illegal	supply	chain	of	lion	
bone	was	not	the	focus	of	my	research,	interviews	with	rhino	horn	smugglers	and	traders	indicated	that	wildlife	
traffickers	were	seldom	species-specific	but	include	a	number	of	endangered	or	threatened	species	and	other	
contraband	in	their	smuggling	bouquet.	The	arrival	of	the	Xaysavang	network	in	South	Africa	coincided	with	a	
drastic	increase	of	the	officially	recorded	export	data	of	lion	bones	on	the	CITES	database,	with	386	and	645	sets	
of	bones	exported	from	the	country	in	2009	and	2010	respectively,	whereas	only	89	sets	of	lion	bones	had	been	
exported	between	2000	and	2008.	Of	those	sets,	75%	went	to	Asia	with	the	‘lion’	share	of	67,7%	destined	to	
Laos	(Lindsey	et	al.	2012:	13),	the	home	base	of	the	Xaysavang	network.	
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who	were	willing	to	host	the	Thai	pseudo–hunting	party.	Upon	receiving	the	Thai	nationals’	
passports,	Steyl	would	forward	the	necessary	information	as	well	as	copies	of	passports	to	the	
outfitters	or	landowners	who	then	applied	on	their	behalf	for	the	hunting	permits	
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	9).	The	Thai	sex	workers	and	strippers	would	accompany	the	
syndicate	members	to	game	reserves	and	hunting	farms	to	pose	next	to	the	dead	rhinos	(see	
Figure	9)	in	exchange	for	free	food	and	drinks	and	R	5000	(475	€)	for	the	“job”	(Kvinta	2014).	
The	professional	hunter	Harry	Claassens	killed	the	rhinos,	and	Steyl	and	his	farm	workers	
would	dehorn	the	rhinos	and	take	care	of	the	carcasses.	Occasionally	Lemthongthai	or	one	of	
his	friends	would	pose	as	hunters	(Olivier	2011:	6).	Steyl	was	paid	R	60	000	(6	135	€)	per	
kilogram	of	rhino	horn;	the	price	went	subsequently	up	to	R	65	000	(6	646	€)	per	kilogram	
(supporting	evidence	attached	to	Olivier	police	statement).	
	
Figure	9:		Thai	pseudo-hunter	
	
Source:	provided	by	Paul	O’Sullivan	
	
According	to	the	hunting	regulations,	nature	conservation	officials	ought	to	be	present	and	
monitor	all	rhino	hunts.	The	Department	of	Environmental	Affairs	failed	to	provide	proper	
supervision	of	these	hunts	(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	12–13)	and	Lemthongthai	and	other	
members	of	the	syndicate	boasted	later	“everyone	has	a	price	in	South	Africa”	(Interviews,	
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2013).	In	his	ruling	during	the	appeal	hearings	the	appellate	judge	commented	on	the	
incompetence	and	possible	collusion	of	the	nature	conservation	officials:	
	
“Equally,	the	relevant	government	department	can	rightly	be	criticized,	not	only	for	
lack	of	proper	supervision	of	the	authorized	hunt,	but,	if	the	photographs	that	form	
part	of	the	record	are	anything	to	go	by,	it	appears	that	at	least	some	of	the	officials	
involved	probably	knew	that	the	terms	of	the	permit	were	not	being	met	and	that	the	
stated	purpose	of	the	hunt	was	false.	From	the	photographs	it	appears	that	these	
officials	should	have	known	that	the	persons	present	during	the	hunt	were	not	the	
persons	to	whom	the	permits	to	shoot	and	kill	rhino	had	been	granted	and	were	not	in	
truth	genuine	trophy	hunters.”	
	
Olivier’s	police	statement	was	more	damning	in	providing	a	list	of	contacts	of	the	Xaysavang	
network	within	the	North	Western	nature	conservation	department,	the	customs	and	airports	
authority,	as	well	as	pliable	taxidermists	(Olivier	2011:	9).	The	same	nature	conservation	
official	would	be	on	‘standby’	to	come	to	Steyl’s	farm	to	be	present	during	the	hunt,	measure	
the	horn,	scan	the	chip	inside	the	horn	and	put	the	details	of	the	hunt	into	the	Professional	
Hunters	Register.	Olivier	witnessed	the	exchange	of	bribe	money	once	but	thought	that	there	
was	a	standing	arrangement	in	place	(Olivier	2011:	7–8).	The	provincial	conservation	official	
appears	to	have	assured	the	national	officials	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	applications	(Interview,	
2013).			
	
Lemthongthai’s	Thai	associate	in	South	Africa,	“the	man	on	the	ground”	Chunchom	Punpitak	
(Olivier	2011:	6)	oversaw	the	hunting	parties	while	Lemthongthai	would	monitor	the	horn	
shipments	between	South	Africa	and	Laos	and	their	onward	journey	to	consumer	markets	
(Olivier	2011:	5).	The	syndicate	received	26	permits	to	shoot	and	kill	rhinos	of	which	most	
horns	were	fraudulently	exported	(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	4).	A	taxidermist	mounted	the	
horns	on	decorative	shields	to	give	them	the	semblance	of	real	hunting	trophies,	which	were	
then	shipped	to	Laos.	Lemthongthai	falsified	the	customs	documents	by	changing	the	
consignee	and	country	of	destination	(Navsa/Wallis/Swain	2014:	4);	the	hunting	trophies	
should	have	been	shipped	to	the	permanent	address	of	the	Thai	sex	workers	and	exotic	
dancers	in	Thailand.	In	2011,	South	African	investigators	closed	in	on	the	South	African	
operation	of	Xaysavang	Trading	Export	Import	Company	Limited.	Lemthongthai	and	his	
associates	were	arrested	and	charged	with	transgressing	the	Customs	and	Excise	Act,	and	
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contravening	against	the	NEMBA,	and	a	bouquet	of	crimes	linked	to	the	transgression	of	the	
Preventing	of	Organized	Crime	Act	(POCA)	(The	Regional	Division	of	Gauteng	Kempton	Park	
2012).	
	
	
6.2.4	The	resilience	of	the	Xaysavang	network	
	
As	the	lead	research	question	of	this	dissertation	asks	why	the	rhino	has	not	been	better	
protected	in	spite	of	myriad	measures	to	disrupt	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn,	the	arrest	
and	conviction	of	Lemthongthai,	on	the	face	of	it,	would	suggest	that	this	is	indeed	a	
successful	disruption	of	an	illegal	rhino	horn	supply	chain.	Why	was	Lemthongthai	arrested?	
And	did	his	arrest	and	his	subsequent	trial	and	that	of	his	co-accused	(which	included	the	
game	farmer	Steyl	and	professional	hunter	Claassens)	successfully	disrupt	the	market	for	any	
length	of	time?	In	response	to	the	former	question:	Johnny	Olivier,	the	South	African	
associate	who	was	responsible	for	the	“administrative	go-between	activities”	(he	was	paid	R	
5000	–	475	€	per	rhino)	allegedly	got	scruples	when	he	discovered	an	order	from	
Lemthongthai	to	Steyl	for	a	further	50	rhinos	(100	rhino	horns)	and	300	sets	of	lion	
skeletons.345	The	team	was	supposed	to	kill	and	dehorn	15	rhinos	per	month;	they	would	
receive	R	65	000	(6	646	€)	per	kilogram	of	rhino	horn	and	R	10	000	(1	022	€)	for	lion	skeletons	
weighing	more	than	10	kg	(Olivier	2011:	10).	Olivier	turned	state	witness	and	his	statement	to	
private	investigator	Paul	O’Sullivan	led	customs	investigators	to	the	heart	of	the	Xaysavang’s	
South	African	operation	but	left	the	transnational	smuggling	operation	and	supply	chain	
virtually	undisturbed.	Olivier	and	his	girlfriend	received	immunity	from	prosecution	and	
entered	briefly	a	witness	protection	programme	but	his	betrayal	did	not	go	unnoticed.	
Lemthongthai	allegedly	put	out	an	R	100	000	(10	225	€)	bounty	on	their	heads	and	the	couple	
started	receiving	veiled	threats	on	social	media	and	suspicious	phone	calls.	Apparently	
Lemthongthai	had	taken	everyone’s	photo	at	a	party	a	few	months	earlier.	Should	any	team	
member	‘snitch’,	then	their	photo	would	be	sent	to	people	that	knew	how	to	take	care	of	
																																																						
345	Olivier	made	the	claim	about	scruples	and	“blood	money”	to	private	investigator	Paul	O’Sullivan	and	later	in	
his	police	statement	(Olivier	2011:	10).	Investigative	journalist	Julian	Rademeyer	relates	that	Olivier	had	a	rather	
murky	past	and	dubious	reputation	(Rademeyer	2012).	His	motivation	to	inform	on	the	dealings	of	Xaysavang	
remains	unclear;	however,	the	sudden	concern	for	rhino	appears	out	of	place	after	sourcing	100s	of	rhinos	for	
the	network	(Interview	with	intermediary,	2013).	
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snitching	(Kvinta	2014).	While	the	digital	capturing	of	conspirators	suggests	that	Lemthonghai	
tried	to	resolve	the	coordination	problem	of	security	by	way	of	an	insurance	policy,	an	
intricate	and	complex	security	system	appears	to	protect	the	Xayasavang	network.	As	it	
turned	out,	Chumlong	Lemthongthai	was	assigned	as	the	“fall	guy”	who	took	the	blame	as	the	
“director”	of	the	import	export	company;	Olivier	had	his	day	in	court	and	lived	to	tell	the	tale.	
Charges	were	dropped	against	all	of	Lemthongthai’s	co–accused346	after	he	pleaded	guilty	and	
claimed	that	the	others	had	no	knowledge	of	his	illegal	dealings.	Lemthongthai’s	fate	and	the	
consequences	of	his	arrest	assist	in	responding	to	the	latter	question,	which	related	to	
whether	the	arrests	had	led	to	a	successful	disruption	of	the	market.	
	
Lemthongthai’s	co-accused	got	off	scot-free	to	deflect	from	other	Xaysavang	dealings.		
The	risk	of	‘getting	caught’	is	considered	an	operational	risk	to	wildlife	traffickers	and	
succession	planning	and	securing	the	continuity	of	the	supply	chain	is	inherent	to	any	
successful	transnational	operation,	thus	resolving	the	coordination	problem	of	security.	The	
network	had	several	fall	back	scenarios	in	case	of	detection	and	defection	of	key	players.	
Lemthongthai	had	left	an	impeccable	digital	record	of	his	business	dealings,347	which	had	
assisted	investigators	and	prosecutors	in	putting	their	case	together.	While	Lemthongthai	may	
have	been	the	designated	as	the	‘fall	guy’	(and	more	so	by	virtue	of	his	digital	record	keeping	
suggesting	that	he	thought	his	approach	was	failsafe),	some	of	South	Africa’s	finest	legal	
																																																						
346	The	National	Prosecution	Authority	(NPA)	reinstated	the	charges	against	game	farmer	Marnus	Steyl	in	2012.	
He	fought	for	a	permanent	stay	of	execution,	which	was	granted	in	June	2015.		
	
347	It	would	appear	rather	naïve	of	Lemthongthai	to	leave	behind	such	detailed	accounts	of	his	business	dealings.	
He	was,	however,	sure	of	the	legitimacy	of	his	dealings	in	light	of	him	attaining	the	“right”	paperwork	to	move	
the	rhino	horns	‘legally’	out	of	the	country.	He	believed	that	he	was	acting	within	the	limits	of	the	South	African	
law,	which	permitted	Thai	nationals	to	hunt	rhinos	and	export	the	horns	to	their	home	country.	While	he	was	
paying	R	60	000	to	R	65	000	per	kg	of	rhino	horn,	poached	rhino	horn	would	enter	the	“black	market”	at	a	cost	of	
R	200	000	to	the	poaching	organizer.	Although	Lemthongthai’s	alleged	profit	margin	was	less	than	R	100	000	per	
rhino	hunt,	poaching	intermediaries	would	make	a	profit	of	R	450	000	per	hunt	(Interview,	2013).	The	payment	
structures	are	discussed	in	more	detail	below.	It	is	noteworthy	how	pseudo	trophy	hunting	was	legitimized	as	the	
lesser	of	two	evils.	Moreover,	while	the	digital	record	on	Lemthongthai’s	laptop	provides	insight	into	the	
‘pseudo-legal’	dealings	of	the	Xaysavang	network,	there	was	no	paper	trail	of	the	overtly	illegal	transactions.	
According	to	sources	within	the	criminal	underworld	that	cooperated	with	Lemthongthai	(Interviews,	2013	and	
2014),	the	network	had	been	involved	in	the	illegal	killing	and	dehorning	of	at	least	700	rhinos	in	southern	Africa.	
The	court	cases	against	Lemthongthai	and	associates,	however,	dealt	with	a	few	dozens	of	pseudo-trophy	hunts	
(The	Regional	Division	of	Gauteng	Kempton	Park	2012).	
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minds	were	assigned	to	his	case.348	The	lawyers	first	fought	in	the	High	Court	and	later	in	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	for	reductions	to	Lemthongthai’s	prison	term.	The	initial	40-year	
sentence	was	first	reduced	to	a	30-year	term,	and	then	the	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	took	off	
a	further	17	years	in	2013.	Lemthongthai	is	to	serve	a	13-jail	sentence	and	pay	a	fine	of	R	1	
million.	According	to	law	enforcement	sources	(Interviews,	2013),	Keosavang	is	taking	good	
care	of	Lemthongthai’s	family	in	Thailand	in	the	interim,	and	he	will	be	generously	rewarded	
upon	his	release	from	prison.	By	exonerating	the	others,	Lemthongthai	ensured	that	none	of	
the	other	co-accused	would	release	privileged	information	about	the	network’s	operations	
and	that	they	could	carry	on	with	their	nefarious	activities.	The	network	managed	to	resolve	
the	coordination	problems	of	cooperation	and	security	successfully	through	Lemthongthai’s	
role	as	intermediary	and	‘fall	guy’.	These	roles	were	based	on	his	reputation	as	a	trustworthy	
criminal	associate	and	mutual	trust	that	both	Lemthongthai	and	the	network	would	honour	
their	roles	in	the	‘security’	agreement	(non-disclosure	of	operational	secrets	versus	support	of	
next-of-kin).	
	
The	significance	of	the	responsibilities	and	functions	linked	to	the	role	of	the	local	organizer	
needs	to	be	underscored:	Steyl	is	but	one	example	of	a	handful	of	southern	African	
organizers349	who	act	as	intermediaries	between	the	supply	and	demand	side	of	the	market.	
These	organizers	have	access	to	influential	political	and	economic	elites	in	southern	Africa	and	
Southeast	Asia;	Steyl,	for	example,	travelled	to	Thailand	on	several	occasions.	Moreover,	
South	African	law	enforcement	authorities	and	their	Asian	counterparts	have	evidence	that	
South	African	wildlife	professionals	and	their	representatives	have	undertaken	several	
“marketing	trips”	to	Vietnam	(Interview,	2013).	In	essence,	Steyl’s	role	and	function	as	the	
local	organizer	with	a	direct	connection	to	the	source	(rhino	horn,	lion	bone	and	other	wildlife	
products)	is	far	more	valuable	to	transnational	traffickers	than	the	role	of	transnational	
transporters	(in	this	case	Lemthongthai’s	role).	While	Lemthongthai	was	the	person	
responsible	for	the	transnational	transport	(export/import)	of	rhino	horn,	lion	bone	and	other	
																																																						
348	According	to	key	informants	interviewed	in	southeastern	Asia,	the	network	financed	Lemthongthai’s	lawyers.	
Julian	Rademeyer	(pers.	communication,	2016)	believes	that	game	farmer	Marnus	Steyl	and	associates	footed	
the	legal	bill	but	could	no	find	corroborating	evidence.	
349	According	to	poachers,	law	enforcers	and	intelligence	operators	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014),	Groenewald	and	
Ras	are	also	organizers.	There	is	also	anecdotal	evidence	of	three	white	executives	in	the	import-export	business	
(two	of	South	African	and	one	of	Zimbabwean	descent)	operating	from	Mozambique.			
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wildlife	contraband	from	South	Africa	to	Southeast	Asia	until	his	arrest	and	subsequent	
conviction,	his	functions	and	duties	were	rapidly	moved	to	someone	else.350	
	
The	arrest	and	conviction	of	Keosavang’s	“deputy”	(Rademeyer	2014b)	also	failed	to	disrupt	
the	market.	While	it	put	an	end	to	the	recruitment	of	Thai	sex	workers	as	trophy	hunters,	
other	‘legal’	and	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn	continue	to	feed	the	market.	A	separate	case	in	
Kenya	has	linked	the	Xaysavang	network	to	ivory	trafficking	(Fuller	2013)351	while	interviews	
indicated	that	the	networks	were	involved	in	a	number	of	other	legal	and	illegal	flows	of	rhino	
horn,	ivory,	lion	bone	and	other	wildlife	products	out	of	South	Africa,	Namibia,	Mozambique,	
and	Tanzania	(Interviews,	2013).	The	primary	modus	operandi	of	the	Xaysavang	network	is	
the	conversion	of	illegally	obtained	wildlife	and	wildlife	parts	into	seemingly	legal	wildlife	
commodities.	The	network	smuggles	1000s	of	wild	animals	and	animal	parts	to	Laos	each	
year.	Keosavang	maintains	a	number	of	captive	breeding	facilities	and	farms	in	Laos,	from	
where	illegally	obtained	wild	animals	or	animal	parts	are	exported	with	official	Laotian	
government	paperwork	stating	that	the	animals	derive	from	captive	breeding	facilities	(Fuller	
2013,	Interview	with	Steven	Galster,	Freeland	Foundation,	2013).	Dubbed	the	“Pablo	Escabar”	
of	illegal	wildlife	trade	(Rademeyer	2014b),	Vixay	Keosavang	has	powerful	networks	extending	
to	the	political	and	military	elite	of	the	southeast	Asian	country	(Gosling/Reitano/Shaw	2014:	
24).	The	former	soldier	turned	business	entrepreneur	remains	“untouchable”	in	his	home	
country	of	Laos	(Gosling/Reitano/Shaw	2014:	23)	despite	the	US	issuing	a	$1	million	reward	
for	information	leading	to	the	dismantling	of	the	Xaysavang	network	in	2013.	Evidence	at	
Lemthongthai’s	trial	had	included	airway	bills	showing	that	some	rhino	horns	had	been	
shipped	to	one	of	Keosavang’s	addresses	in	Laos	–	yet,	this	evidence	did	little	to	dismantle	or	
disrupt	his	wildlife	business	(Fuller	2013).		
	
																																																						
350	The	Freeland	Foundation	believes	that	Loy	Chanthamvonga,	a	young	woman	who	frequently	travels	to	
Mozambique,	is	Lemthongthai‘s	successor.	She	was	implicated	in	a	rhino	horn	shipment	to	Thailand,	which	also	
involved	a	Vietnamese	national	and	two	police	officers	(Rademeyer	2014b).	
	
351		The	Kenya	Wildlife	Service	and	customs	officers	seized	260	kg	of	elephant	ivory	and	18	kg	of	rhino	horn	at	
Nairobi	airport	in	2008.	The	shipment	was	registered	to	Xaysavang	Import	and	Export	and	bound	for	Laos	
(Connett	2014).	
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6.2.5	“Round–tripping”:	Rhino	horn	in	transit		
	
By	the	time	the	legal	loophole	had	been	plugged	and	a	temporary	ban	had	been	imposed	on	
Vietnamese	trophy	hunters	in	2012,	a	new	breed	of	“non-traditional”	hunters	had	already	
slipped	into	the	region.	Czech,	Polish	and	Ukrainian	hunters	were	now	posing	as	“proxy”	
hunters	for	criminal	groupings;	their	‘hunting	trophies’	were	‘legally’	exported	to	their	home	
countries.	From	there,	the	horns	were	pilfered	into	illegal	supply	chains	to	Vietnam	
(Interviews	with	law	enforcement	officials	and	conservators,	2013).	In	July	2013,	24	rhino	
horns	were	confiscated	and	16	suspects	arrested	in	the	Czech	Republic;	an	additional	eight	
horns	were	seized	in	Slovakia.	Czech	authorities	charged	the	group	of	16	including	three	
Vietnamese	nationals,	with	being	members	of	an	international	crime	syndicate	in	December	
2014.	The	syndicate	is	alleged	to	have	moved	rhino	horn	from	South	Africa	via	the	Czech	
Republic	and	Slovakia	to	Vietnam.	This	practice	has	been	dubbed	“round–tripping”	(Bloch	
2014).	In	2012,	the	Czech	Republic	informed	CITES	that	intermediaries	with	contacts	to	the	
local	Vietnamese	community	had	recruited	Czech	citizens	from	a	specific	area	in	northern	
Bohemia	to	act	in	staged	trophy	hunts	in	South	Africa.	Like	the	Vietnamese	pseudo–hunters,	
these	hunters	were	not	registered	members	of	any	hunting	association,	possessed	no	hunting	
licenses	or	rifles	and	had	no	previous	hunting	experience.	The	recruiters	paid	the	travel	
expenses	of	the	Czech	hunters	to	South	Africa,	contingent	on	the	hunter	signing	a	declaration	
that	the	hunting	trophies	would	be	surrendered	to	the	recruiter	upon	return	to	the	Czech	
Republic	(CITES	Secretariat	2013:	6).	The	South	African	partners	–	Czech	nationals	living	in	
South	Africa	and	rogue	wildlife	professionals	associated	with	the	earlier	mentioned	Dawie	
Groenewald	–	arranged	the	permit	applications,	hunts	and	export	of	the	rhino	horns.	East	
European	customs	officials	have	limited	experience	in	identifying	African	wildlife	contraband,	
a	weakness	easily	exploited	by	wildlife	syndicates.	The	Czech	authorities	became	suspicious	
upon	inspecting	rhino	horns	that	were	not	mounted	on	a	trophy	but	individually	wrapped	in	
clear	plastic	and	packed	into	wood	shipping	crates	and	stamped	with	an	official	South	African	
CITES	export	approval.	Another	shipment	of	horns	was	concealed	in	custom-made	machine	
parts	(pers.	communication	with	Julian	Rademeyer,	2016).	According	to	the	airway	bills,	the	
horns	were	to	pass	through	the	Czech	Republic	en	route	the	final	destination	of	Vietnam	
(Bloch	2014).	The	Czech	network	is	allegedly	connected	to	Dawie	Groenewald’s	“Musina	
group”	after	microchips	in	some	of	the	confiscated	horns	were	traced	back	to	several	farms	in	
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the	Limpopo	Province	and	his	name	and	the	names	of	his	co–accused	appeared	on	permit	
applications.	
	
More	recently,	there	have	been	suspicions	that	‘traditional’	hunters	(notably	US	and	Russian	
nationals)	were	also	hunting	on	behalf	of	Vietnamese	groups	(Interviews	with	wildlife	
veterinarian	3,	2013).	The	US	indictment	of	Dawie	Groenewald	confirmed	that	US	trophy	
hunters	had	indeed	collaborated	(albeit	“unknowingly”)	with	the	Groenewald	siblings.		
	
	
6.2.6	The	impact	of	pseudo–hunting	on	price	structures	and	trust	issues	
	
The	price	of	‘legal	hunts’	surged	after	it	became	apparent	how	lucrative	this	economic	
exchange	was.	According	to	Adri	Kitshoff,	former	chief	executive	officer	(CEO)	of	the	
Professional	Hunters	Association	of	South	Africa	(personal	communication,	2015),352	the	price	
ranged	between	US	$	40	000	and	US	$	50	000	per	hunt	in	1995	to	2000,	and	from	2001	to	
2005	it	cost	between	US	$	50	000	and	$	65	000	per	hunt	(compare	with	Graph	4).	Pseudo–
hunting	increased	drastically	from	2008,	and	so	did	the	price	for	legal	rhino	hunts.	A	typical	
rhino	hunt	would	cost	between	US	$	90	000	to	US	$	110	000	at	the	height	of	the	pseudo–
hunting	phenomenon	between	2008	and	2011.	The	entry	of	the	Vietnamese	hunters	into	the	
trophy	hunting	market	also	led	to	a	shift	in	price	valuation	by	rhino	owners	and	outfitters,	
who	started	charging	per	inch,	and	in	some	cases,	per	kilogram	of	horn.	The	length	or	weight	
of	the	rhino	horn	hence	affected	the	total	price	of	rhino	hunts.	Once	the	TOPS	regulations	
were	promulgated	and	adjusted	to	address,	amongst	others,	the	issue	of	pseudo–hunting,	the	
price	came	down	slightly	before	surging	again.	Most	rhino	owners	and	outfitters	continue	to	
charge	per	inch	in	lieu	of	quoting	for	a	rhino	hunt	irrespective	of	the	length	or	weight	of	the	
horn.	In	2015,	hunting	outfitters	who	did	not	own	land	or	rhinos	were	charging	$	3	500	(3	125	
Euros)353	per	inch,	which	includes	the	total	amount	disbursed	to	the	rhino	owner.	Typically	a	
																																																						
352	Adri	Kitshoff,	the	former	CEO	of	the	Professional	Hunters	Association	of	South	Africa	made	available	the	
quantitative	data	provided	in	this	paragraph.			
	
353	Trophy	hunts	are	usually	quoted	in	US	Dollars.	This	is	partially	linked	to	the	high	number	of	American	trophy	
hunters	supporting	the	South	African	hunting	industry,	and	major	hunting	exhibitions,	shows	and	auctions	such	
as	the	Dallas	Safari	Club	happen	on	US	soil.	
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hunter	would	pay	$	91	000	(81	250	Euros)	to	a	hunting	outfitter	for	a	rhino	that	carries	26-
inch	horns.354	Wildlife	professionals	involved	in	the	hunting	industry	have	taken	to	defining	
rhinos	in	terms	of	the	length	of	their	horns	–	typically	a	rhino	that	carries	a	26-inch	horn	is	
described	as	a	“26-inch	rhino”	(Interviews	with	wild	professionals,	2013;	see	also	Chapter	4	on	
the	sale	of	live	rhinos).		
	
While	the	new	price	structure	based	on	inches	of	horn	became	a	market-related	standard	in	
the	wildlife	industry,	trust	issues	led	to	a	further	adaptation	of	remunerating	farmers	and	
outfitters	for	rhino	hunts	according	to	the	weight	of	horn.	Some	criminal	actors	insisted	on	
dispensing	payment	only	once	the	rhino	had	been	shot,	dehorned	and	the	horns	had	been	
weighed.	Interviews	with	wildlife	professionals,	rhino	owners	and	a	prominent	intermediary	
of	a	rhino	trafficking	syndicate	revealed	great	levels	of	distrust	between	rhino	owners	on	the	
one	hand,	and	local	“handlangers”355	and	their	Asian	connections	on	the	other.	Farmers	who	
hosted	pseudo-hunts	and	engaged	in	horn	laundering	knew	that	they	had	no	recourse	to	legal	
protection,	should	their	criminal	associates	decide	to	default	on	payments,	defraud	or	‘rat’	on	
them.	Intermediaries	and	their	Asian	associates	were	concerned	about	getting	real	horn	(as	
opposed	to	fake	horn,	which	is	prevalent	and	widespread	both	on	the	supply	and	demand	
side	of	the	market)	and	getting	sufficient	horn	for	the	price	they	were	paying	(Interviews	with	
horn	smugglers	and	intermediaries,	2013).	In	the	aftermath	of	the	first	pseudo–hunt,	
Lemthongthai	expressed	buyer’s	remorse	for	having	paid	“too	much	money”	for	the	two	rhino	
hunts.	He	then	decided	that	“we	shoot,	we	cut,	we	weigh,	then	pay”	(Olivier	2011:	4).	In	fact,	
Lemthongthai	would	only	pay	the	money	three	to	four	days	after	the	rhino	had	been	
dehorned	to	ensure	that	the	weight	of	the	horn	had	stabilized	from	“moisture	loss”	(Olivier	
2011:	6).	
	
It	is	interesting	that	illegal	market	pricing	structures	affected	the	legal	trophy-hunting	sector.		
Legal	actors	followed	suit	by	valuing	rhinos	in	terms	of	inches	and	grams	of	rhino	horn	instead	
of	selling	rhino	hunts.	Of	further	interest	is	the	agency	of	horn	suppliers	in	co-determining	the	
																																																						
354	The	price	may	also	vary	according	to	the	location	of	the	hunting	reserve	and	the	size	of	the	land	(the	appeal	of	
the	experience).	Some	rhino	hunts	in	“premier	areas”	where	rhinos	are	“wild”	or	“free	ranging”	will	sell	for	more	
than	$	150	000	(Adri	Kitshoff,	personal	communication,	2015).		
	
355	Afrikaans	word	for	helper	or	‘hangers-on’.	
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price	of	rhino	horn,	suggesting	that	not	only	the	sacred	valuation	of	rhino	horn	in	consumer	
markets	but	also	the	security	premium	associated	with	securing	the	supply	chain	(converting	
illegally	obtained	rhino	horn	into	seemingly	legal	rhino	horn	through	permit	fraud)	and	
disbursements	to	legitimate	wildlife	professionals	play	a	role	in	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn.	
Law	enforcement	officials	and	police	reports	(Interviews,	2013;	documents	in	the	possession	
of	researcher)	confirm	that	“rhino	trophies”	exported	from	pseudo-hunts	and	illegal	hunts	
consisted	of	the	horns	only.	The	sale	of	rhino	hunts	per	inch	or	kilogram	reveals	yet	another	
expression	of	contested	illegality,	where	wildlife	professionals	and	their	clients	disregard	that	
rhino	horn	is	not	a	tradable	commodity	permissible	by	the	law	of	the	land.	The	rhino	is	valued	
in	terms	of	the	weight	or	length	of	its	horns,	effectively	rendering	“a	rhino	worth	more	dead	
than	alive”	(Interviews,	2013).			
	
	
6.3	Cooperation:	The	African-Asian	connection	
	
Wildlife	professionals	including	job	categories	such	as	wildlife	veterinarians,	professional	
hunters,	game	capturers	and	transporters,	nature	conservation	officials	and	helicopter	pilots	
acted	on	occasion	as	the	‘go–between’	or	intermediary	of	rhino	farmers	and	Asian	buyers.	
This	intermediary	function	was	not	only	important	in	connecting	potential	buyers	(Asian	
networks)	with	suppliers	(rhino	farmers),	but	it	also	put	distance	(an	additional	node)	
between	different	stages	of	the	supply	chain.	The	intermediary	was	the	‘fall	guy’	should	
‘something	go	wrong’	during	a	business	transaction.	In	essence,	the	intermediary	provides	
protection	for	both	the	supplier	and	buyer	thus	resolving	a	potential	fall	out	due	to	distrust	on	
either	side.	Asian	buyers	were	careful	to	choose	intermediaries	that	either	had	a	good	
reputation	and	social	capital	within	the	rhino	owner	community,	or	wildlife	professionals	who	
were	known	as	mavericks,	thereby	resolving	the	coordination	problems	of	cooperation	and	
security.	Where	rhino	owners	or	outfitters	had	their	dedicated	business	connections	to	
consumer	markets	(discussed	in	more	detail	below),	the	role	of	the	intermediary	was	
superfluous.		A	South	African	wildlife	veterinarian	who	had	been	recruited	to	identify	rhino	
farmers	willing	to	host	white	rhino	hunts	with	Vietnamese	pseudo–hunters	on	their	land	said:		
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“The	 discussions	 [the	 informant	 refers	 to	 a	meeting	with	 an	 alleged	 rhino	 poaching	
kingpin]	centred	around	the	possibility	of	acquiring	white	rhino	for	“legal”	hunts	and	
helping	them	to	get	 in	touch	with	the	right	people.	 I	had	to	source	places	where	the	
Vietnamese	hunters	could	hunt	rhino.	The	ideal	rhino	had	to	be	older	rhino	bulls	with	
big	back	horns	and	the	front	horns	needed	to	have	big	bases	contributing	to	a	heavier	
weight	and	 larger	profit.	 It	was	all	about	the	weight	and	not	about	the	 length	of	the	
horns	or	the	trophies.	The	purchase	price	at	that	time	was	between	R40	000-00	to	R60	
000-00	per	kilogram	[4120	Euros	to	6175	Euros	per	kilogram].356	This	was	only	for	the	
horns.	The	hunting	price	will	be	determined	by	the	weight	of	the	horns	after	the	hunt.	
I	would	have	received	3%	to	5%	commission	based	on	the	weight	of	the	rhino	horns	
after	 the	 hunt.	 The	 payments	would	 have	 been	 in	 cash.	 I	 was	 only	 to	 source	 rhino.	
[Name	of	South	African	intermediary]	used	his	own	Professional	Hunters...[…]…	These	
rhino	hunts	were	only	 for	 the	 rhino	horns	 and	not	 for	 the	 trophy.	 [Two	Vietnamese	
gentlemen]	were	responsible	for	getting	hunters	from	Vietnam	and	they	acted	as	the	
link	 between	 South	 Africa	 and	 Vietnam.	 [The	 South	 African	 intermediary]	 was	 also	
responsible	for	obtaining	the	permits	in	South	Africa.”	
	
In	cases	where	the	state	has	no	or	limited	knowledge	as	to	actual	rhino	numbers	in	a	reserve	
or	on	a	farm,	there	was	(and	continues	to	be)	no	need	for	rogue	operators	to	apply	for	
hunting	permits	or	commit	permit	fraud.	The	secrecy	governing	rhino	numbers	and	reserve	
locations	(see	earlier	section	on	‘put	and	take)	allows	such	operators	to	go	about	their	
business	with	no	detection.	This	breed	of	rhino	farmers	and	wildlife	professionals	tends	to	
have	their	own	‘pipeline’	to	Asian	markets,	and	intermediaries	were	infrequently	used	
because	there	was	no	need	for	them.	Law	enforcement	officials	regard	these	operators	as	
“particularly	clever”	as	they	did	not	get	involved	with	“organized	crime”	(Interviews,	2013).357	
The	initial	connection	to	Asian	traders	and	consumers	happened	either	through	historical	
trade	connections,358	marketing	trips	to	southeast	Asia	or	existing	or	emerging	business	
relationships	with	nationals	or	diplomats	of	consumer	countries	resident	in	South	Africa	or	
one	of	the	neighbouring	rhino	range	states	(Zimbabwe,	Zambia	or	Namibia).	The	advantage	of	
																																																						
356	The	informant	was	referring	to	events	that	happened	in	2010.	
	
357	Arguably	the	criminal	actors	involved	in	this	specific	flow	constitute	an	evolved	form	of	organized	crime	
where	possible	interruption	of	the	supply	chain	is	kept	to	an	absolute	minimum.	The	level	of	sophistication	is	
achieved	by	involving	a	few	trusted	actors	only	who	have	the	means	and	contacts	to	supply,	procure	and	
transport	rhino	horn	at	low	cost	and	minimum	risk.	
	
358	Consumer	markets	in	Asia,	Middle	East	and	Northern	America	have	received	rhino	horn	sourced	from	African	
rhinos	for	several	centuries.	Historical	trade	connections	in	this	instance	refer	to	the	establishment	of	trade	
relations	between	sanction	busters	(the	international	community	imposed	economic	sanctions	on	apartheid	
South	Africa),	apartheid	military	intelligence	operatives	and	rogue	wildlife	professionals	who	traded	ivory	and	
rhino	horn	for	weapons	and	ammunition.		
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the	direct	connection	between	the	rhino	owner,	or	the	wildlife	professional	with	access	to	
rhino	horn,	and	the	Asian	consumer	is	that	the	supply	chain	out	of	the	country	is	
comparatively	shorter	than	in	the	other	setups.	These	relationships	are	based	on	mutual	trust	
involving	actors	of	similar	socio-economic	background,	social	capital	and	access	to	influential	
and	powerful	political	or	economic	elites	at	the	source	and	in	the	market.	
	
	
6.4	Contested	illegality:	Legitimizing	regulatory	breaches		
	
The	notion	of	contested	illegality	is	a	recurring	feature	in	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain	across	
different	flows,	where	the	legitimacy	of	the	rules	and/or	rule-makers	is	questioned,	or	cultural	
frames	legitimize	illegal	or	gray	economic	activities.	The	lack	of	acceptance	of	illegality	or	
what	is	referred	to	as	the	notion	of	contested	illegality	–	in	this	case,	non-acceptance	of	the	
trade	ban	and	domestic	regulations	governing	the	hunting	and	management	of	rhinos	and	
their	horn	–	is	employed	as	a	legitimization	device	for	illegal	or	gray	economic	activities	
involving	rhino	horn	in	the	private	sector.	Wildlife	professionals	who	are	involved	in	the	illegal	
rhino	horn	supply	chain	expressed	sentiments	of	unfairness,	impracticability	and	hostility	with	
regards	to	the	CITES	and	TOPS	regulations,	as	well	as	the	moratorium	on	the	domestic	trade	
of	rhino	horn	in	South	Africa	(see	also	Chapter	5).	In	essence,	the	narrative	relating	to	the	
regulation	of	the	industry	has	become	a	‘chicken	and	egg’	debate	of	whether	(over–)	
regulation	led	to	illegal	economic	activities	involving	rhino	horn	or	vice	versa.	As	explained	in	
Chapter	4,	state	authorities	privatized	rhinos	in	order	to	increase	the	total	conservation	area	
in	South	Africa,	to	create	multiple	viable	rhino	populations	and	to	spread	the	risk	of	disease	
and	extinction.	The	first	rhinos	were	sold	to	private	individuals	and	corporate	entities	in	the	
late	1960s.	CITES	instituted	the	international	trade	ban	on	rhinos	and	their	products	in	1977.	
As	one	of	the	original	signatories	of	the	treaty,	South	Africa	was	required	to	domesticate	and	
implement	the	trade	ban,	which	effectively	happened	in	the	late	2000s.	CITES	granted	some	
leeway	as	provisions	were	made	for	the	non-commercial	exchange	of	white	rhino	trophies	in	
the	early	years	of	the	multilateral	environmental	treaty.		The	Convention,	the	linked	trade	ban	
and	domestic	regulations	became	a	thorn	in	the	eye	of	many	rhino	owners	and	wildlife	
professionals	who	wanted	free	reign	and	agency	to	determine	what	happened	to	their	
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“property”	and	“investment”,	especially	once	property	rights	had	been	conferred	and	clearly	
articulated	(Interviews,	2013).		
	
In	essence,	the	CITES	trade	ban	was	interpreted	as	a	deliberate	stumbling	block,	which	was	
“out	of	touch	with	the	realities	of	the	African	bush”	(Interview	with	conservator	3,	2013)	and	
“dictated	upon	African	conservators	by	powerful	animal	rights	lobbies	and	greenies	within	
CITES”	(Interview	with	rhino	owner	11,	2013).	Interviews	with	rogue	wildlife	professionals	
(including	rhino	owners)	portrayed	the	rhino	horn	trade	ban	as	one	of	many	prohibition–
based	systems	that	failed	to	enforce	its	stated	objective	–	in	this	instance,	the	regulation	of	
wildlife	trade	and	avoidance	of	species	extinction.	The	argument	proffered	is	one	of	“where	
there	is	a	demand,	there	is	a	supply	–	and	if	it’s	not	the	farmer	who	conserves	and	helps	the	
rhino,	then	it	will	be	the	poacher	that	meets	the	demand”	(Interviews	with	wildlife	
professional	3,	2013).	The	role	of	the	state	is	minimal	in	this	narrative	as	to	allow	for	
‘unfettered	market	exchanges’	in	which	self-interested	individuals	realize	their	full	economic	
potential,	and	where	‘the	invisible	hand’	of	the	market	determines	supply	and	demand	by	way	
of	pricing	mechanisms.		The	notion	of	contested	illegality	became	an	important	element	of	
legitimizing	illegal	economic	activities,	as	soon	as	the	CITES	trade	ban	was	instituted,	and	
continues	to	legitimize	underhand	and	illegal	economic	activities.	
Once	the	South	African	state	had	identified	irregular	non-conservation	orientated	activities	on	
private	land,	piecemeal	regulatory	controls	were	introduced	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	in	
preparation	of	South	Africa’s	bid	at	CITES	to	get	rhinos	down-listed	from	Appendix	I	(total	
trade	ban)	to	Appendix	II	(partial	trade	ban),	and	subsequent	attempts	to	allow	for	controlled	
legal	trade.	The	South	African	government’s	leading	argument	was	to	incentivize	private	rhino	
owners	to	continue	breeding	rhinos	on	private	land.	CoP	decisions	allowed	the	export	of	
white	rhino	trophies	as	of	1979;	white	rhinos	were	then	moved	from	Appendix	I	to	Appendix	II	
in	1994,	and	by	2004,	Namibia	and	South	Africa	were	granted	an	annual	hunting	quota	of	five	
black	rhinos.		
Chapter	5	and	earlier	sections	of	this	chapter	referred	to	the	TOPS	regulations.	The	
regulations	were	not	only	aimed	at	bringing	South	African	norms	and	standards	in	tune	with	
the	requirements	set	out	by	CITES	but	also	to	close	loopholes	that	had	been	previously	
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exploited.	Originally	the	regulations	were	promulgated	in	2008;	however,	due	to	the	
phenomenon	of	pseudo-hunting	and	the	identification	of	additional	loopholes,	the	regulations	
were	amended	and	updated	in	2013	(Interview	with	government	official	5,	2013).	While	DEA	
officials	maintain	that	private	rhino	owners	were	sufficiently	consulted	ahead	of	the	
promulgation,	private	rhino	owners	felt	that	their	concerns	and	complaints	were	not	
sufficiently	considered.	The	sentiments	expressed	by	the	rhino	owner	below	(Interview	with	
rhino	owner	2,	2013)	mirror	the	narrative	of	many	wildlife	professionals	interviewed	for	this	
research:		
“One	of	the	things	is	you’re	the	owner	of	the	rhino.	That	means	you	own	everything	
on	it,	the	horn	or	the	body	parts	belongs	to	you.	But	if	that	rhino	dies	and	you	obtain	
the	horn,	then	you	need	the	possession	permit	which	is	fine	by	me.	You	cannot	pass-
on	the	horn	to	someone	else,	not	even	your	children.	So	what	must	you	do	with	it?		
You	are	not	allowed	to	donate	it,	you	are	not	allowed	to	sell	it	and	you	are	not	allowed	
to	keep	it	in	your	house	without	a	permit.	So	it	is	a	worthless	thing.	Why	must	you	
protect	a	worthless	thing?	When	I	die,	it	will	be	a	problem,	it	wont	even	be	part	of	my	
estate.”		
Prior	to	the	end	of	the	apartheid	regime,	the	state’s	main	focus	was	aimed	at	assisting	private	
rhino	owners	whereas	the	attention	has	shifted	to	include	the	interests	of	local	communities	
living	in	or	adjacent	to	conservation	areas	in	the	post–apartheid	regime.	Commercial	farmers	
–	rhino	owners	are	included	here	–	were	a	powerful	lobby	within	the	ruling	National	Party	
during	the	apartheid	regime.	Farmers	had	direct	connections	to	the	provincial	nature	
conservation	bureaucracies	and	representatives	in	parliament,	thereby	influencing	decisions	
pertaining	to	their	interests.	Their	status	as	members	or	associates	of	the	political	and	
economic	elite	began	to	change	during	the	1990s.	Strong	political	ties	to	the	apartheid	
regime,	economic	privileges	and	support,	and	exploitative	labour	relations	on	some	farms	had	
contributed	to	large-scale	social	engineering	in	South	Africa’s	rural	areas	and	upheld	the	social	
structure	and	economic	powerbase	of	the	apartheid	state.	The	change	in	the	political	and	
economic	status	of	farmers	was	not	only	linked	to	the	political	transformation	in	South	Africa	
but	macro-economic	changes	in	the	global	arena	such	as	market	deregulation	and	the	
weakening	of	the	South	African	Rand.		Larger	game	reserves	and	game	farms	that	offer	trophy	
hunting	and	ecotourism	were	largely	unaffected	by	broader	political	and	economic	changes	as	
South	Africa	had	morphed	into	a	top	destination	for	trophy	hunting	and	ecotourism	after	the	
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end	of	apartheid.	Foreign	hunters	and	tourists	provided	ready	access	to	foreign	currency	and	
contributed	to	the	growth	of	the	economy.	
Interviews	held	with	a	bouquet	of	wildlife	professionals	(farmers,	game	capturers,	wildlife	
veterinarians,	taxidermists,	anti-poaching	personnel)	revealed	a	contradictory	and	paradoxical	
relationship	with	state	actors	after	the	end	of	apartheid.	On	the	one	hand,	the	support	of	the	
state	was	needed	to	maintain	land	and	rhino	(and	broader	wildlife)	ownership	privileges;	on	
the	other,	the	changing	of	the	guard	signalled	that	it	was	not	going	to	be	‘business	as	usual’	
and	that	political	transformation	might	lead	to	the	loss	of	at	least	some	privileges.	
Interestingly,	game	and	hence	rhino	farming	offered	an	escape	clause	from	possible	land	
claims359	and	tricky	labour	relations	(see	also	the	section	on	privatization	in	Chapter	4).	
Moreover,	since	rhinos	had	been	declared	a	private	property,	they	could	be	translocated	to	
other	game	reserves	or	farms	that	were	not	subject	to	land	claims	or	complicated	labour	
relations.		In	some	instances,	wildlife	professionals	legitimize	‘off	the	book	transactions’	and	
the	circumvention	of	regulations	as	a	form	of	resistance	to	the	new	political	dispensation.	
Resistance	to	the	new	regime	is	linked	in	part	to	perceptions	of	incompetence	and	corruption	
of	the	new	elite,	“unfair”	labour	laws	and	regulations	(farm	workers	enjoyed	no	labour	
protection	during	apartheid),	the	threat	of	land	claims	and	the	increasing	incidence	of	farm	
attacks.	One	rhino	owner	said	(Interview	with	rogue	rhino	owner	6,	2013):		
“I	want	to	ask	you	another	question.	The	Minister	of	Health	of	any	country	–	who	must	
that	be?		You	think	it	can	be	a	farmer	or	do	you	think	it	must	be	a	doctor?	A	stupid	
farmer	like	me	knows	that	the	Minister	of	Health	must	be	a	doctor	for	he’s	got	all	the	
knowledge.	How	can	somebody	that	doesn’t	even	own	a	bloody	lizard,	can	make	laws,	
can	organise	the	environment	and	tell	us	what	to	do?”		
The	resistance	to	regulation	(portrayed	as	“over-regulation”	by	many	wildlife	professionals)	is	
also	linked	to	a	sense	of	deprivation	of	agency.	Increased	state	intervention	by	way	of	rule–
making,	strict	or	partial	implementation	and	enforcement	of	the	rules	has	accentuated	
tensions	between	the	wildlife	sector	and	the	state	in	the	post-apartheid	period.	The	apartheid	
state	had	facilitated	the	establishment	of	game	reserves	and	farms	by	providing	farmers	and	
wildlife	entrepreneurs	with	support	(e.g.	subsidies	and	property	rights).	Wildlife	owners	had	
free	reign	over	their	movable	and	immoveable	assets	with	little	regulatory	interference	or	
																																																						
359	The	South	African	government	has	opened	a	land	claims	process	for	people	and	communities	that	were	
dispossessed	their	land	after	1913	(Commission	on	Restitution	of	Land	Rights	2015).	
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disruption	to	economic	exchanges.	In	addition	to	other	existential	threats	to	the	former	status	
quo,	the	post-apartheid	state	is	associated	with	introducing	new	rules,	which	are	believed	to	
aim	at	dispossessing	and	emasculating	the	white	farmer	(Interviews,	2013).	Sentiments	of	a	
loss	of	privilege	(the	right	to	determine	what	happens	to	their	property),	deprivation	and	
entitlement	were	expressed:	“the	government	is	out	to	get	us”.	A	government	official	
(Interview	with	intelligence	officer	2,	2013)	recounts	an	encounter	at	a	meeting	of	rhino	
owners:	“You	are	making	us	all	poor.	We	no	longer	have	income	from	harvesting	the	horn.”	
While	the	majority	of	the	around	400	rhino	farmers	and	rhino	reserve	owners	appear	to	be	in	
favour	of	legalizing	the	trade	in	rhino	horn360	and	hence	conform	to	the	new	rules	(Taylor,	
Andrew	et	al.	2014,	personal	communication	with	PROA,	interviews	with	private	rhino	
farmers,	2013),	there	are	a	select	few	rhino	farmers	and	associated	wildlife	professionals	that	
continue	to	flout	regulations	and	engage	in	illegal	and	semi-legal	transactions	involving	rhino	
horn.	Those	in	favour	of	legalization	cite,	amongst	others,	the	rising	costs	of	securing	rhinos	
on	private	land	and	the	private	sector’s	“enormous	contribution	to	rhino	conservation”.	The	
cost	of	securing	rhinos	has	indeed	snowballed	and	is	likely	to	surge	further	as	criminal	actors	
canvas	new	methods	and	security	actors	conceive	of	new	countermeasures.	Buijs	(2002:	37;	
1996)	had	pointed		to	the	lack	of	security	measures	to	safeguard	many	private	rhino	owners’	
“good	investment”	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	before	poaching	had	become	an	issue	of	concern.	
By	the	end	of	2014,	private	rhino	owners	were	spending	around	272	million	South	African	
Rand	(20	million	Euros)	per	annum	on	rhino	security	in	addition	to	the	current	government	
expenditure	in	excess	of	1	billion	South	African	Rand	(75	million	Euros)(Jones	2014).	Rhino	
owners	are	now	calling	on	the	government	to	assist	with	the	protection	of	rhinos	on	private	
land.	Smaller	game	farms	and	reserves	that	do	not	attract	sufficient	international	trophy	
hunters	or	tourists	struggle	to	meet	the	rising	security	costs.	The	legalization	narrative	further	
suggests	that	rhino	farmers	should	be	rewarded	by	allowing	them	to	reap	financial	rewards	
for	their	efforts	through	the	re-opening	of	the	trade	of	rhino	horn.		
In	conclusion,	contested	illegality	in	these	flows	of	the	rhino	horn	supply	chain,	on	the	one	
hand,	relates	to	dissatisfaction	with	the	international	regulatory	regime	and	national	
regulations	in	South	Africa;	and	on	the	other,	there	is	contempt	and	lack	of	respect	for	the	
																																																						
360	I	interviewed	a	few	rhino	owners	who	oppose	trade	proposals.		
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rule-makers	and	enforcers	operating	both	at	the	international	and	national	level.	The	
perceived	illegitimacy	of	the	rules	and	rule-makers	functions	as	a	legitimizing	mechanism	that	
permits	(provides	agency	for)	actors	to	break	or	bend	the	rules.	A	subset	of	this	legitimizing	
mechanism	relates	to	the	normative	aspects	of	the	rules.	To	the	rogue	wildlife	professional	
(used	as	an	umbrella	term	here),	the	contestation	of	the	ban	also	relates	to	the	valuation	of	
rhino	horn	as	a	highly	profitable	commodity.	The	intrinsic	value	of	the	rhino	as	a	wild	animal	
worthy	of	protection	for	the	common	good	is	secondary	in	this	instance.	In	borrowing	from	
the	conservation	discourse	that	portrays	private	ownership	of	rhinos	as	a	conservation	
strategy,	the	rogue	wildlife	professional	legitimizes	his	or	her	illegal	economic	activities	in	
terms	of	contributing	to	conservation.	What	happens	behind	his	or	her	game	fence	should	
escape	from	the	state’s	scrutiny	and	interference,	which	is	contingent	upon	the	community	of	
private	rhino	owners	(those	that	follow	and	those	who	flout	the	rules)	keep	on	growing	the	
number	of	rhinos	conserved	on	private	land.	
	
	
6.5	Conclusion	
	
A	key	feature	of	these	gray	flows	is	the	exploitation	of	legal	and	regulatory	loopholes	as	actors	
ride	on	the	edge	of	legality.	South	African	wildlife	professionals	and	rhino	breeders	who	form	
part	of	the	country’s	white	economic	elite	are	the	principal	actors.	Regulatory	breaches	and	
the	exploitation	of	legal	and	regulatory	loopholes,	including	illegal	hunting	and	dehorning	of	
rhinos,	as	well	as	the	stockpiling	and	laundering	of	illegally	harvested	rhino	horn	into	legal	
trade	flows	constitute	modes	of	‘production’.		What	renders	these	flows	particularly	efficient	
and	safe	is	the	early	stage	conversion	of	an	essentially	illegal	good	to	legal	status	(the	
laundering	of	illegally	harvested	horn	into	legal	trade	flows),	and	contrariwise,	the	conversion	
of	a	legal	product	(the	hunting	trophy)	into	an	illegally	traded	good	in	consumer	markets.	The	
early	conversion	curtails	opportunity	costs	and	risks	further	down	the	supply	chain.	From	an	
illegal	market	actor’s	perspective,	this	mode	of	obtaining	horn	is	not	only	the	safest	and	
modest	expedient	method	but	it	also	minimizes	the	number	of	intermediaries	required	from	
the	point	of	origin	to	the	consumer	market.	This	brings	down	operational	costs	and	increases	
the	profit	like	in	other	legal	and	illegal	businesses.	It	also	allows	a	largely	unhindered	passage	
of	the	horn	through	the	minimal	exposure	to	social	control	actors	(national	and	international	
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law	enforcement	agents)	and	measures	aimed	at	disrupting	the	market.	Moreover,	the	horn	
stays	in	its	original	state,	meaning	it	is	not	processed	into	smaller	pieces	or	powder	form	
before	reaching	the	consumer	market.	This	is	significant	when	it	comes	to	quality	control,	
valuation	and	pricing	of	the	horn	on	the	consumer	market	(see	Chapter	8).		
	
The	significant	role	of	wildlife	industry	players	in	rhino	extinction	(as	opposed	to	rhino	
conservation)	is	noteworthy.	While	public	attention	has	been	drawn	to	rhino	poaching	in	
public	parks,	rogue	elements	within	the	wildlife	industry	were	the	catalyst	for	poaching	to	
increase	in	national	and	provincial	parks	(discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	7).	It	is	
important	to	note	that	gray	flows	are	not	separate	and	disconnected	from	other	legal	and	
illegal	flows	(see	also	Chapter	7).	The	same	actors	and/or	their	social	networks	have	a	vested	
interest	in	or	influence	on	other	flows.	
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Chapter	7:	Poaching	rhinos:	Illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn		
	
“I’m	shooting	for	the	money”	(Poacher,	Cubo	village,	2013)	
	
“You	know	I	wasn't	born	to	hunt	a	rhino.	In	the	village,	we	hunt	the	small	animals.	You	
know	the	guys	in	the	villages;	they	don't	hunt	the	big	animals.	They	want	fresh	meat.	
They	only	hunt	for	the	day.	Normally,	they	keep	big	animals	safe.	There	is	no	fridge.	
And	the	land	used	to	be	free	long	ago,	now	the	land	is	not	free.	I	can’t	just	go	
anywhere;	otherwise	the	guy	will	start	fighting	with	me.	And	he	will	say	this	is	my	land	
and	we	will	start	fighting.	Government	can	stop	this	thing;	they	just	must	give	people	
jobs.	Crime	is	everywhere	and	the	police	is	shooting	us	all.”	(Poacher	16,	SA	
correctional	centre,	2013)	
	
	
7.1	Introduction	
	
This	chapter	draws	on	insights	from	Chapter	4,	which	dealt	with	the	history	of	conservation	
and	associated	protection	paradigms.	The	earlier	chapter	served	the	purpose	of	
demonstrating	how	the	social	architecture	and	engineering	of	the	colonial	and	apartheid	
dispensations	led	to	the	loss	of	land	ownership	and	ancestral	burial	grounds,	as	well	as	
property	and	hunting	rights	of	the	indigenous	and	local	peoples	of	South	Africa	and	
neighbouring	countries.	The	Kruger	National	Park	(KNP),	South	Africa’s	flagship	national	park,	
other	public	parks	like	Hlhuluwe-Imfolozi	and	Mkuze	in	the	province	of	KwaZulu-Natal,	and	
privately-owned	reserves	and	farms	across	the	country	have	become	the	setting	of	what	is	
often	described	as	“a	war	to	save	the	world’s	last	rhinos”	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014).	Of	the	
approximately	21	000	remaining	rhinos361	in	South	Africa	–	19	300	are	white	rhinos	and	
approximately	1	700	animals	belong	to	the	black	species	(Milliken	2014:	15).	Between	8	394	
to	9	594	white	and	343	to	487	black	rhinos	remain	in	the	KNP	(Ferreira	et	al.	2014:	1).362	
	
Rhino	numbers	have	become	a	contested	issue,	tying	into	public	policy	debates,	and	
conservation	and	fundraising	agendas	of	various	conservation	NGOs	and	private	operators.	
																																																						
361	Milliken	collated	rhino	numbers	from	IUCN/SSC	AfRSG	data	that	was	last	updated	on	13	October	2013.	In	
2015,	conservators	(personal	communication,	2015)	estimated	that	the	total	number	of	rhinos	had	dropped	to	
19	700	animals	of	both	species	in	South	Africa.	
	
362	The	figures	relate	to	a	population	survey	undertaken	in	2013.	Surveyors	used	helicopters	to	count	rhinos	in	
878	randomly	selected	blocks	of	three	square	kilometres	in	size	(Ferreira	et	al.	2014:	1).	A	follow-up	survey	was	
undertaken	in	2014.	The	2015	survey	determined	that	the	KNP	is	home	to	8,400	to	9,300	white	rhinos,	according	
to	numbers	released	by	the	South	African	Minister	of	Environmental	Affairs	Edna	Molewa	at	the	end	of	January	
2016.	The	Minister	did	not	provide	numbers	for	black	rhino	populations	housed	in	the	KNP	(Molewa	2016).	
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The	fact	that	the	KNP	is	home	to	the	greatest	number	of	rhinos	in	South	Africa	remains	
uncontested.	Roughly	the	same	size	as	Wales	or	Israel,	the	KNP	stretches	across	an	area	of	
close	to	20	000	square	kilometres.	The	Park	extends	350	kilometres	from	north	to	south	and	
about	60	kilometres	from	east	to	west	(Kruger	National	Park	2015).	It	shares	its	northern	
borders	with	Zimbabwe,	and	Mozambique	extends	along	its	eastern	boundary.	Since	2001,	
the	KNP	forms	part	of	the	Great	Limpopo	Transfrontier	Park	(GLTP),	which	joins	Kruger	with	
Gonarezhou	National	Park	in	Zimbabwe	and	the	Limpopo	National	Park	in	Mozambique	
(Kruger	National	Park	2015).	Flanking	the	western	boundary	of	the	Kruger	Park	and	covering	
close	to	2	000	square	kilometres	are	private	game	reserves	(known	under	the	umbrella	term	
of	Associated	Private	Nature	Reserves	(APNR),	compare	with	Chapter	4).363	Another	layer	of	
private	game	reserves,	a	so-called	‘buffer	zone’	is	located	along	the	eastern	boundary	of	the	
KNP	and	south	of	the	Limpopo	National	Park	(hereafter	LNP)	in	Mozambique	(discussed	in	the	
case	study	on	the	LNP	in	Chapter	4).	South	African	corporates,	private	individuals	and	
shareholding	companies	lease	these	concessions	from	the	Mozambican	government.364		
	
The	creation	of	the	LNP	is	contextualized	as	a	post-colonial	conservation	initiative	that	
perpetuates	the	social,	economic	and	political	alienation	and	marginalization	of	rural	
communities	living	in	and	the	near	the	park.	As	a	consequence,	the	perception	has	emerged	
that	wild	animals,	and	the	rhino,	in	particular,	are	valued	higher	than	local	people.	Moreover,	
the	changed	conservation	status	of	the	LNP	(from	multi-use	to	total	protection)	has	led	to	the	
further	economic	marginalization	of	village	communities	living	inside	or	on	the	edge	of	the	
Park.	Without	any	economically	viable	alternative	available	to	them,	this	constellation	
provides	an	ever-growing	pool	of	villagers	willing	to	risk	their	lives	to	hunt	rhinos	on	the	other	
side	of	the	international	boundary	separating	South	Africa	from	Mozambique.	While	the	
																																																						
363	Groups	of	freehold	landowners,	corporate	and	individual	concession–holders	own	these	reserves	with	
traversing	rights.	Animals	are	able	to	follow	natural	migratory	routes	to	a	limited	extent	as	fences	between	the	
private	reserves	and	Kruger	have	been	taken	down	(Frommer	2015).	
	
364	All	land	in	Mozambique	belongs	to	the	state	and	thus	cannot	be	owned	or	sold.	However,	the	“right	of	use”	of	
the	land	called	the	“direito	de	uso	e	approveitamento	da	terra”	(DUAT)	title	can	be	acquired	for	50	years	and	is	
renewable	for	another	50.	The	infrastructure	and	buildings	hence	can	be	owned	and	resold.	Most	foreign	
investors	seek	local	partnerships	or	register	a	local	company	in	Mozambique	(Wester	2015).	The	game	reserves	
located	along	the	KNP/Mozambican	border	are	predominantly	owned	by	South	African	corporates	or	
shareholdings	in	partnership	with	Mozambican	citizens.	These	politically	connected	generals	and	politicians	
assert	their	influence	in	Maputo	should	conflict	arise	between	the	concession-holders	and	local	communities	
(Interviews,	2013).	
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dominant	conservation	narrative	focuses	on	Western	conservation	ideals,	which	assume	a	
tension	between	wild	animals	and	local	communities,	the	earlier	chapter	had	called	for	a	
nuanced	reflection	on	how	the	framing	of	conservation	might	carry	its	own	seeds	of	
destruction.	The	narrative	of	‘human/wildlife	conflict’	has	created	an	environment	that	is	
conducive	to	the	rise	of	self-styled	Robin	Hood-type	social	bandits	whose	illegal	economic	
activities	are	both	socially	sanctioned	and	embedded	within	village	communities.	The	KNP	as	
the	epicentre	of	the	“poaching	crisis”,	and	the	LNP	and	Mozambican	villages	immediately	
adjacent	to	the	KNP,	which	are	the	“springboard”	for	the	majority	of	illegal	hunting	parties	
into	the	Park,	served	as	the	main	research	sites	for	this	chapter.	It	is	against	this	background	
that	the	following	chapter	analyses	the	role	of	key	actors,	their	role	and	function	in	the	overall	
market	structure.	It	will	be	argued	that	rhino	poaching	is	not	only	a	crime	driven	by	greed	and	
impoverishment	but	also	motivated	by	environmental	and	social	justice	principles.	The	
facilitation	role	of	kingpins	and	smuggling	intermediaries	enables	the	continuity	of	this	
particular	illegal	flow	of	horn.	The	chapter	also	draws	on	data	collected	at	other	public	parks	
and	reserves,	as	well	as	private	game	reserves	and	farms	for	comparative	and	illustrative	
purposes.	
	
7.2	Diffusion,	expansion	and	adaptation	of	flows	from	2008	onwards	
	
The	following	section	deals	with	the	emerging	supply	structures	and	flows	of	rhino	horn	from	
the	late	2000s	onwards.	The	previous	chapter	provided	insight	into	flows	of	rhino	horn	
located	at	the	interface	of	legality	and	illegality.	Bundled	together	with	the	illegal	poaching	of	
rhinos	in	range	states	north	of	South	Africa,	these	sub-legal	flows	constituted	the	principal	
supply	arteries	of	horn	to	northern	and	Asian	markets	prior	to	the	late	2000s.	While	gray	
channelling	continues,	current	horn	supplies	derive	predominantly	from	the	illegal	hunting	
and	dehorning	of	rhinos	in	national	parks	and	private	game	reserves	in	South	Africa.	The	
transformation	from	gray	channelling	to	illegal	hunting	occurred	in	2008	when	poaching	
statistics	spiked	from	13	rhino	deaths	in	2007	to	83	in	2008	(see	Table	1).	The	surge	in	
poaching	in	South	Africa	came	later	than	Zimbabwe	where	the	first	signs	of	the	current	
poaching	crisis	appeared	in	2003	when	44	rhino	were	poached.	That	coincided	with	the	land	
reform	programme	and	may	have	also	contributed	to	the	spillover	into	South	Africa	later.	
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The	spike	appears	to	have	coincided	with	the	promulgation	of	the	TOPS	regulations	in	the	
same	year.	Wildlife	professionals	hence	correlate	the	spike	in	illegal	hunting	with	the	TOPS	
regulations	and	the	subsequent	moratorium	on	the	domestic	trade	in	rhino	horn	(which	
became	effective	in	2009,	see	Chapter	6)	and	suggest	that	“organized	crime”	entered	the	fray	
once	‘legal’	actors	were	prevented	from	trading	in	rhino	horn.	As	demonstrated	in	the	
previous	chapter,	these	so-called	legal	wildlife	actors	bear	all	the	hallmarks	of	organized	crime	
agents	and	certainly	meet	the	definitional	criteria	set	out	in	the	Palermo	Convention	
(discussed	in	Chapter	1).	As	a	matter	of	empirical	evidence,	‘organized	crime’	(in	the	form	of	
wildlife	professionals,	military	and	political	elites)	has	been	part	and	parcel	of	the	illegal	and	
gray	supply	chains	of	rhino	horn	since	the	bush	wars	of	the	1980s.		
	
The	suggested	correlation	tallies	with	the	notion	of	what	law	enforcers	and	criminologists	call	
the		“balloon	effect”.	The	term	refers	to	the	geographic	displacement	of	criminal	markets	as	a	
reaction	to	policy	or	law	enforcement	interventions	(Windle/Farrell	2012:	868).	According	to	
the	metaphor	employed	here,	once	the	state	squeezes	one	end	of	a	latex	balloon,	it	will	bulge	
elsewhere	(Transform	Drug	Policy	Foundation	2011:	4).	In	fact,	South	African	police	
investigators	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	5,	2013)	employ	the	metaphor	of	the	balloon	
effect:	
“We	all	know	about	the	Vietnamese	connection,	people	using	diplomatic	vehicles…	
The	smuggling	routes	changed	when	we	put	pressure	on	the	airports.	It	is	exactly	the	
same	as	the	balloon	effect.	If	you	squeeze	one	side,	the	balloon	is	just	going	to	pop	
somewhere	else.	Kruger	started	squeezing	their	poachers,	and	then	they	pop	up	by	me	
or	in	Limpopo	and	elsewhere.	The	moment	we	start	squeezing,	they	move	back.	When	
you	put	pressure,	they	will	look	for	easier	targets.	Mozambique	is	an	easier	target.	
Namibia	is	an	open	question.”		
	
The	notion	of	a	balloon	effect	feeds	into	a	number	of	paradigms	and	narratives	including	
critiques	of	drug	prohibition,	notions	of	how	‘organized	crime’	is	structured,	and	how	it	
operates.	Proponents	of	drug	legalization	point	to	the	geographic	displacement	of	cannabis	or	
coca	plantations	in	South	America	when	analysing	the	lack	of	success	in	curbing	drug	supplies	
in	the	infamous	“War	on	Drugs”	(The	Economist	2014).	Instead	of	curbing	a	criminal	activity	
and	illegal	markets,	law	enforcement	moves	criminal	actors	and	illegal	markets	elsewhere	
(Transform	Drug	Policy	Foundation	2011:	4).	The	literature	on	organized	crime	points	to	the	
adaptability,	planning	and	foresight	of	organized	crime	actors.	The	law	enforcement	adage	of	
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“organized	crime	is	always	a	step	ahead	of	the	police”	refers	to	a	proverbial	game	of	‘cat	and	
mouse’	in	which	the	cat	(law	enforcement)	is	relegated	to	a	catch-22	situation	and	is	
ultimately	destined	to	fail.	Thus,	the	suggested	causal	relationship	of	the	state’s	intervention	
versus	a	non-state	actor’s	pre-emptive	evasion	of	such	interventions	suggests	the	
hypothetical	invincibility	and	superiority	of	the	non-state	actor	–	in	this	case,	the	non–state	
actor	referred	to	is	organized	crime.	Organized	crime	moves	on	to	“weaker	jurisdictions”	even	
before	the	balloon	is	effectively	squeezed	(Transform	Drug	Policy	Foundation	2011:	869).		
According	to	this	paradigm	and	associated	policy	narratives,365	there	is	little	hope	for	the	
effective	disruption	and	dismantling	of	illegal	drug	markets,	and	hence,	legalization	or	
decriminalization	is	offered	as	an	appropriate	policy	framework.	Criminologists	have	offered	
nuanced	views	on	the	balloon	effect	demonstrating	both	negative	and	positive	impacts	(see	
for	example:	Windle/Farrell	2012).	Moreover,	a	growing	body	of	scholarly	literature	
(Nadelmann	1990;	MacCoun	1996;	Raymond/Raymond	2004)	points	to	the	merits	and	
weaknesses	of	prohibition–based	systems.		
	
With	regards	to	the	current	inquiry,	a	shortcoming	relates	to	the	deterministic	and	
paradoxical	assumptions	underpinning	the	paradigm.	To	suggest	that	the	threat	of	state	
intervention	and	the	execution	thereof	leads	to	defection	or	displacement	of	organized	crime	
equates	to	the	denial	of	other	permissive	factors	–	environmental,	structural	and	actor–driven	
–	leading	to	the	same	or	a	similar	outcome.	It	is	hence	imperative	to	inquire	why	criminal	
actors	choose	to	move	operations	or	are	swayed	upon	the	proverbial	“squeezing	of	the	
balloon”.		The	first	line	of	inquiry	relates	to	whether	the	same	actors	are	involved	or	whether	
a	different	set	of	actors	seizes	a	form	of	comparative	advantage	by	operating	from	a	different	
location.	If	it	were	the	same	actors:	Are	they	pushed	or	pulled?	Does	the	move	constitute	a	
‘cause	and	effect’	scenario	or	is	it	a	choice	they	make?	A	further	line	of	inquiry	relates	to	why	
this	move	was	not	made	earlier	–	especially	in	reference	to	the	suggestion	that	criminal	actors	
only	move	to	“weaker	jurisdictions”	once	they	start	to	feel	the	heat	(Windle/Farrell	2012:	
																																																						
365	There	are	empirical	studies	that	dispute	the	invincibility	of	organized	crime	and	demonstrate	that	spatial,	
temporal	or	tactical	displacement	can	lead	to	positive	outcomes	including	deterrent	and	cascading	effects	
(Windle/Farrell	2012:	871).	Moreover,	a	multi-pronged,	transnational	and	multi-sectorial	approach,	which	
incorporates	cooperation	with	those	negatively	and	positively	affected	by	organized	crime,	has	been	shown	to	
disrupt	illegal	markets	(Interview	with	wildlife	crime	investigator,	2015).		
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869).	Moreover,	can	the	displacement	be	pinpointed	to	a	specific	point	in	time,	was	it	
staggered	over	a	period	of	time,	or	did	it	lead	to	a	process	of	transformation?	
	
The	previous	chapter	examined	why	the	domestic	and	international	trade	bans	lack	social	
legitimacy	amongst	rhino	farmers	and	wildlife	professionals.	The	legitimation	device	of	
“contested	illegality”	has	been	discussed	throughout	the	dissertation.	Calls	for	trade	
legalization	commenced	shortly	after	the	inception	of	the	CITES	ban	on	the	international	trade	
in	rhino	horn.	Curiously	up	until	2009,	legal	domestic	trade	was	permissible	in	South	Africa.	
The	rather	liberal	interpretation	of	what	constituted	‘legal’	economic	actions	such	as	the	
exploitation	of	legal	loopholes	and	under-	or	no	reporting	of	stockpiles,	were	also	highlighted	
in	the	earlier	chapter.	The	domestic	moratorium	has	led	to	a	crescendo	of	protest	against	
both	the	international	and	domestic	ban,	occasioning	the	South	African	government’s	current	
investigation	whether	to	consider	a	proposal	of	limited	trade	at	the	CITES	CoP17	in	2016.	
Proponents	of	trade	legalization	argue	that	once	farmers	were	banned	from	‘legally’	trading	in	
rhino	horn,	the	trade	moved	underground,	effectively	aiding	and	abetting	illegal	hunters	
rather	than	“rhino	breeders	and	conservators”	(Interviews,	2013).366	This	view	ignores	a	
number	of	other	factors	that	influenced	diffusion	and	diversification	of	horn	supplies	and	
trafficking	routes.	While	the	strengthening	of	regulations	led	to	the	defection	of	some	rogue	
rhino	owners	and	wildlife	professionals,367	organized	illegal	hunting	did	not	emerge	out	of	a	
vacuum	left	by	the	defectors.	Rogue	elements	within	the	wildlife	industry	were	the	direct	and	
indirect	catalysts	(‘fire	makers’)	for	a	few	early	poaching	groups	to	emerge	in	Mozambique	
and	South	Africa.	In	some	instances,	poaching	groups	emulated	illegal	practices	of	the	wildlife	
and	conservation	industry	(e.g.	farm	labourers	and	rangers	who	left	their	former	employers	
picked	up	on	the	tricks	of	the	trade,	and	forged	their	own	business	connections	to	Asian	
markets).	Or,	rogue	wildlife	professionals	recruited	poachers	by	providing	tools	to	hunt	
																																																						
366	The	South	African	government	has	set	up	a	Committee	of	Enquiry	to	look	into	the	viability	of	a	legal	trade	in	
rhino	horn.	Public	hearings	were	held	at	the	end	of	March	2015.	A	motley	crew	of	rhino	farmers,	conservators	
and	activists	reflected	on	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	a	regulated	trade	in	rhino	horn.	Their	presentations	
can	be	found	at	
https://www.environment.gov.za/event/deptactivity/committeeofinquiry_rhinopoaching_workshop#workshopa
genda	(accessed	26	March	2015).	
	
367	Once	the	state	had	spelled	out	that	it	was	illegal	to	trade	in	rhino	horn	or	allow	suspicious	hunting	parties	
onto	one’s	property,	law	abiding	actors	were	no	longer	willing	to	cooperate	with	horn	intermediaries.		
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(hunting	rifles)	and	connections	to	horn	buyers	(explained	in	more	detail	below).	The	causal	
inference	of	“over-regulation”	or	“trade	bans”	leading	to	an	escalation	of	poaching	thus	needs	
to	be	critically	interrogated	as	it	disregards	a	number	of	parallel	processes.	
		
Firstly,	the	idea	that	poachers	filled	a	void	suggests	naively	that	there	were	either	no	other	
illegal	market	participants	prior	to	the	regulations,	or	that	rogue	elements	within	the	wildlife	
sector	accepted	state	intervention	and	ceased	all	illegal	or	semi–legal	activities.	In	essence,	
the	notion	of	“filling	the	void”	or	the	“trade	moved	underground”	suggests	market	failure	and	
termination	of	gray	flows;	in	other	words,	the	state	managed	to	successfully	disrupt	the	
market	and	former	market	participants	were	either	“neutralized”	(arrested)	or	ceased	all	
illegal	or	sub-legal	activities.	Moreover,	there	is	also	an	assumption	that	all	rhino	suppliers	
were	competing	in	an	open	transparent	and	legal	market,	only	selling	horn	to	South	Africans.	
This	view	discounts	that	illegal	hunting,	stockpiling	and	horn	laundering	was	taking	place	
despite	domestic	trade	being	permitted.	As	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	illegal	
hunting,	dehorning,	stockpiling	and	horn	laundering	(which	was	illegal	before)	continues	in	
the	private	sector	regardless	of	the	regulations	and	the	moratorium.	However,	an	organized	
crime	investigator	concedes	the	following	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	14,	2013):	
	
“Well,	they	will	rather	do	the	business	in	Mozambique	because	there	is	no	legislation.	
It	is	better	to	be	corrupt	there,	it's	better	to	export	there.	And	coming	back	to	the	
rhino	horn	stocks	of	the	private	rhino	owners,	some	of	whom	are	facing	criminal	
charges	now.	They	are	a	bit	reluctant	to	participate	because	they	don't	know	if	these	
guys	are	going	to	say	we	know	these	guys,	we've	traded	with	them.	It’s	like	opening	a	
can	of	worms.”	
	
Secondly,	there	is	an	implicit	assumption	that	a	few	wildlife	professionals,	rhino	farmers	and	
Asian	wildlife	traffickers	held	monopoly	control	over	rhino	horn	supplies	out	of	South	Africa,	
benefitting	all	those	willing	to	do	business	with	them.	Was	there	a	quasi-vertical	integration	of	
legal,	semi-legal	and	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn?	Hypothetically	speaking,	if	a	hierarchical	
structure	were	in	place	with	a	handful	of	actors	pulling	the	strings	in	a	highly	concentrated	
market,	then	law	enforcement	could	have	easily	disrupted	illegal	trafficking	of	rhino	horn	and	
dismantled	the	market	by	now.368	If	only	a	few	actors	were	to	control	the	market,	they	would	
																																																						
368	This	discounts	the	possibility	of	cooperative	alliances	between	law	enforcement	and	illegal	market	actors.	
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have	to	enforce	market	control	by	way	of	asserting	coercive	powers,	or	there	would	have	to	
be	insuperable	barriers	to	entry,	which	exclude	potential	competitors	either	structurally	or	
economically	(Steinberg	2005a:	9).369	Following	this	logic	and	considering	the	high	profits	
associated	with	rhino	horn,	new	market	entrants	would	have	to	compete	for	a	piece	of	the	
“rhino	horn	pie”.	No	evidence	could	be	found	suggesting	‘turf	wars’	between	the	Afrikaner	
cliques	of	rhino	criminals	(the	so-called	“boere	mafia”),	the	‘new	breed’	of	poaching	
syndicates	active	in	national	parks	and	game	reserves,	and	rhino	horn	thieves.	In	fact,	as	will	
be	shown	in	this	chapter,	there	were	high	levels	of	cooperation.	
	
Instead	of	market	capture	of	the	one	group	of	actors	and	market	exit	of	the	other,	
cooperative	alliances	were	formed	(the	section	on	the	role	of	kingpins	will	discuss	the	
pathways	to	cooperation	in	more	detail);	and	while	some	alliances	weathered	the	test	of	time	
and	possible	conflict	due	to	heterogeneous	social	structures	and	weak	links,	others	dissipated.	
In	addition	to	the	entry	of	Mozambican	criminal	entrepreneurs	and	their	hunting	crews,	other	
African	hunting	teams	crossed	into	South	Africa,	and	criminal	actors	active	in	other	illicit	
markets	diversified	their	bouquet	of	criminal	activities	to	include	rhino	poaching.	South	Africa	
offered	opportunity	structures	to	foreign	hunting	crews,	and	more	so	as	rhino	numbers	were	
being	depleted	in	their	countries	of	origin.	A	poacher	from	Zimbabwe	explains	(Interview,	
2013):	
	
“It	was	not	mentioned	to	me,	it	was	a	rumour.	There	were	some	people	that	knew	this	
item.	We	used	to	kill	them	but	we	did	not	know	where	to	sell	them.	People	used	to	get	
them	from	us	for	next	to	nothing,	for	a	few	dollars	–	you	know.	That	was	in	2007.	Then	
we	continued,	we	used	to	bargain	with	those	buyers	and	they	used	to	hike	the	price	
bit	by	bit	in	order	to	lure	us	into	this.	The	buyers	were	Chinese	–	of	course.	No	English,	
no	German,	no	any	other	nation.	Vietnamese,	we	have	just	heard	about	them	but	we	
have	not	sold	any	to	them.	Most	of	them	are	these	Chinese	guys	in	Johannesburg	that	
order	horn	in	Chinatown,	in	Joburg	there.	We	were	in	Beitbridge370	then.	I	used	to	
																																																						
369	In	his	analysis	of	illicit	abalone	market,	Steinberg	(2005a:	9)	suggests	that	illicit	market	monopoly	is	asserted	
by	way	of	coercive	power	or	through	economies	of	scale.	In	the	latter	case,	entry	to	the	market	is	limited	due	to	
the	high	costs	associated	with	the	market	entry.	Market	pioneers	are	hence	likely	to	dominate	the	market	for	a	
long	time.		
	
370	Beitbridge	is	a	border	post	between	Zimbabwe	and	South	Africa.	There	are	two	small	towns	both	named	
Beitbridge	on	both	sides	of	the	border.	Like	other	border	towns	in	the	region,	there	is	a	lot	of	‘wheeling	and	
dealing’	happening	in	the	two	towns.	While	the	political	border	between	Zimbabwean	and	South	Africa	is	
regarded	as	porous;	traffickers	and	smugglers	prefer	passage	through	the	official	border	post	to	minimize	
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work	in	Zim371	then.	I	poached	there.	The	security	became	tight	and	tighter.	People	
were	killed;	more	people	were	killed	in	game	parks.	In	South	Africa,	the	situation	was	
quite	lax.	The	security	is	not	good,	the	game	parks	are	quite	small	–	they	are	like	zoos,	
they	are	not	like	our	areas	in	Zim.	They	are	just	very	small.	You	can	even	hunt	in	the	
darkness	of	the	night	and	get	that	thing.	So	we	decided	to	move	that	side.	Here	in	Zim	
the	numbers	of	rhinos	are	low,	not	like	in	South	Africa.	Here	they	are	many	in	
Mokopane,	Lephalale,	Thabazimbi372	–	but	in	Zim,	they	are	selected	and	only	in	some	
areas.	The	game	parks	are	not	private	like	here,	where	they	are	owned	by	
individuals…[…].373	Security	is	now	very	tight	although	we	can	get	in,	even	though	
security	is	very	tight.	We	found	it	is	not	as	easy	as	here	in	South	Africa.	No,	here	it	is	so	
easy.	Getting	in	and	all…	You	can	any	time	get	into	this	small	area	and	find	the	tracks.	
It	is	easy	to	track	and	then	you	find	them.”	
	
The	informant	makes	reference	to	the	dwindling	rhino	numbers	in	Zimbabwe.	According	to	
the	African	Rhino	Specialist	Rhino	Group’s	(AfSRG)	latest	statistics	(provided	in:	Milliken	2014:	
15),	less	than	700	white	and	black	rhinos	remained	in	Zimbabwe	as	of	October	2013.374	
Noteworthy	is	the	high	mobility	of	illegal	hunting	crews;	in	other	words,	foreign	hunting	crews	
were	willing	to	move	their	operations	across	the	border	and	the	barriers	to	entry	into	the	
South	African	supply	structures	appeared	marginal.	This	specific	informant	had	historical	
connections	to	a	Chinese	intermediary	in	Johannesburg,	which	cancelled	out	the	need	to	
identify	a	new	buyer	and	supply	chain.	Others	sought	out	alliances	with	local	criminal	groups	
(Interviews,	2013).	Instead	of	competition	(so-called	‘turf	wars’),	there	is	a	form	of	mutual	
‘criminal’	assistance	amongst	southern	African	hunting	crews.	For	example,	the	Zimbabwean	
crews	had	access	to	hunting	rifles,	which	they	either	were	willing	to	lease	out	or	they	offered	
																																																																																																																																																																											
dangers	associated	with	illegally	crossing	against	the	payment	of	a	bribe	(see	for	examples:	Hübschle	2010).	The	
informant	refers	to	the	Zimbabwean	border	town	of	Beitbridge	in	the	citation	above.	
	
371	‘Zim’	is	the	colloquial	reference	for	Zimbabwe.	
	
372	The	three	names	refer	to	small	towns	in	the	northern	province	of	Limpopo	in	South	Africa.	
	
373	Rhino	poaching	occurs	predominantly	in	the	national	parks	of	Zimbabwe.	As	a	consequence,	most	of	the	
remaining	rhinos	are	found	in	less	than	ten	privately–managed	conservancies	(Duffy/Emslie/Knight	2013a:	4).	In	
stark	contrast	to	private	ownership	of	rhinos	in	South	Africa,	rhinos	found	on	private	land	are	managed	under	a	
private	custodianship	programme	for	the	benefit	of	all	Zimbabweans	(Saxton	2007:	10).	
	
374	Zimbabwe	experienced	a	poaching	spike	in	the	mid-80s,	which	was	attributed	to	the	attrition	of	black	rhinos	
in	Zambia’s	Luangwa	Valley	in	the	1970s.	Lusaka	the	Zambian	capital	was	the	major	wildlife	trafficking	hub	at	the	
time.	By	the	1980s,	Zambian	intermediaries	directed	their	poaching	groups	to	Zimbabwe	to	supplement	the	
diminishing	horn	supplies	in	Zambia	with	poached	rhino	horn	from	its	southern	neighbour	(Milliken	et	al.	1993:	
21).	The	Zimbabwean	Department	of	National	Parks	and	Wild	Life	Management	(DNPWLM)	gained	notoriety	
during	the	so–called	“Rhino	Wars”	in	the	1980s	through	its	systematic	and	deadly	anti-poaching	effort,	which	
also	included	the	dehorning	of	rhinos	as	a	conservation	method	(Milliken	et	al.	1993:	2).		
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their	services	as	seasoned	rhino	hunters	to	the	highest	bidder	(compare	with	the	section	on	
the	role	of	kingpins	in	this	chapter).	The	composition	of	hunting	crews	is	often	
heterogeneous,375	meaning	that	men	of	different	age	groups,	ethnicities	and	nationalities	
cooperate.	Deployment	into	a	hunting	crew	depends	on	a	number	of	factors	such	as	the	
location	of	the	reserve	or	park,	prior	knowledge	of,	or	intelligence	regarding	the	contours	of	
the	park,	as	well	as	the	skills	sets	required	for	a	planned	hunt	(Interviews	with	poachers,	
2013).376	Whereas	Zimbabwean	poaching	gangs	adapted	the	composition	of	their	groups	and	
modus	operandi	in	the	past,377	the	new	generation	appears	more	security	conscious	and	
convenience–orientated.	The	subtext	of	the	cited	interview	underlines	the	motivation	clearly:	
Why	waste	one’s	time	and	potentially	one’s	life	when	South	Africa	offers	rhinos	on	a	“golden	
platter”?	Criminal	actors	active	in	violent	crimes	such	as	cash-in-transit	heists	or	armed	
robberies	also	jumped	ship	because	“rhino	poaching	is	much	easier”	(Interview	with	private	
security	actor	3,	2013).		
	
Thirdly,	buyers,	intermediaries	and	law	enforcement	officials	(Interviews,	2013)	cite	the	
increasing	price	of	‘legal’	or	‘gray’	rhino	trophy	hunts	as	a	significant	cost	consideration	
leading	to	the	escalation	of	illegal	hunting.	It	was	cheaper	and	less	complicated	to	undertake	
business	with	local	hunters	who	were	paid	comparatively	little.	When	pseudo-hunting	
commenced	in	the	early	2000s,	a	trophy	hunt	would	cost	in	the	region	of	R	150	000	to	R	200	
000	(19	370	€	to	25	770	€	–	compare	with	Graph	4).	One	Mozambican	kingpin	(Interview,	
2013)	was	paid	1	900	€/kg	when	he	started	illegally	hunting	in	the	KNP	in	2009.	The	rates	for	
South	African	illegal	hunting	teams	were	lower	than	that	of	their	Mozambican	counterparts.	
Some	hunters	were	paid	as	little	as	R	80	000	to	R	250	000	(8	300	€	to	26	000	€)	per	hunt	at	the	
time	(Interviews	with	convicted	poachers,	intermediaries	and	transporters,	2013).		By	the	
																																																						
375	Heterogeneity	of	hunting	crews	does	not	extend	to	questions	of	gender.	While	women	involved	were	
involved	in	later	stages	of	supply	chains,	no	evidence	could	be	found	of	women	participating	in	hunting	crews.	
	
376	Zimbabweans	and	Mozambican	poaching	groups	are	not	pioneers	in	traversing	international	borders	in	
pursuit	of	high-value	wildlife	contraband.	South	African	professional	big	game	hunters	operated	in	Zimbabwe	in	
the	past	(du	Toit	2013,	Interview	with	conservator,	2013);	as	recent	as	2	April	2015,	two	suspected	poachers	
were	shot	dead	in	the	private	conservancy	of	Malilangwe	in	southeastern	Zimbabwe.	One	of	the	suspects	was	a	
South	African	citizen	(Eyewitness	News	2015).		
	
377	Poaching	expeditions	into	Zimbabwean	national	parks	could	take	up	to	two	weeks	during	the	late	1980s	and	
early	1990s.	The	groups	incorporated	a	greater	number	of	members	to	assist	with	carrying	provisions	in	and	
rhino	horn	and	ivory	out	(Milliken	et	al.	1993:	26).		
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time	the	Xayasavang	network	got	involved	the	cost	of	attaining	a	set	of	‘gray’	rhino	horns	had	
more	than	doubled.	Chumlong	Lemthongthai	was	paying	6	135	€/kg	for	pseudo-hunted	rhino	
horn.		At	an	average	weight	of	5,88	kg	per	set	of	white	rhino	horn,378	a	pseudo	rhino	hunt	cost	
close	to		€	36	000	or	more.	Additional	costs	associated	with	transportation,	permits	and	taxes	
and	cooperation	premiums	(bribes	paid	to	social	control	agents)	increased	the	total	cost	of	
pseudo-hunted	rhino	horn.	
	
Pseudo-hunting	had	lost	its	appeal	by	the	time	of	Lemthongthai’s	arrest	in	2011.	While	
hunting	regulations	had	been	adjusted	to	deal	with	the	phenomenon	(albeit	not	too	
successfully	as	East	European	hunters	took	over	from	their	Asian	colleagues),	the	reasons	for	
supply	diversification	seem	to	have	been	driven	by	efficiency	and	security	considerations	
(compare	with:	Morselli/Giguère/Petit	2007),	as	well	as	opportunity	structures	linked	to	the	
geographic	location	of	the	KNP	and	its	close	proximity	to	major	traffic	hubs	(discussed	below).	
Because	the	cost	of	‘legal’	or	gray	rhino	hunts	had	escalated,	poaching	had	become	an	
attractive	alternative	that	could	deliver	higher	volumes	of	horn	at	lower	prices	and	through	
less	complex	supply	chains.	As	attractive	as	the	semblance	of	legality	may	have	been	to	
organizers,	transporters	and	consumers,	the	operational	focus	shifted	to	organized	poaching	
expeditions	into	the	Kruger	National	Park,	provincial	parks	and	private	game	reserves.	While	
the	re-focusing	from	pseudo-hunting	to	organized	poaching	did	not	constitute	market	failure	
or	disruption	per	se,	it	does	signal	the	adaptability	of	wildlife	traffickers	and	the	primacy	of	
cost	saving,	efficiency	and	security	considerations	–	“the	dollar	sign	rules”	(Interview	with	
transporter,	2013).		
	
Fourthly,	the	migration	to	organized	poaching	and	the	continued	laundering	of	stockpiled	or	
illegally	dehorned	rhino	horn	was	further	assisted	through	the	by	then	firmly	established	and	
secure	illegal	and	legal	supply	chains	out	of	South	Africa	and	neighbouring	countries	
(Interviews	with	intermediaries	and	law	enforcement	officials,	2013).	Intermediary	networks,	
																																																						
378	The	average	weight	of	the	front	horn	of	a	rhino	is	between	5	to	9	kg,	and	the	back	horn	weighs	up	to	1,5	kg	
(de	Wet	2013:	4).	Based	on	a	study	conducted	in	the	KNP	and	cross	comparisons	with	data	from	elsewhere	in	
Africa,	former	National	Parks	Board	scientists	(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens	1991:	6)	pegged	the	average	weight	
of	horns	of	white	rhinos	living	in	the	wild	at	5,88	kg	(for	both	the	anterior	and	posterior	horn)	whereas	the	
average	weight	of	black	rhino	horns	were	2,65	kg	for	animals	living	in	the	KNP	and	KZN	national	parks	(slightly	
less	than	the	East	African	species).	The	average	weight	proposed	by	Pienaar	and	his	colleagues	has	become	the	
accepted	norm,	frequently	cited	in	rhino	research	(see	for	example:	Milliken	2014).	
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trafficking	channels	and	alliances	with	state	actors	had	been	firmly	established	by	the	late	
2000s.	While	some	southern	African	traffickers	may	have	had	historical	trade	and	smuggling	
connections	through	apartheid	military	intelligence	structures	to	Asia	(Interviews,	2013,	
2014),	new	business	opportunities	and	routes	emerged	in	the	mid-	to	the	late	2000s.	
Historically,	Asian	criminal	groups	have	been	involved	in	a	number	of	cooperative	alliances	
with	local	actors	in	both	legal	and	illegal	markets.	For	example,	the	historical	bartering	trade	
of	methaqualone	and	later,	precursor	chemicals	used	in	the	production	of	crystal	
methamphetamines	(locally	known	as	‘tik’),	in	exchange	for	high-value	maritime	resources	
such	as	abalone379	had	led	to	criminal	alliances	between	local	gangs	from	the	Cape	Flats380	
and	Chinese	criminal	groups	(compare	with:	Steinberg	2005a).	Initially	interested	in	abalone,	
lion	bones	and	ivory,	Asian	criminals	branched	out	into	the	more	lucrative	rhino	horn	market	
while	Afrikaner	kingpins	started	actively	marketing	South	African	rhino	horn	to	Asian	buyers	in	
Asian	countries	(see	the	previous	chapter).	Wildlife	traffickers	‘piggy-backed’	onto	existing	
trafficking	and	intermediary	networks	and	routes,	expanding	and	entrenching	them	further.	In	
some	instances,	symbiotic	relationships	emerged	which	facilitated	cheap,	reliable	and	speedy	
transportation	of	wildlife	contraband	together	with	other	licit	or	illicit	commodities	from	
source	to	destination.	Smugglers	were	in	a	position	to	move	greater	volumes	of	horn	as	many	
more	rhinos	could	be	shot	dead	and	dehorned	than	‘pseudo’	or	‘proxy’	hunted.	There	are	also	
a	number	of	opportunity	structures	that	render	illegal	hunting	on	public	or	private	properties	
an	attractive	business	proposition.	The	KNP	is	located	a	5-hours	drive	from	OR	Tambo	
International	Airport	in	Johannesburg,	and	Maputo	can	be	reached	by	car	in	about	6	hours.	
Moreover,	Swaziland	is	in	close	proximity,	as	is	Durban	harbour,	South	Africa’s	principal	port,	
which	provides	access	to	international	maritime	routes.	Located	in	the	hinterlands	of	South	
Africa	are	smuggling	corridors	between	Swaziland	and	Mozambique.	These	corridors	were	
used	to	move	anti-apartheid	activists	and	fighters,	weapons	and	ammunition	to	South	African	
liberation	movements	during	the	anti-apartheid	struggle.	After	the	end	of	apartheid,	the	
corridors	morphed	into	trafficking	arteries,	along	which	cannabis,	guns,	cigarettes,	stolen	
motor	vehicles,	other	contraband	and	legal	commodities	(to	avoid	taxation)	were	smuggled	
																																																						
379	Abalone	is	a	maritime	snail	found	predominantly	in	the	cold	waters	along	the	West	and	Overberg	coastlines	
bordering	the	Atlantic	Ocean.	Abalone	is	highly	coveted	in	Asian	markets	for	its	aphrodisiac	qualities.	
	
380	The	Cape	Flats	refers	to	an	area	of	Cape	Town,	to	which	people	of	mixed	race	were	forcibly	moved	during	the	
apartheid	regime.		
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from	and	to	South	Africa,	and	its	neighbours.	They	also	used	to	move	wildlife	contraband	
including	rhino	horn	from	the	source	(predominantly	from	the	KNP)	to	transhipment	hubs	in	
East	Africa.		
	
Finally,	the	creation	of	the	LNP	has	led	to	the	economic	marginalization	of	village	communities	
living	inside	the	area	of	the	park	or	on	its	edge.	The	seven-year	period	from	the	proclamation	
of	the	Park	in	2001	to	the	escalation	of	rhino	poaching	in	the	KNP	in	2008	saw	village	
communities’	lives	and	fortunes	change	from	bad	to	worse.	The	resettlement	of	communities	
(see	Chapter	4),	as	well	as	those	that	chose	to	stay	behind,	has	led	to	diminished	income	
streams,	and	changed	social	relations	within	the	village	unit.	These	impoverished	
communities	provide	a	ready	pool	of	villagers	willing	to	risk	their	lives	in	pursuit	of	the	
‘golden’	horn.		
	
In	concluding	this	section,	it	is	important	to	note	that	a	number	of	parallel	processes	led	to	
the	migration	from	legal	and	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn	to	the	time	expedient,	cost	efficient,	less	
complex	and	secure	flow	of	illegally	hunted	rhino	horn	from	national	parks	and	game	
reserves.	The	following	sections	will	analyse	the	crucial	role	of	kingpins	and	intermediaries	in	
the	supply	chain.	
	
	
7.3	Kingpins,	intermediaries	and	smugglers:	The	local	stronghold	
	
Local	kingpins,381	intermediaries	and	transporters	are	the	anchor	and	driving	force	behind	this	
illegal	flow.	The	role	of	these	actors	is	central	to	the	continuity	of	horn	supply;	however,	actor	
constellations	are	complex	and	multi-layered,	and	economic	relationships	are	frequently	
dropped,	reinvented	or	discontinued.	While	organizing	and	coordinating	illegal	hunting	groups	
takes	up	a	great	part	of	the	everyday	responsibilities	of	a	rhino	kingpin,	their	functions	also	
include	quality	control,	conflict	resolution,	liaison	and	cooperation	with	local	authorities	and	
																																																						
381	The	South	African	organized	crime	unit	within	the	SAPS,	the	Hawks,	employ	the	term	“kingpin”	to	refer	to	
local	crime	bosses.	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	the	controversial	term	is	employed	in	this	dissertation.	It	is	
acknowledged	that	‘queenpins’	do	exist	and	the	term	“kingpin”	could	be	construed	as	sexist	and	gender	
insensitive.	However,	those	interviewed	(bosses,	poachers	and	investigators)	used	the	term	frequently	and	felt	
comfortable	with	the	labeling,	associated	narratives	and	meanings.	
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village	elders,	horn	transporters,	competitors	and	social	control	agents,	as	well	as	securing	
continuity	of	the	supply	chain.	The	section	draws	on	data	collected	in	the	Mozambican	
borderlands	and	South	African	prisons.		
	
	
7.3.1	The	social	economy	in	the	borderlands:	What	does	it	take	to	become	a	rhino	kingpin?	
	
While	there	have	been	a	few	cases	of	social	upward	mobility	and	rank	advancement	from	
poacher	to	kingpin,	the	majority	of	kingpins	have	prior	experience	in	cross-border	crime,382	
law	enforcement	careers	or	conservation	backgrounds,383	or	they	were	running	successful	
legitimate	businesses	such	as	taxi	or	transportation	companies	in	their	previous	lives.	Once	
rhino	poaching	emerged	as	a	lucrative	economic	opportunity,	these	actors	diversified	into	
rhino	poaching.	According	to	intelligence	reports	(Interview	with	intelligence	officers,	
Mozambique	and	KNP,	2013),	a	“group	of	fourteen”384	ran	the	first	poaching	crews	“in	the	old	
days”	of	2008.	Knowledge	of	traversing	routes	through	the	park,	location	of	waterholes	and	
big	animals,	as	well	as	bush	navigation,	military385	and	tracking	skills	rendered	them	ideal	
recruits.	White	South	Africans	involved	in	gray	and	illegal	flows	of	horn	recruited	the	Group	of	
14,	who	became	the	main	horn	suppliers	and	poaching	intermediaries	in	subsequent	years.	A	
Massingir-based	kingpin	revealed	(Interview,	2013):	
																																																						
382	A	notorious	rhino	kingpin	who	goes	by	the	pseudonym	of	Mr	Navara	was	the	organizer	of	a	cross-border	car	
theft	syndicate.	The	syndicate	was	importing	stolen	cars	from	South	Africa	to	Mozambique.	Mr	Navara’s	passion	
for	stealing	luxury	SUV	Nissan	vehicles	of	the	‘Navara’	brand	has	earned	him	his	nickname.	The	kingpin	is	wanted	
for	the	abduction	and	murder	of	a	wildlife	veterinarian	in	South	Africa’s	Limpopo	Province.	In	the	absence	of	an	
extradition	treaty	between	Mozambique	and	South	Africa,	Simon	Ernest	Valoi	(his	real	name)	remains	
untouchable	(Interviews,	2103).	Justice	Ngovene,	another	kingpin	runs	a	DVD	counterfeiting	business	and	
‘jailbreaks’	(cracks)	security	codes	of	stolen	mobile	phones	and	computer	equipment.	He	was	building	
Massingir’s	first	hotel	during	the	last	field	visit	to	Massingir	in	August	2013.	Justice	is	also	known	by	the	name	
“Nyimpini”	which	is	the	Shangaan	word	for	centre,	core	or	foundation,	or	the	handle	of	an	axe	–	illegal	hunters	
use	either	ax,	pocket	knives	or	machetes	to	remove	rhino	horns.		
	
383	Several	rangers	and	field	guides	from	the	KNP,	LNP	and	Hlhuluwe-Imfolozi	(some	of	whom	are	no	longer	in	
the	employ	of	these	parks)	are	running	their	hunting	groups	(Interviews	with	kingpin	1	and	intelligence	
operatives,	2013).	
	
384	The	origin	of	the	number	is	unclear,	perhaps	even	mythical.	Empirical	evidence	confirms	that	there	were	a	
number	of	poaching	pioneers	living	in	proximity	of	the	KNP	on	the	South	African	and	Mozambican	side.		
	
385	The	decades-long	civil	war	in	Mozambique	equipped	most	Mozambicans	over	the	age	of	40	with	basic	military	
skills,	which	were	needed	for	daily	survival.			
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“This	whole	thing	started	with	the	people	from	South	Africa.	They	came	to	
Mozambique	and	introduced	this	business	to	us	and	they	paid	us	a	lot	of	money.	They	
basically	revealed	the	secret.	Then	the	Chinese	saw	the	opportunity	then	they	started	
coming	to	us	for	business…[…]…	The	South	African	white	man	opened	our	eyes,	then	
most	of	us	saw	the	potential	of	the	business	and	then	we	started	to	do	it	on	our	own	
and	we	introduced	more	hunters.”386	
	
The	South	African	recruiters	provided	hunting	rifles,	ammunition	and	cash	for	the	horns.	Early	
transactions	also	involved	the	barter	of	hunting	rifles	for	rhino	horn	(Interview	with	kingpin,	
2013).	The	early	poacher-kingpins	fulfilled	organizational,	operational	and	logistical	functions.	
Once	illegal	hunting	crews	had	poached	and	dehorned	rhinos	in	the	KNP,	rhino	horns	were	
taken	to	Mozambique.	From	there	the	horn	would	be	taken	on	foot	through	the	Giyani	border	
post	to	Johannesburg	(back	to	South	Africa)	or	transhipment	hubs	in	Beira	and	Maputo.	The	
South	African	recruiters	had	business	and	farming	interests	in	Mozambique,	which	provided	
them	with	legitimate	reasons	to	seek	out	‘partnerships’	with	locals.	Two	individuals	have	been	
linked	to	ivory	and	rhino	horn	smuggling	during	the	border	wars	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	The	
existing	export	and	import	businesses	were	used	as	a	front	to	conduct	illegal	deals	and	export	
wildlife	contraband	to	consumer	markets.	The	group	of	white	South	Africans	is	still	operating	
out	of	Mozambique;	the	local	kingpins	are	however	dealing	with	buyers	and	transporters	
directly.	At	least	two	of	the	original	kingpins	(who	were	still	active	in	March	2016)	and	one	
intermediary	were	involved	in	cross-border	smuggling	operations	involving	stolen	motor	
vehicles.387	The	Mozambican	kingpins	and	poachers	interviewed	for	the	research	had	
traversed	the	Kruger	National	Park	on	numerous	occasions	to	search	for	employment	in	South	
Africa	and	to	visit	their	families	in	the	villages.388	
																																																						
386	Other	kingpins,	poachers	and	intelligence	operators	confirmed	the	unlikely	alliance	between	white	rhino	
criminals	and	black	criminal	entrepreneurs	(the	background	to	poaching	kingpins	is	discussed	below).	
	
387	Known	as	the	“Wild	West	of	car	dealing	and	wheeling”	in	law	enforcement	circles,	the	small	town	of	Chokwe	
is	located	about	120	km	south	from	Massingir	and	225	km	north	of	Maputo.	It	is	believed	that	the	majority	of	
South	African	stolen	motor	vehicles	transit	through	Chokwe	(Interviews	with	regional	law	enforcement	officials,	
2013).	Chokwe	was	a	local	market	where	rhino	horn	transactions	would	take	place	up	until	2012/2013.		
	
388	As	mentioned	in	earlier	chapters,	colonial	borders	were	drawn	with	little	regard	for	indigenous	African	people	
and	their	spheres	of	influence.	The	Shangaan	people,	for	example,	live	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa.	The	
political	and	economic	situation	in	Mozambique	led	to	men	seeking	employment	in	South	African	mines	and	on	
farms.	Pathways	through	the	KNP	were	often	the	most	convenient	and	easy	route	to	South	Africa	and	vice	versa	
(Interviews,	2013).	
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7.3.2	Need,	greed	and	environmental	justice	principles	
	
What	motivates	kingpins	and	their	hunting	crews	to	kill	and	dehorn	rhinos?	Law	enforcement	
and	conservation	officials	portray	communities	living	inside	or	on	the	edge	of	the	LNP	as	a	
homogeneous	group	of	people	that	consists	of	poachers,	and	villagers	who	benefit	from	rhino	
poaching	(Interviews,	2013).389	It	is	suggested	that	rural	poverty,	opportunity	structures	of	
living	close	to	the	park,	and	greed	are	feeding	the	poaching	crisis.	These	factors	constitute	
sufficient	drivers	of	poaching;	however,	the	root	causes	of	poaching	touch	on	the	history	of	
conservation,	hunting	rights	and	land	ownership	in	southern	Africa	(compare	with	earlier	
chapters,	especially	Chapter	4).	The	effects	of	structural	violence	are	visible	in	the	village	
communities	who	not	only	live	on	the	edge	of	parks	but	also	on	the	edge	of	society	when	it	
comes	to	social	and	economic	upliftment	initiatives.	The	continued	economic,	political	and	
social	marginalization	of	village	communities	(unpacked	in	Chapter	4)	has	given	rise	to	
environmental	and	social	justice	concerns.	While	the	rhino	has	a	bounty	on	its	horn	that	far	
outweighs	the	average	annual	income	of	a	rural	villager,	poaching	is	not	just	about	the	price	
of	the	horn	but	also	about	claiming	reparations	for	the	loss	of	land,	hunting	and	land	use	
rights	and	demands	for	economic	opportunities	and	agency	to	co-determine	the	future	and	
good	fortunes	of	village	communities	(Interviews,	2013).	It	is	against	this	backdrop	that	
kingpins	and	hunters	have	emerged	as	self-styled	Robin	Hoods,	who	use	rhino	poaching	for	
social	and	economic	upward	mobility.	Says	one	kingpin	based	in	a	Mozambican	village	
community	(Interview	with	kingpin	3,	2013):		
	
“We	are	using	rhino	horn	to	free	ourselves.”		
	
Mozambican	villagers,	rangers,	poachers	and	kingpins,	as	well	as	convicted	rhino	criminals	
serving	prison	sentences	in	South	African	correctional	centres	expressed	their	annoyance	with	
the	state	for	valuing	animals	over	human	lives	(Interviews	and	focus	groups	2012,	2013).	A	
horn	smuggler	(Interview	with	intermediary	1,	2013)	explained	the	rhino	issue	as	follows:		
	
																																																						
389	The	bombing	of	all	villages	within	30	km	radius	of	the	KNP	on	the	Mozambican	side	has	been	mooted	as	an	
anti-rhino	poaching	strategy	in	an	online	discussion	group.	While	this	is	an	extreme	proposal	of	a	radical	
minority,	it	shows	how	stigmatization	of	villagers	as	a	homogenous	group	of	poachers	is	increasingly	entering	
mainstream	thinking.		
	
	 309	
“This	[rhino	problem]	is	because	of	conservation.	They	say	that	we	need	those	things	
[rhinos].	They	are	nice.	Some	of	the	white	people	here	treat	them	like	their	friends.	
They	value	the	rhino	more	than	black	human	beings.	And	now	they	see	it	as	a	
business,	if	you	have	two	rhinos	you	are	rich.”		
	
The	rhino	has	become	the	lucrative	scapegoat	for	the	on	going	relative	deprivation	and	
economic	marginalization	of	village	communities.	Unlike	the	slow	trickledown	linked	to	
community	beneficiation	initiatives	of	the	state	and	private	operators	in	and	around	
conservation	areas,	community	members	observe	the	upward	social	mobility	of	kingpins,	
poachers	and	their	families.	The	influx	of	hard	cash	into	village	communities	has	created	the	
perception	that	all	villagers	benefit	equally	from	rhino	poaching,	the	so-called	‘Robin	Hood	
effect’	(Interviews	with	KNP	officials,	2013).	The	social	banditry	associated	with	Robin	Hood	
captures	an	important	aspect	of	kingpins’	and	poachers’	asserted	identities	in	the	context	of	
village	communities.	The	role,	functions	and	identities	of	kingpins	and	poachers	are	however	
far	more	complex,	multi-layered	and	contingent	on	the	geographic	context.	While	many	
poachers	originate	from	village	communities,	others	join	hunting	crews	from	communities	
elsewhere,	even	foreign	countries	(usually	connected	to	village	communities	via	kinship	ties).	
The	level	of	social	embeddedness	of	kingpins	and	poachers	varies	and	carries	structural	and	
logistical	implications	for	the	flow	of	rhino	horn.	Of	importance	are	community	perceptions	of	
whether	their	fortunes	and	livelihoods	are	improving.	The	community	appears	to	benefit	
largely	indirectly,	as	there	are	very	few	direct	hand-outs.	Direct	hand-outs	are	relegated	to	
certain	kingpins	“throwing	a	village	party”	by	slaughtering	a	few	cows	and	providing	
traditional	beer	upon	the	return	of	a	successful	poaching	expedition	to	the	Kruger	National	
Park.	Others	construct	servitudes,	water	wells,	spaza	shops390	and	shebeens,391	and	
occasionally	a	few	cows	are	donated	for	slaughtering	to	the	benefit	of	the	community	
(Interviews	and	focus	group,	2013).	Compared	to	the	meagre	livelihoods	of	village	
communities,	kingpins	and	poachers	have	purchase	power,	allowing	them	to	buy	greater	
volumes	of	goods	and	services,	which	indirectly	benefit	community	members.	One	young	
poacher	(mid-20s)	related	how	he	was	bearing	the	risk	when	going	on	hunting	expeditions	in	
the	Kruger	Park	and	thus	was	not	prepared	to	share	his	profits	with	the	community	(Interview	
																																																						
390	A	spaza	shop	is	a	small	neighbourhood	grocer.	
	
391	A	shebeen	is	a	pub.	
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with	poacher	15,	Massingir,	2013):	“It	benefits	me,	I	don’t	give	to	the	community.”	Not	all	
poachers	are	paid	equally	well.	A	crime	investigator	in	the	KNP	(Interview,	2013)	recounted	
the	story	of	interrogating	a	17-year	old	poacher,	whose	teammate	was	killed	during	a	
shootout	with	the	KNP	anti-poaching	unit:		
	
“What	the	hell	are	you	doing	here?	Did	they	promise	you	money?	Yes.	But	the	money	
is	not	the	issue.	They	promised	to	give	me	12,5	kilos	mielie	meal.392	They	are	four	–	
three	kids	[and	him],	his	father	passed	away	at	the	mines.	He’s	a	veewagter.393	He's	
looking	after	cattle	for	somebody	else.	He	is	the	only	one	that	earns	money	in	that	
house.	For	a	bag	of	mielie	meal…”	
	
Foreign	or	out-of-town	poaching	crews	rely	on	local	accommodation,	food	and	logistical	
assistance	from	members	of	the	community.	It	is,	however,	incorrect	to	assume	that	the	
entire	community	is	complicit	or	benefits	in	equal	measures.		
	
Poaching	profits	are	predominantly	laundered	into	the	property,	luxury	goods	and	automobile	
sectors.	The	Mozambican	town	of	Massingir	exudes	an	aura	similar	to	short-lived	boomtowns	
during	an	apparent	‘Gold	Rush’.	It	has	become	a	magnet	for	business	entrepreneurs	from	
other	provinces	or	across	the	border,	keen	to	seize	new	opportunities.	Young	men	from	
elsewhere	in	Mozambique	and	South	Africa	arrive	in	Massingir	seeking	recruitment	into	
poaching	crews.	One	kingpin	is	building	a	hotel	complex;	others	have	invested	in	holiday	
houses	at	the	coast	–	the	coastal	town	of	Belene,	for	example,	is	located	a	5	hours	drive	from	
Massingir.394	Many	poachers	are	building	modern	townhouses	in	the	villages,	replacing	the	
traditional	clay	and	reed	huts	common	in	the	region.	The	property	boom	has	also	led	to	an	
influx	of	skilled	artisans,	labourers	and	business	people	working	in	the	construction,	building	
materials	and	retail	sectors.	The	younger	generation	invests	their	rhino	profits	into	off–street	
vehicles	and	luxury	cars	(Interviews	with	poachers	and	kingpins,	2013;	field	observation)	while	
the	older	generation	is	buying	heads	of	cattle	which	signal	affluence	and	status	in	village	
communities.		While	rhino	poaching	has	become	the	main	source	of	income,	some	rhino	
																																																						
392	‘Mielie	meal’	refers	to	maize	meal,	a	coarse	flour	made	from	maize.	It	is	a	staple	food	across	most	of	the	
southern	African	region,	often	eaten	as	porridge	(pap).	
	
393	‘Veewagter’	is	the	Afrikaans	word	for	cattle	herder.	
	
394	Rhino	horn	profits	have	been	invested	into	several	luxurious	seaside	villas	in	the	small	coastal	town.		
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kingpins	are	astute	business	entrepreneurs,	running	a	number	of	legal	and	illegal	side	
businesses.	There	is	awareness	about	the	ceiling	to	the	rhino	horn	fortunes;	in	other	words,	
kingpins	acknowledge	the	existential	threat	to	rhinos	through	poaching	and	that	they	will	
have	to	seek	new	sources	of	income,	or	return	to	the	old	ones	once	the	rhinos	are	gone	
(Interviews,	2013).	Fast	moving	consumer	goods	(designer	clothing,	shoes	and	sunglasses),	
off-street	vehicles	and	face	brick	houses	have	become	sought	after	consumer	products	and	
status	symbols	amongst	kingpins	and	poachers.	Instead	of	accepting	hard	cash	for	rhino	horn,	
some	poachers	choose	to	pay	off	motor	vehicles395,	construction	materials	for	building	face	
brick	houses,	real	estate	or	consumer	goods	instead.	Rhino	kingpins	through	their	business	
connections	are	able	to	procure	or	assist	with	the	procurement	of	such	consumer	goods	and	
construction	materials	(which	are	mostly	imported	from	South	Africa).	They	also	control	the	
debt	economies	emanating	from	this	barter	trade,	which	provides	them	with	another	layer	of	
control	and	an	informal	economic	leadership	role.	In	essence,	indebted	poachers	have	to	
supply	rhino	horn	to	a	specific	creditor	kingpin.	However,	this	dependent	type	of	relationship	
is	not	widespread	as	most	kingpins	are	considered	a	benign	presence	that	uplifts	the	fortunes	
of	village	communities.		
	
In	line	with	environmental	and	social	justice	arguments,	kingpins,	poachers	and	smugglers	
portrayed	their	criminal	careers	as	legitimate	livelihoods	throughout	the	process	of	data	
collection	in	the	borderlands	and	South	African	prisons.	Two	charismatic	Mozambican	
kingpins,	for	example,	have	constructed	their	identity	as	“economic	freedom	fighters”396	that	
fight	for	the	economic	and	environmental	rights	of	their	village	communities.	Others	have	
labelled	themselves	as	‘businessmen’,	‘developers’,		‘community	workers’	or	‘retired	hunters’	
(Interviews	with	kingpin	1	and	2,	2013).	A	convicted	poacher	(Interview	with	poacher	16,	
2013)	stated:		
	
“You	see	in	a	rural	area,	they	used	to	call	each	and	everyone	that	stayed	there	and	
they	talked	with	us	to	decide	about	things	that	concerned	us.	Now	things	are	different.	
																																																						
395	Crime	intelligence	officers	verify	the	registration	numbers	of	vehicles	driven	by	poaching	suspects	at	intervals.	
The	majority	of	vehicles	were	reported	as	stolen	or	no	public	record	is	available	(Interviews,	2013).	
	
396	The	Economic	Freedom	Fighters	(EFF)	is	a	splinter	party	of	the	ruling	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	in	South	
Africa.	Dispelled	former	ANC	Youth	League,	commander-in-chief	Julius	Malema	formed	the	socialist	party.	Its	
policy	platform	of	land	reform	and	wealth	redistribution	is	receiving	widespread	support	in	South	Africa	and	
beyond.	
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And	they	put	the	president	on	the	chair,	they	don't	ask	us	anymore,	they	do	things	on	
their	own.	It	is	them	that	behave	like	they	are	crooks.	That’s	why	we	end	up	killing	the	
rhinos.”		
	
Kingpins	lay	claims	to	fulfilling	important	social	welfare,	community	development	and	political	
leadership	functions.	Rhino	horn	is	instrumental	to	achieving	these	overtly	altruistic	goals	in	
an	environment	where	the	state	has	failed	to	provide	such	functions	(see	next	section).	The	
actual	representatives	of	the	state	and	traditional	leaders	fulfil	ceremonial	duties,	often	
heavily	subsidized	by	resident	kingpins	(Interviews,	2013).	Similar	legitimation	strategies	are	
employed	in	other	natural	resource-dependent	economies	elsewhere	in	the	southern	African	
region.	Abalone	poaching	gang	leaders	in	the	Western	Cape	Province	of	South	Africa	have	also	
made	claims	about	the	social	legitimacy	of	abalone	poaching	in	light	of	commercial	fishing	
quotas,	which	are	perceived	to	be	unjust	and	unfair	to	struggling	grassroots	fishing	
communities	along	the	South	African	coastline	(Hauck	1997;	Hauck/Sweijd	1999,	Interviews	
with	conservation	officials,	Western	Cape,	2014	and	2015).	In	the	case	of	rhino	poaching,	
legitimation	strategies	also	include	the	appropriation	of	job	labels	from	the	‘legal’	hunting	
sector.	Rhino	poachers	regard	themselves	as	‘professional	hunters’	or	‘hunters’	(Interviews	
with	convicted	poachers	and	active	poachers,	2013).	The	position	of	a	hunter	comes	with	
status	and	prestige	in	village	communities	where	a	young	boy’s	first	hunt	is	a	rite	of	passage	
and	“you	actually	become	a	man	when	you	hunt”	(Focus	group,	2013).	The	poacher	is	claiming	
back	his	right	to	hunt	by	poaching	in	modern	day	conservation	areas,	which	were	the	
traditional	hunting	grounds	of	his	forefathers.	Colonial	anti-poaching	laws	and	their	modern	
incarnation	in	the	form	of	hunting	regulations	require	payment	for	hunting	permits.	Total	
protection	zones	which	ban	hunting	and	other	land	uses	have	led	to	the	economic	and	
geographic	exclusion	of	rural	communities	from	‘legal’	hunting	in	areas	close	to	their	location.		
Rhino	poaching	thus	was	initially	also	a	form	of	protest	against	the	hunting	ban	–	another	
expression	of	contested	illegality	–	allowing	actors	to	protest	against	unfair	and	economic	
exclusionary	rule	making.	What	started	as	an	illegal	economic	activity	born	out	of	need	and	
protest	against	unfair	rules	has	however	snowballed	into	greed-based	accumulation	further	
exacerbated	by	the	high	value	of	rhino	horn.		
	
	
	
	 313	
7.4	Feedback	loops	of	rhino	poaching	and	anti-poaching	measures	
	
The	previous	section	dealt	the	social	embeddedness	of	rhino	poachers	within	village	
communities	and	the	legitimation	strategies	employed	to	justify	illegal	economic	activities.	
This	section	looks	into	the	negative	impacts	and	their	societal	relevance,	as	well	as	feedback	
loops	tied	to	the	militarization	and	securitization	of	responses	against	poaching	and	the	social	
embeddedness	of	poachers	and	rangers.	Several	focus	groups	and	individual	interviews	
exposed	deep	rifts	within	village	communities;	especially	mothers	and	wives	were	deeply	
concerned	about	the	poaching	phenomenon	fearing	for	their	children’s	or	husband’s	lives397	
and	the	potential	loss	of	a	breadwinner	should	they	get	killed	or	arrested.	Far	from	being	
supportive	of	poaching,	they	shared	how	poaching	had	affected	the	social	fabric	of	village	life,	
mostly	to	the	detriment	of	women	and	children.398	A	convicted	Mozambican	poacher	shared	
(Interview	with	convicted	poacher	2,	2013):		
	
“The	parents	get	very	angry	but	there’s	nothing	they	can	do	about	it.	There’s	no	
employment	in	the	area.	Our	parents	worry	that	rangers	will	kill	us.	They	do	warn	us	
but	we	don’t	listen.	Sometimes	on	Fridays	and	Saturdays,	they	have	community	
meetings	to	talk	to	us	about	the	dangers	of	poaching.”		
	
																																																						
397	While	women	are	involved	further	along	the	illegal	supply	chain	of	rhino	horn,	I	had	not	come	across	female	
poachers	in	the	southern	African	context	at	the	time	of	fieldwork.	However,	two	young	mothers	were	convicted	
of	conspiracy	to	hunt	rhinos	and	possession	of	an	unlicensed	firearm	and	ammunition	in	the	Ladysmith	Regional	
Court	in	March	2016	(Skinner	2016).	It	also	bears	pointing	out	that	women	were	combatants	during	the	
Mozambican	civil	war.	An	interview	with	a	researcher	working	in	the	field	of	disarmament,	demobilization	and	
reintegration	(DDR)	in	Mozambique	(Interview	with	researcher	1,	2012,	2013)	revealed	that	many	Mozambican	
women	over	the	age	of	30	know	how	to	handle	guns	and	defend	themselves	by	using	such	guns	(which	had	
become	a	necessity	during	the	civil	war).	The	ability	to	use	firearms	to	defend	one’s	life	does	not	necessarily	
correlate	with	a	willingness	to	go	poaching	in	the	Kruger	National	Park.	However,	the	recent	case	in	the	
Ladysmith	Regional	Court	raises	interesting	questions	as	to	the	poaching	motivations	of	the	two	young	mothers	
and	warrants	further	inquiry	into	pathways	to	poaching.		
	
398	While	walking	through	one	of	the	villages	I	came	upon	an	old	woman,	who	was	looking	after	a	group	of	eight	
children	outside	a	hut.	Four	of	the	kids	were	the	old	woman’s	grandchildren,	who	had	been	left	in	her	care.	Her	
daughter	had	left	the	father	of	her	children	for	a	rich	poacher	in	the	village.	The	grandmother	was	disgruntled	
about	the	state	of	affairs,	as	she	received	no	financial	support	from	the	daughter	or	the	deserted	husband.	One	
of	the	children	had	to	be	hospitalized	as	a	consequence	of	severe	burns	from	a	shack	fire	the	night	before.	The	
family	could	not	get	hold	of	the	mother	because	“when	the	boys	come	back	from	Skukuza,	then	there	is	money	
and	celebration”	(Interview	with	old	woman,	Massingir,	2013).	According	to	the	grandmother,	the	mother	
looked	after	the	children	whenever	her	boyfriend	went	off	on	another	poaching	expedition.	The	daughter	
brought	no	money	home,	as	the	horn	profits	are	spent	on	“women	and	booze”.		
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A	few	half-built	houses	in	the	villages	are	a	stark	reminder	of	the	stark	reality	that	many	
poachers	do	not	return	from	‘Skukuza’.399	According	to	Mozambican	sources	(Mabunda	
2012),400	close	to	400	poaching	suspects	from	Mozambique	had	lost	their	lives	between	2008	
and	early	2014.	South	African	officials	are	apprehensive	to	share	the	statistics	(see	Table	12)	
for	fear	of	bad	press	and	retribution	(Interviews,	2013).	At	the	time	of	writing,	poachers	had	
not	killed	rangers;	however,	one	ranger	was	killed	and	another	seriously	wounded	in	‘friendly	
fire’	(personal	communication	with	KNP	officials,	2015).	
	
Table	12:	Arrests	and	deaths	of	poachers	in	the	Kruger	National	Park,	2010	-	2014401	
	 	2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	 2010	
Neutralized	 174	 133	 73	 82	 67	
Killed	in	action	 45402	 47	 17	 21	 4	
	
Source:	Supplied	by	Kruger	National	Park	on	25	August	2014	
	
Focus	groups	with	community	representatives	in	the	borderlands	revealed	that	the	deaths	of	
poaching	suspects	had	led	to	further	alienation	and	outright	antagonism	of	community	
members	towards	the	Park.	Community	members	recounted	that	many	villagers	traversed	the	
KNP	in	search	of	work	or	to	visit	families	in	South	Africa.	As	shown	earlier,	colonial-era	
political	borders	remain	across	most	of	southern	Africa,	which	suited	colonial	interests	at	the	
time	but	often	separated	local	communities.	According	to	interviews	with	Kruger	officials	and	
																																																						
399	Skukuza	is	the	main	rest	camp	and	administrative	headquarters	of	the	KNP.	When	a	poacher	announces	that	
he	is	‘going	to	Skukuza’,	it	indicates	that	he	is	preparing	for	a	poaching	expedition	into	the	KNP.	
	
400	Investigative	journalist	Lazaro	Mabunda	undertook	fascinating	research	into	poaching	crews	in	the	
Mozambican	borderland	in	2012.	According	to	one	of	his	confidential	police	sources	in	the	Mozambican	police	
(pers.	communication	in	2015),	363	Mozambican	poaching	suspects	had	been	shot	dead	in	the	Kruger	between	
2008	and	early	2014.	Former	Mozambican	President	Joaquim	Chissano	announced	at	a	press	conference	in	
September	2015	that	South	African	rangers	and	security	forces	had	killed	476	Mozambicans	in	the	Kruger	
National	Park	between	January	2010	and	June	2015	(AIM	2015).	It	is	unclear	why	the	Mozambican	and	South	
African	statistics	do	not	tally,	which	might	be	linked	to	SANParks’	use	of	term	‘neutralized’	(compare	with	next	
footnote).	Dead	bodies	or	the	disappearance	of	a	community	member	are	certainly	difficult	to	conceal.	
	
401	Explanatory	note:	The	KNP	environmental	management	inspectorate	employs	the	unfortunate	term	
“neutralized”	to	reflect	the	total	of	suspected	poachers	killed	and	arrested	inside	the	KNP.	
	
402	By	25	August	2014,	23	suspected	poachers	had	been	killed.	The	figure	of	45	deaths	derives	from	a	media	
briefing.	Attempts	to	confirm	the	statistics	with	KNP	officials	were	not	answered.	
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older	village	community	members	(Interviews	and	focus	groups,	2013),	some	villagers	carry	
dual	citizenship.	
	
People	living	on	both	sides	of	the	border	are	highly	mobile	and	move	between	South	Africa	
and	Mozambique	for	numerous	reasons.		In	the	eyes	of	the	community,	Kruger	game	rangers	
kill	their	fellow	villagers	on	the	suspicion	that	all	trespassers	are	poachers.	The	increasing	
militarization	of	responses	to	rhino	poaching	is	pitting	them	against	park	authorities,	rangers	
and	rhinos.	Moreover,	these	responses	have	further	exacerbated	the	sentiment	that	wild	
animals	are	valued	higher	than	black	people	in	conservation	and	government	circles.	On	the	
other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	the	Kruger	rangers	who	risk	their	lives	each	day	to	protect	the	
rhino	(see	Graph	6).	While	there	has	been	poaching	of	wildlife	ever	since	the	Park’s	inception,	
the	duties	of	a	ranger	used	to	entail	conservation-orientated	endeavours	and	to	deal	with	
delinquent	tourists.	Nowadays,	rangers	receive	quasi-guerrilla-style,	anti-poaching	training,	
and	spend	most	of	their	time	defending	rhinos	and	tracking	the	spoor	of	suspected	poachers	
(Interview	with	KNP	official,	2013).		
	
Another	cleavage	arises	from	the	social	embeddedness	of	poachers	and	rangers	with	
consequences	for	harmonious	relations	and	social	life	at	the	village	level,	and	the	
effectiveness	of	law	enforcement	disruptions.	Many	LNP	employees	(including	the	ranger	
corps)	and	the	work	force	on	privately-owned	concessions	are	recruited	from	local	village	
communities	living	inside	or	on	the	edge	of	the	Park	and	private	concessions.	The	original	
ranger	corps	in	the	LNP	consisted	of	45	guards	and	55	field	rangers,	who	were	responsible	for	
wildlife	conservation	and	law	enforcement.	The	numbers	of	the	ranger	corps	have	been	
augmented	by	the	addition	of	an	elite	special	anti-poaching	unit	of	30	men,	who	were	
deployed	in	mid-December	2013.	Members	of	the	unit	received	specialized	training,	three	
Land	Cruiser	vehicles,	rifles,	radios	and	patrol	equipment	(Peace	Parks	Foundation	6	January	
2014).	Most	of	the	privately-owned	hunting	and	tourist	concessions403	south	of	the	Park	have	
																																																						
403	South	of	the	Limpopo	National	Park	and	along	the	eastern	boundary	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	are	several	
hunting	and	tourist	concessions.	These	concessions	are	predominantly	owned	by	South	African	corporates	
(including	for	example	Singita’s	Twin	City,	and	Hulett	Tongaat),	hunting	concessions	such	as	Sabie	Park	or	
ecotourism	initiatives	like	the	Xhongile	Game	Park.	All	of	these	concessionaires	have	Mozambican	shareholders,	
as	foreign	nationals	are	not	allowed	to	own	land	in	Mozambique.	The	Mozambican	shareholders	are	politically	
connected	individuals	in	Maputo,	who	assert	their	influence	should	problems	arise	between	concessionaires	and	
communities	(Interviews	in	2013).	Interviews	with	community	members	living	on	the	edges	of	these	concessions	
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employed	their	own	ranger	corps,	sometimes	even	specialized	anti-poaching	and	intelligence	
gathering	units	are	deployed	that	work	closely	with	the	anti-poaching	forces	in	the	KNP.	
Curiously,	Mozambican	government	forces	such	as	the	“Força	de	Guarda	Fronteira”	(border	
guards)	defer	to	security	officials	employed	by	these	private	operators.	
	
Graph		6:	Anti-poaching	interventions	in	the	Kruger	National	Park	
	
	
Source:	Sam	Ferreira	(2015:	slide	3)	
	
In	instances	where	locals	are	employed	as	rangers	or	guards,	family	or	community	members	
may	be	pitted	against	one	another	during	anti-poaching	ambushes	on	private	land,	or	when	
poachers	traverse	public	or	private	land	en	route	to	the	KNP	(Interviews,	2013).	An	‘anti-
																																																																																																																																																																											
revealed	that	while	concessionaires	were	investing	monies	into	community	development	initiatives	(as	part	of	
the	deal),	the	communities	perceived	these	projects	as	a	form	of	placation	to	make	good	on	another	round	of	
displacement.	Some	concessionaires	are	seen	as	the	new	‘colonial	masters’,	who	are	fencing	off	their	properties	
and	barring	access	to	villagers	(Interviews,	2013).	Labourers,	rangers	or	guards	from	the	village	communities,	
work	on	these	concessions.	They	are	often	severely	underpaid	and	not	allowed	to	bring	their	families	to	stay	
with	them	on	the	concessions.	
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poaching	ambush’	is	a	preventative	attempt	to	either	stop	potential	poachers	from	crossing	
into	the	KNP	or	to	prevent	wildlife	poaching	on	the	concession.404	While	the	term	‘ambush’	is	
appropriated	from	military	jargon,	many	of	the	anti–poaching	units	operating	in	the	area	do	
not	have	permits	to	carry	weapons,405	and	hence,	the	element	of	surprise	is	used	instead	of	
the	military	variant	of	a	“shoot	to	kill	approach”.		
	
In	some	instances,	concessionaires	are	equipping	their	staff	with	weapons,	as	carrying	
weapons	may	constitute	a	greater	risk	to	rangers	who	struggle	to	match	to	the	prowess	of	
their	well-trained	and	better-equipped	opponents.	Moreover,	these	weapons	could	get	lost,	
stolen	or	rented	out	to	poachers	(Interviews,	2013).	One	concessionaire	said	for	example:	“I	
only	trust	my	rangers	as	far	as	I	can	see	them”	(Interview,	2013).	Typically,	such	ambushes	are	
launched	close	to	the	boundary	with	the	KNP	(the	concessions	serve	as	a	buffer	zone)	and	in	
concert	with	the	anti-poaching	operations	in	the	KNP.	Concealed	at	strategic	locations	in	the	
bush,	a	group	of	rangers	(sometimes	in	collaboration	with	border	guards	or	the	police)	will	
await	the	arrival	or	return	of	suspected	poachers	and	stop	them	from	progressing	further,	and	
hand	them	over	to	relevant	law	enforcement	agents.	The	KNP	and	concessionaires	regard	
such	ambushes	as	a	proactive	strategy,406	as	rifles	and	vehicles	are	regularly	confiscated.	
However,	poachers	are	likely	to	choose	a	different	route,	gather	intelligence	on	standard	
operating	procedures,	or	pay	a	bribe	to	avoid	detection	in	the	preparation	of	the	next	hunting	
expedition.	On	several	occasions,	field	rangers	found	themselves	face-to-face	with	family	
members	en	route	to	the	KNP,	or	the	worst-case	scenario	(Interview,	2013):		
	
“My	head	ranger	–	we	tracked	his	son.	We	told	Kruger	about	the	group.	They	climbed	
over	the	fence,	all	three	of	them.	And	he	heard	on	the	radio	that	his	son	was	killed	in	a	
shootout.”	
	
																																																						
404	Kruger	rhinos	regularly	cross	into	the	LNP	and	onto	private	land	in	Mozambique.	As	the	chances	of	the	rogue	
rhino	surviving	for	any	length	of	time	are	suboptimal,	rangers	walk	the	rhino	back	across	the	border	and	return	it	
to	the	care	of	KNP	rangers	(Interviews,	2013).	
	
405	There	is	a	due	process	to	apply	for	firearms	in	Mozambique,	which	can	stretch	over	several	months.	
	
406	Obviously,	this	applies	only	to	the	scenario	where	potential	poachers	were	stopped	before	shooting	a	rhino,	
in	which	case	the	only	chargeable	crime	would	be	trespassing	on	protected	land	and	carrying	an	illegal	firearm	(if	
that	were	the	case).	
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Anti-poaching	operations	and	ambushes	have	led	to	several	revenge	attacks	and	death	
threats	against	anti–poaching	staff	and	concessionaires.	Some	concessionaires	have	resorted	
to	recruiting	rangers	and	security	staff	from	other	parts	of	the	country	to	circumvent	the	
possible	consequences	of	the	social	embeddedness	of	poachers	and	rangers.	As	the	head	of	
an	anti-poaching	unit	in	Mozambique	explained	(Interview	with	anti-poaching	operative	6,	
2013):	
	
“I	mean	we	have	an	obligation	to	employ	community	members,	but	it’s	impossible	for	
a	community	member	to	be	an	effective	field	rep.	He	cannot	from	a	law	enforcement	
perspective,	because	he’s	got	to	go	home.	And	what	man	is	not	going	to	protect	his	
own	family,	what	man	is	not	going	to	play	the	game	if	somebody	comes	and	says	
listen,	best	you	look	the	other	way	because	I	know	where	you	live.	I	know	where	your	
kids	are,	what	man	is	not	going	to…you	can’t	expect	him	to.”	
	
Field	rangers	and	scouts	were	paid	an	average	wage	of	3	000	to	4	000	Metical407	per	month	
amounting	to	about	75	to	100	Euros	(Interviews,	2013)	at	the	time	of	fieldwork.408	
Concessionaires	provide	an	additional	bonus	contingent	on	the	success	of	anti-poaching	
operations	(Interviews	with	concessionaires,	2013).	A	community	leader	put	this	wage	in	
perspective:	a	50	kg	bag	of	rice	cost	about	900	Metical	(23	Euros)	at	the	time	(Interview,	June	
2013).	In	comparison,	a	poaching	team	could	earn	200,	000	to	300,	000	Metical	(5,125	to	
7,700	Euros)	per	hunt.409	While	the	‘bounty’	for	rhino	horns	appears	relatively	high	in	
comparison	to	the	minimum	wage,	it	is	negligible	when	compared	to	the	price	of	rhino	horn	
on	consumer	markets.	However,	rangers	are	easily	swayed	to	look	the	other	direction	or	
assist	with	operational	intelligence,	especially	when	relatives	are	involved	in	hunting	crews	
(discussed	in	more	detail	below).	In	light	of	the	low	wages	for	anti-poaching	personnel	(which	
applies	to	parks	and	reserves	in	South	Africa,	too),	it	is	also	not	unexpected	that	rangers,	field	
scouts	and	other	staff	in	parks	start	their	own	hunting	crews,	or	become	involved	in	poaching	
to	supplement	their	meagre	earnings.	
																																																						
407	The	Metical	is	the	Mozambican	currency.	In	November	2014,	one	Euro	could	be	exchanged	for	about	40	
Metical.		
		
408	The	minimum	wage	was	about	2	500	Metical	per	month	at	the	time.	In	April	2014,	the	minimum	wage	of	
workers	in	the	agricultural,	livestock	and	forestry	sectors	was	increased	to	3,100	Metical	(Agencia	de	Informacao	
de	Mocambique	30	April	2014)	
	
409	Poachers	operating	from	the	South	African	side	of	the	border	get	paid	less.	The	going	rate	in	2014	was	
between	30,	000	to	50,	000	Rand	for	a	pair	of	horns	(2,200	to	3,700	Euros).	
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Turning	to	the	macro-level:	Mozambique	does	find	herself	in	a	precarious	position	with	
regards	to	the	rhino	issue:	On	the	one	hand,	its	neighbour	and	transfrontier	parks	partner	
South	Africa,	CITES	and	the	international	community	are	pushing	for	adequate	conservation	
laws,	a	comprehensive	anti-poaching	strategy	and	a	tougher	stance	against	poaching.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	southern	African	country	is	facing	increasing	criticism	from	its	own	citizenry	
over	Mozambican	nationals	getting	shot	and	killed,	or	arrested	inside	the	KNP.	Essentially	
rhino	poaching	and	the	militarized	responses	to	it	are	reinforcing	the	‘fortress’	conservation	
paradigm	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	While	voluntary	resettlement	from	conservation	areas	was	
employed	when	the	LNP	was	initially	established	(see	Chapter	4),	the	Mozambican	
government	employs	now	the	supposed	threat	of	rhino	poaching	from	village	communities	
living	inside	the	LNP	to	extend	its	control	over	the	Park.	Government	officials	and	intelligence	
actors	have	stigmatized	village	communities	as	‘rhino	poachers’.	The	stigmatization	serves	the	
prioritization	of	the	resettlement	of	village	communities	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	
Limpopo	National	Park	as	an	anti-poaching	measure,	reflecting	the	old	conservation	adage	
that	local	communities	and	wild	animals	are	supposedly	a	noxious	combination.	In	addition,	
concessionaires	along	the	eastern	boundary	are	seeing	their	land	tenure	rights	protected	
(which	had	been	tenuous)	as	their	concessions	have	been	declared	as	buffer	zones	in	the	
name	of	protecting	rhinos.410		According	to	a	rezoning	briefing	document	(SANParks	9	July	
2012:	4–5),	the	Great	Lebombo	Conservancy	is	to	become	“the	first	shield	of	defence	against	
rhino	poaching,	provide	ecotourism	development	opportunities	(on	the	Mozambican	side)	for	
the	private	sector	investors	and	create	a	logical	deterrent	to	poaching	activities	through	
tourism	activities.”	The	declaration	of	additional	“intensive	protection	zones”	along	the	
eastern	border	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	signals	a	potential	return	to	forced	removals	
rather	than	‘voluntary	resettlement’.	It	remains	unclear	how	the	Mozambican	government	
plans	to	move	entire	villages,	and	it	boggles	the	mind	as	to	how	the	geographic	displacement	
of	such	villages	could	be	conceived	as	an	appropriate	anti-poaching	measure.	Intelligence	
operatives	active	in	the	border	regions	shared	this	sentiment	(Interview	with	intelligence	
operative	8;	Interviews	2013):	
																																																						
410	Massé	and	Lunstrum	(2015)	have	developed	the	concept	of	“accumulation	by	securitization”	to	capture	the	
nexus	between	conservation-securitization,	capital	accumulation	and	dispossession.	The	researchers	discuss	the	
increasing	privatization	and	securitization	of	responses	to	rhino	poaching,	which	also	includes	land	grabs.	
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“You	might	be	moving	potential	poachers	further	away	from	the	Park	but	where	there	
is	a	will,	there	is	a	way.	You	have	basically	just	added	another	40	km	for	them	to	walk	
extra	and	that	they	will	and	you	have	made	some	villagers	very	angry.”	
	
Moreover,	the	governments	of	South	Africa	and	Mozambique	signed	a	Memorandum	of	
Understanding	(MOU)	in	April	2014	to	enhance	bilateral	cooperation	with	regards	to	the	rhino	
issue.	The	MOU,	amongst	other	measures,	paved	the	way	for	a	controversial	law	enforcement	
measure	that	allows	for	cross-border	“hot	pursuits”	to	take	place.	Essentially,	this	measure	
allows	South	African	law	enforcement	officials	to	chase	a	poaching	suspect	across	the	border	
without	a	warrant	or	official	permission.	This	measure	has	a	nasty	connotation	in	the	South	
African	context	as	South	African	Special	Forces	crossed	into	neighbouring	countries	to	
apprehend	or	even	kill	suspects	during	the	apartheid	regime	(Orkin/Community	Agency	for	
Social	Enquiry	1989:	127–128).	Rhino	protection	strategies	such	as	the	resettlement	of	
“problem	villages”,	the	creation	of	“total	protection	zones”	and	“hot	pursuits”	signal	a	return	
to	fortress	conservation	in	a	zero	sum	game,	which	sees	wildlife	conservation	pitted	against	
the	interests	of	rural	village	communities.	The	‘quasi’	war	against	poaching	appears	to	be	
strengthening	the	symbolic	(and	deadly)	message	that	poaching	of	rhinos	is	illegal	in	the	KNP;	
however;	on	the	ground,	there	are	perceptions	that	the	state	has	instituted	“shoot	to	kill”	
policies	to	protect	rhinos	(wild	animals)	and	kill	villagers.		
	
When	asked	whether	the	rhino	carried	cultural	significance	or	symbolic	value,	convicted	
poachers	and	kingpins	observed	that	the	rhino	was	“feared”,	“admired”	and	“respected”	but	
not	hunted.	Kids	were	warned	to	stay	clear	of	the	rhino	because	it	was	an	“angry”	and	
“dangerous”	wild	animal	(Interviews,	2013).	In	the	current	context	of	expanding	transfrontier	
conservation	initiatives,	the	“white”	rhino	has	taken	on	a	symbolic	meaning,	representing	the	
continued	multi-layered	marginalization	of	village	communities.	Each	fallen	rhino	whittles	
away	from	the	notion	of	‘peace	parks’	and	the	long-term	sustainability	of	conservation	areas.	
Poachers	are	killing	the	‘white	men’s’	natural	heritage,	which	was	socially	constructed	
through	successive	regimes	of	exploitation	and	dispossession	of	local	people	living	near	parks.	
Rhinos	are	not	only	killed	for	profit,	but	they	are	also	killed	for	their	symbolic	value.	The	
deadly	anti-poaching	measures	and	the	village	community-unfriendly	expansion	drives	of	
conservation	areas	are	exacerbating	the	rhino	problem	by	turning	village	communities	against	
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wild	animals.	Meanwhile,	the	deadly	role	of	‘white’	rhino	poaching	syndicates	(see	discussion	
in	Chapter	6)	in	destroying	the	same	natural	heritage	is	downplayed	in	the	mainstream	
discourse,	suggesting	the	return	to	the	race-based	normative	categories	of	‘black	poachers’	
(bad	hunter)	versus	‘white	hunters’	(good	hunter).	
	
	
7.5	Roles	and	functions	within	poaching	groups	
	
Interviews	with	kingpins,	intermediaries,	smugglers	and	poachers	and	their	law	enforcement	
nemeses	(Interviews,	2013)	revealed	that	hunting	expeditions	into	parks	and	reserves	range	
from	highly	organized,	well-planned	and	executed,	to	opportunistic,	and	sometimes	chaotic	
operations.	Tidings	of	the	high	earnings	attached	to	rhino	poaching	have	led	to	amateurs	
seizing	the	opportunity,	and	embarking	on	chaotic	badly	planned	incursions	into	reserves	and	
parks.	While	some	opportunists	are	caught	and	arrested,	others	succeed.411		Kingpins	usually	
coordinate	highly-organized	operations,	which	come	with	the	promise	of	fringe	benefits	to	
poachers	such	as	“life	insurance”	in	the	case	of	death,	and	legal	support	and	access	to	top	
criminal	lawyers	in	the	case	of	capture.412	They	tolerate	‘unattached’	or	independent	hunting	
crews,	many	of	whom	ultimately	choose	to	cooperate	with	the	kingpins	as	they	have	ready	
access	to	buyers,	hunting	rifles,	ammunition,	and	they	provide	logistical	support	before	and	
after	hunts.	While	there	was	no	evidence	that	kingpins	or	competing	poaching	crews	
informed	on	unattached	or	less	experienced	hunting	crews,	there	was	a	sense413	that	the	
unlucky	ones	served	as	cannon	fodder	or	“dead	cows	for	piranhas”	(see	next	chapter).	A	
kingpin	explained	that	the	“bosses”	had	a	preference	for	multiple	rhino	hunts	to	take	place	
concurrently.	The	Park’s	security	forces	have	only	the	capacity	to	deal	with	a	limited	number	
																																																						
411	An	anti-poacher	(Interview,	KZN,	2013)	related	how	an	obese	teacher	from	an	urban	centre	in	South	Africa	
had	joined	a	spontaneously	constituted	poaching	group.	The	quartet	jumped	into	a	saloon	(an	inappropriate	
vehicle	when	driving	on	sand	roads	in	the	bush),	stopped	on	the	road	next	to	a	rhino	reserve.	After	scaling	the	
game	fence	with	difficulty,	an	anti-poaching	unit	intercepted	them.	The	unfit	teacher	was	apparently	struggling	
to	keep	up	with	the	rest	of	his	crew.	
	
412	These	fringe	benefits	may	or	may	not	materialize	as	interviews	with	several	convicted	poachers	revealed.	The	
“boss”	had	arranged	for	legal	representation	in	a	few	cases.	A	handful	of	legal	teams	appear	to	defend	these	
rhino	criminals;	in	other	words,	the	same	criminal	lawyers	appear	on	behalf	of	alleged	rhino	criminals	in	South	
African	courts	(Interview	with	prosecutors,	2013).	
	
413	Some	convicted	poachers	claimed	that	they	were	unlucky	and	got	caught	during	their	very	first	hunt.	While	
few	criminals	would	admit	to	any	crimes	beyond	the	crime	at	hand,	some	might	have	been	‘unlucky	first-timers’.		
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of	“trespassing”	incidents	–	“maybe	one	or	two”	while	the	others	“will	still	bring	back	the	
horn”	(Interview,	Cubo,	2013).	Some	hunting	expeditions	are	choreographed	in	such	an	
efficient	manner	that	the	outgoing	hunting	crew	will	swap	hunting	rifles	and	intelligence	on	
fresh	rhino	tracks	and	the	position	of	anti–poaching	units	as	they	pass	the	incoming	crew.		
	
Originally	kingpins	recruited	their	own	hunting	teams	from	local	villagers	who	were	firmly	
embedded	in	their	communities	and	could	be	trusted	to	bring	back	the	rhino	horn.	However,	
news	of	the	good	fortunes	of	rhino	poachers	has	travelled	beyond	the	village	communities	in	
and	around	the	parks.	Many	new	hopefuls	arrive	daily	in	the	hope	of	getting	recruited	into	
poaching	crews.	Initially,	kingpins	were	seeking	to	recruit	men	with	hunting	or	bush	tracking	
skills.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	decades-long	civil	war	in	Mozambique,	many	men	(and	women)	
possess	military	and	tracking	skills,	and	some	have	access	to	old	weapons	from	caches	
situated	in	the	border	areas.414	In	the	early	phase	of	poaching	in	the	KNP,	Portuguese	colonial	
hunting	rifles	and	old	rifles	dating	from	the	Civil	War	were	used	to	kill	rhinos,	fitted	with	
homemade	silencers.	As	the	rhino	fortunes	grew,	kingpins	and	hunters	invested	in	
sophisticated	hunting	rifles	such	as	CZ-550s,	as	well	as	Mauser	.458’s,	.375’s,	typically	used	by	
trophy	hunters	to	shoot	rhinos	or	elephants.	One	kingpin	said	that	he	and	one	of	his	close	
associates	would	also	provide	weapons	training	to	new	recruits.	Another	kingpin	accepted	
new	recruits	once	they	had	passed	a	test,	which	could	range	from	hunting	bush	meat	through	
to	acquiring	hunting	rifles	through	a	holdup	or	robbery.415	Kingpins	set	up	the	poaching	crews,	
which	will	consist	of	a	hunter,	a	tracker	and	a	food	and	water	carrier	(who	may	also	carry	the	
horns).	The	number	of	participants	in	hunting	crews	is,	however,	variable	depending	on	the	
projected	duration	of	the	stay	inside	the	park.	In	light	of	declining	rhino	numbers	and	
increasing	pressure	from	anti-poaching	units,	poaching	crews	spend	longer	periods	of	time	
tracking	rhinos	and	evading	detection	in	the	Park.	The	duration	of	the	hunting	expedition	is	
contingent	on	the	reliability	of	the	group’s	intelligence.	This	changed	state	of	affairs	had	led	to	
the	enlargement	of	some	hunting	crews.	Additional	members	are	enlisted	to	carry	extra	
																																																						
414	Trained	in	low	intensity	warfare,	ex-soldiers	with	bush-tracking	skills	from	the	days	of	the	apartheid	bush	wars	
were	connected	with	a	number	of	poaching	incidents	in	game	reserves	and	parks	in	KwaZulu-Natal.	
		
415	Game	and	commercial	farmers	are	reputed	to	hold	hunting	rifles	and	other	high	calibre	rifles	on	their	
properties.	Organized	crime	investigators	(Interviews,	2013)	pointed	to	the	possible	connection	between	farm	
attacks	and	rhino	poaching;	however,	only	tenuous	links	were	made	between	ballistics	at	rhino	crime	scenes	and	
stolen	hunting	rifles.			
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provisions	for	longer	stays	in	the	park	and	to	provide	protection	in	case	of	detection.416	Larger	
groups	may	split	up	once	they	are	inside	the	Park.	Some	hunting	crews	enter	the	Park	legally	
and	book	into	safari	camps;	others	use	one	of	the	many	footpaths	and	animal	migration	
routes	traversing	parks,	reserves	and	wilderness	areas.	When	rhino	poaching	increased	in	
frequency	in	the	late	2000s,	poaching	crews	concentrated	on	areas	with	high	rhino	densities	
in	the	southern	parts	of	the	Park.	When	entering	Kruger	from	the	Mozambican	side,	poachers	
are	dropped	off	as	closely	as	possible	to	the	fence	line.	An	off-street	vehicle	(a	so-called	four-
by-four	drive)	is	needed	to	drive	along	the	otherwise	impassable	sand	roads.	Another	option	
further	south	is	the	hiring	of	a	boat	to	row	across	the	Corumana	dam,	or	simply	to	wade	
across	the	Sabi	River.	
	
According	to	KNP	anti-poaching	officials	(personal	communication,	2015),	there	was	an	
available	pool	of	2	500	to	3	000	poachers	in	and	around	the	national	park417	and	an	average	of	
ten	to	fifteen	hunting	crews	were	tracking	rhinos	at	any	given	point	in	time	in	2015	(see	Graph	
6).	When	illegal	hunting	into	the	KNP	commenced	in	the	late	2000s,	hunting	crews	were	still	
learning	the	ropes	and	mistakes	were	made,	but	the	crews	learnt	rapidly,	adapted	their	
modus	operandi	and	upgraded	their	‘toolbox’.	An	investigator	(Interview	with	KNP	
investigator,	2013)	points	to	the	inferior	types	of	gun,	ammunition	and	sloppy	execution	of	
early	poaching	in	the	KNP.	Some	poachers	used	AK-47’s	and	multiple	shots	in	lieu	of	the	
professional	‘one-shot-kill’	to	the	heart	or	lungs.	In	the	modern	poacher’s	toolbox	are	
sophisticated	hunting	rifles,	machetes	or	axes,	satellite	navigation	systems	or	mobile	phones	
(sometimes	even	GPS-enabled	smartphones).	While	there	is	no	network	signal	in	many	parts	
of	the	KNP,	Movitel418	cell	phone	towers	are	sprinkled	across	the	Mozambican	borderlands,	
which	facilitate	communication	between	kingpins	and	poachers	once	they	get	close	to	the	
Mozambican	border.	The	term	“poacher’s	moon”	used	to	be	synonymous	with	a	higher	rate	
																																																						
416	The	high	rate	of	poacher	fatalities	in	the	KNP	has	led	to	some	groups	carrying	handguns	for	self-defence	
purposes.	
	
417	This	number	had	grown	to	6	000	poachers	in	and	round	the	Park	by	2016	(pers.	communication	with	Julian	
Rademeyer	and	KNP	officials,	2016).	
	
418	Movitel	is	a	joint	venture	between	Viettel	Global,	a	Vietnamese	telecommunications	company	owned	by	the	
Vietnamese	Ministry	of	Defence,	and	Mozambican	partners.	The	first	cell	phone	towers	were	erected	in	October	
2011,	and	the	company	launched	officially	in	May	2012.	Movitel	was	the	fastest	growing	telecommunication	
company	in	the	Middle	East	and	Africa	in	2014	(IT	News	Africa	2014).	
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of	rhino	attrition.	The	natural	light	of	the	full	moonlight	shines	the	poachers’	path	during	the	
full	moon	period	hence	the	term	“poacher’s	moon”.	While	rhino	poaching	is	still	rife	during	
poacher’s	moon,	illegal	hunters	are	traversing	the	park	day	and	night	in	search	of	their	
bounty.	Kruger	officials	also	found	that	poaching	rates	spiked	before	East	Asian	holidays419	
and	during	the	Christmas	holiday	season.420		
	
Kingpins	were	initially	involved	in	illegal	hunting	expeditions	themselves;	nowadays	they	
execute	multiple	functions	essential	to	the	continuity	of	the	flow.	It	is	important	to	
differentiate	between	hunters	and	kingpins	within	the	overall	structure	of	the	flow.	Although	
poaching	groups	display	a	flat	structure	by	virtue	of	relationships	being	reliant	on	reciprocal	
trust	and	“everyone	faces	the	same	fears	and	risks	in	the	bush”	(Interview,	2013),	the	position	
of	the	hunter	is	attributed	with	the	highest	status	and	commensurate	with	the	most	
rewarding	remuneration	within	poaching	groups.	The	hunter	is	thus	the	unofficial	leader	of	
the	group	in	the	bush.	Once	the	hunting	crew	leaves	the	bush,	the	buck	stops	with	the	
kingpin,	who	wears	many	different	hats	but	most	importantly	he	has	to	assure	that	the	horn	
moves	further	along	the	flow.	What	differentiates	kingpins	from	poachers	and	other	members	
of	village	communities	is	their	social	capital,	which	incorporates	the	ability	to	communicate	
and	trade	beyond	the	confines	of	village	communities.	On	the	one	hand,	kingpins	are	
competent	economic	actors	that	hold	the	key	to	local	horn	transactions;	on	the	other	hand,	
these	kingpins	exude	high	levels	of	social	and	cross-cultural	mobility	enabling	them	to	
undertake	business	with	criminal	actors	transcending	boundaries	presented	by	ethnicity,	
language	and	nationality.	Kingpins	recruit,	mobilize	and	motivate	others	to	partake	in	hunting	
expeditions	that	involve	the	illegal	killing	and	dehorning	of	rhinos	in	protected	areas.	They	
ensure	that	hunts	go	ahead	without	disruptions	by	the	government	or	traditional	authorities;	
in	other	words,	standing	arrangements	exist	to	ensure	the	undisturbed	flow	of	horn	from	the	
park	to	the	buyer	(discussed	in	more	detail	below).	Once	the	kingpin	takes	receipt	of	the	horn,	
a	process	of	quality	control	commences	(see	Chapter	8).	Upon	confirming	weight,	provenance	
																																																						
419	No	supporting	data	could	be	provided	for	this	claim.	However,	several	rangers	and	security	personnel	
suggested	that	Asian	intermediaries	were	returning	home	to	spend	holidays	with	their	families	and	capitalized	
on	the	return	trip	by	transporting	horn	back	home.	
	
420	Crime	statistics	confirm	a	spike	in	property	crimes	during	the	festive	season	in	South	Africa	(Lancaster	2014).	
There	is	no	empirical	evidence	to	explain	the	phenomenon.	According	to	anecdotal	accounts,	thieves	seize	
opportunities	while	holidaymakers	let	their	guard	down.	With	regards	to	spikes	in	rhino	poaching,	anti-poaching	
operatives	(Interviews,	KNP,	2013)	suggest,	“Poachers	celebrate	Christmas	too”.	
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and	authenticity	of	the	horn,	the	kingpin	‘secures’	the	horn	from	detection	through	law	
enforcement	for	its	onward	journey.	Kingpins,	poachers	and	smugglers	confirmed	that	the	
horn	is	left	intact;	in	other	words,	it	is	not	processed	into	disks,	pieces	or	powder	at	the	
source.	As	an	anti-poaching	measure,	some	rhinos	carry	satellite	trackers	in	their	horns.	
Poaching	crews	use	rubber	tubes	of	car	tires	to	disrupt	the	tracker	signal	en	route	to	the	
kingpin	(Interview	with	poacher	15,	2013).	The	kingpin	will	boil	the	horn	to	stop	organic	
material	from	releasing	putrid	smell,421	which	could	attract	the	attention	of	sniffer	dogs.		To	
permanently	disrupt	the	tracking	device,	kingpins	put	the	horn	into	an	oven,	‘baking’	the	
tracking	device	at	extremely	high	temperatures	for	several	hours.	This	process	destroys	the	
signal	permanently	(Interview	with	kingpin	2,	2013).	These	security	and	quality	control	
measures	showcase	sophisticated	planning	and	foresight	of	wildlife	trafficking	groups.	
	
Kingpins	also	provide	the	important	bridge	between	poacher	and	buyer	by	facilitating	the	safe	
and	speedy	passage	of	horn	from	the	park	to	the	buyer	or	smuggler.	This	process	earns	them	
double	commission;	they	thus	profit	from	“buying”	the	horn	from	their	own	or	independent	
poaching	crews,	and	from	selling	the	horn	to	the	smuggler	or	buyer.	Initially,	rhino	horn	was	
supplied	to	South	African	buyers,	who	arranged	its	integration	into	gray	and	legal	flows.	The	
migration	to	new	buyers	(Chinese	and	Vietnamese	buyers),	local	markets	(Chokwe,	Maputo,	
Beira)	and	routes	(from	Maputo,	Nairobi,	Lusaka	to	Middle	Eastern	and	Asian	entrepôts	or	
directly	to	the	market)	appears	to	have	been	triggered	by	opportunity	structures	presented	by	
the	geographic	location	of	Mozambique,	the	high	presence	of	rhinos	close	to	the	Mozambican	
border	in	the	KNP,	and	the	state	of	the	criminal	justice	system	in	that	country.	In	the	late	
2000s,	kingpins	and	independent	poachers	sought	out	new	buyers	to	introduce	competition	
and	negotiate	better	prices	for	the	horn.	The	rapprochement	between	kingpins,	poachers	and	
Asian	buyers	was	actively	pursued,	and	business	connections	were	established	through	
opportunistic	meetings	or	referrals.	In	this	instance,	the	kingpin’s	worldliness	and	social	skills	
facilitated	the	establishment	of	new	criminal	connections.	As	one	kingpin	put	it:	“If	you	want	
to	sell	a	rhino	horn,	you	go	to	Asian	markets	or	Chinatown	and	speak	to	anyone”.	Many	of	the	
extant	kingpins	have	worked	and	travelled	beyond	their	village	communities,	which	allowed	
																																																						
421	The	horn	is	usually	removed	as	close	as	possible	to	the	growth	point	to	maximize	weight	and	profit.	Hacking	
or	cutting	close	to	the	growth	point	inevitably	involves	blood	and	gore,	which	decompose	and	rot	once	taken	off	
a	rhino.			
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them	to	reach	out	and	establish	both	strong	and	weak	connections	in	South	Africa	and	
beyond.		
	
While	business	alliances	are	fluid	and	reinvented	frequently,	the	demand	has	grown	to	the	
extent	that	horn	is	pre-ordered	and,	in	some	cases,	a	deposit	is	paid	to	ensure	exclusive	
delivery	to	the	ordering	party.	The	time-span	between	placing	the	order	and	receiving	the	
horn	plays	a	significant	role,	especially	in	cases	where	couriers	are	already	awaiting	their	
consignment.	Transporters	and	buyers	(Interviews,	2013)	hence	prefer	to	engage	with	
kingpins	who	have	a	reputation	for	speedy	delivery	of	the	genuine	product.	There	are	
however	no	exclusive	relationships;	in	other	words,	kingpins	engage	with	a	number	of	buyers	
and	vice	versa.	Moreover,	some	kingpins	combine	intermediary	and	transport	functions.	In	
such	cases,	the	kingpin	or	a	trusted	associate	transports	the	horn	to	the	buyer	or	courier,	or	
the	latter	undertakes	the	journey	to	fetch	the	horn	(which	happens	on	rare	occasions).		
	
Although	the	initial	procurement	of	rhino	horn	is	essential	to	initiating	this	illegal	flow,	
securing	its	onward	journey	is	equally	important	and	navigated	through	relationships	built	on	
trust	and	the	reputation	of	those	involved.	Kingpins	have	struck	up	deals	with	law	
enforcement	officials	in	some	instances,	whereby	a	police	officer	transports	rhino	horn	to	the	
buyer	or	ensures	its	safe	passage	(more	below).	An	organized	crime	investigator	(Interview,	
2013)	describes	the	next	level	of	sophistication:	
	
“	And	then	you	get	situations	where	the	poachers	pay	30,000	Rand	danger	pay	to	hunt	
a	rhino.	They	shoot	a	rhino	and	they	immediately	get	paid	25,	000	to	30,000	Rand	per	
kilo.	Now	they	can	afford	it,	like	the	big	Joe	also.	He	knows	that	the	next	level	is	the	
market.	The	good	thing	about	his	operation,	he	does	not	stand	the	risk	to	be	shot	or	
apprehended.	He	minimises	risk	by	transporting	it	in	a	taxi,	transport	it	in	a	private	
vehicle,	as	long	as	I	keep	on	the	road,	get	the	horn	to	my	markets	and	sell	it	off.	And	
you	see	the	current	case	in	Skukuza:	a	traffic	cop	from	the	Kruger,	a	game	ranger	and	
another	staff	member.		The	game	ranger	shoots	the	rhino	and	the	traffic	cop	
transports	the	horn	outside	the	park	and	then	asked	his	wife	to	transfer	it	further	to	
the	market.	How	you	going	to	stop	a	traffic	cop?	He	is	a	police	officer.	Organized	crime	
at	its	best.	The	wife	sold	it	to	the	market	in	Johannesburg.”422	
	
																																																						
422	25	000	Rand	was	worth	€1870	and	30	000	Rand	was	€	2	240	at	the	time	of	the	interview.	
	 327	
The	most	common	form	of	horn	transportation	from	the	border	villages	involves	a	close	and	
trusted	associate	of	the	kingpin	transporting	the	horn	to	the	buyer	or	transnational	courier.		
These	local	horn	couriers	tend	to	use	public	transport	–	buses	and	minibus	taxis	–	commuting	
between	Gaza	Province	and	Maputo	(or	one	of	the	other	transhipment	hubs,	see	below).	
Public	transport	provides	another	layer	of	protection	to	the	courier.	In	the	case	of	detection,	
the	courier	can	easily	shift	the	blame	to	the	driver	or	fellow	passengers.	Local	couriers	have	
trust–based	relationships	with	kingpins	anchored	through	familial,	kinship	or	past	criminal	
relationships;	kingpins	seldom	use	so-called	“runners”,	as	the	risk	of	detection	and	defection	
is	too	uncertain.	One	smuggler	said	(Interview	with	smuggler	4,	2013):		
	
“I	can’t	see	someone	trusting	a	runner	in	the	street	to	transport	a	rhino	horn	in	a	taxi.	
Maybe	they	stole	it	somewhere.	I,	as	a	supplier,	would	not	do	that.	I	would	want	to	
have	a	clean	deal.	Like	a	guy	like	Mr	Big,	where	I	know	if	he	doesn’t	pay	me,	I	kill	him.	
Simple	because	that	is	the	deal,	you	take	this	from	me	this	is	my	money.	If	you	don’t	
do	it,	I	know	where	you	live.	I	kill	you.	With	small	runners	you	don’t	have	it.	It	is	like	
drugs.	You	know	where	the	guy	lives	and	if	he	doesn’t	pay,	then	there	is	an	accident.”		
	
The	role	of	the	traditional	intermediary	who	interacts	with	poachers	on	behalf	of	buyers	is	
more	common	in	rhino	horn	flows	out	of	South	Africa.	In	this	instance,	the	intermediary	
constitutes	another	segment	or	nodal	point	in	the	flow.	On	the	one	hand,	the	intermediary	
negotiates	the	price,	provides	both	poacher	and	buyer	with	anonymity	from	one	another	and	
hence	an	additional	layer	of	protection	from	detection;	on	the	other	hand,	this	additional	
segment	renders	the	exchange	less	efficient	but	more	secure	and	creates	social	distance	
between	poacher	and	buyer	(the	security/efficiency	trade-off	is	discussed	in	more	detail	
below).	Other	tasks	include	quality	control,	money	laundering	and	off-shore	investments,	as	
well	as	the	coordination	of	local	and	international	transport	logistics.	Unlike	the	kingpins,	the	
traditional	intermediary	needs	no	charisma	or	social	skills.	Good	contacts	in	the	criminal	
underworld	and	law	enforcement	are,	however,	obligatory.	This	type	of	intermediary	has	
well-established	legitimate	business	or	investment	links	to	South	African	or	Asian	buyers,	
which	justify	close	ties	in	the	eyes	of	the	outside	world.	She	is	the	known	‘go-to’	person	when	
poachers	are	looking	for	a	buyer.		Due	to	the	expediency,	efficiency	and	security	of	flows	out	
of	Mozambique,	the	role	of	the	traditional	intermediary	is	largely	obsolete	or	diminished.	As	
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poaching	crews	get	better	financial	rewards	in	Mozambique,	South	African	poachers	are	
increasingly	moving	their	horn	supplies	to	Mozambique	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014).423		
	
	
7.6	Cooperation,	security	and	competition:	How	kingpins	secure	the	continuity	of	the	
flow	
	
A	kingpin’s	sphere	of	influence	is	spatially	confined	to	his	geographic	location	and	reach.	The	
level	of	tolerance	and	independence	between	the	different	Mr	Big’s	is	remarkable;	however,	a	
form	of	hegemony	(‘pegging	order’)	was	carefully	negotiated	in	the	Mozambican	hinterlands	
based	on	seniority,	popularity,	the	number	of	teams	and	the	durability	and	strength	of	
network	connections.	Areas	of	influence	are	fluid	and	hence	open	to	negotiation.	One	
Massingir–based	kingpin	informs	on	his	competition	(‘rats’	them	out)	when	their	activities	
lead	to	botched	horn	deals	or	they	undercut	his	price;	he	thus	asserts	his	influence	and	“puts	
them	back	in	their	place”(Interview	with	anti-poaching	official,	2013).	Another	kingpin	is	
reputed	to	have	a	penchant	for	violence	and	coercion	(Interviews,	2013);	however,	turf	issues	
and	competition	are	more	pronounced	on	the	South	African	side	where	a	former	police	
officer	ran	the	Bushbuckridge	and	Hazyview	areas	with	an	iron	fist	until	his	arrest	in	2012	
(Interviews,	2013).424	A	convicted	poacher	from	Mozambique	explains	the	difference	
(Interview	with	poacher	3,	2013):	
	
“It	is	safer	to	deal	with	the	Mozambicans	than	South	Africans.	They	can	pay	you	and	
then	get	someone	to	kill	you	after	the	deal.		Then	take	back	the	money	they’ve	paid	
you	-	and	that	happens	a	lot.	And	the	bosses	from	Mozambique	pay	more	than	South	
African	bosses	because	it	is	easier	to	transport	from	Mozambique.	They	can	get	a	truck	
full	of	logs	or	woods	and	they	can	put	the	horns	underneath.	They	even	transport	the	
guns	that	way.”		
	
																																																						
423	They	get	introduced	to	kingpins	or	intermediaries	through	kinship	ties	or	criminal	connections.	
	
424	Alleged	South	African	rhino	kingpin	“Big	Joe”	Nyalunga,	a	former	police	officer,	wielded	considerable	
influence	over	people	and	authorities	living	in	the	Bushbuckridge	area	near	the	KNP.	He	also	has	a	reputation	for	
violence,	and	there	are	anecdotal	claims	that	he	murdered	and	tortured	a	man.	
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At	the	time	of	data	collection,	there	was	little	competition	or	conflict	amongst	poaching	
groups	or	pronounced	‘turf	issues’.	Pressed	about	competition	or	the	potential	for	conflict,	
one	kingpin	(Interview,	2013)	explained	how	hunting	crews	deal	with	one	another:		
	
“It	does	not	happen.	No	one	owns	the	Kruger	and	even	when	we	meet	we	just	greet	
each	other	and	it’s	not	often	that	we	see	each	other.”	
	
	
The	structure	and	composition	of	hunting	crews	minimize	the	risk	of	“taking	out”	another	
group	while	on	the	hunt.	There	is	a	high	likelihood	that	the	hunters	know	each	other,	they	
might	have	hunted	together	in	the	past,	may	do	so	in	the	future,	or	they	might	be	tied	to	one	
another	through	kinship	or	friendship	ties.	Several	kingpins	and	poachers	talked	about	the	
potential	for	conflict	and	competition	once	rhino	numbers	grew	less;	high	demand	on	rare	
resources	is	likely	to	lead	to	conflict-laden	social	relations	and	diversification	into	other	
coveted	wildlife	products	like	ivory	(Interview	with	kingpins,	2013).	
	
Kingpins	are	confronted	with	the	potential	defection	of	their	hunting	crews.	Several	types	of	
defection	are	theoretically	possible,	some	of	which	are	linked	to	the	dangers	and	challenges	
of	illegal	hunting	in	protected	areas.	There	are	natural	dangers	associated	with	hiking	through	
the	bush,	such	as	running	into	dangerous	animals425	or	exposure	to	the	elements.426	Poachers	
also	face	the	potential	detection,	arrest	or	deaths	by	security	forces	deployed	in	conservation	
areas.	As	mentioned	in	earlier	sections,	kingpins	and	their	network	connections	ensure	legal	
representation	for	poachers	and	smugglers;	fines	and	bail	are	taken	care	of,	especially	in	cases	
where	the	arrestee	might	have	access	to	privileged	information	that	could	disrupt	the	flow.		
The	longer	it	takes	to	track	and	shoot	a	rhino,	the	higher	the	likelihood	of	detection,	and	the	
longer	until	the	buyer	takes	receipt	of	the	order	of	rhino	horn.	Time	and	speed	of	execution	
are	hence	important	elements	in	the	planning	phase	of	a	hunt.	Actionable	intelligence	or	
																																																						
425	KNP	rangers	ran	into	a	now	notorious	kingpin	who	was	a	hunter	a	few	years	back.	He	had	been	mauled	during	
a	lion	attack	while	on	a	rhino	hunt.	When	the	rangers	came	across	him	and	his	teammate,	they	claimed	to	be	
looking	for	work	in	South	Africa.	The	pair	was	taken	to	the	next	hospital,	treated	and	released.	Rangers	found	the	
hunting	rifles	a	few	days	later	(Interviews,	KNP,	2013).	
	
426	Large	parts	of	the	KNP	are	made	up	of	dry	“bushveld”	(South	African	term	for	dry	savannahs).	Temperatures	
range	in	the	late	30s	to	early	40s	in	the	summer	months,	and	the	mercury	drops	close	to	0	degrees	in	winter	
nights.	Floods	are	a	common	occurrence	during	the	rainy	season,	when	otherwise	dry	riverbeds	swell	to	full	
capacity	and	beyond,	sometimes	sweeping	away	rest	camps	and	park	infrastructures.	
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knowledge	of	recent	rhino	sightings,	tracks	or	locations,	and	the	position	and	movements	of	
security	personnel	shorten	the	duration	in	the	park	and	thus	minimize	the	risk	of	detection.	
Such	intelligence	is	either	gathered	proactively	or	bought	from	so-called	“spotters”,	who	work	
in	parks	or	reserves	and	are	hence	well-acquainted	with	standard	operating	procedures,	shift	
rosters	and	rhino	sightings	(Interviews	with	anti–poaching	officials,	2013).	An	organized	crime	
investigator	put	it	like	this	(Interview,	2013):	
	
“The	field	rangers	get	paid	5,000	Rand	now,	so	when	one	of	these	guys	come	with	
50,000	Rand	to	show	them	the	rhino,	what	is	your	choice	going	to	be?	Do	you	
remember	when	they	had	the	illegal	strike	inside	the	park?	And	all	the	Rangers	parked	
out	here.	They	were	out	here	for	about	a	month.	It	was	so	easy	to	make	contact	with	
these	guys	and	give	them	a	cell	phone	number	that	they	can	contact	these	guys.	You	
know	–	at	the	end	of	the	day	we	all	have	a	price.	Syndicate	bosses	pay	one	hundred	
thousand	Rand	so	that	a	docket	is	lost.”427	
	
Payment	to	members	of	poaching	groups	is	disbursed	on	a	sliding	scale	linked	to	functions,	
responsibilities	and	gun	ownership	of	individual	group	members.	‘Payments’	(bribes)	to	game	
rangers,	law	enforcement	officials	and	other	social	control	agents	are	standard	practice	and	
considered	operational	costs	(Interview	with	kingpin,	2013).	In	cases	where	no	standing	
agreement	exists	(securing	“free	passage”	of	poaching	groups	forms	part	of	the	kingpin’s	
coordination	repertoire),	poachers	will	carry	money	on	them	“to	free	themselves”	should	they	
“run	into	trouble”	(Interview	with	kingpin	2).	The	‘bounty’	on	the	rhino	and	the	low	wages	
paid	to	game	rangers,	as	well	as	situational	insider	knowledge,	standard	operating	procedures	
of	anti–poaching	units	render	staff	entrusted	with	protecting	rhinos	particularly	vulnerable	to	
accepting	bribes	or	recruitment	into	poaching	groups.	Says	a	Massingir-based	kingpin	
(Interview,	2013):	
	
“We	are	scared	of	the	rangers.	I	am	so	scared	of	them.	South	African	rangers	will	kill	
you	but	the	rangers	in	Mozambique	take	bribes.	There	are	rangers	who	work	with	the	
hunters.	There’s	a	ranger	who	has	his	own	group	of	hunters.	He’s	got	a	high	position	
there,	 and	 if	 he	 finds	 a	 hunter	 that	 is	 not	 in	 his	 group	 he	will	 shoot	 him,	 and	most	
hunters	know	him.”	
	
																																																						
427	5000	Rand	was	worth	427€	and	50	000	Rand	was	4275	€	at	the	time	of	data	collection.	
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Fieldwork	undertaken	in	the	borderlands	adjacent	to	the	KNP	(also	known	as	the	“eastern	
boundary”)	found	a	network	of	border	protection	staff	(Força	de	Guarda	Fronteira),	rangers	
from	the	LNP	and	the	KNP,	private	security	and	intelligence	operators	and	poachers	that	
directly	affect	the	protection	(or	lack	thereof)	of	the	rhino.	The	official	‘protectors’	(game	
rangers)	and	the	border	guards	are	important	elements	within	the	illegal	flow	as	they	provide	
protection,	information,	and	in	some	instances,	guns	to	the	poachers.	A	conservator	in	
Mozambique	revealed	(Interview	with	conservator	8,	2013):			
	
“The	guardians	of	the	park	are	complicit.	We	confiscated	the	same	gun	three	times	
and	we	confiscate	good	hunting	rifles	from	poachers	all	the	time.	They	rent	it	from	
rangers	in	the	Limpopo	National	Park.	One	of	the	main	rangers	had	all	the	main	guys	
under	his	protection.	No	one	could	do	anything.	So	we	had	this	massive	event	and	got	
the	governor	to	talk	about	anti-poaching.	So	in	front	of	this	guy,	we	gave	a	big	speech	
with	the	Guarda	Fronteira.	Then	there	was	political	pressure,	and	they	removed	all	the	
Guarda	Fronteira	and	then	they	phoned	me	and	said	they	had	just	gone	into	a	little	
village	and	had	confiscated	42	rifles.	As	it	turns	out,	they	confiscated	all	of	the	
Limpopo	National	Park’s	guns	because	they	were	corrupt	and	had	no	control	over	who	
had	access	to	the	guns.	They	were	renting	out	the	guns.	It	was	an	absolute	dog	show.	
For	one	year,	the	Limpopo	National	Park	didn't	have	any	AK-47s.”	
	
The	defection	of	poaching	crew	represents	another	risk.	This	can	take	the	form	of	selling	the	
ordered	rhino	horn	to	a	higher	bidder	or	the	theft	of	freshly	harvested	horn	by	competitors.428	
Failing	to	deliver	ordered	rhino	horn	or	reneging	on	payment	for	horn	can	lead	to	negative	
sanctions	and	consequences	for	the	poacher	or	their	families.	“I	get	my	boys	to	get	them”,	
said	one	kingpin,	alluding	to	the	use	of	force	in	case	of	defection.	However,	the	need	for	
direct	enforcement	or	coercion	appears	to	be	rare	on	the	Mozambican	side,	as	the	kingpin	
knows	and	recruits	his	poaching	crews	personally	and	often	shares	strong	links	with	them	and	
their	extended	families.			
	
Criminal	and	terrorist	networks	use	trust	and	secrecy	as	mechanisms	to	conceal	criminal	
activities	and	associations	(Morselli/Giguère/Petit	2007).	At	the	village	level,	it	is	difficult	to	
hide	clandestine	activities	or	liaisons,	because	boundaries	between	public	and	private	life	are	
fluid.	In	other	words,	there	is	limited	room	for	anonymity	and	privacy.	Illegal	economic	
activities	are	embedded	in	village	communities	and	have	led	to	changes	in	the	social	
																																																						
428	A	convicted	poacher	related	an	incident	where	poachers	working	for	two	different	bosses	attacked	a	
returning	hunting	crew,	stealing	their	bounty.	The	two	kingpins	resolved	the	turf	issue	peacefully.	
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stratification	of	the	community.	As	argued	in	earlier	sections	of	this	chapter,	the	community	is	
not	complicit	in	rhino	poaching	per	se;	community	members	do,	however,	know	who	the	
bosses	and	poachers	are,	and	are	aware	of	the	other	connections	they	cultivate.	While	the	
composition	of	villages	is	heterogeneous,	community	members	are	bound	together	by	their	
shared	experience	of	economic	displacement,	marginalization	and	exclusion.	The	traditional	
notion	of	secrecy	(keeping	certain	facts	hidden	from	public	view)	is	not	relevant	to	village	
communities;	the	binding	mechanism	preventing	villagers	(including	criminal	actors)	from	
divulging	information	to	unknown	entities	or	persons	is	based	on	solidarity	and	ethical,	
cultural	and	community	building	mechanisms,	which	prevent	villagers	from	stigmatizing	their	
own	in	front	of	others.	I	refer	to	this	mechanism	as	‘village	kinship’,	which	extends	the	idea	of	
social	embeddedness.	Kingpins	and	poachers	thus	resolve	the	coordination	problem	of	
security	through	village	kinship	at	the	village	level.	The	village	will	keep	the	“secret”	until	it	
becomes	untenable	or	affects	the	well-being	of	the	community.	In	the	current	dispensation,	
rhino	kingpins	and	poachers	appear	to	act	in	the	interest	of	the	community	while	the	Park	and	
rangers	have	been	undermining	the	interests	of	the	community.		
	
Once	rhino	horn	moves	beyond	the	confines	of	the	community,	other	mechanisms	become	
relevant.	An	earlier	section	of	this	chapter	described	how	kingpins	migrated	from	South	
African	buyers	to	Asian	buyers.	This	was	a	proactive	but	dangerous	move	at	the	time.	At	
present,	kingpins	collect	intelligence	ahead	of	meeting	with	potential	future	business	
partners.	One	kingpin	related	(Interview,	2013):	
	
“I	know	the	customers	from	my	past,	but	if	people	call	me	for	the	first	time	I	don’t	give	
them	the	correct	information.	I	give	them	the	wrong	information.	Then	I	send	my	guys	
to	go	and	check	who	arrived	at	the	place.	Maybe	one	guy	or	two	guys,	and	if	we	don’t	
suspect	 anything,	 my	 guys	 will	 bring	 the	 people	 to	 me.	 I	 make	 sure	 there’s	 no	
police.”429	
	
Beyond	traversing	difficult	terrain,	poachers	face	a	multitude	of	dangers	and	risks	for	which	
they	have	developed	innovative	protective	measures.	Brotherhood	exists	between	poaching	
																																																						
429	The	same	procedure	was	followed	ahead	of	the	interview	with	me.	I	was	asked	to	meet	the	kingpin	at	a	
specific	restaurant	in	Massingir.	The	interview	was	scheduled	for	12	o’clock.	Several	people	passed	through	the	
restaurant	during	the	course	of	the	next	three	hours.	After	my	companion	and	I	had	passed	muster,	the	kingpin	
and	his	associate	arrived	for	the	interview.	
	
	 333	
crews	from	village	communities:	Information	on	rhino	sightings	and	ranger	presence	is	
shared.	An	early	warning	system	has	been	devised	in	Massingir:	different	types	of	cool	drink	
cans	on	the	roof	rack	of	kingpin’s	off-street	vehicle	signal	whether	it	is	safe	to	head	into	the	
KNP.	Poachers	also	consult	with	traditional	healers	(so-called	sangomas)	ahead	of	poaching	
expeditions.	A	sangoma	will	advise	as	to	when	it	would	be	safe	for	poachers	to	slip	through	
the	fence	line	and	hunt	rhino.	They	also	prepare	‘muti’	(traditional	medicine)	to	protect	
poachers	during	the	hunt.430	Some	sangomas	recommend	the	removal	of	the	eyes	and	ears	of	
the	dead	rhino	after	the	animal	has	been	killed.	According	to	poachers	(Interviews,	2013),	
“the	rhino’s	soul	can’t	hear	or	see	you	[the	poacher]	and	can’t	show	who	you	[the	poacher]	
are.”	Anti–poaching	officials	confirmed	that	they	encounter	carcasses	of	rhinos	where	the	
eyes	have	been	cut	out	with	machetes	or	hand	knives	(Interviews,	2013).	A	new	trend	relates	
to	the	removal	of	rhino	feet	and	genitals.431	The	role	of	the	sangoma	is	attributed	to	high	
status	and	influence	in	village	life.	Many	poachers	related	how	the	sangoma’s	sanctioning	of	a	
planned	hunt	was	as	important	as	leasing	the	gun.	In	essence,	the	sangoma	legitimized	the	
illegal	expedition	in	the	Park	by	providing	protection	and	the	go-ahead.	According	to	Kruger	
officials	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014),	there	were	a	couple	of	Mozambican	sangomas	running	
poaching	groups.		
	
	
7.7	Smuggling	the	horn:	Efficiency	versus	security	concerns	
	
The	heterogeneous	profile	of	local	and	international	transporters	and	their	strategic	
deployment	is	noteworthy.	Transport	intermediaries	acting	on	behalf	of	the	international	
buyer	(predominantly	Asian)	are	individuals	with	legitimate	business	in	the	village	
communities	or	in	local	markets,	such	as	running	a	local	retail	business	or	involvement	in	the	
telecommunications,	construction	or	university	sector.	The	mode	of	inland	transportation	and	
transhipment	hub	changes	frequently,	contingent	on	the	choice	of	transcontinental	
																																																						
430	One	anti-poaching	official	(Interview,	2013)	recounted	that	he	found	raw	eggs	in	the	pocket	of	a	poacher.	The	
sangoma	had	told	the	man	that	he	would	have	to	turn	around	as	soon	as	the	egg	broke	because	it	would	no	
longer	be	safe	in	the	Park.	The	egg	was	in	tact	at	the	time	of	the	poacher’s	arrest.		
	
431	South	African	conservators	(personal	communication,	2015)	believe	that	these	body	parts	are	sold	to	the	local	
muti	market.		
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transportation.	Research	elsewhere	(Milliken	2014:	20–21)	and	empirical	data	collected	for	
the	current	study	at	both	ends	of	the	supply	chain432	suggest	that	most	horn	leaves	the	
African	continent	by	plane,	its	onward	journey	from	entrepôts	depends	on	the	connectedness	
of	intermediaries.	Kingpins	and	their	minions	thus	ferry	the	horn	either	to	the	local	market	
(which	used	to	be	based	in	Chokwe,	Beira	and	Maputo)433	or	directly	to	the	buyer’s	transport	
intermediary	who	would	be	located	in	Maputo	or	Johannesburg.434	The	latter	option	of	the	
kingpin	or	the	local	transporter	transferring	the	horn	to	the	buyer,	or	the	transcontinental	
transport	intermediary,	is	the	preferred	choice	as	it	is	fast	and	efficient.	While	the	previous	
chapter	pointed	to	complex	systems	and	relationships	involving	wildlife	professionals	and	
organized	crime	groups	involved	in	gray	channelling,	illegal	poaching	in	the	KNP	has	allowed	
criminal	actors	to	pursue	decentralized,	straightforward	and	direct	routes	due	to	the	
opportunity	structures	(discussed	above)	presented	by	Mozambique	bordering	the	Park.	The	
simplest,	most	direct	and	efficient	route	from	the	KNP	to	the	international	transhipment	point	
was	also	the	most	secure	and	has	been	tried	and	tested	by	organized	crime	groups	involved	in	
a	bouquet	of	criminal	markets	for	several	decades.		
	
South	African	authorities	have	successfully	intercepted	several	huge	and	multiple	smaller	
consignments	of	rhino	horn	often	smuggled	in	tandem	with	other	prohibited	wildlife	products	
passing	through	Oliver	R	Tambo	International	Airport	(Interviews	with	SARS	officials,	2013).	
Prince	Manyathi,	a	magistrate	presiding	over	cases	of	wildlife	trafficking	going	through	the	
airport	provides	a	nuanced	profile	of	the	smugglers	(quoted	by:	Trung/Huong	2013):	
	
“Since	2008,	more	than	30	rhino	horn	smuggling	cases	have	been	seized	in	
Johannesburg.	During	the	period	of	2010	-	2012,	there	were	132	people	from	various	
																																																						
432	According	to	interdiction	data	of	Vietnam’s	CITES	Scientific	Authority	provided	in	2013	(personal	
communication,	2013),	all	interdictions	involving	rhino	horn	had	occurred	at	the	two	main	international	airports	
in	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	and	Hanoi,	except	for	one	interdiction	along	a	major	highway	in	2004.	
	
433	A	curious	adaption	was	the	use	of	white	Mozambicans	of	Portuguese	extraction	to	transport	horn	from	
Massingir	to	Maputo.	These	runners	supposedly	carry	an	aura	of	privilege	and	status,	which	allows	them	to	
navigate	through	roadblocks	without	being	stopped	or	searched	(Interviews	with	intelligence	officers,	2013).	
	
434	Rhino	horn	has	also	been	smuggled	via	Cape	Town	International	Airport	out	of	the	country.	Police	and	
intelligence	data	suggests	the	use	of	the	international	airports	in	Manzini,	Swaziland	and	Maseru,	Lesotho.	Due	
to	the	high	number	of	pilots	involved	in	rhino	poaching	syndicates,	organized	crime	investigators	believe	that	
organized	trafficking	groups	use	small	light	airplanes	and	transport	rhino	horn	to	neighbouring	countries	from	
the	many	unregistered	landing	strips	sprinkled	across	South	Africa.	
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countries	participating	in	and	smuggling	rhino	horns,	were	under	arrest	in	South	
Africa,	of	which	Vietnamese	nationals	accounted	for	most	of	the	detainees.	On	
average,	every	10	detected	cases,	there	would	be	9	cases	conducted	by	Vietnamese	
people,	and	the	other	one	has	the	involvement	of	Vietnamese	nationals.	Most	of	the	
detainees	admit	in	the	court	that	they	can	receive	USD	8,000	for	a	pair	of	rhino	horn,	
smugglers	can	have	USD	15,000	to	take	them	out	the	South	Africa,	but	there	is	no	
specific	amount	for	the	payment	by	the	final	consumer”	…[...]…4	months	ago,	we	
detained	2	Vietnamese	students	smuggling	rhino	horns,	each	of	them	carried	10	
horns.	In	the	court,	they	admitted	that	they	were	hired	to	transport	a	sealed	package	
that	they	did	not	know	what	was	inside.	The	court	found	they	were	guilty	and	
sentenced	them	with	a	monetary	punishment	of	1	million	Rand	(about	USD	90,000)	for	
each	of	them.	They	paid	the	amount	right	away.	This	is	to	confirm	that	there	is	surely	a	
very	strong	organization	backing	them	up,	willing	to	pay	in	cash	for	the	transporters	if	
they	are	under	arrest.	Most	of	the	hired	transporters	of	rhino	horns	are	poor	or	are	
having	financial	difficulty.”	
	
Wildlife	trafficking	networks	were	using	Vietnamese	students	enrolled	at	South	African	
universities	and	technikons435	as	horn	couriers	upon	returning	to	their	home	country	for	Tet	
celebrations436	and	other	holidays	(Interview	with	organized	crime	investigator,	2013).	There	
were	also	cases	where	trafficking	networks	recruited	people	in	Hanoi	and	other	Vietnamese	
cities	to	collect	a	‘package’	in	South	Africa.	They	would	fly	to	the	country,	collect	the	parcel	at	
the	airport	and	fly	out	the	same	or	next	day	(pers.	communication	with	Julian	Rademeyer,	
2016).	Similar	to	drug	trafficking	networks,	the	profile	of	couriers	and	the	point	of	departure	
and	arrival	are	highly	adaptable.	Decoys	are	used	to	distract	law	enforcement	officials	(see	
next	chapter).		According	to	law	enforcement	sources	(Interviews,	2013	and	2014),	
Vietnamese	nationals	have	been	smuggling	rhino	horn	from	other	airports	in	southern	Africa,	
with	the	international	airports	in	Nairobi	and	Maputo	frequently	featuring	as	transhipment	
nodes.	Airlines	with	direct	or	indirect	flights	to	Vietnam	and	other	Southeast	Asian	destination	
such	as	Bangkok	and	Hong	Kong	are	preferred.	European	airports	also	serve	as	transit	hubs	
(An	2015).	African	transcontinental	smugglers	are	a	rarity	because	Asian	law	enforcement	
agents	are	reputed	to	screen	people	traveling	on	southern	African	passports	(Interviews	in	
Hong	Kong	and	Vietnam,	2013).	
																																																						
435	The	term	‘technikon’	refers	to	a	technical	and	vocational	training	college	in	South	Africa.	
	
436	Tet,	the	“Feast	of	the	First	Morning	of	the	First	Day”	refers	to	Vietnamese	New	Year.	The	date	of	the	most	
important	cultural	event	in	Vietnam	coincides	with	the	Chinese	New	Year,	with	the	date	usually	falling	between	
January	and	February.	
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While	rhino	horn	is	still	transiting	through	OR	Tambo,	Maputo	International	Airport	has	
become	the	airport	of	choice	for	organized	crime	groups	as	staff	from	the	higher	echelons	of	
airport	management	through	to	customs	and	cleaning	staff	have	a	reputation	for	assisting	
with	the	safe	passage	of	contraband	against	a	small	fee.	This	assessment	corresponds	with	the	
observation	of	an	airport	executive	based	at	Maputo	International	Airport,	who	stated	that	
wildlife	contraband	was	only	detected	and	confiscated	when	the	relevant	gatekeepers	had	
not	received	their	bribe.	They	may	also	be	unhappy	with	the	amount	paid,	or	the	horns	were	
“supposed”	to	be	confiscated	as	a	token	of	political	will	(Interview,	Maputo,	2013).	
Competition	between	different	wildlife	trafficking	groups	increases	as	rhino	horn	travels	along	
the	illegal	flow.	According	to	a	horn	smuggler	(Interview,	2013),	several	major	seizures	in	
Asian	transhipment	hubs	were	the	result	of	tip-offs	by	competing	organized	wildlife	trafficking	
groups:	
“Yes	it	was	competition.	I	understand	Chinese	and	the	way	I	see	them	operate.	They	
want	to	prove	to	one	another	who's	the	biggest,	who	is	the	greatest.	If	I	am	more	than	
you,	I	have	to	oppress	you.	You	can’t	do	anything.	They	make	it	like	a	mafia–way,	you	
understand.	They	like	it	this	way,	these	kingpins.	Because	the	information	was	spot-on.	
It	was	exact.”		
	
Rhino	horn	is	also	smuggled	on-board	of	shipping	vessels,	concealed	inside	containers	carrying	
a	variety	of	natural	resources	from	southern	and	East	African	port	cities	including	Cape	Town,	
Durban,	Beira,	Mombassa	and	Dar	es	Salaam.	Smugglers	remarked	that	air	travel	was	the	
preferred	mode	of	transportation	due	to	time	and	efficiency	concerns.		
	
The	previous	chapter	touched	on	the	role	of	Vietnamese	embassy	staff	in	the	procurement	
and	transportation	of	rhino	horn	from	the	source	to	their	home	country.437	The	dubious	role	
of	embassy	staff	came	initially	under	the	spotlight	after	environmental	journalists	filmed	the	
embassy’s	former	first	secretary	receiving	rhino	horns	from	a	known	trafficker	on	the	street	
outside	the	Vietnamese	embassy	in	Pretoria	in	2008	(50/50	2008).438	South	African	police	
																																																						
437	An	informant	in	Vietnam	(Interview,	2013)	equally	found	evidence	that	diplomatic	staff	at	the	South	African	
embassy	in	Vietnam	was	involved	in	rhino	horn	smuggling.	The	matter	is	with	South	African	authorities.	
	
438	Vu	Moc	Anh	was	recalled	after	the	incident.	Law	enforcement	investigators	(Interviews,	2013)	believe	that	
she	has	been	posted	to	the	Vietnamese	embassy	in	Maputo.	This	could	not	be	independently	confirmed.	
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officers	also	found	evidence	that	the	former	economic	attaché	was	using	his	diplomatic	
immunity	to	transport	and	smuggle	rhino	horns	in	diplomatic	vehicles	and	bags	(Rademeyer	
2012:	257).	A	political	counsellor	at	the	embassy	and	the	deputy	head	of	the	Vietnamese	
‘Government	Office’	were	equally	implicated	in	rhino	horn	procurement	and	transport	(ibid).	
More	recently,	North	Korean	diplomats	have	been	linked	to	rhino	horn	trafficking.	The	South	
African	government,	for	example,	expelled	a	North	Korean	diplomat	in	December	2015.	The	
diplomat	abused	his	diplomatic	immunity	and	the	embassy’s	diplomatic	pouch	to	smuggle	
rhino	horn	out	of	South	Africa.	He	was	arrested	in	the	Mozambican	capital	of	Maputo	in	May	
2015	after	4.5	kg	of	rhino	horn	and	close	to	$	100	000	were	found	in	a	vehicle	in	which	he	was	
traveling.	The	car	had	diplomatic	number	plates	and	was	registered	to	the	North	Korean	
embassy	in	Pretoria.	The	diplomat	and	his	companion	were	subsequently	released	on	bail	of	
$30	000	and	returned	to	South	Africa	(Rademeyer	2015).439		
	
Fieldwork	in	Vietnam	revealed	that	buyers	and	consumers	trusted	the	provenance	and	
authenticity	of	rhino	horn	when	procured	from	or	via	diplomats	and	government	officials	(see	
Chapter	8	on	fake	horn).	Disrupting	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn	(or	any	illegal	substance	or	
commodity)	becomes	a	matter	of	high	politics	and	quiet	diplomacy	when	criminal	actors	can	
claim	diplomatic	immunity	from	prosecution.	By	virtue	of	their	diplomatic	status,	Vietnamese	
diplomats	and	their	pouches	are	untouchable	like	the	Mozambican	kingpins.	The	smuggling	of	
any	contraband	through	diplomatic	channels	is	the	most	secure	flow	because	law	
enforcement	bodies	hold	no	jurisdiction	to	open	and	search	diplomatic	pouches	(compare	
with:	United	Nations	Conference	on	Diplomatic	Intercourse	and	Immunities	1961:	Article	27	
of	the	Vienna	Convention	on	Diplomatic	Relations).	
	
																																																						
439	Julian	Rademeyer	compiled	a	timeline	of	North	Korean	diplomatic	involvement	in	rhino	horn	trafficking	that	
dates	back	to	the	1980s.	In	his	book	on	‘Operation	Lock’	(a	controversial	law	enforcement	operation	to	disrupt	
rhino	horn	trafficking	in	the	1980s),	John	Hanks	(2015:	104-107)	argues	that	North	Korean	embassies	were	
notoriously	underfunded.	Diplomats	were	expected	to	raise	the	remainder	of	the	funds	in	their	host	countries.	
Hanks	suggests	that	North	Korean	diplomats	financed	the	embassy	in	the	Zimbabwean	capital	of	Harare	through	
“the	purchase,	smuggling	and	resale	of	rhino	horn	(Hanks	2015:	104).”	The	embassy	had	been	opened	in	1981,	
and	consecutive	councilors	and	embassy	staff	were	allegedly	using	their	diplomatic	privileges	to	smuggle	rhino	
horn	out	of	the	country.	The	former	head	of	WWF-South	Africa	states	that	“irrefutable	evidence	during	a	
number	of	sting	operations”	was	made	available	to	Zimbabwean	ministers	(Hanks	2015:	105).	However,	the	
Zimbabwe	police	and	conservation	agencies	were	allegedly	instructed	to	leave	the	embassy	staff	alone	in	the	
early	1990s	(ibid).	The	North	Korean	embassy	in	Harare	closed	in	the	late	1990s.	
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Illegal	market	actors	confirmed	that	the	risk	of	detection	was	higher	in	source	countries	
where	sniffer	dogs	and	competent	border	staff	knew	how	to	identify	rhino	horn	whereas	law	
enforcement	staff	in	transit	and	destination	countries	have	not	been	sufficiently	trained	to	
identify	illegal	wildlife	contraband	(compare	with:	Sellar	2014a;	Sellar	2014b).	Similar	to	the	
gray	channels	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	shorter	the	supply	chain	(the	fewer	
segments	or	nodal	points),	the	faster	and	more	secure	the	flow.	While	gray	channelling	
involves	more	segments	and	actors	in	the	supply	chain	as	a	precautionary	security	measure,	
actors	involved	in	this	illegal	flow	commented	on	their	preference	for	shorter	supply	chains	
with	a	few	“tried	and	tested”	intermediaries	who	are	nonetheless	swapped	depending	on	the	
final	destination	of	the	horn	and	the	mode	of	transportation.	A	few	strategic	actors	such	as	
government	officials	and	law	enforcement	agents	receive	regular	payments	to	“clear	the	
coast”	(Interviews,	2013).	The	intermediary	and	transport	roles	are	hence	of	particular	
significance	in	short	flows	as	any	wrong	move	could	lead	to	detection	or	defection.	
	
Existing	literature	suggests	that	criminal	networks	face	an	efficiency/security	trade-off	and	
security	concerns	appear	to	reign	supreme	in	operational	decision-making	
(Morselli/Giguère/Petit	2007;	Lindelauf/Borm/Hamers	2009).	Trust	and	secrecy	are	the	two	
binding	mechanisms	that	ensure	and	facilitate	collaboration	between	network	members	and	
enable	flows	(Morselli/Giguère/Petit	2007:	144).	Empirical	evidence	collected	for	this	project	
suggests	the	need	for	a	more	nuanced	interpretation	when	it	comes	to	illegal	rhino	horn	
supply	chains.	While	security	concerns	appear	to	play	a	structuring	role	in	gray	flows	of	rhino	
horn,	they	appear	secondary	to	efficiency	and	quality	control	concerns	in	illegal	flows.	Why	is	
this	the	case?	When	seen	through	a	South	African	or	international	lens,	the	illegal	hunting	and	
killing	of	rhinos,	the	dehorning	and	subsequent	smuggling	of	rhino	horn	from	the	bush	
through	to	transit	hubs	and	the	final	consumer	markets	constitute	an	unambiguous	illegal	
flow.	Actors	do	not	bend	the	rules	or	exploit	loopholes	in	this	instance;	they	break	the	‘law	of	
the	land’	on	several	counts.	This	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to,	trespassing	in	a	protected	
area,	hunting	without	a	permit,	illegal	hunting	of	rhinos	(and	calves),	illegal	possession	of	
rhino	horn,	illegal	possession	of	firearms	and	ammunition,	dealing	in	rhino	horn,	theft,	illegal	
immigration,	racketeering	and	money	laundering	(Interview	with	prosecutors	1	and	2,	2013).		
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Illegal	market	actors	and	market	disruptors	(law	enforcement	and	government	officials)	cited	
the	illegitimacy	of	the	hunting	and	rhino	horn	trade	ban	and	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn	as	a	
legitimate	tradable	commodity	as	legitimation	devices	for	their	illegal	activities.	Like	other	
important	actors	in	the	overall	market	structure,	these	actors	invoke	the	notion	of	contested	
illegality.	The	crime	of	rhino	poaching	and	rhino	horn	trafficking	was	interpreted	in	a	less	
serious	light	than	crimes	that	affected	the	community	or	fellow	human	beings	directly.	
Poachers	and	kingpins	appear	to	use	this	form	of	reasoning	to	bypass	law	enforcement,	and	
they	feel	secure	and	untouchable	on	their	home	turf.	Moreover,	a	few	market	disruptors	
were	co-opted	into	poaching	groups	or	started	their	own	hunting	crews	(several	rangers	from	
the	KNP	and	LNP	run	their	own	hunting	teams	–	see	section	on	cooperation).		The	
participation	of	social	control	agents	in	poaching	groups	does	not	only	secure	the	flow	of	
rhino	horn,	but	it	also	legitimizes	the	criminal	activities	associated	with	obtaining	and	
trafficking	of	rhino	horn.	The	argument	goes	that	if	a	member	of	the	political,	economic	or	
social	elite	is	involved	in	the	flow,	then	it	cannot	be	against	the	law	(Interviews,	2013).	Their	
participation	may	render	the	flow	more	secure,	but	this	does	not	equate	to	the	coordination	
problem	of	security	being	less	of	concern.	
	
Seen	from	a	Mozambican	perspective,	rhino	poaching	was	not	specified	as	a	criminal	offence	
in	the	Mozambican	criminal	code	until	April	2014.		According	to	Portuguese	colonial	laws,	
poaching	of	wildlife	was	indeed	a	minor	transgression	in	Mozambique	obtaining	discretionary	
fines,	except	for	the	occasional	heavy-handed	action	against	villagers	suspected	of	
subsistence	poaching	in	national	parks	(Witter	2013).	Rhino	kingpins	(Interviews	in	
Mozambique,	2013)	justified	illegal	hunting	by	stating	that	rhino	poaching	was	not	even	a	
crime	in	Mozambique	(at	the	time).	Moreover,	hunting	of	wild	animals	was	a	rite	of	passage	
for	young	boys	growing	up	in	villages,	and	boys	and	men	had	been	hunting	in	the	former	
Coutada	16	(now	designated	as	the	LNP)	for	many	generations.	Poachers	(Interviews,	2013)	
referred	to	the	double-edged	morality	of	allowing	“white	men”	to	hunt	rhino	legally	while	the	
“black	man”	is	guilty	of	a	criminal	offence	and	stigmatized	as	a	“poacher”	because	he	cannot	
afford	the	pricing	of	commercial	sports	hunting.			
	
	The	Mozambican	parliament	passed	the	Conservation	Areas	Act	(Republic	of	Mozambique	
2013)	in	April	2014,	which	provides	for	custodial	sentences	of	between	eight	and	twelve	years	
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for	individuals	who	kill	any	protected	species	without	a	license	or	use	banned	fishing	gear	
such	as	explosives	or	toxic	substances.	The	Act	also	penalizes	individuals	found	using	illegal	
firearms	or	snares	with	a	prison	sentence	of	up	to	two	years.	Anyone	found	guilty	of	the	illegal	
exploitation,	storage,	transport	or	sale	of	protected	species	will	be	fined	between	50	and	1000	
times	the	minimum	monthly	national	wage	paid	to	public	officials440	(CITES	Secretariat	
2014:8–	9).	Rhino	poaching	and	the	trafficking	and	possession	of	rhino	horn	thus	were	
criminalized	in	Mozambique	in	April	2014.	However,	the	country’s	legislation	is	currently	
being	revised	to	impose	stiffer	penalties	for	traffickers.	At	this	stage,	smugglers	usually	receive	
a	fine	whereas	poachers	get	jail	time.	Implementation,	diffusion	and	compliance	of	the	new	
law	has	to	involve	training	and	capacity	building	of	law	enforcement	and	judicial	officers,	as	
well	as	awareness	raising	and	education	amongst	those	constituencies	affected	by	the	new	
law.		
	
Graph		7:	Mozambican	arrest,	rifle	confiscation	and	fines	data,	2011	-	2013	
	
Source:	Report	on	Rhinoceroses,	CITES	Secretariat	(CITES	Secretariat	2014:	8)	
	
As	shown	in	the	graph	above	(Graph	7),	there	has	been	a	steady	increase	in	arrests,	rifle	
confiscations	and	fines	issued	between	2011	and	2013.	The	proof	is	in	the	pudding:	Those	
arrested	are	often	released	within	a	few	hours	(Interview	with	poaching	kingpins	1	and	2,	
Massingir,	2013),	rifles	find	their	way	back	into	circulation	and	only	a	small	percentage	of	fines	
are	paid.		
	
	
																																																						
440	This	amounts	to	US	$	4	425	and	US	$	88	500	at	the	current	exchange	rate	in	November	2014.	
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7.8	Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	dealt	with	structures	and	processes	linked	to	the	greatest	source	of	rhino	
horn,	the	illegal	hunting	of	rhinos	in	South	African	conservation	areas.	While	this	form	of	horn	
‘production’	constitutes	an	illegal	flow	from	the	bush	to	the	market,	it	is	connected	to	gray	
channelling	(Chapter	6)	as	some	of	the	same	intermediaries,	transporters	and	routes	are	used.	
This	chapter	also	demonstrates	the	historical	lock-in	linked	to	conservation	paradigms,	which	
renders	disruption	of	these	flows	a	difficult	if	not	impossible	undertaking.	The	increasing	
militarization	of	anti-poaching	operations	is	contributing	to	the	further	alienation	of	local	
communities,	which	under	different	circumstances,	could	act	as	the	first	line	of	defence	
against	rhino	poaching.	Actors	in	this	flow	have	mastered	the	coordination	problems	of	
competition,	cooperation	and	security.	
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Chapter	8:	Fake	rhino	horn:	Trust	and	the	issue	of	quality	control	
	
“You	can	feel	it;	you	can	see	it	if	your	eyes	are	open.	Normally,	especially	when	you're	
African,	you	will	know.	You	know	there	are	some	people	here	that	don't	know	about	
rhinos,	they've	just	heard	about	rhinos.	They've	never	seen	the	rhino.	Maybe	only	in	
the	zoo	(Interview	with	convicted	poacher	16,	2013).”		
	
8.1	Introduction	
	
Chapter	3	focused	on	the	demand	and	valuation	of	rhino	horn.	A	parallel	market	for	fake	
rhino	horn	has	existed	ever	since	rhino	horn	became	a	high-end	tradable	good	several	
millennia	ago.	The	issue	of	fake	horn	is	relevant	to	the	overall	market	structure	due	to	its	
incidence	along	the	entire	supply	chain	and	its	implication	for	valuation.	The	normative	
perceptions	of	regulators	and	illegal	market	actors	regarding	the	legality	of	fake	or	‘Ersatz’441	
horn,	for	example,	provide	fascinating	insights	on	the	valuation	of	rhino	horn.	Tied	to	the	
coordination	problem	of	value	is	the	issue	of	quality	control.	How	do	market	actors	ensure	
that	they	do	not	buy,	trade	or	consume	fake	rhino	horn?	The	chapter	begins	with	the	
differentiation	of	different	types	of	fake	rhino	horn	before	looking	at	actors	involved	in	the	
production	and	distribution	of	such	horns.	The	research	identified	the	role	of	the	rhino	horn	
assessor,	who	fulfils	the	function	of	quality	control	and	risk	mitigation.	
	
	
8.2	Legal	actors	and	Ersatz	horn	
	
Both	legitimate	and	criminal	actors	are	involved	in	the	production	of	fake	or	‘Ersatz’	rhino	
horn,	which	differs	regarding	quality,	purpose	and	functionality.	Taxidermists,	manufacturers	
and	scientists	belong	to	the	category	of	legitimate	horn	replica	producers	although	rogue	
taxidermists	have	also	been	complicit	in	criminal	conspiracies	involving	fraud,	theft	and	
laundering	of	original	and	fake	rhino	horn.	Taxidermists	produce	a	replica	of	hunting	trophies	
and	rhino	horns	for	museums,	galleries,	zoos	and	private	collections	in	order	to	prevent	theft	
of	the	originals	or	to	replace	originals	that	were	stolen	previously	(see	Figure	10).	The	
																																																						
441	The	German	word	“Ersatz”	has	become	usus	for	substitute	horns.	
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production	of	such	horn	replicas	requires	a	specialized	artisanal	process.	Taxidermists	use	a	
variety	of	materials	to	recreate	rhino	horn	including	Jesmonite	acrylic	resin,	glass	fibre	or	
silicone	(Natural–History–Conservation.com	2015).	Such	horn	replica	can	look	surprisingly	
authentic	as	a	gang	of	thieves	found	out	when	they	broke	into	the	Natural	History	Museum	in	
the	British	county	of	Hertfordshire,	and	stole	replicas	made	of	resin	from	stuffed	rhinos	in	
2011	(Staff	reporter	for	Canberra	Times	2011).	
	
Figure	10:	Rhino	trophy	with	Ersatz	horn	
	
Source:	Photo	taken	by	Jens	Beckert	in	Paris,	France	
	
These	high–quality	‘Ersatz’	horns	have	become	an	area	of	concern	to	CITES	authorities,	which	
found	that	the	quality	of	fake	rhino	horns	used	to	deceive	enforcement	authorities	had	
improved	markedly.	The	CITES	Secretariat	(2013:	6)	and	law	enforcement	officials	(Interviews,	
2013)	reported	a	high	number	of	incidents	involving	professional,	pseudo	and	proxy	hunters	
who	removed	rhino	horns	from	their	hunting	trophies	and	replaced	them	with	fake	horns	
upon	returning	to	their	home	countries.	Intermediaries	launder	the	real	horns	into	the	illegal	
market.	Such	fake	rhino	horns	could	be	easily	identified	in	the	past	as	they	were	shaped	into	
horn	moulds	using	fiberglass	or	plastic;	however,	recent	samples	have	been	made	from	high-
quality	resin	with	a	more	solid	structure	than	real	horn.	This	improvement	renders	visual	
identification	of	this	horn	‘Ersatz’	difficult.	As	a	consequence,	CITES	officials	burn	a	small	
quantity	of	dust	from	the	horn,	which	should	deliver	a	distinctive	smell	depending	on	whether	
keratin	biomass	or	synthetic	materials	are	present	(Carnie	2012).	Due	to	the	replacement	of	
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real	horn	and	its	laundering	into	illegal	trade	flows,	the	CITES	Secretariat	has	called	on	
member	countries	to	implement	adequate	legislation	and	enforcement	controls	to	prevent	
horns	of	legally	obtained	hunting	trophies	from	entering	illegal	trade	flows,	and	to	ensure	that	
the	trophies	“remain	in	the	possession	of	their	owners	for	the	purpose	indicated	in	the	CITES	
export	permit”	(CITES	Secretariat	2013:	6).	The	quality	and	authenticity	of	replica	horns	are	
hence	dependent	on	the	trophy	owner’s	rationale	for	replacing	the	horn	with	a	replica.	It	
could	be	a	safety	precaution	to	avert	theft.	Depending	on	whether	close	or	corruptible	ties	to	
public	officials	are	in	place,	the	mounting	of	cheap	plastic	replica	may	be	sufficient	to	keep	up	
a	semblance	of	legality.	This	façade	may	also	apply	to	scenarios	where	the	chances	of	a	trophy	
audit	are	unlikely.442		
	
In	the	hope	of	manufacturing	a	facsimile	rhino	horn	that	could	act	as	a	viable	substitute	for	
the	original	material,443	several	teams	of	scientists	and	engineers	are	in	the	process	of	
“bioengineering”	synthetic	rhino	horn	(Zak	2015;	Aulakh	2015),	attempting	to	“clone”	rhinos	
and	rhino	horn	(Sullivan	Brennan	2014;	Speart	1994),	or	investigating	the	potential	for	
growing	rhino	horn	in	vitro	(Yang	2011:	8).444	Since	rhino	horn	was	struck	of	the	list	off	
permissible	ingredients	in	the	Chinese	pharmacopeia	in	1993,	government	and	traditional	
medicine	authorities	have	encouraged	the	substitution	of	rhino	horn	with	the	horn	of	water	
buffalo,	saiga	antelope,	cattle	and	yak	to	achieve	similar	results.	Such	‘Ersatz’	horns	are	
legitimate,	viable	and	more	affordable	than	rhino	horn;	offering	them	as	the	‘real	deal’	
																																																						
442	In	2014,	South	African	investigative	journalist	Simon	Bloch	(personal	communication,	2015)	contacted	the	
CITES	management	authority	in	Poland	to	verify	whether	Polish	authorities	were	monitoring	the	influx	of	hunting	
trophies	from	South	Africa.	After	a	Czech-Vietnamese	trafficking	network	was	busted,	suspicions	are	rife	that	
Polish	hunters	were	also	collaborating	with	Asian	wildlife	trading	networks.	Bloch	was	told	that	the	Polish	
authorities	were	“struggling”	to	do	check	up’s	on	Polish	trophy	hunters	due	to	country’s	privacy	laws.		
	
443	Conservation	NGOs	such	as	the	WWF	contest	the	legitimacy	of	producing	legal	horn	substitutes	to	prevent	
poaching.	Says	WWF	wildlife	trade	expert	Colman	O’Criodain	(quoted	in:	Aulakh	2015):		
	
"There	is	already	a	huge	quantity	of	fake	horn	in	circulation	in	Vietnam	but	that	isn't	denting	the	
poaching	levels.	In	general,	we	favour	trying	to	change	consumer	behaviour	rather	than	pandering	to	it.	
That	is	where	we	are	currently	directing	our	efforts."	
	
444	Yang’s	article	refers	to	scientific	research	into	the	self-healing	nature	of	rhino	horn.	While	rhino	horn	is	
considered	dead	tissue,	scientists	have	captured	images	that	show	a	polymer	substitute	filling	cracks	of	rhino	
horn.	Two	hypotheses	might	explain	this	phenomenon:	either	there	are	living	cells	in	the	horn	(and	thus	rhino	
horn	could	be	grown	in	vitro)	or	there	might	be	a	transport	system	inside	the	horn	that	carries	living	cells	to	
affected	areas	of	the	horn	(Yang	2011:	8).	Chapter	3	discusses	the	chemical	composition	of	rhino	horn	in	more	
detail.	
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constitutes,	however,	fraud	and	deception	(Nowell	2012a:	2).	The	proposed	substitution	of	
rhino	horn	with	the	horn	of	other	animals	may	have	led	to	some	unintended	near	cataclysmic	
consequences	for	the	saiga	antelope	(compare	with	Chapter	3).	In	the	1980s,	the	WWF	
suggested	the	use	of	saiga	horn	as	a	viable	alternative	to	rhino	horn.	Says	a	WWF	official	
(personal	communication,	2014):	
	 	
“…	yes	it	is	true	that	in	the	1980s,	while	saiga	was	still	common	and	illegal	hunting	
wasn't	a	problem,	we	did	tout	it	as	an	alternative.	That	was	before	the	collapse	of	the	
Soviet	Union,	which	led	to	the	explosion	in	poaching	that	caused	population	crashes.”	
	
Saiga	horn	is	used	almost	exclusively	in	TCM.	Wildlife	monitoring	network	TRAFFIC	
corroborates	that	the	price	for	saiga	horns	has	increased	significantly	since	the	mid–1990s	
(von	Meibom	et	al.	2010:	34).	Highly	organized	poaching	gangs	pushed	the	formerly	abundant	
populations	of	the	Asian	antelope	typically	found	in	the	steppes	of	Kazakhstan,	Uzbekistan	
and	the	Russian	Federation	into	a	state	of	signficant	population	decline	through	illegal	
hunting.445	China	is	the	largest	importer	and	consumer	of	saiga	horn,	followed	by	Singapore	
and	Japan	with	Singapore,	Hong	Kong	and	Malaysia	as	important	trade	entrepôts	(von	
Meibom	et	al.	2010:	V).	A	TRAFFIC	research	project	seeking,	amongst	others,	alternatives	to	
the	use	of	saiga	horn	in	TCM	found	that	few	TCM	traders446	recommended	rhino	horn	as	a	
viable	substitute	for	saiga	horn	(von	Meibom	et	al.	2010:	27);	in	other	words,	the	corollary	of	
replacing	saiga	with	rhino	horn	was	not	endorsed	or	recommended	to	the	TRAFFIC	
researchers.	
	
The	official	Chinese	pharmacopeia	recommends	the	use	of	water	buffalo	in	lieu	of	rhino	horn	
(Nowell	2012a:	33),	and	this	appears	to	have	had	no	impact	on	water	buffalo	populations	in	
Asia.	This	substitution	is	not	entirely	unproblematic	as	rhino	horn	is	perceived	as	a	superior	
																																																						
445	The	number	of	saiga	antelopes	decreased	from	approximately	1	250	000	animals	in	the	mid–1970s	to	less	
than	60	000	antelopes	by	2010	(von	Meibom	et	al.	2010:	33).	Because	male	saiga	antelopes	fashion	the	coveted	
horns	only,	the	sex	ratio	of	populations	is	significantly	skewed	to	the	point	where	roughly	7%	of	populations	are	
adult	males	(von	Meibom	et	al.	2010:	33).	
	
446	Five	staff	members	out	of	a	sample	of	52	TCM	shops	suggested	replacing	saiga	horn	with	rhino	horn	(which	
was	deemed	impossible	to	obtain)	in	Malaysia.	TCM	traders	in	Singapore	and	China	did	not	recommend	rhino	
horn	as	Ersatz	horn	for	saiga	horn	(von	Meibom	et	al.	2010).	
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health	tonic	and	cooling	medicine	to	some	practitioners	and	their	patients.	As	a	traditional	
doctor	in	Hong	Kong	disclosed	(Interview,	2013):	
	
“In	traditional	medicine	the	rhino	horn	is	very	important	and	the	medical	effect	is	very	
good.	If	we	use	the	buffalo	to	replace	the	rhino	horn,	we	will	use	10	or	20	times	more.	
It	is	hard	to	replace	it.	When	we	boil	the	medicine,	we	will	use	lots	of	big	pieces	of	
buffalo	and	it	is	inconvenient.	The	medical	effect	may	be	not	very	good	so	some	
people	in	China	still	use	the	rhino	horn	illegally.”	
	
	
8.3	Criminal	actors	and	fake	or	Ersatz	horn	
	
While	law–abiding	doctors	and	patients	choose	water	buffalo,	other	horn	‘Ersatz’	and	herbal	
tinctures,	gullible	TCM	traders,	doctors	and	consumers	have	fallen	victim	to	fraudsters	who	
peddle	water	buffalo	and	horn	replica	as	if	it	were	real	rhino	horn	with	the	concomitant	
pricing	of	between	US	$	25	000	to	US	$	45	000	per	kilogram	of	rhino	horn.447	Roughly	between	
70	to	90%	448	of	“rhino	horn”	purchased	from	markets,	traditional	apothecaries,	and	medical	
practices	or	on–line	is	believed	to	be	either	fake	or	a	horn	substitute	in	Vietnam	(Institute	of	
Ecology	and	Biological	Resources	quoted	in:	Anonymous	2013,	Interview	with	conservation	
geneticist,	Hanoi,	2013;	Nowell	2012a;	Amman	2013b;	Kvinta	2014).	While	Vietnamese	
nationals	are	largely	unfamiliar	with	the	‘look	and	feel’	of	rhino	horn	(Interview	with	
representative	of	TCM	authority,	HCMC,	2013),449	water	buffalo	is	distinctive	and	recognizable	
due	to	its	concentric-shaped	fibres	and	its	distinct	yellowish	colour	with	a	white	core	whereas	
rhino	horn	consists	of	keratin	tubules	and	is	dark	brown.	The	tip	of	the	water	buffalo	horn	is	
																																																						
447	At	the	time	of	my	fieldwork	in	Southeast	Asia,	TCM	traders,	doctors	and	consumers	paid	between	US	$	25	000	
to	US	$	45	000	per	kilogram	of	rhino	horn.	As	small	amounts	of	horn	were	required	for	medicinal	purposes,	rhino	
horn	was	dispensed	in	disks	or	powder-form,	rendering	its	identification	tricky.	The	price	of	African	‘rhino	horn’	
was	lower	than	Asian	rhino	horn,	which	is	believed	to	be	more	potent	than	the	African	variant.		
	
448	The	overall	market	share	of	fake	and	Ersatz	horn	in	Vietnam	is	difficult	to	assess.	Vietnamese	government	
authorities	(Interviews,	2013)	tend	to	stress	the	high	incidence	of	fake	horn	in	order	to	deflect	from	international	
data	suggesting	that	Vietnam	is	the	main	consumer	of	‘real’	rhino	horn	(Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Rademeyer	2012).	
Dr	Cindy	Harper	from	the	Veterinary	Genetics	Laboratory	at	the	University	of	Pretoria	tested	samples	collected	
from	markets	and	traders	in	Vietnam.	Investigative	journalist	Karl	Amman	and	his	team	had	collected	the	30	
samples	from	TCM	outlets.	90%	were	fakes.	A	Vietnamese	conservation	geneticist	who	tests	rhino	horn	on	
behalf	of	law	enforcement	authorities	pegged	the	market	share	of	fake	and	ersatz	horn	at	70%.	He	based	the	
assessment	on	the	DNA	analysis	of	300	horn	samples	collected	between	2003	and	2013	(Interview,	Hanoi,	2013).		
	
449	Poachers	killed	and	dehorned	the	last	Javan	rhino	in	Vietnam’s	Cat	Ba	National	Park	in	2010.	
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solid	but	it	becomes	hollow	towards	the	end	–	unlike	rhino	horn,	which	is	solid	throughout.	
Due	to	the	familiarity	of	locals	with	water	buffalo	horn,	the	horn	is	blackened	and	“rhinofied”	
(made	to	look	similar	to	Asian	rhino	horn)	to	deceive	prospective	buyers.	Criminals	also	
peddle	the	horn	of	African	ox	considered	a	superior	‘Ersatz’	as	it	is	an	unknown	entity	in	
Vietnam.	The	tip	and	colour	of	cattle	horn	look	surprisingly	similar	to	African	rhino	horn	
(Interviews	in	Hanoi	and	HCMC,	2013).	The	search	for	an	ever-improved	version	of	fake	rhino	
horn	has	led	criminal	entrepreneurs	to	invest	in	highly	sophisticated	horn	forgery	equipment	
and	to	set	up	fake	horn	manufactories.450	According	to	the	head	of	molecular	systematic	and	
conservation	genetics	at	the	Institute	for	Science	and	Technology	in	Hanoi,	the	sophistication	
of	counterfeiting	technologies	has	improved	to	such	a	degree	that	only	experts	can	distinguish	
real	from	fake	rhino	horn	(Interview	in	Hanoi,	2013).	Professional	fraudsters	have	mastered	
the	art	of	faking	rhino	horn	by	using	human	and	animal	hair	to	get	the	distinctive	smell	of	
burnt	keratin,	should	the	above-mentioned	test	of	burning	horn	dust	be	employed	to	verify	
the	authenticity	of	the	horn	in	question.	Imitation	horn	is	‘cloned’	to	near	perfection	
mimicking	the	natural	characteristics	of	horn	such	as	colour,	odour,	hair,	density,	hardness,	
contours	and	the	uneven	natural	grooves	along	the	surface	of	the	horn	(Interviews	in	Hanoi,	
HCMC	and	Johannesburg,	2013).	Those	cheated	have	no	recourse	to	the	law	as	it	is	not	only	
illegal	to	sell	but	also	to	buy	rhino	horn	in	Vietnam,	Hong	Kong	and	China.451		
	
Curiously	it	is	not	only	unsuspecting	horn	consumers	in	Vietnam	or	China	that	buy	tainted	
horn	but	there	are	others	that	knowingly	and	willingly	buy	Ersatz	horn.	While	common-
varieties	type	of	fake	horn	can	be	procured	for	as	little	as	US	$	200	in	Vietnam,	sophisticated	
types	of	Ersatz	horn	come	at	a	price	and	are	essentially	valued	as	a	“second-best”	alternative	
or	as	credible	replica	of	the	real	thing	with	associated	functions.	Conscious	buyers	of		
“superior”	replica	or	Ersatz	horn	pay	up	to	US	$	10	000	per	horn	(Interviews	with	smugglers	
and	intermediaries,	2013).		In	an	attempt	to	impress	their	peers,	aspirant	horn	consumers	buy	
																																																						
450	Karl	Amman	(2012:	36)	has	collected	film	footage	of	a	factory	where	the	tips	of	water	buffalo	are	reshaped	
and	polished	to	look	like	rhino	horn.	Data	collected	in	Hanoi	unveiled	small	factories	that	were	converting	human	
and	animal	hair	as	well	as	fur	into	fake	rhino	horn.		
	
451	The	focus	of	this	research	was	in	these	three	countries	during	data	collection.	The	transnational/international	
trade	and	use	of	rhino	horn	is	in	principle	illegal	in	all	CITES	member	countries;	however,	international	
regulations	and	determinations	concerning	the	ban	and	authorized	use	have	not	been	domesticated	in	all	
jurisdictions.	
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fake	horn	because	they	cannot	afford	real	horn.	An	informant	in	Hanoi	explains	(Interview	
with	rhino	scientist	2,	2013):	“Some	people	want	to	buy	and	keep	the	horn	even,	when	they	
know	its	fake	at	home	for	decoration.”	
	
Wealthy	business	entrepreneurs	and	politicians,	on	the	other	hand,	buy	fake	horn	to	protect	
their	investment.	The	fake	or	Ersatz	horn	is	show-cased	in	lieu	of	real	horn	(similar	to	the	
Ersatz	horn	employed	in	museums	and	collections	in	Europe,	North	America	and	southern	
Africa),	which	is	stowed	in	a	safe	location.	While	showing	off	one’s	wealth	and	status	is	
integral	to	conspicuous	consumption,	it	would	be	“stupid”	not	to	protect	one’s	“very	
expensive	investment	and	growing	asset”	(Interviews	with	intermediaries	and	consumers,	
Hanoi	and	Johannesburg,	2013).	The	need	to	protect	rhino	horn	is	not	only	linked	to	its	high	
value	but	to	the	real	threat	of	theft	(theft	of	rhino	horn	is	widespread	across	the	world).	This	
became	apparent	after	the	vice	president	of	Sarcombank	had	a	rhino	horn	valued	at	an	
estimated	4	billion	Vietnamese	Dong	(134	530	€)	stolen	from	his	mansion	in	the	Mekong	Delta	
(Staff	reporter	for	Thanhnien	News	2012).452	
	
	
8.4	Trust,	quality	control	and	the	role	of	the	horn	assessor	
	
Due	to	the	high	incidence	of	fake	horn,	criminal	actors,	traders	and	consumers	employ	a	
number	of	measures	to	ensure	the	authenticity	of	their	acquisition.	Criminal	groups	involved	
in	sham	or	illegal	hunting	expeditions	ensure	that	a	trusted	ally	such	as	the	horn	organizer	or	
smuggling	intermediary	attends	the	hunt	or	receives	the	horn	immediately	after	the	hunt,	
without	the	precious	good	changing	hands	in	the	interim.	By	being	present	during	the	hunt	
and	the	subsequent	dehorning	of	the	animal,	rhino	trafficking	intermediaries	and/or	the	Asian	
associates	ensure	the	quality	and	the	provenance	of	the	horn,	thereby	resolving	the	
coordination	problems	of	valuation,	cooperation	and	security.	This	mechanism	is	an	important	
aspect	of	valuation	of	rhino	horn	when	it	lands	in	Asia.	Smuggling	intermediaries	who	
coordinate	both	legal	and	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn	ensure	that	the	horn	dispatched	at	the	
																																																						
452	The	case	is	of	Tram	Be	is	also	of	interest	as	the	banker	was	guilty	of	contravening	CITES	rules,	namely	the	
illegal	possession	of	rhino	horn.	The	rhino	trophy	was	registered	to	a	Vietnamese	trophy	hunter	who	had	legally	
hunted	the	rhino	in	South	Africa	and	gave	the	horn	to	Be	as	a	gift	(Staff	reporter	for	Thanhnien	News	2012).	The	
gifting	of	trophy	horn	was	not	a	criminal	offence	at	the	time.	
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point	of	origin	is	the	same	as	the	one	that	arrives	on	the	other	side.	These	smuggling	
intermediaries	are	closely	connected	by	way	of	communication	devices	such	as	mobile	phones	
or	instant	messaging	on	electronic	devices,	or	the	horn	is	marked	with	concealed	signs	only	
known	to	the	intermediaries.	The	receiver	would	thus	know	whether	the	original	horn	has	
been	tampered	(Interviews	with	intermediaries,	2013).	Of	significance	is	the	chosen	route,	
mode	of	transport,	the	length	of	the	flow	(how	many	segments	or	intermediaries	are	
involved),	and	who	receives	the	horn	on	the	other	side.	The	shorter	and	more	direct	the	
route,	the	lesser	the	risk	of	tampering	with	the	expensive	illicit	commodity.	Should	diplomats,	
law	enforcement,	customs,	port	or	conservation	officials	be	involved	in	the	transportation	or	
facilitation	thereof,	then	the	risk	of	defection	is	reduced	as	the	person’s	position	or	status	
holds	sway	and	“opens	doors”	(Interviews	with	smugglers,	2013).		
	
Consumers,	dealers	and	smugglers	(Interviews,	2013)	articulated	a	preference	for	trophy	
horn.	Consumers	and	dealers,	in	particular,	trusted	the	provenance	of	the	horn	if	the	dealer	
could	provide	proof	of	the	hunting	permit,	the	CITES	import	or	export	permit,	or	a	photo	of	
the	supposed	trophy	hunt.	This	corresponds	with	the	preference	for	wild	rather	than	farmed	
rhino	horn.	When	rhino	horn	was	employed	for	medicinal	purposes,	consumers	and	doctors	
alike	suggested	that	horn	from	wild	rhinos	was	more	potent453	than	that	of	farmed	animals.	
Hunting	permits,	photos	and	other	official	looking	documentation,	of	course,	can	be	falsified.	
If	the	dealer	has	a	permanent	address	such	as	a	shop,	stall	or	residence	from	where	she	
trades,	then	consumers	trust	such	dealers	and	their	product	more	readily	(Interview	with	
Chinese	intermediary	and	consumers,	2013).	A	good	reputation	is	cultivated	over	time	and	
with	sufficient	exposure	to	the	right	clientele,	which	accentuates	the	importance	of	
reputation	and	trust	in	resolving	the	coordination	problem	of	cooperation	and	security	in	
illegal	markets.	Word	of	mouth	advertising	through	social	networks	allows	credible	and	
trustworthy	horn	dealers	to	stay	in	business	(Interview	with	Chinese	smuggler,	2013).	Similar	
to	the	drug	trade,	the	reputation	of	the	dealer	rises	or	falls	with	his	or	her	last	deal.	Moreover,	
																																																						
453	The	preference	for	wild	rhinos	is	linked	to	the	belief	that	the	curative	and	especially	detoxifying	properties	of	
rhino	horn	are	linked	to	the	rhino’s	diet	of	poisonous	plants,	thorns	and	brambles	in	Asia	(Interviews,	2013).	The	
preference	for	wild	over	farmed	animal	products	is	not	specific	to	the	rhino	market.	Research	elsewhere	has	
shown	a	preference	for	bear	bile	and	tiger	bone	from	wild	populations	(Economists	at	Large	2013:	11).	
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“scoring”	rhino	horn454	involves	a	pattern	of	interactions	similar	to	that	of	a	stereotypical	drug	
deal	involving	wealthy	drug	users	from	the	upper	strata	of	society.	Rhino	horn	cannot	be	
procured	on	the	open	market,	especially	by	unknown	entities	(compare	with	section	on	‘Fake	
horn	production	and	quality	control	at	source’).	Only	law	enforcement	officials,	journalists	or	
tourists	would	attempt	to	buy	horn	from	random	people	that	they	have	ostensibly	profiled	as	
possible	horn	dealers	(Interviews,	2013).	A	trusted	member	of	one’s	social	network	(such	as	a	
family	member,	friend,	colleague	or	law	enforcement	official)	introduces	an	aspirant	buyer	to	
the	dealer.	The	dealer	employs	a	number	of	safety	precautions	to	minimize	security	risks	(e.g.	
the	person	responsible	for	the	referral	has	to	act	as	a	‘go-between’	or	buffer	between	buyer	
and	dealer)	and	defection	(such	as	advance	payment).		
	
Dealers	prefer	to	enter	into	business	arrangements	with	individuals	whom	they	trust	to	pay	
the	asking	price	for	the	right	amount	or	quantity	of	horn	–	the	preference	is	to	sell	whole	
horns	or	large	quantities	of	horn	as	opposed	to	grams	or	pieces	of	horn	(Interviews	with	
intermediaries,	2013).	The	horn	is	usually	pre-ordered,	and	as	described	elsewhere,	the	price	
of	the	horn	is	contingent	on	its	weight,	which	is	usually	not	available	at	the	time	of	ordering.	
Immediate	availability	and	low	prices	are	viewed	with	suspicion;	in	other	words,	there	should	
be	a	waiting	period	to	allow	the	seller	to	source	the	horn	and	the	price	has	to	be	pegged	
according	to	the	known	street	value	(Van/Tap	2008:	7,	Interviews	with	consumers,	2013).	The	
deal	or	exchange	does	not	happen	in	a	back	alley	or	‘bad	part	of	town’	but	at	the	buyer’s,	
referent	or	dealer’s	residence	or	workplace	(Interviews	with	consumers	and	intermediaries,	
2013).	The	location	of	the	deal	serves	the	function	of	normalizing	the	transaction	as	it	
happens	in	respectful	surroundings	such	as	the	private	or	public	sphere	of	the	transacting	
parties.	It	also	provides	another	layer	of	security455	and	legitimizes	the	deal	as	a	business	
																																																						
454	It	is	important	to	differentiate	between	the	process	of	actively	seeking	to	procure	or	obtain	rhino	horn	as	
opposed	to	the	process	of	receiving	rhino	horn	as	a	gift	(the	notion	of	gift-giving	is	explored	in	more	detail	in	
Chapter	3).	The	former	action	assumes	agency	on	the	part	of	the	actor	whereas	the	latter	refers	to	an	act	of	
giving	where	the	recipient	is	assumed	to	be	a	passive	actor	unless	he	or	she	were	to	reject	the	gift.	In	this	
instance,	the	actor	moves	from	being	a	passive	recipient	to	assuming	agency	and	control	over	the	exchange.		
	
455	Illegal	business	transactions	(including	drug	deals)	are	commonly	believed	to	take	place	at	locations	that	
appear	to	guarantee	the	anonymity	of	the	market	participants	such	as	hotel	rooms,	restaurants,	and	busy	or	
isolated	public	spaces.	The	corollary	suggests	that	the	dividing	lines	between	public	and	private	lives	and	work	
and	leisure	are	blurred.	This	provides	a	further	layer	of	legitimacy	to	the	horn	trade	as	market	participants	allow	
the	lines	of	division	to	be	broken.		
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transaction	that	can	be	safely	and	legitimately	done	from	one’s	place	of	residence	or	work.	
This	suggests	that	market	participants	are	not	concerned	about	the	potential	fall-out,	stigma	
or	social	sanctions	that	might	obtain	from	dealing	or	consuming	rhino	horn	by	their	inner	
circle	of	family,	friends	or	colleagues,	as	these	actions	are	not	perceived	as	illegitimate.	These	
deals	nevertheless	form	part	of	an	informal	underground	economy	in	big	urban	centres	and	
stand	in	direct	contrast	to	the	open	trade	of	wildlife	contraband	in	peripheral	locations	
removed	from	the	prying	eyes	of	the	international	community	and	local	law	enforcement.456	
Unlike	drug	users,	rhino	horn	buyers	are	usually	not	returning	customers.457	Unless	the	
																																																						
456	Reports	(Amman	2012;	Amman	2015b)	and	interviews	with	representatives	of	conservation	NGOs	in	Vietnam	
(Interviews,	2013)	suggest	that	wildlife	contraband	including	rhino	horn	is	traded	openly	in	towns	and	villages	
close	to	Vietnam’s	north-eastern	border	with	China.	I	was	unable	to	travel	to	the	northern	regions	due	to	time	
constraints.	However,	I	undertook	data	collection	and	observations	in	the	southern	regions	of	the	Mekong	Delta,	
where	smuggling	activities	were	rife	and	law	enforcement	limited.	The	open	trade	of	wildlife	contraband	in	
border	towns	corresponds	with	research	elsewhere	(Nijman	2010;	Nijman/Shepherd	2014;	Nijman/Shepherd	
2015;	Environmental	Investigation	Agency	2015)	on	the	lawlessness	and	thriving	illegal	wildlife	trade	in	
neighbouring	countries	such	as	Laos,	Thailand	and	Myanmar.	Situated	in	a	Special	Development	Zone	and	
adjacent	to	China’s	Yunnan	province,	the	town	of	Mong	La	in	Myanmar	has	gained	notoriety	as	the	Asian	
response	to	the	“sin	city”	of	Las	Vegas	(Environmental	Investigation	Agency	2015).	The	tax-free	zone	caters	
almost	exclusively	to	Chinese	tourists	who	arrive	to	enjoy	leisurely	pursuits,	forbidden	or	illegitimate	in	their	own	
country	such	as	gambling,	prostitution	and	the	consumption	of	endangered	wildlife	products	(Environmental	
Investigation	Agency	2015:	3).	An	EIA	investigation	found	that	shavings	of	rhino	horn	were	sold	in	Mong	La	
(Environmental	Investigation	Agency	2015:	10);	however,	there	is	a	high	probability	that	these	shavings	might	be	
counterfeit	or	Ersatz	horn	in	light	of	the	findings	of	the	current	study.	Based	on	regular	surveys	of	markets	in	
Tachilek	and	Mong	La,	Nijman	and	Shepherd	(2015:	5)	observe:		
	
“The	trade	in	Tachilek	and	Mong	La	occurs	in	openly,	with	protected	wildlife	openly	displayed	for	all	to	
see.	Large	cat	skins	were	prominently	displayed	and	many	of	the	tiger	bone	wine	vats	had	tiger	skin	
hanging	above	them.	During	our	nine	visits	we	did	not	once	experience	any	evidence	of	law	
enforcement	with	respect	to	protected	wildlife.	Traders	were	generally	frank	when	discussing	the	trade	
without	expressing	fear	for	prosecution.”	
	
These	findings	suggest	a	core	versus	periphery	bias	with	regards	to	law	enforcement	and	social	acceptance	of	
open	trade	of	endangered	wildlife	(drug	and	human	trafficking	is	also	rife	in	the	region	–	as	the	area	is	part	of	the	
infamous	Golden	Triangle	region).	This	bias	is	not	uncommon:	some	border	towns	and	regions	operate	
differently	from	the	laws	and	norms	established	in	the	core	–	the	urban	political	and	business	centres	of	power,	
authority	and	influence	–	and	the	state	may	directly	or	indirectly	sanction	this	state	of	affairs	due	to	the	high	
economic	returns	and	taxes	(the	previous	chapter	deals	with	the	suspension	of	legal	rules	and	regulations	in	
villages	along	the	Mozambican	border,	immediately	adjacent	to	the	Kruger	National	Park).	The	long	arm	of	the	
state	is	bendable,	open	to	manipulation	and	criminal	alliances	in	border	regions,	which	are	difficult	to	patrol	due	
to	geographical	characteristics	(Nijman/Shepherd	2015)	or	their	special	political	and	economic	status	
(Environmental	Investigation	Agency	2015).	
	
457	This	excludes	the	category	of	investors	who	stockpile	rhino	horn	as	a	growing	asset	with	huge	growth	
potential.		
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purchased	horn	serves	the	function	of	a	gift,	consumers	procure	horn	on	the	basis	of	need	
and	affordability.458	
	
People	in	certain	positions	are	assumed	to	be	worthy	of	trust	and	respect	by	virtue	of	their	
status	and	role	in	society,	as	well	as	the	access	(to	horn	supplies)	and	influence	the	position	
confers	upon	them;	consumers	thus	trust	the	provenance	and	authenticity	of	rhino	horn	if	the	
supplier	is	either	a	law	enforcement,	customs	or	conservation	official,	or	a	diplomat	with	
legitimate	connections	to	the	source	(Interviews	with	intermediaries,	Johannesburg	and	
Massingir,	2013;	consumers,	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City,	2013).	Law	enforcement	and	
customs	officers	had	easy	access	to	confiscated	rhino	horn	while	government	officials	and	
diplomats	who	had	been	posted	to	South	Africa	in	the	past,	or	family	members	of	diplomats	
on	mission	in	South	Africa	were	also	perceived	as	credible	suppliers	of	rhino	horn	with	direct	
links	to	the	source	country	(Interviews	with	consumers	and	suppliers,	2013).459	A	forensic	
scientist	in	Hanoi	supported	this	assumption,	stating	that	horn	confiscated	at	the	airport	and	
brought	in	for	testing	by	the	police,	customs	or	CITES	management	authority	was	usually	the	
‘real	thing’	(Interview,	Hanoi,	2013).460	Law	enforcement	officials	are	also	known	to	exercise	
																																																						
458	In	his	theory	of	conspicuous	consumption	Veblen	suggests	that	consumption	of	valuable	goods	correlates	
with	the	reputability	of	“a	gentleman	of	leisure”	(Veblen	1899:	123).	Competition	between	“gentlemen	of	
leisure”	may	lead	to	mass	accumulation	of	valuable	goods	to	upstage	one	another.	Veblen	argues	that	
competition	extends	to	a	range	of	gifts,	feasts	and	“costly	entertainments”	(Veblen	1899:	ibid).	It	is	thus	not	
quantity	but	quality	and	diversity	of	valuable	goods	that	matters.	This	assumption	is	consistent	with	my	findings:	
I	found	no	empirical	evidence	in	the	literature	or	during	data	collection	that	horn	consumers	had	multiple	horns	
on	display.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	horn	fulfils	a	symbolic	function	of	signalling	that	its	owner	holds	a	certain	
position	and	status	in	society.	In	this	instance,	the	quantity	of	rhino	horn	is	irrelevant.	However,	possession	of	
this	valuable	good	serves	as	a	‘place	holder’	for	the	owner	to	assert	his	or	her	rightful	place	in	society.	In	essence,	
horn	consumers	are	unlikely	‘return	customers’	unless	they	are	buying	gifts	for	friends	or	business	associates.		
		
459	Amman	(2015b)	made	a	similar	observation	after	talking	to	a	horn	dealer	in	the	northern	parts	of	North	
Vietnam	who	had	his	horn	stocks	confiscated	by	members	of	the	drug	enforcement	unit	claiming	that	they	would	
pay	the	dealer	later.		
	
460	I	was	offered	and	shown	rhino	horn	on	many	occasions	in	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City.	Interestingly	powdered	
rhino	horn	had	fallen	out	of	favour,	largely	because	it	was	so	difficult	to	distinguish	it	from	any	other	powder.	
Moreover,	the	primary	use	of	rhino	horn	had	shifted	to	status-uplifting	and	investment	purposes.	Traders	and	
consumers	were	offering	pieces,	disks	or	entire	horns.	There	was	little	doubt	that	Asian	samples	were	fake	
because	there	are	simply	not	enough	Asian	horns	in	existence	to	trade	in	the	‘open’	market.	Without	having	a	
DNA	kit	available,	the	chutzpah	to	smuggle	samples	out	of	Vietnam	to	have	them	tested	later	nor	being	an	
expert	in	identifying	rhino	horn,	I	would	nonetheless	support	the	notion	that	horn	sold	on	the	open	market	(i.e.	
in	TCM	or	TVM	apothecaries,	medicine	stall	and	wholesalers)	is	largely	fake	or	Ersatz	whereas	horn	derived	from	
social	control	agents	and	diplomats	is	authentic.	The	daughter	of	Stage	4	prostate	cancer	patient	related	how	her	
father	obtained	a	prescription	for	rhino	horn	from	the	same	doctor	who	treated	former	President	Nguyen	Minh	
Triet	for	prostate	cancer	(see	also	the	section	on	the	cancer	myth	in	Chapter	3).	She	obtained	50	grams	of	rhino	
horn	from	a	trusted	source	that	works	for	the	anti-smuggling	authority	in	Hanoi.	She	explained:		
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their	position	of	power	to	seize	illegal	horn	stocks	that	never	enter	the	legal	chain	of	custody	
but	are	laundered	directly	into	illegal	market	flows	(Interview	with	TCM	trader	and	
intermediary,	2013).	
	
For	those	with	no	privileged	access	to	real	horn	suppliers,	the	fall	back	option	is	to	obtain	an	
independent	assessment	of	horn	authenticity.	As	laboratory	tests	are	expensive	and	carry	the	
risk	of	detection	and	horn	confiscation	by	law	enforcement	authorities	(Interviews,	Hong	Kong	
and	Hanoi,	2013),	a	new	role	has	emerged	for	practitioners	of	TVM	or	TCM	in	the	cities	of	Ho	
Chi	Minh	City,	Hanoi	and	other	urban	centres:	the	role	of	the	horn	assessor.	TVM/TCM	
doctors	still	fulfil	the	role	of	primary	healthcare	providers	in	Vietnamese	society	(Drury	2009).	
In	addition	to	assuming	an	important	role	in	the	horn	valuation	chain,	the	judgment,	
sanctioning	and	assessment	of	TCM	doctors	is	valued	intrinsically	due	to	their	status	and	
position	in	society.	Moreover,	a	code	of	honour	similar	to	western	notions	of	doctor-patient	
privileges	obtains	to	the	relationship	between	the	horn	assessor	and	client.	An	assessor	thus	
would	not	report	a	client	(usually	also	his/her	patient)	for	possession	of	rhino	horn	to	the	
authorities.	Despite	its	illegal	status,	the	use	of	horn	is	deemed	a	legitimate	practice	and	
morally	acceptable	to	a	broad	sector	of	Asian	society	(Drury	2009;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	
Nowell	2012b),	including	the	TVM/TCM	doctors	turned	horn	assessors	who	mingle	among	the	
upper	strata	of	society.	
	
Consumers	who	are	unsure	of	the	provenance	or	quality	of	the	offered	horn	can	take	
samples,	disks,	pieces	or	powdered	rhino	horn	to	these	horn	assessors	to	test	whether	“it’s	
the	real	thing”.	Fraudulent	or	scam	ingredients	are	not	uncommon	in	Chinese	medicine.	A	
whole	body	of	literature	speaks	to	the	phenomenon	and	assists	laypersons	by	providing	
pictorial	depictions	and	diagnostic	keys	to	distinguish	the	real	from	the	fake			
(Nowell	2012a:	33).	Three	horn	assessors	(independent	of	each	other)	invited	this	researcher	
to	attend	horn	assessments.	While	there	were	slight	nuances	to	the	individual	assessments,	
the	assessors	all	tested	the	colour,	smell,	taste,	density	and	composition	of	the	horn.	These	
tests	involved	no	DNA-analysis	or	modern	instruments;	instead,	assessors	relied	on	their	five	
																																																																																																																																																																											
	
“I	got	it	from	my	customer	who	usually	stay	at	my	hotel.	He	works	for	the	smuggling	department.	
Normal	people	cannot	buy	it…I	got	the	good	price	from	him	because	he	is	my	regular	customer.”	
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senses	and	auxiliary	tools	like	torches	and	scales.	Due	to	strong	social	network	links	and	the	
perception	of	doing	a	service	to	society,	these	assessors	expected	no	payment	for	their	
services.	The	assessor	is	rewarded	generously	in	kind	(i.e.	with	rhino	horn)	if	the	horn	is	found	
to	be	genuine.	Horn	assessments	can	lead	to	conflict	between	seller	and	buyer	(Anh	2014).		
This	is	especially	the	case	when	sellers	realize	that	they	have	fallen	prey	to	fraudsters	further	
up	the	supply	chain,	and	they	will	not	be	able	to	recoup	their	money.		
	
A	noticeable	side	effect	of	the	high	incidence	of	fake	horn	and	associated	fraud	is	that	few	
TCM	or	life-style	consumers	are	willing	to	buy	processed	powdered	horn	(except	rhino	pills	–	
see	below).	Potential	buyers	insist	on	proof	of	provenance.	In	cases	where	the	paperwork	is	
non-existent	or	missing	(like	the	abovementioned	hunting	permits),	consumers	want	to	see	
and	examine	the	full	horn,	and	when	it	is	financially	affordable	the	entire	horn	is	purchased	
(Interviews,	2013).	TCM	doctors	correlate	the	increased	incidence	of	illegal	rhino	killings	with	
the	high	number	of	fake	horns	in	the	market.	Whereas	consumers	used	to	buy	small	
quantities	of	rhino	horn	in	the	past,	they	have	to	dig	deeper	into	their	pockets	to	buy	a	whole	
horn,	which	is	a	form	of	quality	control	and	insurance	policy.	Says	a	TCM	doctors	in	Hong	Kong	
(Interview,	2013):	
	 	 	
“One	reason	that	rhino	are	killed	more	is	because	when	patients	want	to	get	the	real	
rhino	horn,	they	must	get	the	whole	horn	to	ensure	it	is	real.	They	use	very	little,	the	
rest	of	the	horn	is	wasted….	[…]	…	If	we	use	rhino	horn	we	just	use	3	to	5	grams	per	
day.	We	can’t	take	it	for	a	long	time,	not	longer	than	two	weeks.	If	you	buy	in	China,	
you	should	go	to	the	very	big	pharmacy	shop.	Some	of	them	have	good	credit	because	
they	are	operated	by	very	big	medical	group	so	they	can	be	trusted.”	
	
While	the	citation	refers	to	the	medicinal	use	of	rhino	horn,	data	collection	on	the	African	and	
Asian	side	confirmed	a	market	preference	for	whole	horns	of	other	user	groups	too.	Those	
seeking	to	show	off	their	wealth	by	displaying	rhino	horns,	investors	and	gift–givers	preferred	
whole	rhino	horns	to	horn	disks	or	powder	for	obvious	reasons.	Quality	control,	financial	as	
well	as	aesthetic	considerations,	explain	this	market	preference.		
	
The	construction	of	trust	between	different	actors	within	this	type	of	market	exchange	is	
linked	to	a	number	of	factors,	of	which	at	least	one	is	necessary	for	an	exchange	to	occur.	Key	
factors	include	the	reputation	and	status	of	the	dealer	and	whether	the	initial	introduction	
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between	dealer	and	buyer	is	achieved	through	close	or	weak	social	links.	Moreover,	location	
(business	or	private	residence),	time	considerations	(speed	of	horn	delivery)	and	integrity	of	
the	horn	(whole	horn	versus	horn	powder	or	disks)	are	important,	as	well	as	the	choreography	
of	the	deal	(does	it	follow	expectations	and	cultural	norms?).		Should	these	factors	fail	to	
impress	the	prospective	buyer,	the	fall	back	option	is	to	employ	the	services	of	a	horn	
assessor.	The	reputation	and	social	position	of	the	assessor	are	determining	factors	whether	
his	or	her	ruling	is	accepted.	
	
	
8.5	Rhino	horn	pills:	Trust	in	factory-produced	medicines	
	
The	citation	of	the	Hong	Kong-based	TCM	practitioner	in	the	pervious	section	makes	
reference	to	the	trustworthiness	of	Chinese	pharmaceutical	corporations,461	which	is	a	
significant	observation	per	se	and	worthy	of	further	analysis.	Similarly,	other	TCM	wholesalers	
and	some	consumers	inferred	that	the	ingredients	of	factory-produced	medicines	were	
superior,	credible	and	genuine	whereas	small	traders	and	doctors	had	to	improvise	or	
substitute	should	an	ingredient	be	unavailable	(Interviews,	2013).	Trust	in	medicines	that	are	
pre-packaged,	carry	a	visible	(not	necessarily	known)	logo	is	consistent	with	consumer	
																																																						
461	The	business	concept	and	approach	of	multinational	pharmaceutical	corporations	(big	pharma)	are	
progressively	viewed	as	unsustainable	in	Western	societies	(Hunter/Stephens	2010).	The	operational	focus	on	
chronic	diseases	and	medicines	that	promise	huge	profit	margins	is	seen	as	misplaced	if	not	inhumane.	Start-ups	
and	corporations	are	increasingly	moving	into	niche	markets	in	an	attempt	to	secure	“niche	busters”	as	opposed	
to	“blockbuster	medicines”	(Dolgin	2010).	As	distrust	of	corporations	is	growing	(especially	in	the	anti-
globalization	and	Occupy	movements)	across	many	parts	of	the	world,	segments	of	Western	societies	are	turning	
to	natural	or	combination	therapies.	The	inability	to	cure	major	diseases,	the	huge	profit	margins	and	the	side-
effects	of	“blockbuster”	medications	and	failure	to	roll	them	out	at	affordable	prices	to	patients	in	the	Global	
South	have	invoked	criticism	and	questions	as	regards	the	motifs	driving	pharmaceutical	companies	(Barsh	
2001).	It	would	thus	appear	counterintuitive	for	Asian	consumers	to	trust	factory-produced	medication	over	
medicines	dispensed	by	known	family	doctors	or	pharmacists.	When	asked	about	this	apparent	disconnect,	
consumers	related	how	Asian	pharmaceutical	companies	managed	to	combine	the	“old”	with	the	“new”;	in	
other	words,	companies	were	distributing	traditional	medicines	using	modern	technologies	to	growing	numbers	
of	consumers.	There	has	been	a	renaissance	of	traditional	medicine	in	large	parts	of	Asia	including	Vietnam	and	
China,	encouraged	and	supported	by	the	political	elite	(Drury	2009:	44–46).	In	the	wake	of	this	renaissance,	
pharmaceutical	factories	and	corporations	have	mushroomed	across	the	region,	specializing	in	the	production	of	
wholesale	ingredients	or	processed	traditional	medicines.	In	light	of	the	high	incidence	of	fake	ingredients	in	
TCM	(not	only	in	rhino	horn	medicines),	but	it	is	also	reasonable	to	assume	that	some	consumers	would	display	a	
market	preference	for	factory-produced	medicines	based	on	trust	in	the	reputation	and	delivery	of	genuine	
products	of	such	companies.	Interestingly,	many	medicines	stalls	and	practitioners	carry	both	factory-produced	
TCM	products	and	raw	ingredients	of	medicines	so	that	doctors	and	patients	can	prepare	medical	preparations.	
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research	into	counterfeit	pharmaceuticals	elsewhere	(compare	with:	Hornberger	2010;	
Hübschle	2010-2011).462		
	
TCM	traders	and	consumers	referred	to	a	rhino	horn	pill	produced	in	China,	which	supposedly	
contains	powdered	rhino	horn.	Vietnamese	shopkeepers	and	stallholders	revealed	that	the	
rhino	horn	pills	contained	not	only	rhino	horn	but	also	gold	and	other	herbal	ingredients.		One	
dealer	explained	the	use	of	the	pill	as	follows:		
	
“	It	is	recommend	to	drink	three	pills	a	day.	It	is	very	good	for	people	having	a	disease	
like	stroke,	high	blood	pressure,	and	it	helps	with	hangovers.	When	someone	gets	
drunk,	you	take	a	pill,	the	next	morning	you	will	feel	completely	normal.”	
	
Upon	closer	inspection	of	the	pills	on	sale	in	the	back	chamber	of	a	TCM	wholesaler,	the	
Mandarin	dosage	form	indicated	water	buffalo	horn	as	the	main	active	ingredient.	When	
asked	about	this,	the	shopkeeper	explained	that	the	form	“lied”	to	conceal	the	real	
ingredients	because	it	was	forbidden	to	sell	rhino	horn	(Interview,	2013).463	She	and	other	
TCM	dealers	expressed	no	reservations	or	scruples	as	regards	the	sale	of	an	illegal	commodity	
(rhino	horn)	or	a	fake	substitute	(water	buffalo	pills).	The	price	of	the	pills	ranged	between	
250	000	to	700	000	Vietnamese	Dong	(8.90	€	to	24.80€),	which	in	itself	was	an	indication	that	
the	rather	large	pills	(2	cm	in	diameter)	wrapped	in	intricately	carved	wooden	boxes	might	
contain	no	real	rhino	horn.	The	dealer	explained	that	the	price	range	was	linked	to	the	
amount	of	rhino	horn	contained	inside	individual	pills.	It	is	doubtful	that	any	registered	
pharmaceutical	company	would	produce	illegal	medicines	in	the	current	regulatory	
																																																						
462	While	health	practitioners	and	patients	supported	factory-produced	medicines	in	southern	Africa,	the	price	
was	a	significant	consideration	in	choosing	medicines.	This	is	particularly	pertinent	in	light	of	the	notion	of	
intellectual	property	rights	in	debates	governing	the	use	of	original	versus	generic	medicines	and	the	high	
incidence	of	counterfeit	medicines	with	unknown	health	impacts	(Hübschle	2010-2011).	
	
463	Research	into	counterfeit	pharmaceuticals	(UNODC	2009;	UNODC	2010)	has	shown	that	it	is	very	hard	to	
distinguish	the	packaging	of	originals	and	counterfeit	medicines.	Some	pharmaceutical	corporations	have	
introduced	barcodes	to	protect	consumers	against	the	purchase	of	counterfeit	medication.	The	consumer	
verifies	the	authenticity	of	the	pills	by	checking	the	code	via	text	message	or	through	a	barcode	scanner	on	their	
mobile	phone	(World	Health	Organisation/International	Medical	Products	Anti–Counterfeiting	Taskforce	2012).	I	
tried	to	establish	whether	counterfeit	rhino	pills	were	a	problem	and	what	recourse	consumers	had	should	they	
buy	‘fake’	pills.	The	stated	“true”	ingredients	of	the	pills	were	of	no	consequence	to	sellers	and	consumers.	This	
finding	appears	to	support	data	that	horn	consumption	and	possession	increasingly	fulfils	status	uplifting	rather	
than	health	functions.		
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environment	unless	it	were	state–sanctioned.	Water	buffalo	was	the	likely	main	active	
ingredient	in	the	pills.	
	
One	Chinese	pharmaceutical	company	has	however	been	on	the	radar	of	conservators	and	
journalists	alike	(Beech/Perry	2011;	Cota-Larson	2013;	Nowell	2012a)	due	to	its	professed	
objective	of	producing	pills	from	rhino	horn	shavings.	In	2006,	the	Long	Hui	Pharmaceutical	
Company	announced	plans	to	farm	rhinos	with	the	objective	of	“rhino	propagation	and	
scientific	research”	(Long	Hui	Corporation	2006:	1).	The	“Shaving	alive	rhino	horn	technology	
and	rhino	horn	pharmacological	study”	would	see	horn	shaved	off	live	animals	by	means	of	
“self–suction	living	rhinoceros	horn	scraping	tool”	for	medicinal	purposes	(Long	Hui	
Corporation	2006:	4;	Beech/Perry	2011).	The	business	plan	(translation	by	the	Rhino	Resource	
Centre:	Long	Hui	Corporation	2006)	stated:		
	
“Rhino	horn	is	very	important	in	traditional	Chinese	medicine	field	due	to	its	following	
effects:	detoxification	and	anti-cancer,	eliminating	pathogenic	heat	from	the	blood,		
removing	eczema.	Rhino	horn	resource	is	rare	because	rhino	are	protected	by	World	
Organization	and	nobody	shall	catch	and	kill	them	or	do	trade	activities	on	rhino	horns.	
Chinese	government	encourages	people	to	develop	new	substitute	for	it,	but	no	
substantial	progress	has	been	made.	Therefore,	rhino	horn	market	demand	will	be	
great.”	
	
	
The	company	proposed	the	production	of	several	types	of	pills	and	tonics	containing	rhino	
horn.	The	business	plan	has	been	taken	off	the	company’s	website	in	the	interim	as	it	clashes	
both	with	CITES	rules	and	Chinese	domestic	laws,	which	ban	any	use	of	rhino	horn	unless	its	
purpose	is	to	research	viable	substitutes	for	use	in	medicines	(The	People's	Republic	of	China	
1993).	A	Time	Magazine	exposé	suggests	that	Longhui	is	a	subsidiary	of	large	weapons	
manufacturer	–	the	Hawk	group	–	with	strong	links	to	the	highest	echelons	of	the	political	
elite	in	China	(Beech/Perry	2011).	Environmental	activists	claim	that	Longhui	has	established	
two	rhino	farms	in	China	stocked	“with	dozens	of	rhinos	imported	from	South	Africa”	(Welz	
2012).	Parliamentary	records	confirm	that	at	least	four	South	African	white	rhinos	were	
exported	to	a	Longhui	“breeding	facility”	in	2010	(Molewa	2012b)	and	officially,	a	further	68	
white	rhinos	were	exported	to	China	in	the	period	2007	to	early	2012	(Molewa	2012b).464	It	
																																																						
464	China	and	South	Africa’s	official	import	and	export	numbers	of	live	rhinos	do	not	correspond	(also	compare	
with	Chapter	4),	which	led	to	a	brief	moratorium	on	the	sale	of	live	animals.	According	to	CITES	data,	South	
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remains	unclear	whether	any	horn	harvesting	has	taken	or	is	taking	place	at	any	Chinese	
breeding	facilities	(Milliken/Emslie/Talukdar	2009:	7).465	Chinese	state	officials	vehemently	
deny	any	extracurricular	activities	involving	the	dehorning	or	shaving	of	imported	rhinos	at	
the	CITES	CoP	15	in	Qatar	(Beech/Perry	2011).	Conservators	have	however	queried	the	high	
number	of	African	white	rhinos	exported	to	China	for	the	purpose	of	range	expansion	when	
the	region	is	climatically	different	from	the	white	rhino’s	natural	habitat	(Cota-Larson	2013).	
	
	
8.6	Fake	horn	production	and	quality	control	at	the	source	
	
According	to	law	enforcement	officials	and	criminal	actors	(Interviews	in	Mozambique	and	
South	Africa,	2013),	there	is	“willing	seller,	willing	buyer”	for	every	rhino	horn	in	southern	
Africa;	in	other	words,	horn	‘producers’	do	not	have	to	search	for	buyers	as	the	horn	is	pre-
ordered	and	demand	outstrips	supply.	The	only	horn	“floating	around”	is	“a	guy	looking	for	a	
buyer	with	a	false	horn”	(Interview	with	law	enforcer	4,	2013).	Greedy	individuals	hoping	to	
“make	a	quick	buck”	have	fallen	victim	to	fake	horn	dealers.	As	is	the	case	in	Asia,	cheated	
individuals	have	no	recourse	to	the	law	as	they	were	dabbling	on	the	wrong	side	of	the	law.	A	
biodiversity	investigator	with	a	sleigh	of	Schadenfreude	said	(Interview,	2013):	
	
“We	have	got	guys	here	that	went	and	got	bank	overdrafts	to	buy	rhino	horn	and	
when	they	got	it.	It	was	false	horn	and	they	are	still	paying	off	their	bank	overdrafts.”	
	
Horn	buyers	and	intermediaries	fulfil	a	similar	role	at	the	source.	Like	their	Asian	
counterparts,	they	use	a	good	dose	of	common	sense	and	the	mantra	“if	you	are	African,	you	
will	know”	(Interview	with	convicted	poacher	16,	2013).	A	transporter	explains	(Interview	with	
intermediary	2,	2013):		
	
“Rhino	horn	is	very	tough	material,	even	how	much	you	try	to	crush	it	down,	you	
cannot	crush	it.	Even	how	much	you	try	to	hit	it	on	the	floor	or	on	a	rock,	you	cannot	
																																																																																																																																																																											
Africa	exported	193	rhinos	between	2006	and	2009	while	recipient	countries	reported	the	import	of	235	rhinos	
(Milliken/Emslie/Talukdar	2009:	7)	
	
465	A	research	informant	visited	a	state-run	breeding	facility	in	2013.	The	delegation	was	reportedly	shown	
healthy	rhinos	but	none	of	their	progeny.	There	were	no	signs	of	horn	harvesting;	it	would	appear	unlikely	that	
foreign	visitors	would	be	given	privileged	access	however	positively	inclined	they	might	be	towards	the	farming	
or	harvesting	of	rhinos.	
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crush	it.	But	with	fake	horn,	it	breaks.	Horn	material	is	easy	to	identify.	For	me,	I	grew	
up	in	the	rural	areas	and	I	almost	know	all	kinds	of	horns.	Game	horns,	domestic	
animal	horns,	horns	–	I	know	a	number	of	them	so	I	can	easily	identify	them:	this	one	
is	a	horn,	this	one	is	a	rock…	The	article,	how	much	you	can	get	for	it…”		
	
The	quality	of	fake	horn	varies	from	intricately	cut	wooden	horn	replicas	to	Ersatz	horn	made	
out	of	resin.	African-based	scammers	have	to	deal	with	the	familiarity	of	buyers	and	
smugglers	with	horn,	finer	details	such	as	the	smell	of	freshly-harvested	horn	(with	all	the	
blood	and	gore)	have	to	be	considered	in	the	production	process.	A	convicted	horn	smuggler	
related	as	follows	(Interview,	2013):		
	
“They	put	some	other	blood	of	what	it	smells	like	because	it	has	a	smell.	Very,	very	
bad	smell.	That	smell	I	know	it.	If	it	is	another	smell,	I	know	it's	not	the	real	one.	You	
know	the	thing	is,	they	used	to	put	shampoo	or	Colgate	–	if	you	mix	it,	it	takes	away	
the	smell.	If	you	take	the	shampoo,	you	can't	smell	it,	not	even	the	dogs.	466	So	when	it	
comes	for	us	to	test,	we	use	a	hammer.	You	must	hit	it,	almost	3	times.	Very	hard.	You	
hit	it	in	the	middle.	The	real	rhino	horn	will	never	break.	But	if	it	is	a	fake	one,	it	will	
break.”			
	
Sophisticated	fraudsters	also	dress	up	in	the	uniforms	of	actors	who	would	have	legitimate	
access	to	rhino	horn;	uniforms	of	KNP	rangers	and	the	requisite	ranger	regalia,	for	example,	
carry	“street	cred”	467	and	persuasive	value	because	the	carrier	of	such	a	uniform	is	
recognized	as	someone	working	in	the	KNP	with	direct	access	to	rhino	horn.	While	some	
rangers	are	complicit	in	the	illegal	supply	chain	(compare	with	the	previous	chapter),	they	are	
not	the	primary	scammers.	These	uniforms	may	land	up	in	the	hands	of	scammers	through	
indirect	family,	community	or	friendship	networks.		
	
Rogue	wildlife	professionals	and	rhino	owners	who	sell	rhino	horn	illegally	from	stockpiles	
only	transact	with	known	and	trusted	peers.	Several	wildlife	‘kingpins’	and	intermediaries	
fulfil	the	role	of	quality	control,	transportation	and	other	functions	linked	to	this	illegal	market	
exchange.	Farmers	and	wildlife	professionals	are	socially	embedded	within	a	small	
homogeneous	wealthy	group	of	landowners	that	are	tied	together	by	a	common	political	
																																																						
466	Shampoo	or	toothpaste	is	used	to	conceal	the	smell	of	rhino	horn	from	sniffer	dogs	specifically	employed	to	
search	for	rhino	horn	and	wildlife	contraband	on	travellers	or	in	their	belongings.	
	
467	Also	known	as	‘street	smart’,		‘street	cred’	is	colloquial	for	acceptance	of	someone	amongst	young	people	in	
urban	settings.	It	also	refers	to	an	actor’s	ability	to	interact	at	street	level.	
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outlook,	culture	and	tradition	and	a	good	dose	of	survival	instinct	in	light	of	political	
transformation	and	the	changing	of	the	political	guard,	which	carried	uncertainty	as	to	the	
question	of	land	ownership	and	restitution.		
	
	
	
8.7	Cooperation	between	‘con-men’	and	dealers	
	
Rhino	horn	“con-men”468	and	‘real’	horn	dealers	tend	to	co-exist	in	harmony,	mutually	
benefiting	from	each	other’s	business.	According	to	a	former	Asian	intermediary	currently	
incarcerated	in	a	South	African	prison	(Interview,	2013),	criminal	actors	on	both	ends	of	the	
supply	chain	would	knowingly	buy	high-quality	fakes	from	‘con-men’.	Criminal	actors	procure	
fake	rhino	horn	for	two	purposes.	The	fake	horn469	is	either	used	as	a	decoy	to	distract	law	
enforcement	officials	from	big	consignments	of	‘real’	horn	passing	through	a	port	of	entry	or	
entrepôt,	or	to	replace	real	horn	taken	from	government	stockpiles	and	police	safes	(where	
confiscated	horn	from	customs	interdictions	and	criminal	cases	is	stored).	In	the	latter	case,	
South	African	law	enforcement	or	conservation	officials	would	swap	the	horn	with	fakes	and	
sell	it	to	rhino	horn	traffickers.	Criminal	actors	(Interviews	in	South	Africa	and	Vietnam,	2013)	
confirmed	that	law	enforcement	officials	also	laundered	confiscated	horn	into	illegal	markets	
on	the	demand	side	of	the	market.	As	observed	earlier,	confiscated	horn	from	informal	
markets	or	TCM	apothecaries	seldom	enters	the	official	chain	of	custody	and	thus	officials	
would	not	need	to	provide	‘Ersatz’	horns.470	
	
The	use	of	decoys,	on	the	other	hand,	is	similar	to	the	‘dead	cows	for	piranhas’	ploy	in	
transnational	drug	trafficking	operations.	A	large	number	of	drug	mules	are	earmarked	to	
serve	as	‘dead	meat’	thrown	to	‘piranhas’	(law	enforcement	officers)	to	divert	their	attention	
																																																						
468	“Con-men”	is	short	for	“confidence	men”,	a	trickster	who	manages	to	win	someone’s	trust	to	deceive	them.	
	
469	Criminal	actors	might	also	employ	one	or	two	small	‘real’	horns	to	distract	law	enforcement.	
	
470	The	high	incidence	of	corrupt	and	illegal	activities	of	law	enforcement	officials	partially	explains	why	rhino	
horn	interdiction	rates	are	particularly	low	in	comparison	to	actual	rhinos	killed	for	their	horn.	The	section	on	
smuggling	(see	Chapter	7)	provides	further	details	on	the	sophistication	of	horn	smuggling	operations.	It	bears	
mentioning	that	an	unknown	number	of	illegally	harvested	rhino	horn	never	enters	illegal	supply	chains.	Such	
horn	is	stockpiled	for	its	rarity	value	and	kept	as	an	investment.	
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from	drug	smuggling	professionals.471	Rhino	smugglers	use	fake	rhino	horn	to	distract	law	
enforcement	officials	(Interview	with	smuggling	intermediaries;	Mozambique	and	South	
Africa,	2013).	It	would	appear	counterintuitive	for	criminal	networks	and	transporters	to	
sacrifice	real	rhino	horn	however	small	the	quantity	because	of	its	high	street	value	and	the	
sophisticated	transport	methods	employed	to	ship	horn	from	supply	to	consumer	markets.	
Vietnamese	authorities	reported	several	interdictions	of	comparatively	small	quantities	of	
rhino	horn	ranging	from	0,55	to	0,95	kg	in	2013	(Interview	with	government	official,	Hanoi,	
2013;	data	provided	by	CITES	management	authority,	Vietnam),	which	suggests	that	the	
smugglers	were	“rookie”	rhino	mules,	472	opportunistic	horn	buyers	or	“sacrificial	lambs”.	The	
smuggling	of	fake	rhino	horn	is	regarded	a	far	less	serious	offence	than	smuggling	real	rhino	
horn	in	Asia.	On-line	searches	and	interviews	identified	two	cases	of	fake	rhino	horn	reported	
to	law	enforcement:	a	suspected	smuggler	was	released	after	a	rhino	horn	in	his	possession	
turned	out	to	be	fake	in	Chitwan	National	Park	in	India	(Hindustan	Times	2013)	and	an	
Indonesian	court	sentenced	a	man	to	18	months	in	jail	after	he	sold	70	fake	Sumatran	rhino	
horns	(Deutsche	Presse	Agentur	2004).	In	South	Africa	and	neighbouring	Zimbabwe,	the	
smuggling	or	possession	of	fake	rhino	horn	also	obtains	penalties	(Muleya	2014;	Hosken/SAPA	
2012).	
	
	
8.8	Fake	antique	libation	cups	and	the	notion	of	‘pre-Convention’	rhino	horn	
	
Another	form	of	deception	involves	the	conversion	of	real	‘raw’	horn	into	fake	antique	
libation	cups	and	other	ornamental	carvings.	These	objets	d’art	are	sought	after	artefacts	in	
Asian	markets,	the	US	and	amongst	art	collectors	and	connoisseurs	of	Asian	antique	carvings	
(United	States	District	Court	2013:	2).473	A	2013	court	case	heard	by	the	United	States	District	
																																																						
471	Typically	the	drug	syndicate	would	tip-off	law	enforcement	about	an	expected	drug	delivery.	While	law	
enforcement	deals	with	the	tip	off	and	is	sufficiently	distracted,	other	drug	couriers	with	larger	quantities	will	
pass	through	ports	of	entry	undetected	(Hübschle	2008).	
	
472	‘Rookie’	is	a	colloquial	term	used	for	a	person	that	is	inexperienced,	a	first-timer	or	amateur.		
	
473	Libation	cups	have	become	highly	valued	and	coveted	artefacts	over	the	past	decade,	spurred	on,	amongst	
other	reasons,	by	the	high	prices	achieved	at	auctions	of	renowned	internationally	recognized	auction	houses	
(see	also	Chapter	3).	A	story	that	achieved	world	notoriety	involved	an	anonymous	collector	picking	up	a	17th-
century	Chinese	libation	cup	for	$	4	(Australian	$)	at	a	Sydney	charity	shop	and	selling	it	for	$	75	640	through	
Sotheby’s	Australia	a	few	months	later.	The	Chinese	‘Ding’	bowl	sold	for	US	$	2.225	at	Sotheby’s	New	York	
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Court	in	the	district	of	Jersey	(United	States	District	Court	2013)	involved	the	owner	of	an	
antique	business	in	China,	Zhifei	Li	who	had	procured	and	smuggled	rhino	horn	and	objets	
d’art	made	out	of	rhino	horn	and	ivory	from	the	US	through	Hong	Kong	to	China.	The	case	is	
noteworthy	as	it	illustrates	firstly,	the	global	nature	of	rhino	horn	trafficking,	and	secondly,	
the	sophistication	and	innovative	techniques	of	those	involved	in	the	procurement	and	
smuggling	of	processed	and	raw	rhino	horn	across	the	world.	Li	admitted	to	selling	and	
smuggling	30	raw	rhino	horns	to	factories	in	China	where	raw	rhino	horns	are	carved	into	fake	
antiques	known	as	zuo	jiu	(Mandarin	for	“to	make	old”).		The	extraordinary	valuation	of	rhino	
horn	was	evident	when	the	scraps	from	the	carving	process	were	sold	on	the	illegal	medicines	
market	(US	Department	of	Justice	2013).	As	ringleader	of	a	transnational	trafficking	operation,	
Li	also	received	and	sold	artefacts	made	out	of	rhino	horn	or	ivory	from	accomplices	in	Europe	
and	the	US,	and	procured	art	objects	on	an	internet	auction	website	and	through	phone	
bidding.	Li	would	provide	photos	of	the	artefacts	to	a	group	of	wealthy	Chinese	nationals.	If	
they	were	interested	in	purchasing	the	offering,	then	they	would	have	to	make	an	advance	
payment	(United	States	District	Court	2013:	8–9),	suggesting	that	they	shared	the	same	social	
network.	According	to	the	court	papers	(United	States	District	Court	2013:	16),	Li	also	made	
claims	that	“he	did	not	buy	“fresh	horns”	but	only	horns	that	were	50	years	old”,	and	that	no	
CITES	permits	were	required	for	pre-Convention	horns.	Both	claims	were	not	true	but	point	to	
another	form	of	deception	and	fraud,	namely	the	sale	of	pre-Convention	horn.	This	ploy	has	
been	used	to	smuggle	and	trade	rhino	horn	(and	ivory),	ostensibly	attained	from	hunting	
trophies	and	artefacts	pre-dating	CITES.		
	
	
8.9	Conclusion	
	
	
This	chapter	illustrates	how	actors	bridge	several	coordination	problems,	of	importance	to	the	
unhindered	flow	of	rhino	horn,	namely	the	coordination	problems	of	value,	cooperation	and	
security.	In	light	of	the	high	price	of	rhino	horn,	it	is	not	surprising	that	criminal	
entrepreneurs,	as	well	as	actors	from	the	legal	sector,	have	seized	a	thriving	business	
																																																																																																																																																																											
auction	in	March	2013.	The	seller	found	the	famous	bowl	at	a	neighbourhood	tag	sale	in	2007.	Unaware	of	the	
potential	value,	the	bowl	was	bought	for	$	3	(Cockington	2013).	
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opportunity	through	the	production	of	fake	rhino	horn.	The	high	incidence	of	fake	horn	in	
circulation	poses	a	problem	to	horn	suppliers	and	consumers	alike.	Both	actor	groups	have	
developed	mechanisms	to	ensure	quality	control	and	proof	of	provenance.	Intermediaries	and	
smugglers	do	not	only	ensure	quality	control	but	also	the	secure	transfer	of	precious	horn	
consignments.	The	level	of	cooperation	is	complex	as	well	as	sophisticated	as	it	links	suppliers	
to	consumers.	Those	consumers	who	cannot	rely	on	trust-worthy	referrals	from	within	their	
social	networks,	hire	the	services	of	horn	assessors.	What	is	curious	about	certain	types	of	
fake	rhino	horn	is	its	high	street	value,	further	accentuating	the	sacred	value	of	rhino	horn	in	
consumer	markets.	The	fact	that	consumers	are	willing	to	pay	good	money	for	fake	rhino	horn	
reinforces	that	many	consumers	appreciate	rhino	horn	as	a	status	symbol.		
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Conclusion:	How	can	the	rhino	be	better	protected?	
	
	
	 “I	don’t	believe	that	we	can	stop	the	hunting	as	long	as	there	are	rhinos,	the	hunting	
will	 continue.	And	as	 long	as	Chinese	are	still	here,	 it’s	 impossible	 to	stop	 (Interview	
with	poacher,	Massingir,	2013).”	
	
“The	only	thing	that	can	stop	hunting	 is	 if	 the	government	speaks	to	people	 like	me,	
the	experienced	and	the	big	bosses	because	we	know	the	business,	and	who	goes	to	
hunt	 where	 and	 when,	 we	 also	 know	 the	 buyers.	We	 can	 help	 the	 government	 to	
arrest	all	those	who	do	rhino	poaching	(Interview	with	kingpin	3,	Massingir,	2013).”	
	
“I	don’t	think	that	giving	rhinos	to	farmers	and	communities	will	be	the	solution.	The	
demand	is	too	big.	Say	you	cut	two	horns	from	your	rhino	and	the	Chinese	have	
ordered	five	horns,	so	you	will	be	forced	to	go	and	hunt	for	three	more	horns	
(Interview	with	rhino	kingpin	1,	2013).”	
	
	
Why	has	the	rhino	not	been	better	protected?	
	
The	leading	research	question	of	this	dissertation	asked	why	the	rhino	has	not	been	better	
protected	despite	the	myriad	measures	employed	to	disrupt	the	market.	A	theoretical	
framework	grounded	in	the	sociology	of	markets	was	used	to	explain	the	structure	and	
functioning	of	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn.	It	was	argued	that	a	sociological	study	of	
valuation,	competition,	cooperation	and	security	in	the	illegal	market	for	rhino	horn	could	
assist	in	understanding	the	reasons	why	it	is	so	difficult	to	disrupt	the	various	flows	of	rhino	
horn.	Central	to	the	analysis	was	the	idea	of	a	historical	lock-in	and	the	concept	of	“contested	
illegality”,	a	legitimization	mechanism	employed	by	actors	to	justify	illegal	economic	action	in	
contravention	of	the	law	on	the	books,	or	used	to	defend	the	exploitation	of	legal	or	
regulatory	loopholes.	The	following	sections	summarize	the	findings,	ending	with	an	
assessment	of	the	rhino’s	long-term	chances	of	survival.		
	
	
The	sacred	value	of	rhino	horn	
	
Cultural	beliefs	led	to	the	sacralization	of	rhino	horn	in	Asian	communities;	however,	the	
animal	itself	is	not	imbued	with	sacred	value.	The	valuation	of	rhino	horn	in	consumer	
markets	tends	to	trump	conservation	and	anti–poaching	initiatives	in	places	geographically	far	
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removed	from	the	consumer.	The	sanctity	of	ancient	beliefs	and	socially	accepted	norms	not	
only	supersedes	rhino	conservation	initiatives	but	also	international	trade	bans	and	domestic	
rules.	The	history	of	the	cultural	use	of	rhino	horn	highlights	the	difficulties	associated	with	
attempts	to	reverse	social	norms	that	are	supported	by	cultural	beliefs	but	out	of	sync	with	
modern	regulations.	While	few	consumers	uphold	the	quasi-mythical	valuation	of	rhino	horn	
as	miracle	cure	for	a	bouquet	of	ailments,	its	transcendental	and	sacred	value	remains,	and	
explains,	in	addition	to	the	increasing	rarity	of	the	species	and	its	use	as	a	status	symbol,	the	
high	price	of	rhino	horn.	The	high	price	on	the	consumer	market	has	led	to	comparatively	high	
disbursements	for	rhino	horn	on	the	supply	side,	facilitating	the	entry	of	new	horn	producers	
(rhino	poachers).	The	dissertation	argues	furthermore	that	trophy	hunters	were	crucial	to	the	
economic	valuation	of	rhinos	on	the	supply	side.	In	this	instance,	rhino	horn	is	appreciated	for	
its	symbolic	value.	Both	the	economic	and	cultural	valuation	have	led	to	the	high	demand	for	
rhino	horn,	thus	resolving	the	coordination	problem	of	value.	
	
	
Historical	lock-in	
	
The	dissertation	showed	that	rhino	conservation	and	protection	have	been	closely	linked	to	
colonial	land	appropriation,	subjugation,	exploitation	and	loss	of	hunting	rights	of	local	and	
indigenous	communities.	The	privatization	of	farmland	and	wildlife	in	South	Africa	heightened	
the	alienation	and	marginalization	of	local	communities	further,	creating	a	huge	rift	between	
local	people	on	the	one	hand,	and	conservation	areas	and	wild	animals	on	the	other.	
Exacerbated	by	the	high	number	of	deaths	of	poaching	suspects	in	parks,	the	prevalent	
sentiment	among	many	locals	is	one	of	the	wild	animals	getting	valued	more	than	black	lives.	
This	sentiment	is	also	employed	as	a	legitimization	tool.	Rhino	horn	is	not	only	hunted	for	its	
financial	but	also	for	its	symbolic	value.	The	symbolic	value	of	rhino	horn	is	linked	to	the	
historical	lock-in	and	systematic	disenfranchisement	of	the	rural	communities	living	around	
protected	areas.	Underpinning	these	conservation	regimes	are	archaic	and	elitist	preservation	
and	conservation	paradigms	that	discount	the	potential	for	harmonious	relationships	
between	local	communities	and	wildlife.	In	the	modern	context,	parks	and	game	reserves	
continue	to	present	manifestations	of	colonial	dispossession	and	apartheid	segregation.	
Conservation	areas	are	seen	as	symbols	of	elite	interests	and	wealth,	inaccessible	to	the	poor	
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majority.	These	problematic	conservation	approaches	and	paradigms	have	led	to	a	historical	
lock-in,	where	romantic	and	utopian	notions	of	‘Africa’s	Wild	Eden’	continue	to	undermine	
the	support	and	buy-in	from	local	communities	in	wildlife	conservation.		
	
	
Contested	illegality	
	
The	notion	of	‘contested	illegality’	was	introduced	as	a	legitimation	strategy	of	important	
actors	who	justify	their	participation	in	illegal	or	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn	based	on	the	
perceived	illegitimacy	of	the	rhino	horn	prohibition.	The	process	of	illegalization	of	the	trade	
in	rhino	horn	commenced	in	the	late	1970s	when	the	multilateral	environmental	treaty	CITES	
entered	into	force.	Prior	to	that,	economic	exchanges	involving	rhino	horn	were	either	legal	or	
undetermined.	The	diffusion	of	the	trade	ban	at	the	domestic	level	in	range,	transit	and	
consumer	countries	has	succeeded	to	varying	degrees.	The	dissertation	highlighted	important	
actors	such	as	public	officials,	law	enforcement	officials,	wildlife	professionals,	local	
communities	and	criminal	actors	who	do	not	accept	the	law	on	the	books	for	a	variety	of	
reasons	including	the	perceived	unfairness	of	the	ban,	divergent	social	or	cultural	norms	that	
clash	with	the	ban,	or	for	politico-historical	reasons.	Contested	illegality	is	linked	closely	to	the	
coordination	problem	of	valuation.	For	example,	consumers	who	value	rhino	horn	as	a	sacred	
good	are	unperturbed	about	breaking	the	law	when	purchasing	rhino	horn.	In	addition,	both	
suppliers	and	consumers	display	a	sense	of	entitlement.	These	actors	feel	that	they	have	a	
right	to	use	natural	resources,	which	the	law	prohibits.	There	is	thus	a	cognitive	dissonance	
between	the	law	on	the	books,	cultural	practices	and	social	norms.	While	rural	communities	
continue	to	feel	that	the	state	and	other	non-state	actors	value	rhinos	more	than	the	lives	of	
black	people,	poaching	is	likely	to	obtain	limited	negative	sanctions	and	continue	unabated.	
The	notion	of	contested	illegality	also	facilitated	this	research	project	greatly.	Actors	who	do	
not	believe	in	the	legitimacy	of	the	trade	ban	had	no	qualms	to	share	their	insights	on	illegal	
economic	action.	
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The	interface	between	legality	and	illegality	
	
One	of	the	key	findings	was	the	involvement	of	actors	from	the	legal	sector	such	as	wildlife	
professionals	and	public	officials	in	the	illegal	and	gray	flows	of	rhino	horn.	Bolstered	by	
sentiments	of	contested	illegality,	such	actors	have	no	qualms	to	exploit	or	bypass	regulatory	
loopholes.	These	actors	belong	to	influential	and	transnational	social	networks	with	links	to	
political	and	economic	elites	in	supply,	transit	and	consumer	countries.	While	conventional	
narratives	point	to	the	involvement	of	organized	crime	in	transnational	rhino	horn	flows,	this	
label	is	only	correct	if	wildlife	professionals	and	state	officials	are	subsumed	under	it,	and	the	
dominant	role	of	local	actors	is	acknowledged	(as	opposed	to	the	othering	of	foreign	criminals	
–	organized	crime	as	an	‘alien	conspiracy	theory).	The	dissertation	showed	that	state	actors	
facilitated	the	economic	valuation	of	rhino	horn	on	the	supply	side	by	privatizing	rhinos.	The	
international	regulatory	protection	regime	is	riddled	with	ambiguities	such	as	allowing	the	
trophy	hunting	of	rhinos,	which	usually	leads	to	a	hunting	trophy	(a	status	symbol)	while	
prohibiting	other	not	dissimilar	uses	of	rhino	horn	(such	as	objets	d’art	or	status	symbols).	The	
juxtaposition	of	white	trophy	hunter474	versus	black	poacher	is	eye	opening.	While	wealthy	
trophy	hunters	are	allowed	to	kill	rhinos	for	a	fee	(ostensibly	hunting	profits	are	employed	to	
serve	conservation	objectives),	locals	with	no	economic	resources	are	stigmatized	as	poachers	
when	trespassing	and	hunting	wild	animals	on	land	that	was	formerly	theirs.	The	interface	
between	legality	and	illegality	thus	relates	to	agents	of	the	state	facilitating	illegal	flows,	the	
existence	of	legal	and	illegal	means	of	horn	‘production’	and	legitimate	and	illegitimate	uses	
of	rhino	horn,	as	well	as	an	arms	race	between	state	actors	and	their	close	anti-poaching	
associates	on	the	one	side,	and	poachers	and	local	communities	living	in	close	vicinity	or	in	
parks,	on	the	other.	This	interface	between	legality	and	illegality	has	led	to	ambiguity	as	to	
what	is	legal	or	illegal.	The	gray	area	has	led	to	ample	opportunities	to	bypass	formal	rules,	
aiding	and	abetting	illegal	economic	action.	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
474	There	are	also	poaching	groups	consisting	of	white	poachers.	For	example,	incidents	of	so-called	“chemical	
poaching”	involved	wildlife	veterinarians,	game	capturers,	helicopter	pilots	and	professional	hunters	who	use	
veterinary	drugs	to	anaesthetize	rhinos.	The	animal	is	dehorned	once	it	is	sedated,	and	the	horn	is	sold	to	
buyers.	
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The	resilience	of	flows	
	
The	metaphor	of	flows	was	employed	to	show	the	adaptability	and	resilience	of	flows.	
However,	the	historical	lock-in	created	through	the	implementation	of	archaic	conservation	
paradigms,	the	regulatory	backdrop	and	the	resultant	expression	of	contested	illegality	have	
created	favourable	conditions	for	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	to	grow	and	flourish.	Rhino	
poaching	did	not	emerge	from	a	vacuum,	factors	such	as	the	historical	lock-in,	the	sacred	
value	of	rhino	horn	and	contested	illegality	facilitate	the	resilience	of	rhino	horn	flows	and	
undermine	protective	measures.	Various	chapters	showed	how	actors	managed	to	resolve	the	
coordination	problems	of	value,	cooperation,	competition	and	security.	By	resolving	these	
issues,	actors	created	a	bridge	from	African	savannahs	to	Asian	markets.		While	analyses	of	
legal	or	formal	markets	focus	on	the	coordination	problem	of	value,	cooperation	and	
competition,	it	is	argued	here	that	actors	in	illegal	markets	have	to	deal	with	an	additional	
coordination	problem,	that	of	security.	Although	actors	in	legal	transnational	markets	may	
likewise	institute	security	precautions,	the	need	to	exercise	caution	and	implement	a	security	
plan	is	more	pressing	in	illegal	markets.	Not	only	is	the	security	of	illegal	market	participants	
at	stake	but	also	the	continuity	of	the	supply	chain.	Especially	in	cases	where	high-value	
contraband	such	as	rhino	horn	is	transported,	actors	need	to	ensure	that	the	good	is	not	
intercepted	en	route	to	the	market.	Usually,	the	safest	and	most	expedient	method	involves	
facilitation	and/or	transport	of	rhino	horn	by	untouchable	agents	of	the	state,	including	
diplomats	and	law	enforcement	officials.	Beckert’s	theory	of	social	order	in	legal	markets	
stresses	that	actors	want	to	create	“stable	worlds”	by	resolving	the	coordination	problems	of	
value,	cooperation	and	competition	(Beckert	2009).	It	is	argued	here	that	actors	in	illegal	
markets	thrive	on	chaos	and	unpredictability.	While	they	reduce	uncertainty	by	addressing	
security	concerns,	collaborators,	flows	and	routes	change	frequently.	It	stands	to	argue	that	
illegal	markets	thrive	in	a	state	of	disorganized	crime	or	organized	chaos.	Many	of	the	illegal	
activities	described	in	this	dissertation	flourish	because	illegal	market	actors	are	adaptable	
and	resilient,	and	not	hamstrung	by	bureaucratic	rules	of	engagement	that	slow	down	law	
enforcement	responses.	
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The	structure	of	the	market	
	
The	dissertation	has	focused	on	legal,	gray	and	illegal	flows	of	rhino	horn	while	also	
presenting	an	overview	of	the	production	and	function	of	fake	and	Ersatz	rhino	horn	in	the	
overall	market	for	rhino	horn.	These	flows	were	presented	as	distinct	entities	for	the	purposes	
of	analytical	clarity.	However,	these	four	flows	are	interconnected	and	form	a	composite	
whole.	In	essence,	the	market	in	rhino	horn	is	constituted	of	hybrid	complex	flows	that	
involve	recurring	actors	who	hold	social	capital.	The	dissertation	stressed	the	role	of	
intermediaries	who	play	the	role	of	connecting	producers	to	consumers.		Intermediaries	have	
access	to	transnational	social	and	criminal	networks	and	knowledge	of	the	‘product’	and	
regulatory	loopholes.	While	Asian	nationals	were	often	involved	in	transnational	transport	
facilitation,	local	intermediaries	such	as	the	poaching	kingpins	and	wildlife	professionals	
provide	the	most	crucial	bridge	between	Africa	and	Asia.	While	horn	producers	are	mostly	
closed	homogeneous	groups,	these	local	intermediaries	are	worldly,	connected	and	prone	to	
taking	calculated	risks	that	open	new	opportunities	and	business	ventures.	As	mentioned	in	
the	earlier	section	on	the	interface	between	legality	and	illegality,	the	dissertation	cautiously	
applies	the	idea	of	the	involvement	of	organized	crime	due	to	its	traditional	association	with	
foreign	mafia-type	groups.	It	stands	to	argue	that	both	legal	and	criminal	actors	constitute	
organized	rhino	crime.	It	is	acknowledged	that	several	pipelines	out	of	Africa	involve	
professional	smugglers	who	have	expert	knowledge	of	smuggling	both	legal	goods	and	
contraband	along	transnational	flows.	Pivotal	to	understanding	the	architecture	of	rhino	horn	
flows	is	a	nuanced	awareness	of	how	the	economic	valuation	of	rhinos	by	way	of	privatizing	
ownership	rights	(the	conversion	of	a	public	good	to	private	ownership),	the	colonial	history	
of	land	appropriation	and	conversion	of	indigenously-owned	land	into	conservation	areas	has	
opened	the	proverbial	can	of	worms	in	the	South	African	case.		
	
	
Theoretical	contribution	
	
The	dissertation	contributes	to	Beckert’s	theory	of	coordination	problems	by	introducing	the	
coordination	problem	of	security,	which	is	of	relevance	to	actors	in	transnational	and	illegal	
markets.	While	various	scholars	have	written	about	the	notion	of	contested	illegality,	it	is	
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introduced	as	a	mechanism	employed	to	legitimize	illegal	and	gray	economic	action.	While	it	
is	difficult	to	generalize	from	one	case	study,	the	illegal	market	in	rhino	horn	appears	to	
present	an	ideal	type.	Structural	conditions	tied	to	the	historical	lock-in,	contested	illegality,	
the	participation	of	actors	from	the	state	and	legal	sector,	and	the	interface	between	legality	
and	illegality	create	the	perfect	environment	for	the	illegal	market	to	flourish.	
	
	
	
Parting	words	
	
In	conclusion,	the	title	of	this	dissertation	is	borrowed	from	a	popular	TV	series	that	
dramatizes	conflict	between	ruling	royal	elites	in	a	medieval	phantasy	epic.	Since	embarking	
on	the	journey	of	researching	rhinos,	I	have	been	amazed	by	the	emotions,	conflict	and	moral	
panic	this	majestic	creature	inspires	amongst	a	rather	diverse	group	of	people.	Once	I	was	in	
the	thick	of	the	research,	it	felt	like	I	was	observing	a	drama	unfolding	in	front	of	my	eyes:	
Tugged	away	in	their	fortresses	kings,	queens,	scribes,	advisors	and	companions	were	pitted	
against	conquerors,	reformers	and	the	people	–	all	surviving	in	a	rather	uncertain	
environment.	The	dissertation	touched	briefly	on	the	role	of	the	international	community,	
conservation	NGOs	and	private	individuals	who	are	fundraising	to	save	the	rhino.	These	funds	
seldom	reach	the	places	where	they	could	achieve	tangible	results	that	affect	changes	on	the	
ground.	Instead	of	dedicating	monies	to	the	militarization	of	anti-poaching	measures	or	
paying	inflated	salaries	to	NGO	staff,	the	state,	the	conservation	community	and	international	
donors	should	support	initiatives	that	affect	positive	changes	for	local	communities	living	
close	to	parks.	Consultation	should	be	done	in	a	bottom-up	fashion	so	that	the	voices	of	
marginalized	people	are	finally	heard.	Local	communities	need	to	be	given	agency	to	co-
determine	their	livelihoods,	the	outlook	for	conservation	areas	and	the	wild	animals	
contained	within	them.	Only	once	gains	from	wildlife	and	parks	enhance	the	well-being	of	
local	communities,	live	animals	and	parks	will	be	attributed	with	value	(be	it	intrinsic	or	
instrumental),	and	rhinos	will	have	a	fighting	chance.	Unfortunately,	this	dissertation	topic	
does	not	examine	a	game	or	a	drama	series;	it	deals	with	the	real-life	issue	of	the	possible	
extinction	of	a	wild	animal.	Unless	we	change	course,	the	rhino	and	other	creatures	will	be	
relegated	to	natural	history	books.	
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Appendix	A:	Research	sites	and	maps	
	
	
The	following	places	were	visited	during	the	course	of	this	research	project:	
	
	
• KwaZulu–Natal	(KZN):	The	south-eastern	province	of	KwaZulu–Natal	is	home	to	the	
port	city	of	Durban,	several	national	parks	including	Hluhluwe–iMfolozi,	Mkuze,	
iSimangaliso	Wetlands,	Thembe	Elephant	Park	and	the	private	game	reserve	Phinda,	
all	of	which	were	visited.	
• Limpopo	Province:	The	northern	province	of	South	Africa	shares	borders	with	
Zimbabwe,	Botswana	and	Mozambique.	Many	private	game	reserves	and	farms	are	
located	in	this	province,	which	is	also	home	to	a	portion	of	the	Kruger	National	Park	
and	the	UNESCO–recognized	Waterberg	Biosphere	Reserve.	
	
Map	2:	Map	of	South	Africa	
	
Source:	http://www.safaribookings.com/parks/south-africa	(accessed	2	July	2014)	
	
• Mpumalanga	Province:	The	eastern	province	of	South	Africa	borders	Swaziland	and	
Mozambique	and	holds	the	southern	sections	of	the	Kruger	National	Park.	The	capital	
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city	Mombela,	formerly	known	as	Nelspruit,	and	the	town	of	White	River	were	
important	pit–stops.	
• Gauteng:	Johannesburg,	South	Africa’s	business	centre	and	the	administrative	capital	
of	South	Africa,	Pretoria,	are	both	located	in	the	Gauteng	Province.	National	
departments	(ministerial	offices),	law	enforcement	agencies,	the	national	
prosecutorial	authority	(NPA),	NGOs	and	professional	associations	are	also	housed	in	
this	province.	
	
	
Map	3:	Map	of	the	Kruger	National	Park,	Limpopo	National	Park	and	Massingir	
	
	
Source:	Map	provided	by	Brian	Sandberg475	
	
• Kruger	National	Park	(KNP):	Two	trips	were	made	to	South	Africa’s	flagship	safari	park,	
the	Kruger	National	Park	where	most	of	the	world’s	remaining	rhinos	live	and	are	
poached.	At	the	invitation	of	the	University	of	Pretoria,	a	joint	presentation	(with	a	
																																																						
475	A	detailed	map	is	also	accessible	at:	https://goo.gl/maps/um6ky	(my	creation)	
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former	colleague)	on	researching	sensitive	subjects	was	given	at	the	One	Health	
Conference	during	the	first	month	of	fieldwork.	The	conference	and	subsequent	
networking	opened	many	doors	to	engage	with	the	conservation	community,	KNP	and	
Mozambique.	Upon	receipt	of	the	research	permission,	a	further	3	weeks	of	intense	
fieldwork	were	undertaken	in	the	Park.	
• Mozambique:	Many	rhino	poachers	either	originate	or	commence	their	cross-border	
hunting	expeditions	from	small	villages	situated	in	close	proximity	to	the	Mozambican	
border	with	the	Kruger	National	Park.	The	biggest	village	of	Massingir	was	visited	
twice,	and	several	smaller	villages	were	also	frequented.	I	also	spent	time	in	the	
Limpopo	National	Park,	Chokwe,	Belene	and	the	capital	city	of	Maputo.	
• Swaziland:	Upon	completing	fieldwork	in	the	Kruger	National	Park,	a	road	trip	was	
taken	through	Swaziland	en	route	back	to	Cape	Town.	The	country’s	Game	Act	is	both	
lauded	as	an	exemplary	piece	of	legislation	because	poaching	carries	a	minimum	jail	
sentence	of	five	years	(Ramsay	2014)	and	contested	as	draconian	
(Werksman/Cameron/Roderick	2014:	193).			
• Namibia:	Namibia	is	one	of	the	four	major	rhino	range	states	in	Africa	
(Duffy/Emslie/Knight	2013b).	The	country’s	communal	wildlife	conservancies	have	
become	a	model	for	community-based	conservation	and	sustainable	livelihoods.	
Historically,	elephants	and	rhinos	were	hunted	and	traded	by	the	South	African	
Defence	Force	and	its	affiliates	during	the	bush	wars	in	northern	Namibia	and	
southern	Angola	(Reeve/Ellis	1995).	At	the	time	of	fieldwork,	no	poaching	incidents	
had	occurred	in	recent	history	and	the	question	arose,	why	Namibia	was	spared.	Since	
then,	poaching	numbers	have	soared	and	theories	that	it	was	a	matter	of	time	for	
rhino	poaching	to	sweep	across	South	Africa’s	northern	borders	have	indeed	
materialized	(Duffy/Emslie/Knight	2013b:	6).	
• Hong	Kong:	Several	consignments	of	smuggled	rhino	horn	from	South	Africa	(together	
with	other	wildlife	products)	were	interdicted	in	Hong	Kong.	The	city	where	‘east	
meets	west’	offers	many	fascinating	avenues	for	the	investigation	of	cultural	meanings	
of	wildlife	consumption,	the	use	of	animal	products	in	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	
(TCM)	and	enforcement	efforts.	The	Regional	Office	of	TRAFFIC	and	WWF-Hong	Kong	
hosted	me.	This	offered	a	foot	in	the	door,	as	did	the	invitation	to	provide	a	seminar	
on	my	project	at	the	Policing	Studies	Forum	of	the	University	of	Hong	Kong.		
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Map	4:	Map	of	Southeast	Asia	
	
Source:	http://webspace.webring.com/people/mj/james_shum/sin-hkg/	(accessed	on	4	July	2014)	
	
	
• Vietnam:		According	to	the	literature	(Gwin	2012;	Milliken/Shaw	2012;	Rademeyer	
2012;	Nellemann	et	al.	2014;	Gosling/Reitano/Shaw	2014;	Ipsos	Marketing	2013)	rhino	
horn	is	destined	for	both	Vietnamese	and	Chinese	markets.	Due	to	time	and	language	
constraints	and	the	innate	limitations	of	Ph.D.	research,	I	chose	to	undertake	research	
of	the	market	structures	and	consumer	preferences	in	Vietnam.	While	I	was	not	able	
to	do	fieldwork	in	China,	I	was	able	to	interview	Chinese	respondents	and	experts	on	
wildlife	trade	in	China	in	South	Africa,	Hong	Kong	and	on–line.	I	had	identified	key	
informants	ahead	of	the	field	trip	to	Vietnam	and	employed	the	services	of	two	
interpreters	in	the	major	urban	centres	of	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	and	Hanoi.	Several	trips	to	
rural	areas,	including	the	Mekong	Delta,	were	undertaken.		
• Correctional	centres	(prisons)	in	South	Africa:	The	final	month	of	fieldwork	entailed	a	
road	trip	to	correctional	centres	strewn	across	five	provinces	of	South	Africa.	30	
inmates	convicted	for	rhino-related	offences	were	interviewed	in	15	maximum-	and	
medium-security	correctional	centres.476		 	
																																																						
476	The	Department	of	Correctional	Services	(DCS)	differentiates	between	minimum–,	medium–	and	maximum–
security	facilities.	Offenders	(as	they	are	referred	to	in	DCS	parlance)	are	sent	to	these	correctional	centres	
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Appendix	B:	Indemnity	form	for	interviews	with	offenders	
	
The	research	guide	of	the	Department	of	Correctional	Services	gave	me	the	form	below	with	
the	request	to	have	all	prison	research	informants	sign	it	prior	to	conducting	the	interview.	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																																											
depending	on	the	seriousness	of	their	crime,	the	length	of	their	prison	sentence	and	conduct	during	their	prison	
term.	
	
 
 
 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW 
 
Indemnity form 
 
 
I  ………………………….………………………………………………………..…, 
Registration number ……………….    hereby declare that I am in custody at 
…………..…………………………………. Center. 
\ 
I hereby agree/do not agree to be interviewed by ………………………….. 
 
  I do so entirely at my own will and I do not hold the Department of    
  Correctional Services or any of its members, responsible for anything that 
might transpire from the interview. 
 
  I do not want any or expect any reward of any nature for partaking in the   
  interview. 
 
I certify that  I make this statement out of my own free will and understands 
the contents thereof. 
 
 
 
 
  SIGNED:  ……………………………………  WITNESS:  ………………………………… 
 
   
  DATE:  ……………………     WITNESS:  ………………………………… 
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